The longer Putin delays with the presidential nomination, the more fun it is for analysts and conspiracy theorists. Everything is like in the old joke - again this damned uncertainty! Medvedev remained silent, Sobyanin winked, Dyumin was shown on the evening news for twenty-seven seconds instead of the usual twenty-five: the slightest shift in the usual picture is a reason to suspect intrigue; to know that the issue with the candidate from the Kremlin has not been resolved yet, they are looking for a successor. Political scientists of a higher rank - one of those who start not an anonymous, but a personalized channel on Telegram - are trying to guess the general course of Putin's fourth term without exchanging fortune-telling about the successor, by the beginning of December all forecasts come down to two main vectors. As in another old joke: pessimists say: “it won’t get worse”, and optimists say “no, it will, it will!”
The position of optimists, who believe that it will still be worse, was formulated in ten points in early October by lawyer Pavel Chikov. In short, Chikov predicts a deterioration in relations with foreign countries and a complete cleansing of the political field within the country, and enough events have happened over the past two months - from the law on foreign agents in the media to Putin's indicative "non-meeting" with Trump and the increasingly likely exclusion of Russia from the Olympics - to recognize this forecast as gradually coming true. On the other (joyfully pessimistic) side, new faces appear on the central channels, and criticism of the current order is heard, and it feels like even the official Kremlin line of the future campaign is not yet built on the thesis “enemies are all around, and we must unite”, but from the promises of a brilliant digital future, a comfortable urban environment, giant infrastructure projects and oil, 75 each. That is, at least at the level of election rhetoric, the values of development win out over the values of confrontation. In general, the glass of Putin's fourth (let's not deceive ourselves: of course, Putin's) term is either half full or half empty.
But as everyone knows very well, it may well be the same glass.
The key word of the previous political cycle - and also the magic spell that ensured its sustainability and, in a sense, success - was the term "hybrid". The hybrid war gave rise to hybrid people's republics (when necessary, they exist, but if necessary, they seem to be absent), hybrid (in the same sense) interference in the American elections led to a hybrid victory of a candidate convenient for Russia - well, that is, a victory, obviously, has been achieved, but it is not possible to take advantage of its fruits, the hybrid regime in the domestic political space has successfully crossed freedom and lack of freedom, and even the future presidential elections promise to be highly hybrid - in accordance with the well-known advertising slogan: "with all the wealth of choice, there is no alternative." Why not pursue further hybridization—combining authoritarianism and international isolation with a digital economy and infrastructure modernization?
In fact, a fourth-term Putin is a president of limited opportunities: in many ways, he remains a hostage to the system that he himself created. Its existing contours provide room for maneuver, and it is not that big: relations with the West will remain the same or get worse, the appetites of the security forces will not decrease, the monopoly on power will be supplemented by natural (or unnatural) economic monopolies. These objective limitations hinder the development of the digital economy and, in general, all sorts of modernization projects, but do not cancel them altogether.
Putin in his fourth term is a president of limited opportunities: in many ways he remains a hostage to the system that he himself created
Looking at China with its transcendental level of e-commerce and digital financial technologies, one can assume that everything digital and progressive grows beautifully sometimes even under authoritarianism and a firewall - and the “Chinese model” understood in this sense for the future Russian authorities now looks like an inspiring example. Even if Trump and Merkel finally stop talking to Putin, Navalny will be sent to Nizhny Novgorod, Facebook will be closed in Russia and exit visas will be introduced, large near-state banks and Internet companies will still develop new services, urban environment experts will advise municipalities to make transport , as in Barcelona (they managed to go there), and enlightened oligarchs will build stadiums and dream museums. Yes, many bright minds will leave because it is unbearable, and, yes, there is a risk of being completely modernized to the state of North Korea - but in general (and this is also an unpleasant discovery of recent years), new technologies do not necessarily become the result of political freedoms and, in and of themselves, lead to them do not lead. The digital world, which until recently seemed like an ideal space for public self-organization and free access to information, today looks more and more like a tool for information manipulation and control over society: Putin with an iPhone - nothing is impossible in this picture, he just will have other applications installed than at Zuckerberg. And if the next generation ever has to make a choice between technology and freedom, I would not undertake to guess now what it will vote for.
New technologies do not necessarily result from political freedoms and do not in themselves lead to them. The digital world today looks more and more like a tool for information manipulation and control over society.
* Yuri Saprykin - journalist, former editor-in-chief of Afisha magazine (2003-2008) and editor-in-chief of Rambler-Afisha (2011-2014), regular NT columnist.