States, especially authoritarian ones, are structured like banks: as soon as citizen-depositors lose confidence, they run to withdraw their valuables.

The essentially uncontested gubernatorial elections in the Sverdlovsk region and the municipal elections in Moscow, where there are independent candidates (however, let's not forget that the levels of government here are different) represent situations that reflect the real dispute going on in Russia. It is between those who hope for the revival of dead institutions, such as elections, and those who consider this a utopia.

If you explain Russian politics to an alien, you can start by saying: look, there are laws and rules, parties and organizations, there is an election procedure, there is the media. If you have time, you can explain that parties are registered according to such-and-such rules, access to elections is arranged in such-and-such a way, and there are a thousand other circumstances, including the structure of the Russian political system. The difference between the first and second understandings will be essential. In the first explanation, Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov will be the parliamentary opposition without quotation marks. In the second, they will be part of the system and the "opposition." "Elections" and "parties" will also eventually receive quotation marks.

At the first level, there is no dispute about principles: we accept phenomena, so to speak, at face value. At the second level, the conversation is only about principles: now we do not accept the offered coin at its face value, but try to understand what it is really worth (in real life, these levels are not strictly separated, but it is important to understand that they exist).

Let's leave aliens aside for a moment and note that in Russia itself there are people who see the picture only in the first, nominal sense. When a system exists for a long time, time helps it to normalize. People get tired of maintaining the bar of comparison with samples and dreams - there is not enough life to dream. There are fewer alternatives, quotation marks are erased, the nominal becomes a full-fledged norm.

Normalization of wild and strange things – from the war in the neighboring country to the way TV channels look and the way prisons and elections are organized – is the strategy of Russian political management. Let's be fair: not only is the horrible being normalized, but in some places it is being improved – from the "My Documents" centers to the streets in big cities and the cautious admission of independent candidates to municipal elections. But normalization of the horrible is still the main line. If elections are emasculated in advance, they can be held completely legally. It is no coincidence that legality (not legitimacy, not turnout) has been declared a priority during the September events resembling elections.

For some reason, I am sure that this is what "Putin's plan" is, because legality is one of his favorite concepts. However, the authorship of the plan is not so important. What is important is the strategy, and it is to ensure that there are no people who see the second level, the inside, the staged nature and weakness of the political design of power. The strategy is to ensure that only those who see the upper, nominal level of politics remain: the existing laws, rules, elections. The strategy is to reach a situation where it will be impossible to throw the dissident "Observe your laws!" to the authorities, because the honest answer will be "Yes, we do, we do."

Read also: Politicize This

This is not the case yet. Moreover, it will never be so, because the state mechanism is a legalistic utopia. The state and civil servants do not always observe their own laws, if only because they write and constantly rewrite them not to observe them themselves, but to catch their enemies in non-observance. The most recent high-profile story about this is the case of director Kirill Serebrennikov. At the top level, it is about breaking the law, and at the second level, about repression. By the way, it reminds us that this is not only about access to the political process. There is also a double bottom in access to strategic business, to large audiences in the media, art and other areas that are gradually being nationalized.

The other side of the scenery is visible to many: the Russian information space is heavily distorted, but not completely closed. About 60% of people in Moscow and 30% in the country regularly use alternative sources of information. And this reminds us of a surprising feature of the Russian political structure. When journalist Oleg Kashin writes that most Russian artists have long since gone over to Putin’s side and have a hard time understanding why they would suddenly become dissidents because of one director, he is right. But most likely, the side they, like most Russian citizens, have gone over to is not “Putin’s side.”

Of course, there are many young, naive and simply busy people who see only the upper level of political reality – the pure coin – like that alien. But many, perhaps even very many, are not aliens and understand that the decorations of existing institutions, including the outright fake elections, are not backed by real value. States, especially authoritarian ones, are structured like banks: as soon as citizen-depositors lose trust, they run to take out their valuables. Russians are not running yet, they support unsecured institutions in the hope that over time they will be filled with real life: there will be an awakening of sleeping institutions; the first and second levels will gradually merge; under the splashes of living water, the dead will come to life. Perhaps the municipal elections in Moscow can be a step towards this transformation?

This is the question. Despite the illusory nature of the hopes that living water exists, its supporters win quantitatively. But this does not change the fact that the uncontested political structure built in Russia is based on the trust of citizens, and not on the cunning of its architects and the strength of its guardians.

Full version of the article. The abridged newspaper version can be viewed in the Vedomosti archive (smart version)

Is it possible to revive dead institutions?