In Russia now, not fascism, but a dictatorship of thieves

In an interview “Radio Liberty” Georgy Satarov noted that it is difficult to predict the further actions of Putin, since he has long been in a “high degree of unpredictability”.

- What is the margin of strength of the Russian economy taking into account sanctions? There is an opinion that Russia will lose the war due to economic exhaustion.
- I believe that the resource is not very large, and this is due to three circumstances.
The first - Russia has already created a very distorted economy for many years, focused on hydrocarbon resources and other sources of mineral wealth, and at the same time other industries suffered.
The second is the financial crisis that is piled on the country and which is especially acute when currency reserves are exhausted, it can lead to default. In 1998, the rather gloomy and negative forecasts, which after the default were formulated, did not materialize primarily because import substitution allowed the independent Russian business to tear very seriously, developing their own production. Now it will be impossible due to economic sanctions.
The third circumstance is that the exit from the economic crisis of Russia, as many economists believe, lies not in the field of economics, but in the field of reform of legal and political institutions. It is difficult to imagine that the current Russian government will decide to eliminate these legal and political barriers. Therefore, indeed, while the forecast is rather gloomy. Now multiply all three factors by the war, which acts destructively on any economy, and you will understand that there is very little left to the full collapse.

- How many?
- There are different forecasts, but even the most optimistic of them do not give the Putin economy, and, as a result, the current system, while maintaining the current course, stretch longer than several years. I think that everything will fall much earlier. The sanctions are too crushed and the military expenses are too exhausted.

- Some Western experts believe that sanctions, in fact, are not so scary to Russia, since the whole history of Russia is the history of the economic crisis and deprivation, with short and infrequent periods of prosperity. Do you believe in the effectiveness of economic sanctions?
- I do not think that sanctions are not afraid for Russia. Another thing is that such sanctions do not have an instant effect. They begin to work gradually. But already now problems are manifested as, for example, a restriction of the possibility of re -overpatement for many banks and state corporations, which are already in debt as in silk. This is a problem not only for business, but for the whole country that still wants to save the sovereignty of its state capitalism. In the current conditions, this is very difficult, because risks appear when state assets simply begin to take for debts. The impact of sanctions is very significant.

- Many of your colleagues with whom you had to communicate, they say that in Russia there are only emergency scenarios of a change of power. Do you agree with this? Is there a tendency to grow a real alternative to Putin? And if so, who is it?
- I'm not sure that it makes sense to speak personally, but I am sure that such an alternative always exists. I would not like to substitute anyone, calling the surname. It would be impolite on my part.
There is an alternative in the sense that when Putin does not become, someone from the current Kremlin will not necessarily be a new head of Russia. Options are possible. Another thing is that in the current state - under Putin, a legitimate change of power seems problematic.

- Let's speak frankly - it is impossible.
- It seems problematic.

- Is the influence of the economic bloc of the Russian authorities and the catch elite in Putin in connection with the sanctions growing?
- I have no idea. Probably grows, since the vice is clamping more and more, but I would not want to speak the facts and I would not want to speak unfounded. Believe me, here I know no more than yours. I am not entered into any “circles” than I am proud.

- Most Russians, judging by the polls, are ready to endure and accept Putin’s initiatives. Until the revival of the monarchy. How do you explain such a feature of a national character for yourself and is it possible to change it, to make it more modern?
- We are not talking about the national character. These surveys shows only two things - the degree of conformism and the effectiveness of monopoly propaganda. They do not show the real structure of public opinion, this is quite obvious.

- You do not believe that 85% of Russians really blindly believe in Putin and accept everything that he suggests?
- I think that among those 85% there is a certain proportion of people fascinated by Putin, but this share is not more than 15%. The rest are just conformists. They will also accept another state course at least tomorrow. And then, a few percent of the active and motivated population is enough for the revolution.

- Do you seriously allow the likelihood of a revolution in modern Putin's Russia?
- I do not exclude any scenarios of this kind. But not now, but when the current crisis under the pressure of sanctions will seriously affect the population. This will happen soon - they will do their business and unemployment, and, as a consequence, the growth of crime. In addition, coffins from Donbass. A social protest will inevitably arise. When a social protest will gain a political form, then anything is possible.

- Is there an opposition in the Russian political field that can consolidate and lead a social protest?
- There is definitely not in parliament if you mean it by a political field. The Russian parliament is not a place for discussions, as you know. I think that the political opposition of the foreseeable future will be cultivated inside social protest. In general, the opposition to the Putin course exists even in his environment, but these are rather timid and unprepared people. But they will be happy to join the new strength, turn out to be such an opportunity.

