About freedom among the ancients compared with freedom among modern people

De la liberte des anciens comparee a celle des modernes.

Lecture given at the Royal Athenaeum. Paris, 1819 [1]

Gentlemen,

I'm going to show you some of the differences between the two types of freedom. These differences have so far remained unnoticed, or at least very little attention has been paid to them. The first of the freedoms was so dear to the ancient peoples who professed it; possession of the second seems especially valuable to modern nations. Such a study, if I am not mistaken, could be very interesting in two respects.

Firstly, the confusion of these two types of freedoms by our contemporaries was the cause of many misfortunes in the too famous times of the turmoil of the revolution. France felt exhausted by the fruitless actions carried out by people embittered by the small successes of their enterprise. These people tried to force the country to take advantage of a benefit it did not want and to take away from it what it wanted.

Secondly, since we are called by our happy revolution (in spite of all the outrages I call it happy, since I proceed from the results) to enjoy the benefits of representative government, it would be useful and interesting to study why such a system, the only one under the shadow of which we can today find some freedom and relaxation, was almost completely unknown to the free nations of antiquity.

I know of attempts to recognize traces of representative government among some ancient peoples, for example, in the Republic of Lacedaemon [2] or among our ancestors the Gauls, but they were in vain.

Lacedaemon was ruled by a religious-caste aristocracy, but there was no representative government there. The power of kings was limited, but it was limited by the ephors [3] and not by men invested with powers similar to those with which elections in these days vest the defenders of our liberties. Of course, after its establishment, the members of the ephor were called kings by the people. But there were only five ephors. Their authority was as much religious as political; they participated in the activities of the government, that is, in the administration of executive power; Thus, as was the case in almost all the people's magistrates of the ancient republics, the prerogatives of the ephors were far from being a barrier to tyranny, but in some cases they embodied the intolerable tyranny itself.

The Gaulish regime, so similar to the one that a certain party would like to impose on us, was both theocratic and warlike. The clergy had unlimited power. The military class, or nobility, had unheard-of and oppressive privileges for all others. The people had neither rights nor guarantees.

The mission of the Roman tribunes was to some extent representative in nature. They represented the organs of the plebs, which the oligarchy, the same at all times, having overthrown the kings, subjected to harsh exploitation. Nevertheless, the people had most of the direct political rights. He met to vote on laws to try the accused patricians; thus there were only very weak signs of a representative system in Rome.

This system is a discovery of contemporaries, and you will see, gentlemen, that the state of the human race in antiquity was not favorable to the introduction or rooting of this form of government. The ancient peoples could neither feel its necessity nor appreciate its advantages. Their social organization forced them to desire a freedom quite different from that which such a system provides us.

This evening lecture will be devoted to proving this truth.

First of all, gentlemen, let us ask ourselves, what meaning does an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a resident of the United States of America put into the concept of freedom these days?

This is the right of everyone to obey the laws alone, and not be subjected to ill-treatment, arrest, imprisonment, or death penalty due to the arbitrariness of one or more individuals. This is the right of everyone to express their opinion, choose their own business and engage in it; dispose of your property, even abusing it; do not ask permission for your movements and do not report to anyone the motives for your actions. It is the right of everyone to associate with other individuals, either to discuss his interests, or to practice the worship chosen by him and his like-minded people, or simply to fill his days and hours according to his inclinations and fantasies. Finally, it is the right of everyone to influence the implementation of government, either by appointing all or some officials, or through representation, petitions, requests, which the authorities are forced to take into account to one degree or another. Now compare this freedom with the freedom of the ancients.

The latter consisted in the collective but direct exercise of several functions of the supreme power taken as a whole - discussing in a public place questions of war and peace, concluding alliances with strangers, voting laws, passing sentences, checking the expenses and acts of magistrates, promulgating them, and condemning or justifying their actions. But at the same time with all this, which the ancients called freedom, they allowed the complete subordination of the individual to the authority of the community, as compatible with the collective form of freedom. You will not find in them practically any of those rights that constitute the content of the freedom of our contemporaries. All private activities are under strict supervision. Personal independence does not extend to opinions, activities, much less religion. The opportunity to choose one's faith, an opportunity which we regard as one of our most precious rights, would have seemed in ancient times a crime and a sacrilege. In matters that seem to us the most insignificant, the authority of the social organism dominates the will of individuals and oppresses it. Among the Spartans, Terpander [4] could not add an extra string to his lyre without offending the ephors. The authorities interfered in the most ordinary household affairs. The young Lacedaemonian could not freely visit his wife. In Rome, the censors also directed their searching gaze at family life. Laws governed morals, and since morals extend to everything, there was nothing that was not regulated by laws.

