How revolutions begin

The famous American historian Richard Pipes in his classical work "Russian Revolution" calls one of the causes of the February revolution bad weather.

The first three months of 1917, the average temperature in Petrograd was almost 30 degrees below zero. There were such colds, writes a historian that peasant women did not dare to go on the road to city markets. The railway tracks were noticeable with giant snowdrifts, there was no one to clear them, and this led to the fact that fuel ceased to be supplied to Petrograd. The bakers stopped, and the plants gradually began to stop.

The famous American historian Richard Pipes calls one of the causes of the February Revolution bad weather

The weather really plays a big role in the political life of the country. An example from recent history, when, after mass snowfalls from the post of Governor of St. Petersburg, Valentina Matvienko was forced to leave, only confirms this conclusion.

But still, how do revolutions begin? We will talk about this on the example of the February Revolution with a doctor of historical sciences, professor at the Faculty of History of the European University in St. Petersburg Boris Kolonitsky .

- Boris Ivanovich, that, indeed, weather conditions played such a decisive role in the onset of the February Revolution?

- I would not reduce to the weather all the conditions necessary for the revolution. It is difficult to talk about the reasons here, because we are historians, not representatives of the natural sciences, and we cannot accurately prove the reasons. But what happened in February according to the old style in Petrograd is not the first food performances in Russia. They took place in different cities, starting in 1915.

Weather conditions are only one of the factors. The weather and the features of the transport system affected. In this case, weather conditions only aggravated the problems associated with the transportation of food. There are objective reasons for this.

During the First World War, Russia was able to create the largest army in the world. She had to be worn, armed, fed. It was necessary to organize the front, and this is a giant economic event. The whole ten millionth army had to be supplied. And the Russian railway workers, despite objective difficulties, for example, for shortcomings in the annual production of wagons, were able to somehow improve indicators. And this is the merit of engineers, jeelorous managers. But there were more and more problems. And the weather added difficulties.

- From what events is it customary for historians to count the beginning of the February Revolution?

- Historians have no unity on this issue. There are dominant opinions. One version, which was then, dates the revolution on November 1, 1916 - a performance in the State Duma of Pavel Milyukov, that is, a well -known opposition attack. There are some reasons in this, because there was a crisis of the political elite, and without this it is difficult to imagine any revolution.

Other historians talk about February 18 according to the old style, when the strike was announced, and then a partial locout appeared in the Putilov plant in Petrograd. Indeed, this is a giant industrial enterprise, a strike on which could not but affect the course of events.

But most of the historians still call another date-February 23 according to the old style (March 8-in the new one). This day is the beginning of strikes on the Vyborg side of Petrograd, which was initiated by the-bastards at textile enterprises. Why do I think this date is important? The strike at the Putilov plant is of course a large event, but the plant itself is far from the city center. On the working outskirts, something like this is seething ... And on February 23, everything was overwhelmed to the city center, including Nevsky Prospekt, that is, what later turned out to be a revolution, became a city event, starting on February 23.

- After Nicholas II sent a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs Alexander Protopopov demanding to use weapons to restore order in Petrograd and this became known to the public, on February 27 the Petrograd garrison rebelled. How influenced the course of events to the soldier’s refusal to use weapons against the population?

The behavior of the soldiers was decisive

- The behavior of the soldiers was decisive. The first cases of disobedience took place on February 26, when the fourth company of the reserve battalion of the Pavlovsky regiment rebelled. This movement was localized and suppressed, but in the city they knew about it. People called back, reported this to each other-some degree of tension was raised. And the great uprising really began on February 27.

It was such a small civil war on the streets of the city: for several days, clashes, shelling took place, and this was crucial. Firstly, the events on the street acquired a different quality. And secondly, the State Duma was forced to act more sharply and harshly. Officially, she was dissolved by the emperor’s decree, her work was interrupted. But the deputies gathered for an unofficial meeting. Then, under the influence of radical deputies, the audience became more decisive, and in the end of the evening of the same day, the interim committee of the State Duma was created. They, of course, did not call him that, but it was such an application for power.

The deputies formulated their tasks carefully: “No matter what happened,” but for so many people the Duma was a great authority, and even the same rebellious soldiers could now represent their actions as legal: they were supported by the State Duma.

