Hunter to trouble

100 years ago, on the Russian front of the First World War, the Lutsk-Chernivtsi battle broke out. The battle was called the Brusilovsky breakthrough

Adjutant General Alexei Brusilov (sitting) with his son Alexei (second on the right) and officers of the headquarters of the South-Western Front

The history of the offensive, which received the name of the general, began on April 14, 1916. In Mogilev, chaired by Nicholas II, a team meeting was held. The prospects of the campaign were discussed. There were not enough grounds for optimism, the spirit of the bloody March battle in Belarus hung over the generals, during which the troops suffered heavy losses, unsuccessfully trying to break through German positions in the area of ​​Lake Naroch. “Technical poverty made a problematic offensive operations,” generally reasoned General Alexei Evert, who commanded the armies of the Western Front. Everything was against the Russians: German guns, machine guns and wire, weather, roads and fools.

Against the background of such pessimistic sentiments, the statement of one of the participants about the desire to advance caused a considerable surprise. General Alexei Kuropatkin, an unlucky warrior of the Russian-Japanese war and the current Northern Front-puffed up old and grunted from such an indefatigable initiative. After the meeting, he went to the tightened cavalryman and began to rebuke him: “The hunt was to you, Alexey Alekseevich, to beg! What kind of hunt to be subjected to trouble? In your place, I would have rejected with all my strength from any offensive operations that, in the present position, can only break your neck, and they will not bring you personal benefits. ” However, the interlocutor did not heed the wise advice. He was the new commander in chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front Alexei Brusilov. He won the Mogilev meeting at Evert and Kuropatkin.

Now it remained to defeat the Austrians.

"Against Russian, he is weak"

The theater of military operations was unfolding in Volyn and Bukovina. The troops of the South-Western Front, whose line passed west of the Sarna region and further south, to Kremenets-Ternopol-Buchach to the Dniester, was not opposed by the Germans, but the Austro-Hungarian, the enemy was weaker, but no less diligently buried in the ground. Three defensive stripes were located three to five kilometers from each other, each strip turned on three or four trench lines. Between them were installed mines, traps with high -explosives, and barbed wire fences. In some areas, up to twenty -five rows of “thorns” were exhibited, and electric current was missed for some of them. At the same time, Brusilov did not even have a decisive advantage and could use only 39 infantry and 13 cavalry divisions - against 38 infantry and 11 cavalry at the enemy.

Commander of the 8th Army General Alexei Kaledin, photo of November 1915

However, the front was preparing for the offensive. The “shell hunger” of 1915 remained in the past, the howitzer and mortar artillery arrived. Ensigners and second seconds of accelerated issues first in amateurly commanded the lower ranks of early calls, but, as one of the infantry officers wrote, "if God was merged, a month later they were excellent and exemplary commanders of companies and half-switch." The headquarters of the four armies worked out the tasks. Preparation of personnel, bayonet fighting exercises, actions in the trench and trench were brought to automatism. In the 7th Army, led by professors of the Imperial Nikolaev Military Academy-commander General Dmitry Shcherbachev and chief of staff, Lieutenant General Nikolai Golovin,-engineering work was carried out in cyclopic dimensions: in preparation for the operation, 12 thousand cubic meters of land were opened.

Solid feldfebelles brought to young replenishment the simple wisdom: “Austrian put us in an underground housing, leaned over his wire, like a spider web, and he does not understand that the sponge of centuries against Russianness is weak. And the guns will not help, and the wire will be called. ”

Brusilov’s idea

Brusilov was energetic, imprinted, revered behind the protege of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich (the youngest), was known as a sensible cavalry and successful general. “Do not be born wise as Kuropatkin, but be born happy as Brusilov,” said contemporaries. There were rumors that, thanks to the ties and origin, the hereditary nobleman Brusilov bypassed the appointment of General Platon Lychitsky, a talented commander, who was born in the family of a poor rural priest.

“As a commander, he, without a thorough base of military knowledge, was not legible in choosing an operational idea and did not spare the soldiers on the campaign, and in the battle - their blood. But he was a favorite of military happiness, and therefore was a winner "

In the army, Brusilov was taken with restraint and for the boss over the officer cavalry school was nicknamed the Bereter - a specialist in the training of horse riding. “As a person is inanimate, offensive, imaginary to intrigues, not objective,” Colonel Evgeny Messner wrote about Brusilov. - As an officer was a careerist, a poser, a bad comrade (merits - to himself, misses - others), had a firm will to defend his opinion and for sacrifice in battle by soldiers. As a commander, he, without a thorough base of military knowledge, was not legible in choosing an operational idea and did not regret the sweat of soldiers on the campaign, and in battle - their blood. But he was a favorite of military happiness, and therefore was a winner. Happiness was favorable to him both in his career and in the fight. ”

The idea looked original, but did not escape the raid of operational adventurism. So that the Austrians do not guess about the place of the main blow and could not maneuver reserves, Brusilov decided to conduct artillery training at once on the entire front and break through not in one, but in five places. As a result, the enemy will be confused, begin to rush and frantically patch “holes”, and will not hold a wide attacking wave. These calculations are well known. It is less known that in the end, Brusilov splashed all his small force along the front line 400 km. Having divided the troops for action in five directions, Brusilov could not reinforce them with strong reserves, and even if the development of success became problematic. Brusilov compensated the lack of reserves by the combat qualities of soldiers and officers, about which General Golovin wrote in exile: "In such an army as the old Russian army, the command staff was spoiled by the valor of the troops ... This valor of the troops had a mental laziness." Questions arose with the goals of the operation.

