By August 1991, all the main old levers of control and maintenance of the country's integrity were lost. No new levers were created. At the most crucial moment of perestroika, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was unable to build a new mechanism of power. The refusal to control the party and through the party destroyed the unity of power and created colossal uncertainty within it. It paralyzed the capacity of the entire governing system of the country.

By the end of 1987, symptoms of a systemic crisis were already growing, and discontent in society, which had not found an outlet for many years, was growing. The organizational work of the Central Committee lost touch with real life. Society, inspired by the ideas of perestroika, went far ahead. All prohibitions were lifted in the press and in cultural life. It was possible to show and write whatever you thought. But in the economy, all the old fetters, checks, and brakes remained almost untouched. Gosplan, Gossnab, and the State Committee on Prices worked in the old regime. The Statistical Directorate played a special role, managing to cover any information with a veil of secrecy. It was impossible to obtain real data on food resources, consumer goods, sources and reserves of currency, the role of oil (its production began to decline at that time) and defense spending, even while working in the Central Committee.

Only the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov, some of his deputies and part of the government apparatus saw the full picture of the upcoming collapse caused by the decline in foreign exchange earnings from oil supplies. This information was, unfortunately, unavailable to both academic analysts and the Central Committee as a whole.

Photo.

The main revolutions of the 20th century

Politics / Photo

Of course, the external reason for the collapse of the USSR can be called the GKChP rebellion. But this is a very superficial idea. The GKChP appeared at a stage when the country was already in a deplorable state. A much deeper, but again not the only reason was the acute shortage of food and consumer goods. It had been growing for many years, but starting in 1988 it turned into a real disaster for the absolute majority of the country's population. Prices for the only source of currency, essentially - oil - were falling.

"If there is no oil, there will be no economy. What are we waiting for?" Ryzhkov said at one of the internal meetings with his deputies. The meeting was held, as always, behind closed doors. The dead-end path of the USSR economy, which began with collectivization and dispossession in the 1930s, found its end in the equally hopeless policy of the leadership in the late 1980s. By 1988, a real economic crisis had broken out, manifested primarily in the catastrophic breakdown of the financial system. The deficit spiral was unwinding. The economic reform program developed by the June 1987 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was effectively buried.

By this time, the party had almost been removed from power. The government had lost control over the money supply and the population's income flows. Consumer goods disappeared. Citizens' discontent was growing rapidly. The imbalance between the capital construction program and material and technical resources was growing, which hit even such a strategically important industry as oil production. At the same time, the planned indicators for oil supplies began to be underfulfilled. Around 1988, the emission of money by the USSR State Bank ceased to be of a credit nature and turned into a source for covering the state budget deficit. The ruble began to rapidly depreciate and gradually lose its functions as a universal equivalent.

Long before the crisis, the issue of returning to the NEP was discussed more than once in a narrow circle at the Volynskaya workers' dacha. But there was not enough courage to answer the main questions. How to quickly break the existing system of plans, supplies and district committee management? How to ensure uninterrupted supplies to the cities if we abandon Gossnab? How to switch to free market prices for agricultural products? It is clear that prices will immediately skyrocket, and wages at state enterprises are regulated by the plan. Ultimately, there was only one way out - a transition to free prices immediately and throughout the entire economy. It was necessary not only to break the entire old system, but also to simultaneously create a new one. Unfortunately, the country's top leadership lacked either the understanding or the political will to take such a difficult step.

The State Emergency Committee, in fact, recorded only an act of despair. The members of the committee were not capable of doing anything more. Their downfall was predetermined by the very non-competitive mechanism by which these people came to power.

No connection. August 19-20, 1991.

I wasn't arrested that day. And the next day, too. Although a few ambiguous situations did arise on the way to my office in the Kremlin.

