The unreliable spring of 1917

The history of any revolution is always the subject of constant adjustments and clarifications. Whether it is successful or unsuccessful, whether it is written by an ally of the winning forces or a follower of the losing forces, any version of the revolution is one way or another created from the position of some ideology, since outside of ideology it is impossible to recognize the very fact of the revolution: if nothing important happened for your personal belief system, then what are we talking about?

Ideologies undergo changes over time. People of the 1920s knew a completely different February Revolution of 1917 than people of the 1950s and especially the 1970s, and the point is not in the absence of living participants or the publication of new documents, evidence and research: the description tools are modified, and this is very changes a lot. The events of 1917 before the October Revolution in the 70s were known by the people only as “the overthrow of the Tsar” and “red bows”; the February Revolution was a purely preliminary event of the Great October Revolution. Now, from 2017, everything looks a little different: the October Revolution looks like one of the final crushing episodes of the Great Russian Revolution, as it was respectfully called back during the Civil War by both the winners and the losers of all the confrontations that followed it.

And it is even more ridiculous to talk in this vein about the “victory” or “defeat” of the February Revolution in comparison with October, if it itself is the penultimate act of a huge process.

Like many other revolutions, the February Revolution can and, apparently, even needs to be considered as a delayed and much belated consequence of another revolutionary enterprise - the revolution of 1905-1907. It was in the fall and winter of 1905 that, without even knowing it, institutions and political forces finally took shape, which in 12 years would eliminate the existing structure of both state power and society itself. The Soviets, as the idea of ​​a new type of state power in society, appeared in 1905 and at the same time claimed to replace the existing government. The ideas of creating a Russian parliament, a formal separation of powers, limiting the supreme state power (in the case of Russia - monarchical) by constitutional law and transferring to parliament the right to create a government - the same time. Among the concepts “knocked out” by the main driving force of the 1905 revolution, the workers and employees of large cities, Nicholas II, were the rights to legal political activity, and the formal inviolability of the individual with his rights, and freedom of speech. Among the concepts that could not be “knocked out” were universal voting rights in parliamentary elections, “responsible government” and agrarian reform, which was understood by the majority of the population of the Russian Empire at that time as the nationalization or socialization of agricultural lands in one form or another. The pre-revolutionary history of Russia in 1906–1913, before the country entered the Great War in 1914, was filled with events and achievements of all kinds. From the outside, it might seem that these events were pushing the agenda of the 1905 revolution somewhere into the realm of pure unnecessary theory, “progressive ideas” of all kinds of dreamers, extremists, far from the “real agenda” of society.

But such questions can wait, despite the Tsar’s consecration of the Constitution - the release of the Manifesto on October 17, 1905, despite domestic railways, Russian, Belgian and French investments in the Donbass, despite Acmeism and symbolism, despite the “Russian Seasons”, and Zvorykin at the Technological Institute, and even Pavlov at the Military Medical Academy. Questions about democratic power, about equal civil liberties and about ownership of land by society, in fact, were decided for themselves, and were decided completely differently from what suited the monarchy and its state apparatus. All that remained was to wait, in the fullness of life between 1906 and 1917, for this social consensus to try to translate itself into change again. Not necessarily revolutionary - the entire history of the February Revolution itself until March 1917 demonstrates the extent to which its key participants, not even excluding radicals, were ready to negotiate with each other and with opponents in order to prevent a civil war.

And, what is most surprising, this equally applies to the two most powerful opponents of the autocracy, between whom back in 1915 it was impossible to find literally anything in common. The Socialist Revolutionary Party boycotted the elections to the third and fourth State Dumas and, like the RSDLP, relied on a forceful change in the state structure. Created in August 1915, the Progressive Bloc in the Fourth State Duma, more than half of its deputies and six leading Duma factions, backed by mass parties, demanded that the monarchy, in essence, implement practically the same program as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social Democrats , minus perhaps the socialization of the lands - but by purely non-revolutionary methods. Throughout the February Revolution, representatives of the two most significant ideological blocs of the opposition showed an amazing willingness, despite the complete opposition of their political ideals, to come closer to each other in practices adopted from each other.