Thus among the ancients the individual, almost sovereign in public affairs, remains a slave in private life. As a citizen, he decides questions of war and peace; as a private individual, he is always under surveillance, limited and suppressed in all his impulses; as a part of the collective organism, he questions, condemns, exposes, banishes or puts to death his magistrates or superiors; but, being subordinate to a collective organism, he, in turn, could be deprived of position, dignity, cursed or killed by the arbitrariness of the community of which he is a part. Among our contemporaries, on the contrary, an individual who is independent in private life is sovereign in politics only in appearance, even in the freest states. Its sovereignty is limited, almost always without foundation; and even if at certain, but rather rare times, an individual, entangled in various precautions and fetters, is able to exercise this sovereignty, it is only to renounce it.

Gentlemen, I must pause here to preface a comment you might make to me. In antiquity there was a republic where the subordination of individual existence to the collective organism was not as complete as I have just described. This is the most famous of all the republics - you guessed it, I'm talking about Athens. I will return to this issue later, and, recognizing the validity of the fact itself, I will explain its reason. We will see why, of all the ancient states, Athens is most similar to the modern states. In all other states, public jurisdiction was unlimited. As Condorcet says [5] , the people of antiquity had no concept of individual rights. They were only machines whose progress was guided by laws. The same subordination characterizes the golden age of the Roman Republic - the individual was in some way dissolved in the nation, the citizen in the city-polis.

Let us now turn to the origins of such a significant difference between us and the ancients.

All ancient republics were confined within narrow borders. The most populous, powerful and significant of them cannot be compared in size even with the smallest modern state. An inevitable consequence of the size of these republics was their warlike spirit; every nation constantly crushed its neighbors or was crushed by them. Forced into opposition, these peoples constantly fought or threatened each other. Even those who did not want to be conquerors could not lay down their arms because of the threat of being conquered. Everyone bought their security, their independence, their entire existence at the price of war. It was a constant interest, almost a common occupation, of the free states of antiquity. Finally, as an inevitable consequence of this way of life, all states had slaves. Mechanical activities, and among some peoples productive work, were entrusted to chained hands.

The modern world shows us a completely different picture. The smallest of our modern states are incomparably more extensive than Sparta or Rome for five centuries. Even the division of Europe into many states thanks to the progress of the Age of Enlightenment is more an appearance than a reality. If earlier each nation formed an isolated family, hostile to others from birth, now huge masses of people, existing under different names, having different methods of social organization, are homogeneous in nature. And this nature is strong enough not to be afraid of barbarian hordes. And she is enlightened enough for the war to be a burden to her. She is completely committed to peace.

The following follows from this difference. War precedes commerce, for war and commerce are nothing more than two different ways of achieving one goal: to have what you want. Commerce is only a tribute to the power of the owner on the part of the one who strives for possession. This is an attempt by mutual consent to obtain what they no longer hope to obtain through violence. The strongest person, always and among all, will never have the idea of ​​trade. Only experience that proves to him that war, that is, the use of one’s strength against the strength of another, exposes him to various trials and defeats, pushes him onto the path of trade - a softer and more sure means to interest another to concede what corresponds to his own interests. War is an impulse, trade is a calculation. But that is precisely why the time must come when trade will replace war. We have come to such a time.

I do not want to say that in ancient times there were no trading peoples. But they were a kind of exception to the general rule. The scope of the lecture does not allow me to point out to you all the obstacles to the progress of trade in antiquity; however, you know no less about them than I do; I will name only one. Ignorance of the compass then forced sailors not to lose sight of the shore if possible. The passage through the Pillars of Hercules, that is, through the Strait of Gibraltar, was considered the most daring undertaking. The Phoenicians and Carthaginians, the most skilled of navigators, dared to do this much later, and their example remained unimitated for a long time.

In Athens, which we will talk about shortly, 60% of citizens were interested in the sea, but for only 12 out of a hundred it was commonplace - the idea of ​​long-distance sailing was so associated with danger.

In addition, if I were to embark on a discussion that, unfortunately, promises to be too long, I would show you in detail, gentlemen, the features of the morals, habits, and methods of fishing of the trading peoples of antiquity: their commerce itself was, so to speak, imbued with the spirit of the era, that is, the atmosphere of war and hostility. Trade was a happy exception; it is only today that it is a common occurrence, the only goal, a universal tendency, the true life of nations. The latter desire peace, and after peace - prosperity, and as its source - production. War is still the most effective means of fulfilling desires. But it no longer gives either individuals or nations those profits that are comparable to the results of peaceful labor and regular exchange. Among the ancients, a successful war replenished public and personal fortunes with slaves, tribute, and land. For our contemporaries, even a successful war takes away much more than it gives.