On the morning of August 19, as always, I got ready for work at half past eight. I was with my family then outside the city, in Uspenka. My wife and son decided to go to the metro with me. We approached the car. The driver said tensely: "Oleg Ivanovich, did you turn on the TV or the radio?" - "No, I didn't." - "Turn it on. Something strange is happening." I returned and sat down in front of the TV. Famous stories were on, "Swan Lake." At some point, a message appeared that due to the fact that Gorbachev had fallen ill and could not fulfill his duties, a State Committee for the State of Emergency had been created and had taken over the leadership.

I knew that Gorbachev had no health problems. In general, it became clear to me that something very serious and unclear was happening, similar to a coup. I suggested that my wife and son stay, and I went to the Kremlin to my workplace.

I drive up to the Kremlin gates. As always, there is a guard. "Will he let me through or not?" He salutes and lets me through. I drive up to the entrance where Gorbachev and his assistants had their offices. I get out of the car. There is a guard at the entrance. "They will either stop me, or let me through, or say, 'Let's go!'" But everything happens as usual.

Then I had to go down the corridor past Yanayev's office to get to my office. I saw that there were 8-10 people from the security that usually accompanied Gorbachev standing there. I tensed up. Gorbachev's deputy head of security took a step towards me and calmly said: "Hello, Oleg Ivanovich!" We had shaken hands before. We greeted each other. Neither he asked me anything, nor I him.

I went further to my room. I sat down. “Is the connection disconnected or not?” I had a direct connection with Gorbachev in his office in the Kremlin. There was also a so-called long-distance connection, also direct – wherever Gorbachev was. I picked up the phone. As usual, the special communications service was connected. A woman’s voice: “Good afternoon, Oleg Ivanovich! What did you want?” – “I would like to contact Mikhail Sergeyevich.” – “The connection with Foros has been interrupted,” they answered. “Understood,” I hung up.

Usually in the morning they put closed mail on my desk. Information from abroad, from the special services. Everything was brought, as usual. But no calls, silence. All phones are silent, but all are working. I checked - all communication channels are working.

Somewhere around midday, information begins to arrive about what is happening around Yeltsin, in the leadership of the Russian Federation. Messages come from cities, republics, from abroad. The information is unusual. Only the procedure for its receipt is usual.

I don’t leave my office and I don’t call anyone. The secretary comes to me. I ask what’s going on. She tells me. The girls do talk to each other. She says: “Boldin called a meeting” (Valery Boldin, head of the USSR presidential administration. – Vedomosti). Fortunately, he didn’t invite me. I wasn’t at all eager to go to his meeting. In general, my relationship with Boldin – this is a separate topic – has always been cool. For some reason, I didn’t really like him as a person.

At some point, Yegor Gaidar called. Our relationship was normal. I can’t say it was warm, but it was comradely, businesslike, respectful, calm, and to some extent trusting. He asked, “Do you have a connection with Gorbachev?” I said, “I don’t have a connection with Gorbachev.” He asked, “Can I be of any help? Do you need any help?” I said, “Thank you. I don’t need any help for now.” That’s how the first day passed, sitting alone, thinking and analyzing what was happening. In the evening, I decided to stop by Vladimir Yegorov, the cultural adviser. He got out a bottle. We sat. We tried to assess what was happening. It was clear that there was some kind of fuss going on with Gorbachev’s removal. It was unclear what the State Emergency Committee was doing.

The next day, August 20, I went to work again in the morning. Everything continued in the same spirit. At some point, the head of the protocol department, Volodya Shevchenko, showed up. We were on friendly terms. He came in and asked what was going on. I said, “Apart from the general information that comes in, I don’t know anything else. I don’t go to Boldin or Yanayev, no one bothers me. And did you go there?” He said, “No, why should I? In a sense, I took an oath. Gorbachev hired me, and I only recognize him.”