The constant debate in historical science about whether there were prerequisites for the collapse of the Russian Empire, or whether a strong state machine, capable of development and adaptation, fell victim to conspirators and external circumstances, is in fact quite scholastic. Along with Russia, at least three more world-scale empires became victims of the First World War in the history of mankind - Ottoman, German and Austro-Hungarian, and acute crisis phenomena in the British Empire, visible mainly in the economy, began already in 1920, by historical standards - immediately after the war. There is no point in wondering whether the Russian Empire would have survived if there had been any other war - even if Germany, with its exemplary tough social structure, did not survive these influences, it is not strange that Russia did not survive them. Looking from the current century, it is difficult to deny oneself the thought that the progressives, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and socialists in general resisted the revolution in the proper sense of the word, the disintegration of a large country, in various ways. Projects for the radical reorganization of Russia were put forward by all parties solely so that Russia, God forbid, does not disappear.

By the autumn of 1916, from which, apparently, it makes sense to start counting the chronology of the Great Russian Revolution, the threat of the collapse of Russia was seen by every person interested in politics - and even those who were not interested. The main events of the summer of 1916 for Russia at war with Germany were the Brusilov breakthrough, an unexpectedly successful auxiliary operation to divert the forces of Austria-Hungary from the Italian front, but also the summer Battle of the Somme, where Germany and the Entente lost a million soldiers together. By the fall of 1916, at least 9.5 million people, mostly peasants, were under arms in Russia, and almost none of them understood what goals and objectives the war in which they were participating might have, and why all this was necessary. The question “of the goals and objectives of the war” was directly raised by almost all political parties in Russia before the pre-revolutionary conference of the Entente in Petrograd in February 1917. No one was going to give a clear answer to it, other than “the need for victory.” Meanwhile, hardly anyone could call the question idle. In February–March 1917, the Russian army was to launch its largest offensive against the enemy. She already had shells after overcoming the “shell crisis” of 1915. It already had reserves - 2 million called up to reserve companies, a significant part of which were quartered in Petrograd. It already had the missing materiel reserves - the United States was entering the war as Russia's ally, the Entente was already supplying rifles, greatcoats and artillery to the renamed Murmansk and the unrenamed Arkhangelsk. There was no answer to a simple question: what reasons prevent the end of the war, which turned into a massacre; For what higher purposes do governments, including the Russian government, not strive for a speedy conclusion of peace? If we win, then why do we win, what are we striving for in this war? Why do we need victory, and why are bloody military sacrifices made?

Alas, in the political structure that was attacked by the State Duma, the Socialist Revolutionary revolutionaries, and the RSDLP, there could be no answer. The idea of ​​countering the depletion of the country's administrative resources with a new institution, the government of people's trust, drawn up by the State Duma, did not find interest in the monarchy, which since 1905 had become accustomed to stalling for time in resolving any issues. It seems that they simply did not understand what we could be talking about at all - in this sense, Nicholas II and his entourage were extremely apolitical people. When on February 26, 1917, the uprising of first the reservists, and then the main military units of Petrograd, provoked by food shortages, did happen, the State Duma, dissolved for a break, was literally forced to create, in place of the government of Nikolai Golitsyn, which was in force and fled in February, a temporary executive power from its leadership - simply because there was no other power: the alternative, the Workers' Councils, the discovery of 1905, was just being formed, and such an alternative looked dangerous even for a moderate socialist. The provisional government under the leadership of Prince Lvov negotiated with the tsar for several days, halfway through military preparations against his army - until Nicholas II nevertheless agreed to abdicate, observing with his own eyes that practically no one intended to fight for him with Rodzianko, Lvov and Miliukov .

On the revolutionary side, on the other hand, the Socialist Revolutionaries, by then the largest political party in the country with approximately a million members, found themselves in a surprising position. On the one hand, almost all revolutionary socialist parties in Europe knew decades before the Great War how the socialist revolution should be accomplished. It’s simple: a wave of social strikes develops into a general political strike; workers and employees, paralyzing the economic mechanism with their unity, liquidate the current and opposing authorities, since with such unity they simply have nothing to manage! In war conditions, the workers' strike, theorists said, is joined by the workers' wars - soldiers and sailors, they are armed, and the alliance of protesters takes power into their own hands, overcoming the resistance of a minority of counter-revolutionaries. All this is true, if not for one problem: the Socialist Revolutionaries are a predominantly peasant party, sharing in many ways the old anarchist ideas of Europe in the 19th century. The peasants have no reason to go on strike - they are only interested in land in the context of continued demographic growth. You can go on strike as much as you like, but this is not about land.