- Many participants in the events and close to the king later, most often already in exile recalled the indecision with which they acted, more precisely, were inactive by officials who had the opportunity to change the situation in Petrograd. What is explained?

The troops in Petrograd were unreliable

- Yes, many did not act very decisively, and there were many reasons for this - in particular, maybe the wrong selection of people in positions. But here you can’t do it decisively, because the troops in Petrograd were unreliable. This was not the imperial guard of the pre-war model, but the spare battalions-people who were only called up, who, after some time, had to be sent to the front. There were a lot of them, and they were very poorly controlled. Officers and non-commissioned officers were not enough, and good ones were not enough. Try to move such a mass to the street - it is still unknown who they will raise the weapon against! In the end, it turned out against whom ...

A very important thing is the terrible isolation of the royal family, including among the imperial house. The opposition of many grand -ducal clans on the eve of the February Revolution is a real fact. And the fact that Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich transferred the Guards crew, the commander of which he was, is also a real fact. There was a lot of disputes about whether he had a red bow on his chest or not. I personally think I was. But this is not very important.

A very important thing is a terrible isolation of the royal family

Extreme isolation ... Often quotes words from the diary of Nicholas II: “Around the betrayal, cowardice and deception ...” But the king was a very restrained, very controlled person who developed this quality in himself, and he did not allow himself anything like that. But then he broke through, he could not help but write it ... Apparently, there was a very large tension. After all, most of the country suspected him of treason ...

- The penultimate Minister of Agriculture of the Tsarist Government Alexander Naumov recalls how reluctantly members of the State Council came to contact with the State Duma. Did these high -ranking officials also contribute to the establishment of a pre -revolutionary situation in the country?

- Deputies of the State Duma made speeches of a clearly opposition nature. Probably, Pavel Milyukov’s speech was a special and new tone on November 1, 1916, in which the words were refused: "What is this, stupidity or treason?" And although he in his memoirs says that he left this question open, he admits that the audience read the second answer: this is treason. And, in general, a hint of this speech was that treason was at the very top.

Often quoted words from the diary of Nicholas II: "Around the betrayal, cowardice and deception"

Milyukov’s speech overshadowed other performances that were also very bright. Kerensky , for example, called the existing regime of the occupation, that is, no dialogue, the struggle to death ... But there were other very resonant performances. For example, the extreme right -wing deputy Vladimir Purishkevich , a monarchist with a reputation as an “extremely cocky monarchist”, also criticizes the government. Here, you know, even a very good policy would be difficult to find a common language with the State Duma. And many ministers were not good politicians.

- In what condition was the State Duma on the eve of the February Revolution?

- There was a "progressive block", uniting a significant part of the deputies. Their slogan was “the Ministry of Trust!”, That is, the creation of a government consisting of ministers that would not be appointed the State Duma, but which the Duma could trust. In general, a sufficiently moderate requirement. They say that the Duma would not be satisfied with this, but it is difficult to say, because they didn’t try it. But personally, the emperor took a few steps, with the help of which he not only went to meet the State Duma, but also brutally aroused it.

Even a very good policy would be difficult to find a common language with the Duma. And many ministers were not good politicians

The aggravation of relations between the monarchy, appointed by the monarch of ministers and representation, grew, which was extremely dangerous for the regime. The regime did not feel the growing popularity of the Duma in the country, and the authority of the government fell. This explains a lot of what seems incomprehensible to us.

Do not forget that many people then sincerely suspected the king and even the queen of the desire to conclude a separate peace with Germany, in the sympathies of the queen to Germany. No one has ever proved it. Moreover, we can say that the queen in her own way was a patriot of Russia. But, as we know, in life it is often not what is actually, but that millions of people believe in. Millions of people believed in what we call rumors today.

-Did the Bolshevik faction in the State Duma influence in February 1917?

- There was no longer this faction in the State Duma, because the deputies of the Bolshevik faction were arrested, deprived of deputy inviolability and exiled to Siberia. By the way, one of the defenders of this Bolshevik faction was Kerensky. He and other left -wing deputies constantly struck the Bolshevik deputies from exile, but this did not happen before the February Revolution.

The Bolsheviks had an underground structure

The Bolsheviks had an underground structure. There was the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, in which Alexander Shlyapnikov was the most important person. In addition, there was the St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks. His name was just that, because both the Bolsheviks and some other left considered the renaming of the city to Petrograd in 1914 "a concession to chauvinism." Until the twenties, they (and not only the Bolsheviks) called their organizations Petersburg.