Finally, thanks to commerce, religion, and the intellectual and moral progress of the human race, the European peoples no longer have slaves. Free people must engage in all professions and fulfill all social needs. You clearly see, gentlemen, the necessary result of these differences. First, the vastness of the country reduces the political importance of each individual. The humblest citizen of Rome or Sparta was a force. The situation is completely different with the ordinary citizen of Great Britain or the United States. His personal influence is completely imperceptible in the public will that dictates the direction in the leadership of the country. Secondly, the abolition of slavery took away from the free population hours of leisure, which were formed due to the fact that slaves performed most of the hard work. If there were no slaves, 20 thousand free Athenians would not be able to freely debate every day in the city square.

Thirdly, unlike war, commerce does not leave periods of inaction in a person’s life. The constant exercise of political rights - daily discussion of state affairs, discussions, meetings, participation in the succession and movement of political factions were part of the mandatory daily routine, if this term can be used, of the free peoples of antiquity. Without this activity, they would languish from painful inactivity. But for our contemporaries, such activity would only cause anxiety and fatigue. A person busy with his own affairs, his own business, the benefits that he has or hopes to receive, can be distracted from all this only for a very short time.

Finally, commerce arouses in people a keen desire for personal independence. Commerce satisfies their needs, fulfills their desires without government interference. Moreover, such interference almost always (I don’t even know why I say “almost”) is only a hindrance and a burden. Whenever collective power wants to interfere in a private calculation, it only annoys a person. Whenever rulers try to do our affairs for us, they do it much worse and more wastefully than we do.

I promised you, gentlemen, to tell you about Athens; their example could be contrasted with some of my statements, but, on the contrary, it confirms them all.

As I have already admitted, of all the Greek republics, Athens was the most commercial and, in addition, it gave its citizens incomparably greater individual freedoms than Rome and Sparta. If I could go into historical detail, I would show that, under the influence of commerce, the Athenians lost many of the characteristics that distinguished ancient peoples from modern ones. The trading spirit of Athens is similar to that of today's merchants. Xenophon narrates that during the Peloponnesian War, Athenian merchants withdrew their capital from enterprises on the mainland and transferred funds to the islands of the archipelago. Commerce created trade turnover there. In Isocrates one can find references to the use of mortgage letters. You see, therefore, how similar the morals of the Athenians were to ours. In their relations with women (I again quote Xenophon) you can notice the husbands' satisfaction with the peace and decent friendship in the house; they take into account the weak nature of a woman, turn a blind eye to the irresistible power of passions, forgive the first weakness and forget the second. As for relations with foreigners, the Athenians easily granted citizenship rights to those who came to them with their families, engaged in crafts, and founded a business. Finally, one cannot help but be amazed by their excessive passion for personal independence. In Lacedaemon, says the philosopher, citizens came running at the first call of the magistrate, but the Athenian would have been in despair if anyone had considered him dependent on the authorities*.

Nevertheless, since other circumstances decisive in the character of ancient peoples were also characteristic of the Athenians; Since slaves existed in Athens and their territory was very limited, we find there all the signs of the freedom that was characteristic of antiquity. The people create laws, control the behavior of magistrates, demand an account from Pericles, and condemn to death all the military leaders who led the battle of the Arginus Islands. At the same time, ostracism, which seems and should seem to us today a flagrant lawlessness, this legal arbitrariness, praised by all the legislators of that time, proves that the individual in Athens was still completely subordinate to the supreme power of the social body, which is not to be found today in any of the free social states of Europe.

From all that has been said, it follows that we can no longer follow the ancient type of freedom, which consisted of active and constant participation in the collective exercise of power. Our freedom should consist in the peaceful enjoyment of personal independence. The participation that in antiquity everyone took in the exercise of national sovereignty was not, as it is today, an empty abstraction. The will of each had a real influence, the implementation of this will brought living and constant satisfaction. As a result, ancient man was capable of great sacrifices in order to preserve his political rights, his share of participation in government. Everyone proudly felt the value of their voice and found significant satisfaction in the awareness of their personal significance.

For us, such satisfaction no longer exists. A person lost in the crowd almost never notices the influence he has. His will always drowns without a trace in the general flow; nothing gives him a sign of his cooperation in the common cause. Thus, our exercise of political rights does not bring us even a fraction of the satisfaction that the ancients found in it. At the same time, the progress of civilization, the commercial trends of the era, and connections between peoples have endlessly multiplied and diversified the means of achieving personal well-being.

