If the political agenda of the authorities and the opposition is equally failed, the people choose the status quo

In The Death and Restoration of American Democracy, Sarah Macdonald quotes a contemporary American TV series whose character, describing the creation of advertising, says: "The new makes the consumer itch, but there is a more reliable way to tie it to the product - nostalgia."

This phrase seems to accurately describe the transformation experienced by the population of Russia over the past 30 years. If the end of the 80s and the very beginning of the 90s were the period when the new political agenda “sold” best, then at the end of the 90s, a nostalgic agenda was offered to society. Thanks to a successful advertising campaign, this agenda is still the most popular political product in the country.

The power of memory

Creating deep connections with the image of the past is a good explanation for the long-term popularity of the political regime created by Vladimir Putin.

After the fight, you can, of course, “wave your fists” and speculate about the electoral and media oppression of the “non-systemic opposition”, but only extremely shocking figures can assume that even in the most ideal conditions for political competition, the current “liberal” opposition could compete today on equal terms. with power. Even before the vote, the authorities won the main battle against the opposition - for an attractive political agenda. However, this does not mean that power is invulnerable.

The use of nostalgia in political agitation is by no means an invention within Russia, it is used in all countries of the world, but does not prevent the change of power. Almost everywhere, the opposition has by and large learned to cope with the nostalgic political syndrome. And if in Russia the appeal to historical memory, coupled with moderate political repression, was enough to completely knock out the liberal opposition, then this speaks more about the helplessness of the opposition than about the power of the authorities.

The memory of power

It is necessary to look for an explanation for the chronic "political insufficiency" of the Russian "liberal" opposition by analyzing its own political agenda. To combat the nostalgic agenda of power, a combined program is most suitable, focused on protecting the basic values ​​that remain attractive to the majority of voters (who supported the current government), while at the same time offering new solutions to the problems that continue to worry voters. But in Russia it is not customary to choose easy roads ...

In its opposition to the authorities, the Russian opposition uses a much more original solution: it fights against the nostalgic agenda of the ruling party ... with the same nostalgic agenda of its own. It's just that the opposition has a "different memory" and, accordingly, a "different nostalgia." While the current government is nostalgic for the times of the USSR, the “non-systemic opposition” appeals to memories of the early 90s of the last century. But if nostalgia for the USSR is a widespread phenomenon among the electorate, then nostalgia for the 90s is quite rare and is characteristic mainly of a narrow “stratum”, which is almost professionally engaged in “opposition activities”.

Although the Russian opposition imagines itself to be a revolutionary force, in fact it is on the positions of the “White movement” from some 19th year of the last century: it continues to believe in “political idols” - leaders who have long fallen and lost the confidence - in the depths of their souls they no longer rely on himself, but on “foreign intervention” (“The West will help us”), he spends his main efforts on mobilizing small groups of the population (mainly students and the remnants of the “Soviet intelligentsia”) and considers it below his dignity to communicate with the politically uneducated masses.

Political amnesia

The current political agenda of the Russian “liberal” opposition, by definition, cannot be winning: it is enough just to look at what the population is really interested in and what is offered to them.

The opposition completely ignores the successes of the current government - but, nevertheless, in the eyes of the socially unprotected segments of the population, they look very significant. The latter are not ready to simply give up these achievements and do not want to risk what they have for the sake of something abstract and incomprehensible. Of course, the result obtained by the authorities (“relative stability”) is incomparable with the resource spent to achieve it, but one cannot abstract from the fact that it exists, and the situation in the social and economic sphere is not comparable to the same 1994.

The opposition, constantly talking about rampant theft and corruption, pays almost no attention to the guarantees of maintaining the achieved standard of living of the population, not to mention the promise of something more. It is, as it were, implied, but not an active element of her program. As a result, the masses are placed in the situation of the classic choice between Putin's titmouse in the hands and the liberal crane in the sky.

An even more painful topic is the recognition of one's own mistakes - at least those that are in the minds of the overwhelming majority of the electorate. In particular, different opposition forces to varying degrees avoid discussing the revision of the results of privatization (some - resolutely and completely, others - declaring their attitude towards it, but not offering solutions).

Meanwhile, it is privatization that remains one of the most vulnerable places on the political agenda of the current government, which, in its “Back in the USSR” policy, has reached a logical dead end: private ownership of the Soviet production and mining complex, on the whole, contradicts its nostalgic agenda, creates everything in society greater tension and gives rise to a heightened perception of social injustice.

Memory of the future

Not the last role in the failure of the opposition was played by its specific understanding of "revolutionary". The program of the "liberal" opposition for the most part is "destructive": cancel, imprison, stop. All this actually creates only the illusion of a “revolutionary agenda”, supposedly capable of “killing” state propaganda. Practice shows that a creative agenda can be much more revolutionary and successful in a “tired” society.

Yes, power, according to Mao, "grows from a gun barrel", but "war" is not always the best strategy - one can fight for peace no less colorfully and effectively. One of the longest-lived and long-term (not without problems with the democratic component) parties in the world was born in the wake of the Mexican Revolution and is called the "Revolutionary Institutional Party". For many decades, the promise to build "working state institutions" in the country was enough to gain popularity in a politically depressed society.

Unfortunately, opposition parties in Russia are not inherently parties. These are social clubs - or even pressure groups with their own narrow agenda, most of all concerned with keeping their "internal" ideals intact and retaining existing supporters.

Criticizing the authorities for their inability to change, they themselves consider, in the depths of their political soul, adaptation to the needs of the population (that is, voters) to be a deeply vicious thing, and the evolution of ideals to be tantamount to betrayal. In this situation, one can only argue about the timing of their survival, but by no means about their electoral chances. And this is at any level of honesty of the elections.

Only the opposition that will create a program oriented not to the past, but to the future, and taking into account the real views of voters, including their delusions, phobias and prejudices, will be able to win.

Boris Pastukhov, London School of Economics, University of Law (London) - especially for Novaya