A quarter of a century ago, the Soviet Union collapsed - a rigid management system based on an ideology that was attractive to many (its adherents still exist), nuclear weapons and the world's second largest economy (in terms of volume). Moreover, if we impartially look at the numbers, then the version that the country fell under the weight of exclusively economic problems will not be so plausible - Russia’s current 48th place in terms of GDP per capita is somewhat worse than the 28th place of the USSR.

The lack of competitiveness of the economy was undoubtedly one of the problems that led to the collapse of the country. But, in my opinion, it was the rigid management model that failed the USSR, which failed to adapt to the changes taking place in the world. At some point, the number of challenges to which it was necessary to formulate management responses exceeded the capabilities of the centralized system, closed to a dozen and a half aging men.

The presence of the then young Alekperovs, Chernomyrdins and Nazarbayevs on the “second floors” did not help. The source of legitimacy for the entire system was one - the Politburo - and the system itself was built according to this source, according to its ability (and in the 1980s, rather, inability) to perceive and process information, according to its phobias and addictions. In the economy, this led to monopolization, blocking innovation and simplifying the economic structure. Similar processes took place in society, culture and science (with rare breakthroughs such as ballet, Gaidai and space against the backdrop of general stagnation). Therefore, when the system was faced with numerous, albeit absolutely uncritical, challenges (falling oil prices, the arms race, Afghanistan, Chernobyl, breakthroughs in biotechnology and cybernetics), it was unable to provide answers and collapsed - instead of adapting and emerging from the crisis stronger.

25 years have passed, and we see all the same signs - monopolization, an attempt to keep everything in hand through a narrow group of trusted “assistants”, and as a result - corruption, stagnation, inefficiency and a latent, but widespread awareness of the fact: this system, having collided, for example , with the inevitable crisis of a change of power, will collapse in the same way, possibly burying the country under itself.

In fact, many are strategically preparing for an increasingly probable event (where to go - age), which will result in a change of power: from Washington and European capitals to Kazan and Tsentoroi. And only in the Kremlin, for obvious reasons, do they pretend that their owner will live forever and will forever be able to keep his greedy and ineffective entourage from taking completely suicidal steps.

I do not believe in Putin’s ability to change and begin to change the system, making it more adaptive and suitable for functioning in the realities of the 21st century. He, in my opinion, is already psychologically too old and too afraid of change. Most likely, we will have to make changes after his departure, after overcoming the acute phase of the crisis, which has already begun, but has not yet reached its peak.

It is quite obvious that a huge country with a still large, fairly educated population and a diverse culture, aspiring to leadership in the world, in the 21st century. cannot wait for management signals to pass through one person's head. It is not only in the Western world that states no longer function in this way. There is nothing like this in the most dynamic and seemingly more beloved by the Russian authorities, China and India. The described model is typical only for the countries of Central Asia with their constant “referendums” on the extension and expansion of the powers of local “national leaders” and the constant reshaping of legislation to please one person, i.e. the same “national leader”. We must remember, however, that the Central Asian countries, unlike Russia, do not pretend to have any decisive role in the world and do not try to compete with the strongest powers.

State reform is necessary, and the set of steps for this is obvious and theoretically can be carried out today. The key task is to recreate local self-government and transfer to this level powers and sources of funds to resolve the vast majority of issues that concern the average person. Only such a mechanism is capable of imparting dynamics to the development of the country, involving wide circles of citizens in social and economic activity, ensuring the motivation of the authorities to work in their interests, and making Russia competitive both in terms of quality of life and growth rates.

However, such a mechanism will require the presence of real political representation (parliaments) on a regional and national scale, as well as an independent dispute resolution system (judicial system), since the released energy of society, being limited by the current capacity of the “vertical”, will simply tear it to pieces. Therefore, the first step should be the reform of the federal parliament and the system of its relations with the executive branch. The executive branch should not exist in isolation from the society represented by parliament. And parliament should not be indifferent to society, which does not see the opportunity to express and coordinate its interests through it.

The super-presidential model is outdated and should be replaced by at least a presidential-parliamentary model. The government, headed by the Prime Minister, responsible for all economic matters, should be effectively appointed and recalled by Parliament, which will ensure the coordination of public interests in determining the general course and specific tools to solve the problems facing the country. The President, while remaining the country's representative at the international level, commander-in-chief and head of the structures responsible for protecting the Constitution, will be quite capable of intervening in the situation in case of critical deviations in terms of protecting the rights and interests of citizens. Of course, and this is the most important condition for us, the terms of stay in power of top officials must be unconditionally limited, and the ability to reshape legislation at personal discretion must be reduced to zero.

Yes, the likelihood of such a large-scale reform is now low, based on the well-known realities of the Russian state. The reform was not carried out even in much more favorable conditions 8-10 years ago. But we are not talking about probabilities, but about necessities. This reform is precisely necessary - so that the state and the country are able to overcome the crisis in which we are already living, but of which we have not yet reached the “ninth wave”. Therefore, no less important than the reform itself is the time frame in which it will be implemented. We remember that in the last two or three years of the life of the USSR, feverish attempts were made to transform the state - the Congress of People's Deputies, the introduction of the post of president, a new union treaty, limiting the role of the Communist Party. Only it was already too late.

A timely reform of the power structure could provide the country with the prospect of stable development according to the European model, regardless of personal changes in the Kremlin, and a gradual departure for the Kremlin clan.

Which is inevitable anyway.

The author is the founder of the Open Russia movement

We need government reform