It follows from what has been said that we must be more attached than the ancients to our personal independence. The ancients, sacrificing this independence for the sake of political rights, sacrificed less to achieve more; We, making similar sacrifices, would give more for less.

The goal of the ancients was the division of public power among all citizens of the country. This is what they called freedom. The goal of our contemporaries is the security of the private sphere; and they call freedom the guarantees created by social institutions for these purposes.

At the beginning I said that during our long and stormy revolution, the rulers, who, however, had the best intentions, neglected these differences, which caused countless misfortunes. And let my too severe reproaches against them be displeasing to God: their mistake was even forgivable. It is impossible to read the beautiful pages of ancient authors, it is impossible to imagine the actions of these great people, without experiencing those special emotions that nothing in today’s existence evokes in us. With these memories, it would seem that elements of nature that preceded ours awaken in us. It is difficult not to regret those times when human abilities developed in a predetermined direction, but in a field so vast, so strong in the own strength of these abilities, with such a sense of energy and dignity. And since we express a feeling of regret, it is impossible not to want to imitate what you regret.

This impression was the more profound when we lived under rulers who abused their position, who, without power, were oppressors, absurd in their principles and insignificant in their actions; rulers who resorted to arbitrariness in order to humiliate the human race. And although even today some people dare to extol these rulers, we can never forget that we were witnesses and victims of their stubbornness, helplessness and overthrow.

The goal of our reformers was noble and bold. Who among us has not heard our hearts beat in hope of entering the path they seemed to have opened? And unfortunate is he who, even today, does not feel the need to admit that understanding some of the mistakes made by our pioneers does not mean denigrating their memory and abandoning the ideas that have been professed by the friends of humanity from century to century.

But these people drew some of their theories from the works of two philosophers who themselves had no idea about the changes introduced by two millennia into the structure of the human race. Someday, perhaps, I will undertake to analyze the system of the most famous of them - J. -J. Rousseau. And I will then show that by bringing into our times the concepts of public power and collective sovereignty belonging to other eras, this great genius, inspired by the purest love of freedom, nevertheless created the destructive conditions for several types of tyranny. No doubt, in telling what I consider to be a serious error requiring refutation, I will be careful in my denial and respectful in my condemnation. I would in no way want to join the detractors of the great man. And I feel distrust of myself when I accidentally agree with them on some point. But this similarity is external, on individual and specific issues. And when it is discovered, I find consolation by dissociating myself from imaginary helpers, refuting them as much as I can.

Nevertheless, the desire for truth must prevail over such strong feelings that evoke the brilliance of extraordinary talent and the authority of great fame. However, as we will see later, the error with which I am struggling is not due to Rousseau at all - it largely belongs to one of his followers, less eloquent, but no less severe and a thousand times more excessive in his judgments. We are talking about the Abbé de Mabley, who can be considered as a representative of a system that is trying, in full accordance with the principles of ancient freedom, to subjugate citizens in the name of the sovereignty of the nation, to turn a person into a slave in the name of the freedom of the people.

The Abbé de Mably, like Rousseau and many others, following the ancients, accepted the power of the social body as freedom, as a result of which all means seemed to him good for extending the action of this power to the part of human existence that stubbornly refused to submit to it, the independence of which Mably so deplored. In all his writings he laments the fact that the law applies only to actions. He would like thoughts, the most fleeting impressions, to be subject to him, so that the law would pursue a person, not giving him either rest or shelter in which to hide from his, the law, omnipotence. As soon as Mably noticed a measure of coercion among any people, he considered it his discovery and immediately offered it as a model to follow. He hated personal freedom as one hates a blood enemy. And as soon as Mably met a nation in history that was completely deprived of this freedom (we are not even talking about political freedom), he could not help but admire it. This philosopher was delighted with the Egyptians because, as he himself said, with them everything was subject to law, right down to rest, right down to needs; everything was subject to the rule of the legislator, all minutes of the day were occupied with the performance of some duties. Even love submitted to this revered intervention, and it was the law that sometimes opened and sometimes closed access to the marriage bed.

The philosopher was even more enthusiastic about Sparta, which combined republican forms of government with the Egyptian-like enslavement of individuals. This vast monastery seemed to him the ideal of a perfect republic. He deeply despised Athens and would willingly attribute to this most important nation in Greece the words said by one extremely important academician about the French Academy: “What monstrous despotism! Everyone does what they want there!” I should add that he was talking about the Academy as it was thirty years ago.

