December 01, 2016, 01:02 / Opinions

The fight against corruption and government ratings

Sociologist Denis Volkov on public perception of major corruption cases

In November, Vladimir Putin's approval rating rose again to 86%. This happened against the backdrop of a strong decline in assessments of the work of other government institutions. In 2014, a sharp increase in the president’s popularity was ensured as a result of the annexation of Crimea to Russia. In the eyes of the majority, this act symbolized the revival of the country's former greatness. Putin has repeatedly emphasized that he was the architect of the policy towards Crimea. The ensuing conflict with the West and partly the war with Syria, coupled with a fairly rapid adaptation of the population to the economic crisis, helped keep the popularity of the first person at a high level for a long time.

However, in recent months, the number of those monitoring the developments in Syria has decreased. There has also been a temporary detente in relations with the West (if not in politics, then at least on Russian TV), i.e. the image of the United States as an enemy is temporarily not working to rally the population around the figure of the president. In these conditions, probably the only thing that could add points to the presidential rating was the arrest of the Minister of Economic Development Alexei Ulyukaev on suspicion of corruption.

Regular group discussions on socio-political topics show that there are three issues, the discussion of which greatly affects respondents. These are problems of Russian-American relations, migration and corruption. People talk calmly about other topics, but as soon as they talk about these three, emotions begin to overflow. Probably, each of these topics contains serious mobilization potential and can be used to manipulate public opinion and increase political capital.

Demonstrative arrest

Opinions / Editorial

In recent years, Russian authorities have exploited mainly anti-American sentiments. The anti-migrant theme was used carefully and in doses. For example, the problem of illegal migration was hotly discussed during the Moscow mayoral elections in 2013. Perhaps the authorities were reacting to part of Alexei Navalny’s agenda. As soon as the elections were over, the topic was closed. The conflict with the West has shifted attention from migrants to Americans, but now polls signal that everyday xenophobia has not gone away.

As for the demonstrative fight against corruption, the most high-profile and popular among the population were cases against oligarchs, which died down in the first half of the 2000s. The victims of that campaign were Gusinsky, Berezovsky and Khodorkovsky. The popularity of the campaign was based on the conviction of the population that the oligarchs in Russia “enjoy unlimited power” (according to opinion polls of those years, more than 80% of Russians thought so). It is characteristic that the trial of Khodorkovsky, which unfolded during the election campaign (more likely presidential than parliamentary), coincided with one of the first peaks of Putin’s popularity. The beneficial effect of the ostentatious fight against corruption (and this is how the majority of the population perceived this criminal process at that time) was felt by the authorities even then.

The popularity of high-profile anti-corruption investigations can be judged by two observations. Firstly, there is a widespread (approaching the same 80%) belief among the population that the bureaucracy is mired in corruption and that it is impossible to earn millions in our country in an honest way. Secondly, this is evidenced by the reaction of public opinion to previous corruption scandals in which major officials were involved. The common thing in the stories associated with the names of Serdyukov, Skrynnik, Chaika and Zakharchenko was that in the eyes of the population they became a manifestation of “general decay and corruption of power” (80% also thought so). Even more people (about 85%) in the case of Elena Skrynnik and especially in the case of Anatoly Serdyukov wanted to see officials in the dock. And when this did not happen, society felt strong disappointment (in group discussions, people always remember the Oboronservis case). Every decision made contrary to public opinion becomes a test of the legitimacy of the Russian government.

The Ulyukaev case differs from previous stories in that a noticeably large proportion of respondents to quantitative surveys are inclined to see in it (at least now) not only a sign of the disintegration of the system, but also the beginning of a real fight against corruption. Perhaps there is a cumulative effect associated with other cases (governors, businessmen, security officials), but most likely this is the result of a combination of the words “minister” and “prison.” How public perceptions will further develop will depend on the outcome of the process. Based on the experience of previous criminal cases, it can be said that in the eyes of public opinion, a detainee, if he is rich or holds a high position, is guilty by default.

Interestingly, only about a third of the population now believes that the story with the minister casts a shadow on Putin personally. Although, overall, more than 70% are convinced that the president, in principle, bears “full” or “partial” responsibility for the misconduct of major officials. That is, public opinion can, in principle, swing in one direction or the other. Today, the majority of the population is inclined to justify Putin personally: “he’s trying,” “he’s pulling Russia out,” “if Putin can’t, no one can,” our respondents say. This attitude can be explained by the notorious “Teflon effect” - thanks to the president’s high personal authority, criticism “does not bother” him. But if popularity begins to decline, negativity will begin to “stick” to him too, as was observed in 2010–2013. Demonstrative anti-corruption investigations work to improve the image of the government only if it already has high legitimacy. In conditions of low public support, such campaigns are more likely to undermine the authority of rulers rather than strengthen them.

All this allows us to talk about the great potential of the fight against corruption to maintain the government’s ratings at the current stage. Such a struggle does not depend on the foreign policy situation and falls on well-established ideas in society about the total disintegration of the Russian bureaucracy. However, in conditions when society is hungry for imprisonment and is not inclined to delve into details, there is a great risk that everything will be limited to demonstrative reprisals against individual representatives of the Russian elite. From the point of view of increasing ratings, such processes can be much more effective than a real and complex fight against corruption.

The author is a sociologist at Levada Center