- What is the real percentage of dissatisfaction with Putin’s policy in Russian society, which, of course, is not visible behind the screen of total propaganda?
- There is a certain pulsating activity, it can grow up to 15% maximum. But this is quite enough to strongly shake the foundations of the regime. You just need to wait until they go into active discontent from a half -second state. I already called catalysts.

- How would you describe anti -Putin rallies that have passed a few weeks ago in a number of Russian cities? Can they develop into something similar to the Kyiv Maidan?
- Absolutely unpredictable. We can only say that these rallies are the “announcement” of a quick social protest that I have already said.

- Putin clearly does not suit the Minsk format of peaceful negotiations on the Donbass. What do you think, what format can he agree to, and for what will stop active hostilities?
- This is not a question for me, I am a weak specialist in this area. Moreover, it is very difficult to somehow reflect on the preferences of Putin, which is in a high degree of unpredictability.

- As Merkel said “lives in another reality”?
- Naturally.

- What is the role of Putin personally in the Ukrainian war?
- Direct and maximum. This is his war, he fired her.

- Western media are discussing the likelihood that Putin can arrange a war in the Balkans and distract the West from Ukraine. Comment on how great the probability of such a scenario is? As options, even a corridor in Kaliningrad and the capture of Estonian Narva are called.
- I completely exclude this. It's funny. Putin has no resources, no matter what he says and no matter what the Russian military leadership says. For such operations, even if he wanted to, you need to have a large number of combat -ready units, and they can hardly have enough of them now even for the war on a small piece of Donbass. From all over Russia, what else can fight, but nothing else is being taken there.

- Accordingly, in the prospect of a full -scale war on the European continent, you also do not believe?
- Putin has no resources for this. And this is good, because such a desire, I admit, he can have. The degree of Putin's unpredictability is very high.

- Give a forecast regarding the future status of the current territories of Donbass, under the control of militants - a return to Ukraine, a long stay in the status of "New Somalia" or something else?
-Here I am a supporter of widespread assessments: Putin will try to freeze the current situation with permanent outbreaks and the support of quasi-states of the DPR and LPR as much as possible. He needs a constant vague conflict and controlled chaos.

- For what purpose?
- This is the most convenient position for any maneuvers. He cannot retreat, but he could not quickly capture the east of Ukraine.

-In the 90s, you worked closely with President Boris Yeltsin, were his adviser and worked at the election headquarters. Is it true that Yeltsin would also decide on the annexation of part of the territory of Ukraine, if he had Putin's resources? It is generally accepted that this is the idea of ​​a fix in general of any Russian government.
- Oh, no, stupidity. I knew Boris Yeltsin very closely, often talked in an informal setting and if he had at least a hint of the idea of ​​a possible Ukrainian-Russian war with the aim of annexation of territories or something else, I would know. And now I could definitely tell about it. No, the war with Ukraine and its capture is the idea of ​​Putin, and not the desire of the whole Russian elite after the collapse of the Union, as they sometimes say.

- For you personally, Crimea is the territory of Ukraine or Russia?
- This is Ukrainian territory. Under this statement is the Russian signature in the Budapest Protocol. I completely share the Ukrainian point of view that Crimea is the territory of Ukraine temporarily occupied by Russia. But you will not be able to return the Crimea, with all due respect to Ukraine.

- Putin's regime today in Russia is fascism?
- Of course not. The fascist regime is, first of all, an ideological regime, but Putin's Russia does not have ideology.

- But what about the "Russian world"?
- “The Russian World” and “Sovereign Democracy”, which was discussed before - these are temporary fakes of ideology for viewers. Ideology should be permeated, first of all, the elite. And the Russian Putin elite does not believe in the “Russian world”, these are rather pragmatic and mercantile comrades.
In Russia now it is not fascism, but, I would say, a plebiscite dictatorship with a cross of prohibitive kleptocracy (in the per. With other Greek. Literally-“power of thieves”,-ed.). This is a dictatorship that is covered by the appearance of democratic procedures that do not represent the possibility of real choice, but are quasi-loser of the regime. With quasi-samples, quasi-horses and quasi-free words. Fascism could be all shamelessly discarded, and the plebiscite dictator needs to create the appearance of democratic procedures.

- Your assessment of the current Ukrainian government.
-Firstly, I have no doubt about her legitimacy.
Secondly, I treat great sympathy, because she has to solve fantastically complex problems against the background of war. I hope they can handle it.

-Do you understand how we, two once close people, will get out of a state of mutual hatred and how much time will you need?
- Now - nothing. After the change of Russian authorities and its aggressive course in a couple of decades, that is, in one generation, a degree of tension will be reduced. After the Second World War, Germany took several decades to gain respect, weight and authority in the world.


"Radio Liberty" Feb. 22nd, 2017

Photo: Kosinets Alexander/TASS