Montesquieu, endowed with an observant mind because he had a less hot head, managed to practically avoid these mistakes. He was amazed at the differences I mentioned above, but did not recognize their true cause. “Greek politicians,” he wrote, “who lived under popular rule, did not recognize any other force than the force of virtue. Today’s politicians tell us only about manufactures, trade, finance, wealth and even luxury” (“On the Spirit of Laws”, III). He correlates this difference with a republic and a monarchy, whereas they should be correlated with the opposition between the spirit of antiquity and modernity. Everyone - citizens of republics, subjects of monarchies - strives to possess goods, and no one in the modern state of society can complain about this. Even before the liberation of France, the people who most thirsted for freedom were also the people who valued the blessings of life more than others. He valued his freedom primarily because he saw in it a guarantee of the benefits so dear to his heart. Once, where there was freedom, people could endure hardships, but now, wherever there are hardships, slavery is necessary for people to submit. Today it is much easier to turn a people of slaves into a Spartan people than to teach the Spartans freedom.

The people who were elevated by the flow of events to the head of our revolution, due to the education they received, were imbued with the ideas of antiquity, which have now become false. But such ideas were extolled by the philosophers of whom I have spoken. Rousseau's Metaphysics, where, like lightning, the highest truths and lines of captivating eloquence suddenly flash; Mably's severity, his intolerance, his hatred of all human passions, his irrepressible passion for the enslavement of everyone, his excessive ideas about the competence of laws, the difference between his advice and what existed in reality, his flair against wealth and even against property - all this should have fascinated people, inflamed by the recent victory, who had legally won power and were ready to easily extend it to everyone and everything around. For them, the authority of two writers was extremely valuable, who, not being interested in power, anathematized the despotism of people, but raised the line of law to an axiom. These people wanted to use the power of society as their mentors taught them, that is, as they once did in the free states of antiquity. They believed that everything should yield to the collective will and that any restrictions on individual rights would be more than compensated by participation in public power.

You know, gentlemen, what came of it. Only free institutions, based on knowledge of the spirit of the era, were able to survive. The renovated building of the ancient [institutions] collapsed, despite all efforts and heroic acts worthy of admiration. The fact is that social power has in every sense damaged personal independence without destroying the need for it. The nation did not at all agree that the ideal part of abstract sovereignty was worth the sacrifices demanded of it. And in vain they repeated to her after Rousseau: the laws of freedom are a thousand times more severe than the cruel yoke of tyrants. The nation did not want these harsh laws and, falling into exhaustion, was sometimes inclined to believe that the yoke of tyrants was preferable. The experience gained brought me out of my delusion. The nation saw that human tyranny is much worse than the worst laws. But laws must also have their limitations.

If I have succeeded in persuading you, gentlemen, to share my conclusions, which, I am sure, follow from the facts presented, you, like me, recognize the truth of the following principles.

Personal independence is the first of modern needs. This means that one should never demand sacrifices from her for the sake of establishing political freedom.

From this it follows that none of the many and too celebrated institutions which in the ancient republics limited individual freedom are acceptable in modern times.

At first glance, gentlemen, establishing this truth seems unnecessary. Some governments today seem reluctant to imitate ancient republics. Nevertheless, however little their affection for republican institutions may be, they have an attachment to certain republican customs which I do not understand. The most annoying thing is that these are precisely the customs that make it possible to expel, exile, and rob people. I remember how in 1802 an article was inserted into the law on special tribunals introducing Greek ostracism in France. God knows how many eloquent speakers, in order to force us to agree with this article, told us about the freedom of Athens and all the sacrifices that people had to make in the name of preserving this freedom (however, the article was then withdrawn). Likewise, quite recently, when timid authorities timidly tried to direct the elections to their own discretion, a certain newspaper, in no way tainted by republicanism, proposed the revival of Roman censorship in order to eliminate dangerous candidates.

I do not think that I will be a little off topic if, in support of my assurances, I say a few words about these two much praised institutions.

Athenian ostracism was based on the assumption that society had complete power over its members. Under this assumption, ostracism could be justified. And in a small state, where the influence of an individual, confident in respect for himself, with his clientele, his fame, often balanced the power of the mass of people, ostracism could seem useful. But in our conditions individuals are endowed with rights which society is obliged to respect, and, as I have already noted, personal influence is so dissolved in a multitude of other influences equal or superior in force that any oppression motivated by the need to diminish that influence is useless and therefore unjust. No one has the right to exile a citizen unless he is convicted by an ordinary court in accordance with a written law punishable by exile for an act of which the citizen is guilty. No one has the right to expel a citizen from his homeland, an owner from his lands, a merchant from his occupation, a husband from his wife, a father from his children, a writer from his deep thoughts, an old man from his habits. Any political exile is a political crime. Any exile proclaimed by the assembly under the imaginary pretext of public safety is a crime of this assembly against public safety, which always consists exclusively in respect for laws, in observing forms and in maintaining guarantees.

