Translated material
In a trap of a local maximum
From a meeting at the Gulag Museum, the question came to me: “Today, many good economic programs have been developed, how Russia to switch from a“ special path ”to the beaten path, including the KGI program. What/who prevents their implementation? "
I answer as far as I can publicly. There are at least two serious problems.
The first is the problem of, so to speak, beneficiaries. Here it is worth talking a little about the concept of “local optimization”. People, and especially society, evaluate their position (very simplified) on the coordinate field “Quality of life” - “risks”. At the same time (not mathematics - shut up your ears), depending on the attitude to risks, people and society are ready to change the quality of life at risk in different proportions, but, generally speaking, they are ready to give/get a certain amount of quality of life (x) for a certain reduction/increase in risks (y). If x is large, and small - they say that this person is very careful. If on the contrary, then he is very “risky”.
Accordingly, people (and societies) say that they became “better” if they received more than X as life, and risks have grown less than in (or they reduced the quality of life less than on x, and risks were reduced more than in). People, and especially societies, tend to strive to improve their position by sequential actions, the result of each of which is a positive change. Neither people nor society, as a rule, are capable of multi -way planning for the type “Five times worsened quality of life, so that later it is sharply improved” - largely because they see the risks much higher than just the risk of each of the individual stages of such a transformation.
Now imagine that in the way of such an improvement in life a person falls into a “zone”, any movement from which leads to a rapid increase in risks with a very small reward, or to a very large decline in the quality of life with a small reduction in risks. This (not mathematics, do not open your ears yet) - a local maximum function. Given the fact that the process of optimizing life in people is built from small optimal steps, it becomes impossible to get out of the point of local maximum, even if it is very low compared to the global maximum.
Well, here. The public system built (and to a large extent that was spontaneously built) in Russia, based on the active operation of natural resources and the bureaucratic hierarchy, has created a kind of “local maximums” for most members of society that actively affect the state of the system.
A hundred families who are close to power, and half a million families serving their interests earn from the flows of petrodollar, use low personal taxation and optional laws, relatively low prices for goods and services in the domestic market, privileged position and other white man’s benefits in the colony. They are most afraid to lose their capabilities, fixed by informal ties and many years of gaining confidence in their curators. Any changes bear the risks of losing this status.
Several million people associated with power structures and the defense complex, in addition to the growth of earnings over the past ten years, have received the comfort of the stability of their situation and the respect of society-privileges, the loss of which in the 90s they remember very well and are very afraid to part with them.
A couple of tens of millions of “state employees” - officials of medium and small rank, Gups managers, employees of the lower -level state -owned level, etc. - never saw another source of income, except for the state, a different way of maintaining it, except for the manifestation of complete loyalty, and another way to increase it, except for hardware intrigue, and competition in devotion. They are afraid of abbreviations, afraid of a “market”, which will require completely different qualities from them, are afraid of uncertainty and instability.
Millions of pensioners mainly consist of those who were 35-45 years old at the turn of the 90s. These were people who were held in the Soviet system, no longer ready to change paradigms and professions by virtue of age. It was the mass of the 90s that left them on oatmeal and water for several years, even the small income that they had under socialism, forced to sharply reduce their social status, humiliated them, forcing them to feel guilty for how they lived until 1991. In the current system, they see a return to “reasonable socialism”, which justifies their past and, at the same time, protection against uncertainty and humiliation of the 90s. Yes, they are poor - but they were always poor; But they are not humiliated and not afraid that tomorrow they will lose everything; But they can enjoy the condemnation of those who destroyed their world in the 90s.
Millions of people living, for example, in the North Caucasus, are historically used to being conformal to a strong hierarchy - they will play for that hierarchy that will prove their strength. They not only fit into the new system, but also support it, at least while their hierarchies are strong people, whose power is reinforced by permissiveness and petrodollars from the center. Changes for them will almost certainly mean new conflicts (most likely bloody), and the lack of guarantees not only to preserve, albeit low, status, but even - life.
And there are millions of people who have adapted to make their small gray business (who carries smuggling, who teaches, who heals, who trades), fit into the system and survive - they know who to pay for security and permission to work, how to get away from taxes and got used to their role. Changes in their case are the loss of a “niche” and the need to start again, with new bosses and bandits, apparently with taxes, etc.
We have not listed so many people - their number is unlikely to exceed the very 15 - 20% of the population who consistently advocate “reforms”. And this percentage is mainly concentrated in very narrow strata of the population - the middle layer of entrepreneurs, the remains of scientific and cultural intelligentsia, young managers and middle -sized professionals. The percentage of such people in power, power structures, and regional elites are close to zero - namely, these strata of society most determine its readiness for changes and their “permission”.
Of course, through logical reasoning, each representative of each of the above group can prove that reforms are needed, that as a result of reforms, each of them (including those who are close to power) can “become better”. But their abstract need is associated with real risks not only for years to lose even what is now, but also, if the reforms are not successful or if they do not go the same as they are announced, to lose everything and forever. Therefore, those same 80% of the population are not ready to maintain reform plans, moreover, they actively sabote even those reforms that are trying to impose “from above”; In many ways, therefore, few reforms carried out “from above” look as a result of half and formal.
This system lives while there are sufficient income from hydrocarbons sales and the “depreciation” of the technological heritage of the Soviet era and the times of the high cost of oil have not gone too far. As incomes decreased, the accumulation of an unrealized need for the replacement of the released infrastructure and the development of development from the countries of the first and second groups in terms of economics, various large strata, today dear to relative comfort, will go into the zone in which changes for them will be preferred compared to preservation of the status quo.
The state employees will be the first to be there - they will simply not have enough money, and social services will be much worse than now. In parallel, the regional elites and hierarchy will change their attitude, which will also lack revenues from the center. The central elites (possibly, except for the near circle) will want changes quickly enough - their rapidly decreasing income will not compensate for the overall deterioration of the quality of life in Russia and the growth of risks. By that time, the stratum of the “pensioners” will leave the political scene simply for natural reasons, social security will be waiting for those who were 20-25 years old in 1990, that is, those who just fit into the reforms and have the right to ask the question: “Why are their fruits lost?”
One way or another, but gradually more than half of the Russian citizens will want changes, but even a significant dilemma will arise here: part of the population will want “left” changes - that is, redistribution in their direction of the remains of the pie; Part - “right” changes, that is, expanding the ability to create a pie and distribute it. According to the experience of supplies of the socialist type, the first will be more, so the “for” reform programs written to this day will still be a minority, and the country, apparently, will have to survive not only the period of bankruptcy of “stability”, but then the period of bankruptcy of “left democracy”.
And finally - the second reason for problems with economic programs is much more prosaic. It consists in the complete isolation of these programs from the real economic and political context of modern Russia. All of them answer the question “What is good?”, But not one gives an answer to key questions: “How much is it possible?”; “How to motivate society to implement this program?”; "What resources are needed for this, how to achieve this, taking into account the realities and expected reaction of society?" “What risks does this carry in itself?”; “How much time does it take and what will happen before?”; "What is the plan B in case it does not work out?" As a business manager (and I visited several businesses), I would never even think about the implementation of a plan in which there are no answers to the above questions.
So, summarizing, in Russia there are neither ready to implement programs, nor a society that is ready to implement any program. Time will pass, and a request for reforms will appear in the country - most likely, then suitable programs will appear. When it will be, no one knows; It can be said very approximately that this will happen no earlier than the 30s.