
The loud resignation of Mikhail Saakashvili from the post of Odessa governor, not yet adopted by President Peter Poroshenko, led a fat line under a protracted experiment. Is Ukraine capable of, albeit in a single region, to a breakthrough in the fight against corruption? Should we expect significant socio-political changes from her in a short time? There is an answer to these questions - and it is negative.
The appointment of Saakashvili by the governor of the Odessa region on May 30, 2015 was a brilliant political course of Poroshenko. Having visited Odessa shortly before, in April, I could appreciate the social stress in the city. The pro -Russian terrorist underground operating there was open and eliminated just a couple of weeks before my arrival, but the main danger was not in it. The ruins in the center of the resort capital of Ukraine, the numerous poorly dressed drunken local residents, staggering in the middle of broad day in the quarter -two from the main tourist attractions, the complete absence of prospects for the bulk of the population - all this was immediately evident, even in comparison with poor and very corrupt Kharkov. By autumn, a social explosion is possible - this was my impression. However, one of many of my informants remarked: "Now it’s bad, but let's see what the" season. "I think it will be better next year."
Poroshenko did not wait for the results of the holiday season - which became, as I was told a year later, "the best over many years." Appointing Saakashvili, he immediately killed several hares. Residents of the problem area received their losing pride and hoping figure as a leader - what other region of Ukraine does the former president of the whole state control, which the entire civilized world considers a brilliant reformer? Pro -Russian and autonomist groups in the local elite were balanced by the active opponent of Putin's regime. Foreign sponsors of Ukraine saw a clear signal about the country's intention to continue reforms. And finally, the group of Igor Kolomoisky, who at that time was the main domestic political rival of Poroshenko, with this purpose lost its influence on state -owned enterprises in a large and strategically important region that managed to crush under itself during 2014.
Saakashvili tried to live up to all expectations. He offered the region a whole package of initiatives already tested by him in Georgia, brought with him a qualified team and tried to create a group of future leaders of the region and officials pure from corruption from local youth. Everything was almost like in Georgia - except for one important circumstance. In Georgia, he was president, and here is the governor. There he had fully controlled law enforcement agencies and courts that he could force him to work against corrupt officials of any level, as well as loyal parliament, which quickly adopted the necessary laws. And in the Odessa region, he was subordinate only to through the corrupt local police and patriotic, but very limited in powers and ultimately subordinate to the president of the country of the SBU. And he had to observe a mass of Ukrainian laws pierced at different times, not having the opportunity to influence their change.
Saakashvili could hope for the support of the president, but in daily clashes with general Ukrainian and Odessa political realities, she helped little. However, the "credit of trust" was spent still quickly. This was also facilitated by the style of the governor, who wanted to demonstrate to the population of the region a familiar onslaught and a quick solution to overripe problems. However, when words and even actions were not supported by measures of state coercion, the effect often turned out to be the opposite expected. In April 2016, Odessaites told me about how Saakashvili ordered to demolish the fence along the beach of some oligarch. The fence in his presence was demolished. And after a couple of weeks, the violated right of private property was restored by the court decision. And so almost every public statement and action turned around.
Saakashvili did not want to and did not want to change, does not want to take into account the Ukrainian political - but what to say, and the national is the mentality in which the search for a compromise is most appreciated. This is understood by Poroshenko, who, in an effort to maintain the integrity of the country in the face of external aggression and conduct at least some reforms went to a series of large and small transactions with regional and general Ukrainian oligarchic clans. Saakashvili knows how to organize his team perfectly, but is clearly unable to join the coalition. And this is important in those cases when he is “on horseback” and rights, and when he makes mistakes that someone should correct.
A few months after the appointment, when the Odessa residents returned from joyful expectations to the usual skepticism, Saakashvili entered an open war not only with local oligarchic clans, but also with the Ukrainian government, which, in his opinion, was slow with the support of his reforms. We will not figure out who was right, and who sometimes accepted the indecent form of discussions. As a result, under the pressure of Saakashvili (and not only) the reformer in essence the Yatsenyuk government fell. And Saakashvili himself, who managed to feel the limitation of his capabilities in Odessa, did not become the head of the new.
His relationship with Poroshenko had deteriorated by that time, and the president, apparently, began to regret the "calling of the Varangians." Parliament forbade persons with dual citizenship to occupy public positions. This legislative restriction was formally aimed at pro -Russian bureaucrats, but really hit foreign specialists who enthusiastically supported Saakashvili.
The last months of his stay in Odessa resembled agony. Despite the successful tourist season of the last year and a sharp revitalization of business and social activity in Odessa, Saakashvili was clearly replaced from the city to the region. After the elections in the regional and Odessa city councils, as well as in the councils of a number of coastal cities held in October 2015, the positions of former leaders of the Party of Regions were strengthened. The deputies from the Petro Poroshenko bloc openly laughed at the few supporters of Saakashvili and concluded transactions with their opponents. The deputies of the governor, including Maria Gaidar, turned due to the new law into powerless advisers. In the spring, an attempt to organize a common Ukrainian party on the basis of anti -corruption forums in the main regions of the country failed to fail in a fidelity to Kolomoisky Dnieper and essentially failed.
Meanwhile, Saakashvili potentially has his own electorate, which appreciates him for trying to overcome corruption and do something for ordinary people. Such people met me this spring even in the seemingly hopelessly "pro -Russian" (rather antikiev) areas of the Dunay Bessarabia. There they appreciated the governor’s attempt to repair the hopelessly killed track going to the region from Odessa. And in general, the idea that the “third Maidan” ahead is dedicated to sore social issues and designed to select the funds from the “oligarchs” in favor of the people, has become a common place. Will Saakashvili become his organizer or “beneficiary”?
Some of my Ukrainian acquaintances in one form or another would like to. Such a development of events seems unlikely to me. Saakashvili is valued primarily for knowledge of the technologies of social "progressive", for past successes and for a firm anti -Putin position. His successful experience in Georgia is actively copying. However, this is clearly not enough for him to claim not only one of the first three positions in the state, but also the leadership of a large parliamentary faction. Lack of reflection, the ability to learn from your mistakes; Unwillingness to seriously treat your image and its public performances (this once again manifested itself in the final speech in Odessa); scandals periodically seeping into the press (and even more - rumors going to the Kyiv political elite) associated with his private life; Almost complete "foreignity" of the team - all this does Saakashvili with a politically weak figure. In fact, his fate is now completely in Poroshenko's hands. The President of Ukraine showed himself a more skilled politician who solved his tactical problems due to the moral and political capital of the former president of Georgia.