Roman censorship, like ostracism, presupposed power. In a republic, all the citizens of which, through poverty, fell into extreme simplicity of morals, lived in one city, did not engage in any profession that would divert their attention from public affairs, and were thus constant spectators and judges of public authorities, censorship, on the one hand, could have more influence, and on the other, the arbitrariness of the censors was restrained by a kind of moral supervision on the part of the citizens. But as soon as the expansion of the borders of the republic, the complication of social relations and the improvement of culture deprived censorship of what was both its basis and limiter, this institution degenerated even in Rome itself. This means that it was not censorship that gave rise to good morals, but the simplicity of morals that supported the power and effectiveness of censorship.

In France, an institution as arbitrary as censorship would be both ineffective and intolerant. In the current state of society, morals are composed of such subtle, fluid, elusive nuances that they would change their essence a thousand times if they were tried to be brought into a more strict framework. Only [public] opinion can encroach on them, can judge morals, since it has the same nature. Opinion would rebel against any authority that attempted to give it greater clarity. If the government of a nation, like the Roman censors, wanted to brand a citizen by its arbitrary decision, the whole nation would protest the verdict without ratifying the decision of the authorities.

Everything that has been said about the transfer of censorship to modern times can also be applied to many other elements of social organization, about which antiquity is increasingly and more pompously cited to us as an example. For example, education. What we are not told about the need to allow the state to take possession of the younger generations so that it can shape them at its own discretion, and what kind of quotes our scholars do not support this theory! And the Persians, and the Egyptians, and Gaul, and Greece, and Italy alternately pass before our eyes. Ah, gentlemen, we are not Persians, subordinate to a despot, not Egyptians, enslaved by priests, not Gauls, whom their Druids could sacrifice, and finally, not Greeks and not Romans, to whom participation in public administration brought joy from enslavement in private life. We are modern people, each of us wants to use our rights, develop our abilities at our own discretion, without interfering with others; we ourselves want to monitor the development of these abilities in our children, entrusted by nature to our love - the hotter it is, the more enlightened the love. We need the authorities here only in order to receive from them those general means of education that they are able to collect. In this we are like travelers who use government roads, but do not ask the authorities for the direction of their journey. Religion was also put to the test by memories of past centuries. The gallant defenders of doctrinal unity quote to us the laws of the ancients against foreign gods, and justify the rights of the Catholic Church by the example of the Athenians, who killed Socrates for trying to shake polytheism, and also by the example of Augustus, who wanted the Romans to remain faithful to the cult of their fathers, because of which, a little later, the first Christians began to be thrown to be torn to pieces by wild beasts.

Воздержимся, господа, от этого восхищения, вспоминая некоторые черты античности. Поскольку мы живем в другое время, я желаю соответствующей этому новому времени свободы; и поскольку мы живем в монархиях, я смиренно прошу монархии не заимствовать у античных республик способы нашего угнетения.

Я повторяю: личная свобода – вот подлинная современная свобода; политическая свобода выступает ее гарантом. Но требовать от нынешних народов, как от древних, пожертвовать всей их личной свободой ради политической свободы – самый верный способ заставить народы отрешиться от личной свободы; когда это удастся, то у них вскоре похитят и свободу политическую.

Как видите, господа, моими замечаниями я вовсе не стремлюсь принизить ценность политической свободы. Из предложенных на ваше рассмотрение явлений я отнюдь не делаю заключений, сходных с выводами некоторых людей, а именно: поскольку древние были свободны, а мы не можем быть свободными по их подобию, умозаключают, что мы обречены быть рабами. Рассуждающие подобным образом хотели бы построить новый общественный порядок из малого числа элементов, только и присущих, по их мнению, нынешнему миру. К числу таких элементов относят предрассудки, пугающие людей; развращающий их эгоизм; одурманивающую их суетность; грубые удовольствия, разоряющие их; деспотизм, предназначенный для управления людьми; надо думать, сюда относят и позитивные знания, и точные науки для более ловкого обслуживания деспотизма. Но было бы странным принимать это за итог сорока веков, в течение которых человеческий разум приобрел столь много нравственных и материальных средств, И я не могу себе подобное принять.

