Gathered for the first time in thirteen centuries, the Pan-Orthodox Council ends on Sunday, June 26, at the Orthodox Theological Academy on the island of Crete. The meetings lasted only 6 days with the participation of 10 out of 14 local Orthodox churches. Undoubtedly, the demarche of the Moscow Patriarchate and its three satellites - the Churches of Antioch, Georgia and Bulgaria (they refused to participate in the council at the last moment) - slightly spoiled the impression: the planned demonstration of the unity of world Orthodoxy did not work out. But a new global split in Orthodoxy has not yet occurred either: an unsteady balance has been established between war and peace.
The actions of Patriarch Kirill (Gundyaev) on the eve of the council were sustained in a “hybrid” style: blackmail, the threat of a full-scale split, ignorance by opponents, and tense expectation. How long it will last and who will be the first in world Orthodoxy to lose their nerves is the main intrigue of the new post-conciliar reality. And the main source of tension is Ukraine.
On the eve of the official opening of the cathedral, on June 16, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine appealed to the chairman of the cathedral, Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, with a request to consider the issue of complete independence (autocephaly) of the Ukrainian Church. This plot has a long history (to which the deputies appeal). From the time of the Baptism of Rus' and until the very end of the 17th century, the Kievan Metropolis was part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
As a result of the Moscow-Polish war and the aggravation of relations between Russia and Turkey, the Patriarch of Constantinople entrusted the management of the Kiev Metropolis to the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686, but, as it turned out in 1924, after the fall of the Russian Empire, this decision was temporary and conditional. In 1924, Constantinople granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Poland, substantiating this decision by the fact that the Kiev Metropolis was and remains an integral part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the dioceses on the territory of interwar Poland were historically part of the Kiev Metropolis.
In Kyiv itself, on January 1, 1919, the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church was proclaimed, which finally took shape at the All-Ukrainian Council of 1921. True, this cathedral was unable to form a legal hierarchy, but this problem was solved during the Second World War, when the above-mentioned Orthodox Church in Poland came to the territory of Ukraine along with the Wehrmacht. This church was Ukrainian in terms of the ethnic composition of the clergy and parishioners, and at the first opportunity extended its jurisdiction to the entire territory of Ukraine.
The Soviet government banned Ukrainian autocephaly, which survived only in exile. In 1989, she returned to Ukraine; The first Patriarch of Kiev was the legendary Mstislav (Skrypnik), adjutant of Simon Petliura, who was ordained bishop in occupied Kiev in 1942. After his death in 1993, the church split into two branches, each of which is fighting for its canonical recognition by Constantinople.
Despite all this, the largest Orthodox jurisdiction in Ukraine remains the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), within which the confrontation between pro-Moscow and autocephalous groups is growing. The latter is personified by Metropolitan Alexander (Drabinko), the closest associate of the late primate of the church, Metropolitan Vladimir (Sabodan). And the new primate elected in 2014, Metropolitan Onufry (Berezovsky), is guided by Moscow and does not accept the idea of autocephaly. However, in the conditions of the current war, this idea is gaining more and more supporters: the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada was supported by influential priests and laity of the UOC-MP, who no longer want to be associated with Moscow.
Officially, the Pan-Orthodox Council did not consider the "Ukrainian issue" - it was not on the agenda approved by the primates of 14 churches in January. But on the sidelines of the cathedral, this question was central.
Significantly was the appointment of the official speaker of the cathedral, which every evening from June 20 to 25 held briefings for journalists, the Ukrainian Archbishop Job (Getcha). Once, in response to a request from Russian journalists to condemn “the gross interference of the Verkhovna Rada in church affairs,” Job noted that all modern autocephalies were presented “in connection with the political situation” and taking into account the appeals of the state authorities of the respective countries. In response to the requests of the authorities, Constantinople gave autocephaly to the Polish and Albanian churches, recognized the autocephaly of the Bulgarian Church.
The danger of losing the Ukrainian Church in Moscow is very well understood. They say that during the days of the cathedral in the Russian capital, a high-level meeting was held, as a result of which the Moscow lobby in Kyiv was instructed to intensify the fight against autocephaly. As a result, on June 23, an “alternative” appeal appeared by 39 deputies of the Verkhovna Rada from the Opposition Bloc, which is sympathetic to Russia, headed by Vadim Novinsky, an oligarch who moved several years ago from Moscow to Kiev. The authors of the appeal urged Patriarch Bartholomew not to react to "initiatives of political adventurers to change the existing canonical system in Ukraine."
