Don't expect stagnation

NT asked one of those who brought Putin to power 18 years ago: what to expect from the fourth term?

The questions made me sad. They assume that Putin is an uncontrolled natural phenomenon, like a meteorite fall and a volcanic eruption in Bali. If I were a dictator, I would not dream of a more pleasant way of posing questions. Where the country of Russia has disappeared from sight, and in the center of everything is the personal will of a single person in the Kremlin.

Putin's position is stable, since his "re-election" will be carried out without him and properly formalized by the apparatus. But in this position there is not even a shadow of the omnipotence that is attributed to him. The Kremlin is a symbiosis of three classes of political beings, partly feeding on one another, partly copulating with each other. This:

1) guards and security guards of all kinds, often referred to as siloviki;

2) senior government officials from the government and presidential administration;

3) the president's friends are the core of his inner circle.

The latter are the most important link. They are the base of the triangle, the conditional point of the top of which is called "Putin". The Kremlin court is a group of private interests within the body of power. The coalition beneficiary of power, budget money and any private profit that they decided to take away. Yes, the president can do something else that bypasses everyone. But for this, he will have to resort to complex court intrigue every time. After all, his powers have long passed at the disposal of those against whom he intrigues.

The Kremlin court is a group of private interests within the body of power. Coalition beneficiary of power, budget money and any private profit that they decide to take away

Questions reflect the image of a mighty leader. Like the great kings of France, who, having risen in the morning, thought - and not whether to declare war on the Netherlands? But the “sun king” Louis XIV was dressed in the morning by dozens of courtiers. Putin has even more of them, although he still pulls on his trousers himself. Could he, having risen in the morning, appoint himself the chairman of the government of the Russian Federation? Theoretically, yes, it can. Since such a move will please as many as two of the three court classes - close friends and guards. Friends will get "government" offices, and the question of what they are doing in the Kremlin will soften for a while. The guards will still rise as the new power structure will be extremely fragile. An attempt to unite the apparatuses of the government and the presidential administration will multiply the chaos that arose already in the “year of tandem”, during the formation of two power communities - the court of Putin and the court of Medvedev. Chaos, from which Putin did not get rid of during the years of his third presidency. Chaos, which is carefully nurtured by the Kremlin courtyard.

Putin simply does not dare to do anything that will harm the interests of one of the court classes. He will not order anything that the court would sabotage. He is not even able to seriously change the balance of the court. And by the way, what kind of “balance” is there that telegram political scientists talk about so often? The balance is a framework of forces that, supporting the president, surround him, act on his behalf, not allowing him to go beyond certain limits. But they are Putin's "exoskeleton", and it is not Putin who sets the program of movements for a long time.

Putin simply does not dare to do anything that will harm the interests of one of the court classes. He will not order anything that the court would sabotage.

There is no need to “wait for the announcement of reforms” from Putin, because in this case there will be no reforms. After all, it is not clear to him how and with whose help to carry them out. At the same time, some reforms will undoubtedly take place. The coalition that will have Putin at its disposal after the 2018 elections will have to carry them out. The failure of the reforms is easily predictable.

Can Putin go on hacking the Constitution, personally heading the "government" (by the way, the Constitution does not directly prohibit this). Oh yes, his majesty may be persuaded that this will give him more authority - our Bourbon believes that he still does not have enough of them. But in this way he will undermine his own system and hasten its finale.

It doesn't matter if the court changes the head of government. In this scheme of power, the government is only the AHO, the administrative and economic department of the Kremlin. But with a further transfer of power to the “court”, not the president, but the prime minister, can be appointed the frontman of some reforms. Medvedev will be called the frontman or not Medvedev - does it matter?

Beijing was very happy that the Kremlin took on the role of a Pekingese, a small angry dog ​​barking at its owner's competitors. But it is clear that there is no shadow of allied relations here.

Changing foreign policy? It is inevitable. Beijing was very happy that the Kremlin took on the role of a Pekingese, a small angry dog ​​barking at its owner's competitors. But it is clear that there is no shadow of allied relations here. The international reaction to the excesses of the third presidency follows the law of the pendulum. The offensive phase of Moscow's policy was replaced by a defensive one, and the initiative passed to the opponents. They started pressure on Moscow and will increase it. And the Kremlin, with its “reciprocal mirror measures,” only gets confused in the situation.

Liberalization in Russia is by no means the password for its future policy. Despite the fact that the liberalization of the rules is urgently needed by certain sectors - the business sector, culture and education, penitentiary policy, network initiatives. But in general, a rapidly politicizing Russia needs only a more open policy. Soon politicization will reach intolerable severity, and its participants will be forced to resort to the establishment of some general rules. But what about Putin? He's just one of the prizes they're giving away.

So do not wait for "stagnation", but fasten your seat belts. If you want to continue to be a spectator.

* Gleb Pavlovsky - political strategist, co-founder and director of the Effective Policy Foundation, ex-adviser to the head of the presidential administration

The opinion of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the editors