How to finish a hybrid war?

We publish the speeches of the conference "Ukraine - Russia: free from myths", which was held in the Paris House of Europe ("Branes" - an information partner of the conference).

Antoine Arzhakovsky is a French historian and theologian, head of the research department in the college of Bernardinsev.

Apparently, negotiations in the "Norman format" (Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine) do not bring tangible results. The Minsk agreements of February 2 and 11, 2015 are not executed, since the warring parties do not comply with a truce, and Ukraine has not yet restored control over the border with Russia.

The time has come to propose alternative peaceful decisions of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which observers rightly characterize as a hybrid war. First of all, it is necessary to understand how hybrid wars are arranged, and then we will offer a solution option, lying in two planes - philosophical and political.

Analysis of the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war

In the book "Russia - Ukraine: From the war to the world?" , published in June 2014, I proposed the definition and analysis of the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war. I will put out here briefly some of the main conclusions.

A hybrid war is a real conflict prepared by propaganda based on a mythological reading of history and seeking to hide the causes and customers of aggression; The conflict, which leads to the establishment of control over someone else's territory in order to destabilize the country that has been attacked.

Return to the use of propaganda is possible only if control over the media and cultural elites are previously established. After all, propaganda is based on the denial of truth. Like, truth as such does not exist. This can be seen in the example of the 2015 discussion between Valery Zorkin, close to Vladimir Putin, the head of the Constitutional Court of Russia, which separates the positive law based on prohibitions from natural law, and lawyer Elena Lukyanova, who adheres to the opposite point of view: the right to be separated from the truth of the moral law.

In this context of epistemological agnosticism and even nihilism, mythological historiography is widely used to justify the actions of the state. It is known that President Putin has released a new history textbook, glorifying Stalin and silent about the crimes of the communist regime. It is also known that the Moscow Patriarchate promotes the mythology of the so -called Russian world in which the Russian state and the Russian Church are the only heirs of medieval Kievan Rus. The neoimpers ideology that arose in the ruins of the Soviet Union picks up the myth of "Moscow to the Third Rome", developed around 1550 by the Pskov elder Philofei. In March 2015, the Russian president justified the annexation of Crimea, referring to the "sacred" connection of the baptism of Rus', which occurred in Crimea in 988, and modern Russians - in his eyes this fully justifies Russia's non -compliance with its international obligations in terms of border indestructibility. On May 29, 2016, President Putin took place on the throne of the last Byzantine emperor on Mount Athos. Thus, it was decided to note the 1000th anniversary of the "Russian" presence on Athos-despite the fact that the Monk Anthony Kiev-Pechersky was from Chernigov. Whether or not the Russian state, which arose only in the 17th century, the Rev. Anthony equally revered both the Roman Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches.

This ideology undoubtedly incites in many Russians a sense of resentification in relation to the modern world, especially American. But this feeling shares an increasing number of Europeans - through the efforts of such media as Russia Today and Sputnik. In fact, the ultraliberal ideology showed its detriment during an exchange collapse in September 2008. However, non -Soviet propaganda uses this crisis to create virtual reality, designed to legitimize the power appetites of the Russian state. Since this virtual reality contradicts the facts, we observe the “overtaking” effect: the Kremlin needs more and more intimidation shares and even the seizure of new territories. Today, many in Eastern Europe and even in Turkey consider Russia a gangstard. It got to the point that on May 30, the NATO parliamentary Assembly warned the allies that they should be ready to respond to a “potential threat” from Russia regarding one of the alliance members.

It is clear that Ukraine also suffers from the impact of Russian propaganda. The country, which only in June 2015 officially condemned the communist ideology, is not so easy to cope with the toxic effect of non -Soviet propaganda. Ukrainians quickly lose confidence in their governments, since no one has sufficient authority to explain to them how to effectively fight corruption and how much time it will take to make the right decisions to combat this chronic evil. In addition, the war with Russia, in which, recall, more than 9300 people died from March 2014 to May 2016 (and more than a million people became refugees within the country), is not favorable to develop a national spirit that can maintain the conquest of the revolution of dignity, that is, the priority of citizenship based on humanizing values, over ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliation. Ukrainian intellectuals rapidly lose hope of the possibility of dialogue with a democratic, non -aggressive Russia.

How to overcome hybrid thinking?

As we see, the hybrid war is primarily based on hybrid thinking, in which elements of mythological consciousness and positivism are bizarrely mixed with a desire for power.

First of all, it is necessary to call a spade a spade, although this is not enough to solve problems. Yes, now there is a war between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between neo -reactionaries governed by the Kremlin, and most countries committed to the legal state and international law under the auspices of the UN.

At the same time, you need to understand the logic of the myth - it has its own truth that you need to be able to make out. Religious beliefs or ideological beliefs do not appeal to conceptual thinking. A purely positivist approach to myth only adds oil into the fire of irrational beliefs and beliefs.

Thus, it is important to put forward reasonable arguments based on facts to show inconsistencies in the opponent’s argument, when it is separated from rationality and common sense. That is, we are not talking about replacing some myths with others, but about their collision with the mind. Russian Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky in the five-volume essay "Myths of Russia", released in 2008-2011, is trying to move from the myth-cliche "Russians are drunk" to the myth that "the Russians have always been a great nation." This is a revival of neo -nationalist ideology. The reality of the Russian nation today is a society where violence is highly flourished. For example, it is known that in Russia every 40 minutes a woman dies from family violence.

Putin, using the myth of New Russia, wanted to “prove” that some of Ukraine were always part of the Russian Empire, while serious historians state that Moscow in the 19th century only dreamed of this imperial project.

