March 17, 2017, 17:35 / Opinions

Long-term effect of Crimea

Sociologist Denis Volkov about the place of Crimea in public opinion

Three years ago, an agreement was signed in the Kremlin on the admission of the Republic of Crimea to Russia. This decision immediately caused general euphoria. In March 2014, 88% of Russians supported this decision. For a third (34%) it evoked a feeling of “pride in the country”, for another 31% - “a feeling of the triumph of justice”, and for 19% - joy. No more than 5% spoke about their indignation, shame, despair, fear, and anxiety. For several months, this event was called by respondents the main event of recent times, and in December 2014, Russians called the annexation of Crimea the main event of the year, on a par with the victory at the Olympics. In group discussions, people talked a lot about Crimea as a success of the country, but when we asked respondents to draw Russia, people depicted not the usual rivers, lakes and girls in kokoshniks, but round dances, mass rallies, processions, jubilant crowds of people holding hands. I have not seen such a clear and voluminous reflection of mass mobilization in drawings either before or after 2014.

Immediately after the annexation of Crimea, the ratings of the top officials of the state soared, general optimism and confidence in the future and in the right direction of developments increased. For the first time in many years, there was a feeling of unity between government and society. And if in 2011-2013. The political system was in a protracted crisis (more than a third of the population did not approve of the actions of the authorities, and, although the mass protests had already been ended, the authority of the authorities could not be restored), then with the annexation of Crimea these problems were resolved.

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The euphoria itself lasted only a few months; already in the fall, the usual economic problems began to come to the fore (the December shock from the fall of the ruble exchange rate was especially strong), strong excitement was replaced by growing apathy and fatigue. But the effect of the events of three years ago is still felt. In fact, the vector of the country's political life for several years ahead was then set. Thanks to the newfound legitimacy, the party in power confidently won the Duma elections; in the upcoming presidential elections, the undisputed favorite is Vladimir Putin, who strengthened his shaky popularity in 2014.

Prerequisites

Why did the annexation of Crimea have such a strong effect? This is partly due to the fact that in the time that has passed since the collapse of the USSR, society has not come to terms with the loss of the peninsula. The polls we asked while working at VTsIOM showed: in May 1998, 77% of Russians would like Crimea to be “returned to Russia.” Almost half of them believed that a change in the status of the peninsula should occur as a result of a referendum of local residents. In March 2002, 80% held a similar opinion. Six years later - in responses to Levada Center - the figure reached 85%. At the same time, in order to return Crimea to Russia, the majority of Russians (76%) allowed various types of pressure to be exerted on Ukraine (including military pressure - 9%).

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Why is Crimea so dear to the average Russian citizen? Surveys show that there are three main types of associations associated with the peninsula: a seaside resort, the glory of Soviet weapons and a base for the Black Sea Fleet. All three can be paired with stable cultural images: these are the “All-Union health resort Crimea”, the epic painting by Alexander Deineka “Defense of Sevastopol” and the song “Sevastopol Waltz”. Symbolically, Crimea was tightly connected with the Soviet past: be it a vacation at a prestigious Soviet resort, the cult of victory in the Great Patriotic War, or the attributes of the country’s military power. Crimea turns out to be not so much “Russian” as “Soviet”.

Although the topic was practically not discussed publicly, nostalgia for Crimea periodically erupted in popular culture. For example, in 2000, Alexei Balabanov made the film “Brother-2”, in which, during a criminal showdown, one of the heroes unloads a pistol at a Ukrainian mafioso with the words: “You bastards will answer me for Sevastopol!” In 2007, bard Alexander Gorodnitsky wrote the song “Sevastopol will remain Russian.” In other words, the loss of Crimea was experienced quite intensely by Russian society. And today, when we ask respondents to explain why they support the annexation of Crimea, the majority, both in surveys and in group discussions, answer: “Crimea has been ours all our lives.”

And yet, in parallel, there was a slow process of accepting the fact that neighboring Ukraine is a separate state, and there is no need to interfere in the affairs of its neighbors. In order to disrupt the status quo and take Crimea for themselves, the authorities and Russian society itself needed to find a compelling justification. And it was found quite easily. Today, 64% of Russians justify their annexation by the fact that “Crimea has always been Russian,” but in March 2014 everything was different. Then, in the eyes of the majority (62%), Russia’s actions were justified by the need to “protect the Russian-speaking population” from Ukrainian nationalism. Much less was said about the desire to “restore historical justice.” Later, the story that by annexing Crimea, Russia violated its international obligations was completely pushed out of public consciousness: 80% do not agree that any violation took place; no more than 5% of the population is ready to call what happened annexation.