Boris Kolonitsky

There were also some district Bolshevik organizations, primarily in the Vyborg district. But one should not exaggerate the significance of these organizations. In addition, several provocateurs were constantly in these organizations, and sometimes their presence was very significant. In principle, the police knew a lot about both the Bolsheviks and other underground groups.

If you collect everything that the Bolsheviks did during the February Revolution, you will get a book. And in Soviet times, the role of the Bolsheviks in this revolution was in every possible way exalted. But to determine the scale of the activity of some political group, it is not enough to study the activities of only this group, it is important to compare it with others. There were SSER and Menshevik organizations. And the Mensheviks had more opportunities, because they had semi -legal and legal structures, that is, the resource was different.

In Soviet times, the role of the Bolsheviks in the February Revolution was in every possible way exalted

There were Social Democrats of a completely different sense. And one of these organizations, well structured, were the Bolsheviks, and they were far from the most famous, which was demonstrated by the February Revolution, after which they were not a majority. At first they were a small political party.

- And you, as a historian who professionally study the revolution of 1917, does not surprise how the Bolsheviks managed to carry out the October Revolution and then keep power?

-The question is inaccurately formulated: what you call the October Revolution, I would call some stage in the development of the Russian revolution. And it does not come down only to the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks.

We can describe the February Revolution as rudely as follows: events in Petrograd and the reaction to these events in the country, because actions, for example, the emperor are also a reaction to events in Petrograd. And the events in other cities depended on how, when and under what circumstances information was transmitted about events in Petrograd.

One Georgian Social Democrat said: "We received the revolution by mail"

One Georgian Social Democrat said: "We received the revolution by mail." And where, for example, they delayed the information and there were some rumors that the delay was caused by some counter-revolutionary events, tragic events took place, as it was in Helsingfors and Kronstadt, where many officers died. In the end, it was impossible to hide this information, and the delay was perceived as a action of counter -revolution.

October is a much more complex phenomenon, because there were a lot of different "October" in different parts of the country. And what happened in Petrograd, of course, is very important, but some important events occurred in other places, for example, in Finland. On the one hand, the Finnish government was increasingly distance from the empire and challenged the Provisional Government. And on the other hand, the most powerful Russian garrisons located in Finland came out of submission to the Provisional Government even before the Bolsheviks took power. And this, by the way, is four dreadnought of the Russian fleet, his pride and a kind of backbone.

There were a lot of different "October" in different parts of the country

And in other cities, important events took place. For example, it is impossible to imagine the fall of 1917 without events in Kyiv. There was a very complicated combination. On the one hand, there was a representative office of the Provisional Government, military and civil structures. The second center of power was the Kyiv council, in which the Bolsheviks and their allies, left -wing ssers met. The third center of power is the Central Rada, which claimed power over the whole of Ukraine. Such a triangular conflict ... And for some short time, the Kiev council and the central radical act acted as allies opposing the Provisional Government. In addition, a wave of pogroms went throughout the country in different places, and the authorities of the Provisional Government, as it were, were not there.

If we talk about the Bolsheviks and their allies, then sometimes they try to saddle this spontaneous movement, somehow arrange it and redirect it for their own purposes. And sometimes, as we see according to the documents, they declare that they came to power precisely in order to stop this kindness: "We come as a firm power!"

So there were a lot of October - some of them began back in September. And in some places they continued in early 1918.

Many were sure that the Bolsheviks would not last long

Many were sure that the Bolsheviks would not last long. "Such operetta power" - many built the calculation on this. “You can’t cook any porridge with Kerensky, let the Bolsheviks overthrow Kerensky, they won’t stretch for a long time, it is technically impossible, but then a normal military dictatorship will be established!”, Such irresponsible statements were made. Many believed that there could not be worse than Kerensky. Many Bolsheviks (and you can’t talk about their unity) experienced quite sacrificial moods. "Yes, our experiment is doomed to failure, but we must fulfill our duty to push the world revolution!" - Many of them believed.

They say that once Lenin came to some meeting unusually pleased, although the general political atmosphere did not inspire optimism. When he was asked what was the matter, he replied: “We lasted one day longer than the Paris Commune,” that is, a world record was broken to hold the dictatorship of the proletariat.