Vadim Medvedev, the presidential adviser, urgently returned from vacation. He is, in essence, Gorbachev’s right hand. Reliable, decent: “What’s going on here? I think I’ll go see Boldin now.” He returns and says: “My first question was: “How did this happen, how could you? You were always Gorbachev’s closest confidant. Why did you end up in the other camp? With the people who removed him from power?” Boldin fidgeted. The conversation turned out to be very difficult. Then he snapped: “Why did you decide that we are against Gorbachev?” And he almost threw out the phrase that “Gorbachev will be with us. Everything is in his hands.” And he quickly left.

By the evening of the second day, it became clear that the State Emergency Committee was absolutely helpless. The coup had failed ingloriously. But Mikhail Gorbachev's days in power were still numbered. The star of the Soviet Union was rapidly setting.

The President's Star Has Set in Crimea

"The putsch is the end of Gorbachev as president. The end of his career" - this prophecy of Vadim Medvedev came true faster than expected. And then, on the night of August 21, 1991, the two of us rushed through the night Moscow to the airport to meet Mikhail Sergeyevich from the Crimean residence. "It's strange, why the end?" I thought. "He was legally elected, and there is an opportunity to continue working!"

As soon as the plane comes to a stop on the runway, Alexander Rutskoy jumps out of the door hatch with a machine gun. And he comes to us to check if everything is clear. In addition to Medvedev and me, the President of the USSR is met by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the days of the coup, he overdid it out of fear and gave the order to our foreign embassies to take down Gorbachev’s portraits just in case. Rutskoy shakes our hands, checks us with his eyes for weapons, but it seems like he’s greeting us. He waves towards the plane: “Only our own. Now we can!” Mikhail Sergeyevich comes down. We shake hands – and into the cars: “Guys, see you tomorrow! We’ll start in the morning!”

The most common question is: how could the State Emergency Committee come into being? After all, it included Mikhail Gorbachev's protégés. They were not considered such close associates as, for example, Medvedev, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze and a number of others. But still... Gorbachev literally dragged Yanayev through the Supreme Soviet to the post of vice-president. The parliament categorically did not want to approve this controversial candidate. Until that moment, Yanayev had not proven himself either as a bright politician or as a smart administrator. He worked in trade unions. And even earlier, he headed the Committee of Youth Organizations, strengthened ties with foreign countries. He was not even the secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee. In fact, his duties were limited to establishing friendly relations. It was necessary to behave properly at the table, participate in feasts, be able to keep up with the company, be a good guy.

Yanayev's level of competence cannot even be compared with the post of vice president. The vice president must be a statesman. If something happened to the president, Yanayev would take his place. Gorbachev's choice was not clear to anyone. This post could have been offered to Nazarbayev, Yakovlev, the same Ryzhkov, Medvedev. They were three heads above Yanayev.

Obviously, Gorbachev was guided by the idea that the person closest to him should be weaker than him. It was this approach to nomination that highlighted the putsch. After all, the conspirators had everything at their disposal: the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they had a party that supported them almost from the very beginning. They had an army at their disposal. Foolishly or drunk, they even brought in tanks.

When they came to arrest them, everyone had already left, but Yanayev remained in the office and spent the night there. According to eyewitnesses, he was drunk and had trouble understanding what was happening. In general, those who communicated with the members of the State Emergency Committee during the coup said that they were all in some kind of delirious state. They did not understand what to do. And it was not some “black colonels” who came to power. These were all people from Gorbachev’s inner circle. Yanayev was the vice-president, Pavlov was the prime minister, Kryuchkov was the chairman of the KGB, Lukyanov, who practically collaborated with them, was the chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

This confusion is evidence of their level. And a consequence of the impotence of the authoritarian system that developed in the Soviet Union.

During Mikhail Gorbachev's six years in power, not only the appearance of the USSR, the Soviet bloc countries, but also, in essence, the world as a whole changed radically. This is a fact. But another indisputable truth is that all the actions and inactions of the system at that moment predetermined its fate.

Was it possible to save the USSR economy?

The author is an assistant to the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, Doctor of Economics

The article is a selection of chapters from the book of memoirs “Ideals and Crimes”

If there had been no State Emergency Committee