Из всего отличающего нас от античности я вывожу противоположные заключения. Отнюдь не нужно ослаблять гарантии, а следует расширять круг прав. Я вовсе не хочу отказаться от политической свободы, но наряду с развитием других ее форм я требую гражданской свободы. Правительства не больше, чем в древности, имеют право присваивать себе нелегитимную власть. Но правительства, опирающиеся на легитимные основания, имеют меньше, чем прежде, права осуществлять над людьми всевластный произвол. Мы и сегодня обладаем правами, которые существовали у нас всегда, – этими вечными правами соглашаться лишь с тем, что законно, рассуждать о своих интересах, быть неотъемлемой частью общественного организма. Но на правительства возложены новые обязанности. Прогресс цивилизации, изменения, привнесенные веками развития, требуют от власти больше уважения к привычкам, чувствам и независимости индивидов. И власть должна простирать над всем этим более осторожную и легкую длань. Такая осмотрительность власти, входящая в число ее самых строгих обязанностей, отвечает, разумеется, и ее собственным интересам; коль скоро свобода, пригодная современным людям, отличается от свободы древних, то и деспотизм, возможный в античности, немыслимо перенести в новые времена. Из-за того, что зачастую мы менее внимательны к политической свободе, чем должно, и в нашем обычном состоянии менее, чем должно, пристрастны к ней, можно заключить, что подчас мы напрасно пренебрегаем предоставляемыми политической свободой гарантиями. Но в то же время, поскольку мы больше, чем древние, ценим личную свободу, мы более настойчиво и умело будем защищать ее от покушений. И для защиты мы наделены средствами, которых не было в античности.

По мере роста торговли произвол над нашим существованием оказывается более гнетущим, чем прежде, – раз наши сделки становятся разнообразнее, то и произвол должен умножаться, чтобы накрыть их все. Вместе с тем, именно торговля позволяет легче уклоняться от самодурства властей, ибо она меняет природу собственности, которая обретает после всех изменений почти полную неуловимость.

Торговля наделяет собственность новым качеством – обращением. Без него собственность есть только пользование. Власть всегда способна воздействовать на пользование, ибо может отнять владение. Обращение же ставит невидимые и непреодолимые препятствия для подобных действий общественных властей.

Влияние торговли простирается еще дальше: она не только освобождает индивидов, но, создав кредит, ставит власти в зависимость.

Деньги, как говорит один французский автор, есть самое опасное оружие деспотизма, вместе с тем и самая крепкая узда для него: кредит подчинен мнению, сила бесполезна, деньги скрываются или убегают, все операции государства приостанавливаются. Кредитные отношения не имели подобного влияния у древних: их правительства были гораздо сильнее частных лиц. В наши дни частные граждане сильнее политических властей: богатство есть сила вездесущая, более соотносимая со всеми интересами и оттого гораздо более реальная, вызывающая большее послушание. Власти угрожают, богатство вознаграждает; от властей можно ускользнуть, обманув их; чтобы добиться милости богатства, ему нужно служить; и последнее должно возобладать.

Вследствие тех же причин индивидуальное существование оказывается менее поглощенным политической жизнью. Индивиды могут перемещать свои сокровища на дальние расстояния; они всегда сохраняют при себе все блага частной жизни. Торговля сблизила нации, наделила их почти схожими нравами и обычаями; главы государств могут быть врагами, народы являются соотечественниками.

Пусть власть, наконец, смирится с таким положением дел – нам нужна свобода, и мы ее добудем. Но поскольку свобода, которая нам нужна, отлична от свободы древних, она требует и иной организации, нежели та, что соответствовала античной свободе. В античности человек считал себя тем более свободным, чем больше времени и сил он посвящал осуществлению своих политических прав. При годном для нас виде свободы, чем больше времени осуществление политических прав оставляет для наших частных интересов, тем драгоценнее для нас она самa.

Из сказанного, господа, вытекает необходимость представительной системы правления. Представительная система есть не что иное, как организация, посредством которой нация перекладывает на нескольких индивидов то, что она не может или не хочет выполнить сама. Бедняки сами занимаются своими делами, богатые же нанимают себе управляющих. Такова история древних народов и народов современных. Представительная система есть полномочия, доверенные определенному числу людей всей народной массой, желающей, чтобы ее интересы были защищены, однако, не имеющей времени защищать их всякий раз самостоятельно. Но богатые люди, если они не безрассудны, наняв управляющих, со всем вниманием и строгостью следят, как те выполняют свои обязанности, предупреждая нерадивость, неумение, продажность. Дабы иметь возможность судить об отправлении службы своими уполномоченными, осторожные доверители входят в курс всех дел, ведение коих перепоручают другим. Точно также и народы, взявшие представительную систему в целях пользования приемлемой для них свободой, должны осуществлять постоянное и активное наблюдение за своими представителями и оставить за собой право через определенные промежутки времени (им не следует быть слишком продолжительными) устранить их, если они обманут ожидания, и лишить полномочий, которыми они злоупотребили.

Поскольку современная свобода отлична от античной, ей угрожают опасности другого рода.