- Vasily Rozanov wrote that "Russia fucked in two days." Are there really all the prerequisites for this?

- Once this happened, it means that it was natural. But was all this inevitable? It's hard for me to say. I think that some great shock would expect Russia during or after the war.

For many people, the civil war began already in 1916

The English historian Jonathan Smil wrote the book "Civil War in Russia. 1916-1926." It expands the chronological framework of the event. I do not want to talk about whether he is right or wrong, but he finds arguments. Ведь действительно в 1916 году произошло большое восстание в Средней Азии , во время которого погибли десятки тысяч человек, то есть для многих людей Гражданская война началась уже в 1916 году.

Первая мировая война была колоссальным напряжением для всех стран, и страны с гораздо меньшим ресурсом, чем Россия, иногда тянули ее из последних сил. И в Германии, и во Франции было непросто.

Если посмотреть какие были трудовые конфликты во Франции, например, и как осторожно, грамотно они разруливались, то видишь, что в России иногда действовали не скальпелем, а топором. Например, во время Первой мировой войны в 1915 году использовали оружие против забастовщиков. Использовали оружие во время события, которое мы очень часто недооценивали – во время майского антинемецкого погрома в Москве, который современники воспринимали как революцию.

Россию уже несколько раз крепко тряхнуло и до февраля 1917 года, так что я бы не назвал большой неожиданностью события Февральской революции. Было очень большое напряжение. Была объективно сложная ситуация, которой занимались не всегда умелые политики.

Была объективно сложная ситуация, которой занимались не всегда умелые политики

Когда мы говорим о революции, это всегда о политической элите, которая расколота, дезорганизована, непрофессиональна, часто безответственна. Конечно, революцию сложно представить без революционеров. Но очень часто огромный вклад в развитие революции вносят те люди, которые любой ценой хотят ее предотвратить.

– Если говорить о сегодняшнем дне, можно ли провести какие-то параллели с ситуацией в России накануне Февральской революции? Усвоены ли ее уроки и какие это уроки?

– Я думаю, что уроки Февраля учитывались и учитываются. В выступлении президента Путина перед Федеральным собранием говорилось о 2017 годе как о юбилейном годе, и прозвучал призыв к национальному единству. Я думаю, что этот призыв находит некоторый не политический, а психологический отклик у людей разных взглядов. Ведь если смотреть результаты опросов, то большая часть жителей России категорически настроены против революции как средства решения национальных проблем и даже считают, что революцию нужно предотвратить любой ценой. And this is understandable. Политическая культура России сейчас, как мне кажется, очень сильно отличается от политической культуры Украины, где и в 2014 году, и ранее существовал романтический культ революции, отчасти связанный с советской политической культурой. В России он тоже существовал, но само психологическое неприятие революции не обязательно гарантирует нас от самой революции.

Часто огромный вклад в развитие революции вносят те люди, которые любой ценой хотят ее предотвратить

Тут важны несколько вещей. Во-первых, нужно сохранять легитимность власти, проводя необходимые реформы. Было бы небольшим упрощением утверждать, что надо делать реформы, чтобы не было революции, ведь мы знаем, что исторически реформы иногда приводили к революциям. С другой стороны, в большой перспективе, если ничего не делать, соблюдая такой жестко консервативный курс без какого-либо развития (а совместить консерватизм и развитие довольно сложно), то это очень часто приводит к революции.

Во-вторых, очень важно отчуждение людей от политики. This is a big problem. Иногда культивируется аполитичность, и решение вопросов откладывается.

Аполитичность какое-то время может быть удобна властям, но в конце концов это может привести к непрофессиональной политике и радикализации политического процесса

Для меня очень важной характеристикой революции являются судьбы людей, которые жили тогда. Вспомним биографии нескольких советских военачальников времен Великой отечественной войны. Жуков, Рокоссовский, Конев и некоторые другие: все они – члены полковых комитетов в 1917 году, то есть люди, которые начали политически созревать и одновременно в какой-то степени входили в политическую элиту еще до Октября. Если бы они были включены в политическую элиту ранее, может быть, у них и взгляды были бы не такими радикальными…

Аполитичность какое-то время может быть удобна властям, но, в конце концов, это может привести к непрофессиональной политике и радикализации политического процесса.