The Moscow Patriarch is inclined to replace the myth of the inevitable victory of the proletariat with the myth of salvation, which brings to humanity the "Russian world". Meanwhile, it is known that this doctrine is based on filletism, that is, an ethnic approach to Orthodoxy, and in this regard is a heresy. That is, it is necessary to work with a religious component of mythology. For example, in modern Russian Orthodox mythology, it is denied that the Florentine union of 1439 reconciled Christians, belonging to various national and cultural traditions. The Kyiv Church, unlike the Russian Tsar, supported this ecumenical union. Historical amnesia, unfortunately, led to the repeated persecution of Greek Catholics. Only the recognition of objective facts and the requirement of official apologies from the Russian Orthodox Church for its role in the destruction of this church in March 1946 can open the way to the Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation. It is significant in this sense that the Moscow Patriarchate at the last moment refused to participate in the ecumenical seminar, which took place in Vienna in early June with the participation of the best specialists in this matter.

To propose a dialogue between history and historical memory means exposing the propaganda half -truth. Therefore, the work of the Stopfake website, the activities of the Ukraine Committee, which has its own blog on the website of the Libération newspaper, the publication of Boris Nemtsov’s report on the war in Ukraine (the book was published by Actes Sud), which probably cost the author of life, and so on. But all these undertakings seem ridiculous when we see what means are expanded by Russian propaganda on a global scale. Until now, there is not a single Russian -speaking channel, committed to truth and a critical approach that could offer alternative information to Russian citizens.

There is still no serious publication that would not only talk about the abuses of the Russian authorities, but from a scientific point of view would analyze the main myths about Russia, Ukraine and the post -Soviet space. You can cite such examples as “the equivalence of events in Kosovo and Crimea”, “Russians need a strong hand for managing such a huge country”, “Stalin was a great statesman”, “citizens can have any real influence on politics,” etc.

The main thing in this new strategy for the fight against a hybrid war is that Western democracies themselves re -believe in the power of truth. One of the most important lessons in the victory of democracies over totalitarian regimes in the 20th century is the principle of "not to lie" may be stronger than nuclear warheads. On February 13, 1973, Alexander Solzhenitsyn published in Samizdat his manifesto “live not by lies”, in which he offered fellow citizens a simple life principle - consciously not to support lies. This is one of the key texts of the dissident movement. Even the expulsion of the writer could not undermine the power of this text. It is clear why today Ukrainians are striving for the decommunization of their institutes and monuments. Four laws on decommunization (access to archives, the celebration of victory in World War II and the victory over Nazism - May 9, the ban on communist and fascist symbols, rehabilitation of fighters for Ukraine’s independence in the XX century) in the West has not yet been appreciated. Expressing the distrust of the information emanating from the official sources of totalitarian states, one must not forget that each state has its own idea of ​​morality and truth.

The adoption of historical facts played an important role in the Franco-German reconciliation, while for a long time propaganda speeches sounded on both sides of the Rhine. The French historian Georges Dubi, in his 1973 work, “Sunday in Buvin” criticized the version of the battle of 1214, set forth by the Guillo of Breton, the chaplain of Philip II Augustus, and managed to separate historical facts from the introduced memories. The Book of Dubi as a whole was directed against the corruption effect of a one -sided, nationalist interpretation of the battle of Buvina.

Inspired by this example, modern historians must convene a tripartite commission (Russia, Ukraine and the third country capable of becoming an intermediary) to develop an impartial version of the history of the two countries and come to consensus on controversial issues, albeit with reservations.

How to get out of this situation from a political point of view?

Democratic countries committed by the supremacy of the law should be adamant against economic and political sanctions against Russia, which defiantly neglects international law. It is necessary to expose the violent policy of the Kremlin in relation to neighbors. But these measures, alas, are not enough. Democratic countries should understand the need to finance peaceful initiatives. Currently, no research in the historical field or media projects are supported by anyone. This is all the more sad because NATO spends millions of euros on the rearmament of the Baltic countries and on a migration deal with Turkey against migrants.

The media has a great responsibility for adequate reflection of information within the framework of the Russian hybrid war. It is necessary to call a spade a spade - for example, Donbass and Crimea to characterize as occupied territories, stop talking about the "separatists of the Donbass" or disseminate erroneous allegations that "Crimea has always been Russian." This peninsula has a long and rich history. For more than two thousand years of existence, he was occupied by Russians only during periods from 1855 to 1917, and then between 1945 and 1954.

In the Donbass to Igor Girkin (Strelkova) there was not a single separatist, even if there were those who were wary of the Kyiv authorities and nostalgic for the USSR. Separatism arose as a result of the fact that Russia provoked dissatisfaction and promised the inhabitants of Donbass the prospects of the Russian state. Until March 2014, not a single political murder was recorded in Crimea.

The intelligentsia should also contribute to the construction of the world, recalling what the real price of rejection of ethical principles. Churchill, after the Munich agreement, said that, choosing between war and dishonor, the British chose dishonor and gaining war. Fidelity to the Code of Honor may be profitable. France, being the guarantor of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, should protect the boundaries of Ukraine in exchange for its rejection of nuclear energy. Having decided to cancel the sale of the Mistrals of Russia, France already received a number of large orders for military equipment from other countries in 2016.

Conclusion

The West should also reconsider its attitude to the truth. The fight against myths implies the struggle with the world, where the truth is prohibited if it does not fit into a certain framework. It is necessary to show attention to Eastern Europe - do not deny historical facts, respect a critical approach and take into account the context. But Western Europe should be more critical of a too simplified vision of history. For the truth can be seen not only in the obvious. The West will again recognize the part of the truth that manifests itself through myths.