Угроза античной свободе заключалась в том, что люди, занятые исключительно обеспечением раздела общественной власти, оставляли без должного внимания индивидуальные права и блага.

Угроза современной свободе состоит в том, что, будучи поглощены пользованием личной независимостью и преследуя свои частные интересы, мы можем слишком легко отказаться от нашего права на участие в осуществлении политической власти.

Носители власти не упускают случая склонить нас к этому. Они с такой готовностью спешат избавить нас от любых хлопот, за исключением уплаты налогов и послушания. Они могли бы сказать нам: «Какова в сущности цель всех ваших усилий, что побуждает вас к трудам, являясь предметом чаяний? Разве не счастье? Позвольте же нам создать счастье, и мы вам его дадим!» Нет, господа, мы не позволим вам это сделать! Сколь трогательной ни была бы ваша забота, попросим власть оставаться в своих рамках. Пусть она ограничится тем, что будет справедливой, мы же позаботимся о собственном счастье.

Сможем ли мы быть счастливыми, благодаря нашим благам, если эти последние будут отделены от гарантий? И где мы найдем эти гарантии, если откажемся от политической свободы? Отказ от нее, господа, сродни намерениям безумца построить на песке дом без фундамента под тем предлогом, что он собирается жить только на втором этаже.

Впрочем, господа, в самом деле счастье, каким бы оно ни было, являет собой единственную цель рода человеческого? В этом случае наше поприще оказалось бы слишком ограниченным и наше предназначение – чересчур приземленным. Вряд ли кто из нас захотел бы растрачивать попусту свои нравственные качества, опошляя желания, отказываясь от деятельности, славы, глубоких и благородных чувств, чтобы превратиться в животное и быть благодаря этому счастливым. Нет, господа, я призываю в свидетели лучшую часть нашей натуры – это благородное беспокойство, преследующее и терзающее нас, это горячее стремление распространить наши познания и развить способности: не к одному только счастию, а именно к совершенствованию влечет нас наша судьба. Политическая же свобода есть самое мощное, самое решительное средство совершенствования, ниспосланное нам небесами.

Политическая свобода выносит на изучение и рассмотрение граждан их самые заветные интересы, развивает разум, облагораживает мысли, устанавливает между всеми людьми своего рода интеллектуальное равенство, составляющее славу и могущество народа. Вы видите, таким образом, как возвышается нация при появлении в ней первого же института, делающего возможным регулярное осуществление политической свободы. Вы видите, как наши сограждане из любых классов и всех профессий, покидая сферу обычных занятий, свой частный промысел, внезапно поднимаются на уровень важных обязанностей, доверенных им конституцией, – здраво делать выбор, энергично сопротивляться, разоблачать хитрости, не бояться угроз, благородно противиться соблазнам. Обратите внимание на патриотизм – чистый, глубокий и искренний, торжествующий в наших городах и оживляющий все, вплоть до деревушек, проникающий в наши мастерские, воодушевляющий селенья, пронизывающий сознанием наших прав и необходимости гарантий справедливый и здравый разум земледельца и искусного торговца, которые знают бедствия, перенесенные в истории и достаточно просвещены в том, чем излечиться от этих бедствий. Эти люди охватывают взглядом всю Францию и, выказывая признательность нации, три десятилетия спустя после революции выражают верность принципам своим голосованием за одного из самых знаменитых защитников свободы [6] .

Я далек, господа, от непризнания любого из двух видов свободы, о которых вам говорил. Нужно, и я это показал, научиться сочетать их друг с другом. Как писал известнейший автор труда по истории средневековых республик [7] , общественные институты должны исполнять предназначения рода человеческого; они тем лучше достигают своих целей, чем возможно большее число граждан поднимают до высот нравственного достоинства.

Труд законодателя не завершается, когда благодаря ему жизнь народа становится спокойной. Даже когда этот народ доволен, остается еще много дел. Общественные институты должны завершить нравственное воспитание граждан. Уважая их личные права, оберегая их независимость, совершенно не вмешиваясь в их занятия, эти институты должны, тем не менее, оказывать влияние на общество во имя его блага, чтобы призвать граждан способствовать своей решимостью и своим голосованием осуществлению власти, гарантируя им взамен право контроля и надзора посредством волеизъявления; институты должны воспитывать людей, практически готовя их к исполнению высоких функций, одновременно наделяя их возможностями и внушая им желание браться за это дело.

Источник : http://www.humanities.edu.ru , перевод с французского и примечания кандидата философских наук М.М. Федоровой. Публикуется по изданию: Constant В. De la liberte chezles Modernes. Ecrits politiques. Hachette. P., 1980.