Support indicators

Let us repeat that for the majority of the population, the inclusion of Crimea into Russia has lost its relevance; this is less often discussed in focus groups. Moreover, with the growing economic crisis, voices are sometimes heard that the bridge to Crimea need not be built, since enough has already been spent on this region. And Crimeans already live better than the majority of the country’s population: they have sun, sea, and fruits. However, such routinization of the event did not affect the attitude towards it.

Today, from 83 to 89% support the annexation of the peninsula to Russia (depending on the wording of the question), and from 8 to 13% are against it. The answer to the question whether accession brought more benefit or harm does not look so clear: in November 2016, 64% of Russians saw more positive things in it, 19% saw more negative things. However, no more than 12% are ready to return the peninsula to Ukraine, and 83% are categorically against it. Today, even some of those people who believe that the decision to include Crimea into Russia was wrong are against such a return. In group discussions, only a few motivate their opinion by the fact that this would be unfair to the Crimeans. There are other mechanisms at work here. A central role is played by a change in the semantic context in which the problems associated with the peninsula are discussed and understood.

Until 2014, public opinion was dominated by nostalgia, a sense of injustice and infringement over the fact that Crimea went to Ukraine. Today, the peninsula has acquired a new symbolic meaning. The majority of the population understood the annexation of Crimea as confirmation of the “resurgent greatness of Russia.” About 80% of Russians are confident in this today. People in focus groups said: “just two days - and Crimea is ours”, “if earlier Putin only spoke about the greatness of the country, now he has proven it”, “we showed everyone”, “showed our teeth”.

According to the results of a January survey, the “return of Crimea” is understood today as the second most important reason for Russians to be proud (after the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War). Focus groups paint an even starker picture: for many respondents, Crimea is almost the only recent achievement they can be proud of. It is in the context of the “rebirth of Russia” and the restoration of the country’s role “as a great power” that the effect that the annexation of the peninsula had on strengthening the legitimacy of the political regime should be explained. By the way, violation of international obligations in this context looks like a virtue: a great power, in the minds of our respondents, can do what “other countries cannot afford.”

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Moreover, understanding the events of three years ago through the prism of the revival of Russian greatness blocks the possibility of any talk about the return of Crimea to Ukraine. As Russian officials say: “the issue is closed.” People in groups echo them: “Crimea is ours, and we will not return it.” In the described context, the return of Crimea looks like an admission of weakness, a loss of face, a concession not so much to Ukraine as to pressure from the United States and Europe. And this is impossible without losing your newfound sense of self-worth. Therefore, the return of Crimea is the “worst case scenario”, “the very last thing”. And those who advocate such a development of events, in the eyes of the majority, are “being fed by the West.”

Those people for whom the annexation of Crimea is a “problem”, a “shame”, a “failure of foreign policy”, a “mistake”, of course, remain. Their share, depending on the sharpness of the wording of filter questions, can be estimated from 5 to 20% of the population. The age and education of respondents have virtually no influence on their position. Rather, it is a matter of ideological attitudes. Those who do not approve of the annexation of Crimea to Russia are more numerous among supporters of opposition parties and politicians, among Muscovites, people focused on expanding contacts with the outside world. But even there they are a minority. As our colleague Boris Dubin would say, “a minority of a minority.” The main arguments against joining that are heard in group discussions are: an increase in budget expenditures and a deterioration in relations with developed countries, turning Russia into a rogue country.

In the last three years since this event, polls show that public opinion on this issue was formed by the spring of 2015 and has remained virtually unchanged since then. Moreover, now the respondents’ answers are even more categorical than at the very beginning. It can be assumed that the rapprochement between Russia and the West, as well as the decline in the legitimacy of the current political system, may weaken the ideological tension surrounding this topic. This means that the number of skeptics may also increase. But it is unlikely that their number will increase significantly. And the longer Crimea remains part of Russia, the fewer people will want to question the existing status quo.

The author is a sociologist at Levada Center