Therefore, the victory of the February Revolution, which occurred according to the notes of socialist theory: a general strike, army riots, the fall of a rotten regime, the formation of a new people's power - had only intermediate value for the socialist revolutionaries. Of course, it is important what happens in the cities - and the Social Revolutionaries had excellent, practically leading positions both in the Soviets and in the changing Provisional Government. But they were primarily interested in the peasantry. The million-dollar party literally disappeared into millions of soldiers who deserted from the German front in order to be in time for the redistribution of the land. Fortunately, the exhausted enemy did not advance. Well, it almost didn’t come—until the time came; Revel has already been evacuated. In St. Petersburg and Moscow, after the murder of several hundred officers by soldiers and sailors and the formal democratization of the army, the military authorities remained demoralized and little involved in organized political life. Unlike the armed sailors, the ideas of anarchy were popular among them, so the rank and file of the Baltic Fleet carried out the destruction of existing state institutions not without pleasure.

Outwardly, after the victory of the revolution, which, by the way, was almost instantly recognized by the Entente allies, everything went well, although strangely. On the one hand, the former deputies of the Progressive Bloc of the not yet dissolved State Duma, the only body of power that remained the successor to the old regime, in the person of the Provisional Government looked like a natural and legitimate power, moreover, quite revolutionary. Laws were adopted that previously would have been impossible to imagine without going to the Peter and Paul Fortress. Meetings were held and appropriations were made, commissars were sent to the places, and from there correspondence and taxes flowed in the usual manner. There was a state press, basic freedoms were implemented in practice, and newspapers were published. The population of Russia as a whole supported the authorities - at least in comparison with the unpopular Nicholas II, who was hardly mentioned without the name of his family consultant Rasputin. On the other hand, from the newspapers of that time one can clearly sense not even dual power, but the mood of the population in relation to the new government as something more ephemeral, lightweight in comparison with the tsarist one. It was still necessary to get used to the non-repressive government in the Russian Empire.

However, the power of the Provisional Government on the ground was more or less recognized - fortunately it declared itself temporary. The parallel power of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, in which the moderates were represented less than the Socialist-Revolutionaries and two factions of the RSDLP - the radical socialist Mensheviks and the ultra-radical socialist Bolsheviks - of course, worried the formal authorities. But this state of affairs until July 1917, until the Bolsheviks, left Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists tried to shift the balance of power in the Soviet direction by force, was considered tolerable. After all, Alexander Kerensky, Minister of War of the Provisional Government from March 1917 and the most popular politician in the country, was himself a Socialist Revolutionary and one of the leaders of the party.

Of course, the soldiers still did not want to fight, despite the put forward slogan “War to a victorious end” - the offensive on the fronts, previously prepared by the tsar for February-March, was postponed to the summer of 1917 and the soldiers were frightened (when it finally began - and this was already in July - it turned out that no one wanted to fight, not only in words, but also in deeds, so it was simply cancelled). There was not enough bread, so the Provisional Government tried to carry out surplus appropriations (for this it lacked cruelty; after a year or two the Bolsheviks already had enough). Of course, the top of the army, which came to its senses, immediately saw the potential for political power in Kerensky’s military jacket, and in August what was later called the “Kornilov rebellion” happened. But the generals, who were planning something like a conspiracy, were successfully arrested in the Belarusian Bykhov, from where they fled in November 1917 in the turmoil of October, forming a reliable backbone of future Whites - by no means all monarchists: the restoration of the monarchy as the main goal of the White movement was invented later.