Brusilova Manil Kovel - a large and fortified unit of communications. The Commander-in-Chief was hoping to master them as a result of a blow to the converging directions of the two groups of the right-flank 8th army. Directions from Rivne to Lutsk - Kovel and from the Sarnah region to Charrtysk - Kovel turned to Brusilov into the main and only ones. He did not see the prospects for his left-flank 9th and 7th armies, which, as a result of a breakthrough, could enter the deep Austrian rear, supporting the neighboring 11th and even the 8th Army. In fact, Brusilov invited each commander to play his own battle.

The last victory

On May 15, the Austria-Hungra attacked the Italians in the Trenty Alps, so the bet ordered Brusilov to start without waiting for the arrival of additional forces. According to the historian Anton Kersnovsky, "the Russian ambulance rushed to save the next ally." Brusilov passed to active actions earlier than Evert with Kuropatkin, who delayed the terms for the transition of his armies on the offensive.

General Anton Denikin

At dawn on June 4, from the nineteen assault bridgeheads, Russian batteries opened a hurricane fire on the enemy. “The stakes and wire scattered and scattered, opening the way to the enemy housing, which now turned out to be a fortress, but absurdity,” recalled Colonel Ivan Eichenbaum. Thus began the Lutsk-Chernivtsi battle, which ended only in October. According to Messner's estimates, 7 million people fought on both sides in it, of which 4 million were killed, they were injured, and were captured.

The championship in the battle belonged to the 8th Army of General Alexei Kaledin. By the evening of June 7, the 4th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Anton Denikin broke through all three enemy defensive strips. Then the Denikins and parts of the 15th Infantry Division of Major General Peter Lomnovsky entered Lutsk. A group of troops under the command of German General Alexander von Linzingen was divided on the Styr River, having lost 82 thousand people - more than half of the personnel. The Kaledin troops captured 44.5 thousand people, dozens and hundreds of guns, machine guns and bombers, having lost more than 33 thousand people upon occurrence, about a fifth of their forces. Unfortunately, Brusilov “held” Kaledin, considering his direction to be secondary, but, in turn, the Caledin did not allow the cavalrymen of the major General Baron Karl Mannerheim to pursue a crumpled enemy and drive him to Vladimir-Volynsky.

In barren attempts to master Koley, Russian troops suffered bloody and irreparable losses - and a major breakthrough of Brusilov’s troops did not turn into strategic success

On the left wing of the front, success accompanied the “professor” of the 7th Army, who attacked the enemy, which had a double superiority in artillery. From June 6 to 17, the troops of Shcherbachev and Golovin broke through the Austro-German defense from the Yazlovts and successfully reflected the attempt of the counterattack. In the Chernivtsi direction in Bukovina, the 9th Army of Lychitsky from June 4 to 13 inflicted a crushing defeat of the 7th Austro-Hungarian army, General Baron Karl Pflander-Baltin. On June 18, drafts fell, and the 9th Army entered the line of the River Prut. The enemy’s defenses and the 11th Army of the Cavalry General Vladimir Sakharov, which advancing from the Ternopol region, broke through the defense of the enemy. As a result, by June 25, the troops of the South-Western Front captivated almost 200 thousand soldiers and officers, captured more than two hundred guns, more than six hundred machine guns, about two hundred bombomets. According to Anton Kersnovsky, the general losses of the enemy exceeded 400 thousand people, the losses of the Russian troops reached almost 290 thousand Germans and the Austrians began to hastily send reserves and reinforcements to the east, but their attempt to attack Volyn against the 8th Army of Caledin failed.

Unfortunately, Brusilov missed the opportunity to achieve strategic success. The bet in the person of the chief of staff of General Mikhail Alekseev suggested that he change the direction and strike the front by the front of Rava-Russian, to the rear of the entire Lviv district. In case of success and development of operations, the collapse of the entire Austrian front could occur. However, Brusilov did not see the prospects: he was attracted by Kovel. This fortified communications node was in a wooded-bolotyous area, and attempts to take the Kovelsky district through the assault inevitably led to the battle. Subsequently, in fruitless attempts to master the Russian troops, especially the guard, suffered bloody and irreparable losses - and a major breakthrough of Brusilov’s troops did not turn into strategic success.

In the euphoria from the last June victories, contemporaries did not see that unjustified bloody losses - the result of “mental laziness” - weary the troops and society, weaken the army efficiently and open the road to the upcoming revolutionary disaster, which will come to Russia in the image of the rear soldier’s rebellion.

Photo: Wikipedia.org, Akgimages/East News, Russiahistory.ru