Literally on the eve of the council, the Patriarch of Constantinople sent Ukraine an encouraging sign. As the head of the Department for Religious Affairs of Ukraine, Andriy Yurash, told the author of these lines, Bartholomew invited the Primate of the UOC-MP, Metropolitan Onufry, to make a trip to Cappadocia with him. Another invited guest was the Archbishop of Canterbury, head of the Church of England. In the language of Constantinopolitan diplomacy, this means that the Patriarch wants to see the Church of Ukraine in the same status as the Church of England.
One of the documents adopted by the Council is called "Church autonomy and the way it is granted." The status of autonomy is lower than autocephaly, but is perceived as an important step towards full independence. The draft of this document was also signed by the Moscow Patriarchate in the process of preparing for the council, despite the fact that there is a clear allusion to Ukraine. The document mentions certain territories that two local churches consider theirs at once. And if one or both of the "mother" churches want to give autonomy to the churches in these territories, then the last word in resolving this issue remains with Constantinople. Ukraine, as can be seen from the Tomos of 1924, Constantinople considers its own. As well as Moscow.
The "Ukrainian question" should be decided soon after the council. The Patriarchate of Constantinople feels that it may lose time: the political situation in Ukraine can hardly be called stable so far, and the “window of opportunity” may close soon. In addition, the part of the Ukrainian Church striving for independence will simply get tired of waiting and proclaim autocephaly on its own, without any participation of Constantinople.
What was Patriarch Kirill counting on when on June 13 he announced his final decision not to go to the Pan-Orthodox Council? To the same cathedral, the preparation of which exactly 55 years ago was started by his spiritual father, Metropolitan Nikodim (Rotov). To the cathedral, in which Cyril himself invested a lot of effort, sitting at all kinds of synaxes and meetings, seeking more and more concessions from Constantinople. There is no unequivocal answer to this question, because Kirill's losses from the decision made clearly exceed his gains.
The latter can only be attributed to the pacification of the intra-church right-wing conservative opposition, which habitually criticizes Cyril for the "heresy of ecumenism", and became especially active after the meeting with Pope Francis in February of this year.
This opposition, uniting several bishops, a group of active priests and a significant number of monks and laity, proclaimed the Council in Crete "wolf", "robber" and even "antichrist". Such harsh definitions are connected with the prophecies existing in the Orthodox environment - both medieval and recent - that the Church is established on the seven pillars of the seven Ecumenical Councils, which approved the fullness of the truth, therefore the eighth council is not needed, it will be false and mark the beginning of the last times, the Apocalypse. A number of monasteries and parishes warned Kirill: we are waiting for the cathedral, and then we are leaving the Moscow Patriarchate. Fortunately, there are many "alternative", truly Orthodox jurisdictions in Russia.
It seems to sound menacing, but this movement did not pose a real danger to Cyril. Firstly, with all the efforts, it occupied a rather marginal position in the ROC MP. Secondly, the charter of the Moscow Patriarchate is drawn up in such a way that in the event of a monastery or parish leaving its jurisdiction, the buildings of churches and all property remain in the patriarchate, they are in no way assigned to a particular community. And for the church leadership, it is only important who owns the temple, and not who is going to pray somewhere in the apartments. However, it must be admitted that Kirill's refusal to go to the Sobor brought confusion to the ranks of the right-wing opposition, part of which is already ready to return under the patriarchal omophorion and believe that the "heresy of ecumenism" in the ROC MP is over.
The "imitative version" seems more likely. Patriarch Kirill, having been brought up under the conditions of the Soviet command system, with its total and rigid control over the church, caught the features of Putin's "vertical" system. Seeing that the national leader is stepping up anti-Western rhetoric, breaking with the G8, violating the principles of international law, introducing “counter-sanctions”, preparing for war, etc., Kirill tries to project all this onto church policy and also “goes to exacerbation."
If his ideal is a "symphony" of secular and ecclesiastical power, then the latter must repeat all the moves of the former, play in unison with it. And among other things, the Patriarch of Constantinople - a "Turkish subject" receives financial support from the United States, the churches of the Greek-Roman world serve in NATO member countries, and condemn the "peace-loving foreign policy" of the Kremlin. Isn't all this enough to repeat the "geopolitical feat" of Vladimir Putin on your small plot?