In September the Russian Republic was proclaimed. A pre-parliament was created, preparations were made for secret, equal and general elections to the Constituent Assembly, which was supposed to complete the creation of a new statehood. The Bolsheviks, who seemed to be numerous after the July events, increased their numbers, and they supported the growing influence of the Soviets. Ukraine did not live up to the most alarming expectations, wanting nothing more than political autonomy within the future Russian Federation. In the economy, however, everything was so-so - inflation for six months exceeded the figures for the last two years, new money was rapidly depreciating. The composition of the government in government crises became increasingly socialist, although non-Marxist in essence. There was no attack on private property; only the idea of ​​“workers’ control” over factories legally owned by capitalists was in vogue. Only the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, who had gone underground since July, were guided by the doctrine of the proletarian revolution “according to Marx”; for the Socialist-Revolutionaries it was already more or less gibberish, and for the Mensheviks it was almost heresy. Others discussed a variety of projects for the future development of the revolution in a non-violent or almost non-violent form; it seemed harsh, but light.

In general, the February Revolution, after six months from the moment of its easy victory, began to decline. Interesting, stormy, but seemingly not at all tragic prospects awaited society in the future. The world war of attrition was coming to its logical conclusion. The future government in Russia was inevitably seen as a socialist federal republic with a penchant for light populist authoritarianism and a strong role for the army. The socialization of land was considered a solved problem; the only question was the form and speed of the process. It was clear that the new government institutions would profess the principles of civic nationalism, would be created creatively and would not exactly copy Western democracies. And there is no civil war - the tsarist police have already been replaced by the people's militia (which sharply increased crime), the country in 1917 generally rapidly decentralized power. In general, it promised to be interesting.

It didn't work out. After the failure of the July offensive, the number of soldiers and sailors willing to fight fell progressively, and questions about land, parliament and government were daily replaced by less exalted, but more pressing questions about peace and food, which the Soviets insisted on and which the Provisional Government was not able to resolve. condition. In October 1917, the Bolsheviks, guided by the strange Marxist doctrine of the world proletarian revolution, the nationalization of all means of production and the dictatorship of the proletariat in an agrarian country, in alliance with the left faction of the Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists, almost playfully took power by force - first in Petrograd, and then in Moscow. In the growing chaos, which almost all attributed the influence of the future final phase of the Great Russian Revolution, the Constituent Assembly, the coup almost no one noticed - except for civil servants, who had sabotted the parish of incomprehensible people with strange ideas, until the Cheka Dzerzhinsky had earned. Elections to the Constituent Assembly were predictably won by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who still remained the main force and in the Soviets. But the greatest socialist-anarchist party of the country, the main power of the revolution, the expressor of the aspects of the majority of the population of Russia, the main partner of the former progressive bloc in the opposition of the monarchy, the revolutionary party No. 1 was not able to ensure the victorious end of the February revolution. In the frenzy that she considered a true political struggle, she seemed to simply not notice the defeat from the party of Vladimir Lenin, who put on the dictatorship. This dictatorship even by the Socialist Revolutionaries was considered an intermediate episode, an unpleasant, but corrective failure on a difficult path to a normal country. Ahead, as it was believed, there was a whole era, and it was supposed to be a democratic era, the era of freedom, equality and brotherhood.

The fact that Kerensky’s attempt in November 1917 to regain power in Petrograd failed by the army because of the unwillingness of anyone except the Bolsheviks, with someone to fight, was a symptom of the final failure of the path to the national authorities, offered a progressive block six months ago As the main. The point was set when accelerating the Constituent Assembly with the guidance of the famous sailor-anarchist Zheleznyak. However, until the spring of 1918, when the old army dissolved for unnecessarily in November was replaced by the general military service for the New Red Army, few perceived what was happening otherwise than the natural expansion of the Soviets, one of the possible options for future national authorities in Russia.

And only with the realization that there will be nothing normal in the Bolshevik version of the Soviets, and the real civil war began, with the beginning of which the Great Russian Revolution ended. She practically achieved her goals, but this did not matter. Russia itself ended for 70 years, turning into Soviet Russia, a country of completely different fate. Viktor Chernov, chief ideologist of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and the last chairman of the Constituent Assembly, in 1919 published a book of his own translations of Verkharn, created in 1917-1918. Both Chernov and Lenin returned from emigration to Russia after February 1917. Lenin also loved the Verkharna, but his translations of the great poet are unknown.