I can assume that the patriarch shared the plan of torpedoing the Cathedral with Putin on Athos on May 28 and, apparently, received approval. Obviously, the Moscow Patriarch hoped that Constantinople would tremble before the union of the ROC MP, Mount Athos and the masses of Slavic churches that were supposed to support Moscow. The critical mass, however, did not work out - the Serbian, Polish and Czechoslovak churches went to Crete. And Constantinople did not flinch, deciding to hold the Council without "Protestants". It remains to be assumed that Patriarch Kirill did not calculate his strength.
Now he has taken a wait-and-see position: the information “mochilovo” of Constantinople, which began in the state and church media on June 13-14, has been suspended after the decision of the synod not to go to Crete. If anyone allows themselves to be harsh, then only marginal sites and bloggers who are ready to love the patriarch to death. The official position, formulated by the head of the department of the ROC MP for interaction with society and the media, is that the cathedral in Crete, in general, must be respected, it is not only necessary to call it Pan-Orthodox. It is recognized by the Moscow Patriarchate as a council of 10 local churches - a very authoritative event in the Orthodox world.
But the Patriarchate of Constantinople and other participating churches see the Council differently. After all, it was convened not by a voluntaristic decision of the "opponents of Moscow", but by all 14 primates of the churches of world Orthodoxy, including Patriarch Kirill. The mechanism for canceling this decision by the participants in the synaxis was not provided. So, despite all the belated ultimatums, it is impossible to cancel the Council. Moreover, Constantinople insists on the binding nature of its decisions for all churches, including the ROC MP. He believes that the current Council has finally given the Orthodox world a mechanism for resolving issues without Moscow, which has always been dissatisfied with something, protested and hampered the conciliar process. Now, they believe in Constantinople, the Orthodox world will breathe more freely.
According to the rules of the council, all its decisions are taken by consensus, that is, unanimously. This provision is interpreted in different ways: the participants in the council, naturally, believe that we are talking about the consensus of all those present at the council. And the Moscow Patriarchate, which itself did not go to the Cathedral voluntarily, also insists on the consensus of those absent. In general, the principle of consensus was developed to please the ROC MP: the traditional canon law of the Orthodox Church recognizes the adoption of a decision by a simple majority of the participants in the council. This is exactly how the holy fathers of the Ecumenical Councils voted - and at every ancient Council there was a mass of people dissatisfied with the opinion of the majority. If consensus had been demanded of the Ecumenical Councils, the dogmas and canons of Orthodoxy would not have been accepted. This was recalled at the opening of the Council by the head of the Albanian Church, Archbishop Anastassy. But the consensus principle was not changed.
The Council adopted a total of six documents in six days of work: on the mission of the church in the modern world, on relations with the rest of the Christian world, on marriage, on fasting, on the Orthodox diaspora and church autonomy. All documents are extremely streamlined, it is useless to look for a sensation in them. Preparations for the cathedral in the 1960s began with a program of radical reforms (the transition of all churches to a new calendar style, the reduction of services and posts, the permission of married episcopate and second marriage of the clergy, etc.), but this program gradually lost all its radicalism - "if only there was no schism." As a result, the council adopted a cautiously ecumenical confession of faith, recognizing the churchness of Catholics and some Protestants, allowed (with reservations) the marriages of the Orthodox with the same Catholics and Protestants, and allowed the fasts to be relaxed at the discretion of the confessor on an individual basis. You can't call all this a "reform of Orthodoxy". Moreover, the Georgian Church, which does not participate in the council, warned that it would not accept a marriage document, as it blesses its children to marry only and exclusively Orthodox.
In general, the Council in Crete passed quite peacefully, there was no new global split in Orthodoxy. This outcome is due to the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate nevertheless “put on the brakes”, abandoning the original plan of intensifying confrontation. I really don't want to lose Ukraine... But the position of the Moscow Patriarchate in world Orthodoxy, which has learned to make church-wide decisions without Moscow, has weakened. If we draw analogies with secular politics, Moscow was expelled from the church G8. Or even from the UN. Who is better off for this? Definitely not the Moscow Patriarchy. But you have to be patriots and suffer along with your country, right?