Drones attack

Why does the Ministry of Defense talk about the successful repelment of the attack of drones, but is silent about the New Year's mortar shelling?

Having withstand a two -day pause, the Ministry of Defense of the telling of the successful repelment of the attack of the drones undertaken by the militants on the night of Saturday, from January 5-6. According to the information posted on the page of the Russian military department on Facebook, the Islamists launched in the direction of the Russian air base in Syria Khmeimim and the aircraft station in Tartus 13 shock unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with homemade explosive explosive devices (IVO) attached to them.

According to the Ministry of Defense, the calculations of the anti-aircraft missiles of the shell-C1 destroyed seven drones, and the radio electronic warfare units (REB) were able to intercept the management of six enemy flying devices. Three UAVs detonated and self -destructed during landing, three more managed to put it near the air base, mine and deliver to the control point for the examination.

In fact, this message of the military ministry, posted on Facebook, looks strange, because it stands out among other notes, which are usually uninformative for the mass. But in this case, the authors of the post spoke not only about the successful reflection of the drone attacks, but also shared the information of the “political orientation”, the essence of which was that military specialists have already conducted a detailed analysis of the “design, technical filling and home -made ammunition of captured shock UAVs” and came to the conclusion that “engineering decisions used by terrorists in the attack on Russian facilities in Syria could be received Only one of the countries with high technological capabilities to ensure satellite navigation and remote control of the discharge of professionally collected home -made explosive devices (IEAs) in prescribed coordinates. ”

The deputy head of the defense committee of the Federation Council Franz Klintsevich immediately specified the more than transparent hint of the Ministry of Defense, saying that the work of the US intelligence services is being traced in the attack of drones.

The deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee Yuri Shvytkin was also categorical when RIA Novosti stated that it is impossible to get components for the manufacture of UAVs in Syria: "This is the work of special services that are coordinated by the United States."

The answer followed instantly. The Pentagon representative Adrian Rankin-Galloway stated the same RIA Novosti as the technologies used in the assembly of drones that attacked Russian military facilities "easy to purchase in the open market."

And this is true. Moreover, judging by the photographs of the drones that illustrated the Mo message on Facebook, nothing unique in aircraft, at least at first glance, will be found. The militants used exactly the same artisanly manufactured drones back in 2016, when under the Iraqi Mosul they successfully bombed the Kurdish units and French special forces. By the beginning of 2017, the use of drone militants took on a massive nature. In January of last year, the commander of the US forces in Iraq, Colonel Brett Silva, said that during the fighting for Mosul, the US military shot dozens of UAVs of militants of the Islamic State prohibited in Russia.

Exactly the same drones use the gangs of Turkoman (ethnic Turks), continuing to fight in the north of the Syrian province of Latakia - at a distance of not more than 50-60 kilometers from the Russian Khmeimim air base.

By the way, to the Turkish border from the air base in a straight line of about 70 kilometers, to which the new one drew attention back in 2015-in the publication of six seconds, which concerned the circumstances of the attack by the F-16 of the F-16 of the Turkish Air Force on the Russian Front Bomber Su-24. Then - in November 2015 - we also talked about the banditing of the Turkoman under the command of Alpaslan Chelik, whose members shot Oleg Peshkov, who was descending from the downed bomber.

The field commander Alpaslan Celic has long returned to Turkey, where he was arrested and convicted for violation of the Law on Weapons. But its gang forms continues to operate in a hard-to-reach mining area and could well be adopted by drones.

In the message of the Ministry of Defense, the following phrase also attracts attention: "As a result of decoding the data of the intercepted UAV, the exact place of their launch is determined." However, the exact place of the launch is not indicated, although it is reported that drones are launched “from a range of more than 50 kilometers using modern guidance technologies for satellite GPS coordinates” and that “such attacks can be carried out by terrorists from a range of about 100 kilometers”. That is, theoretically, the Khmeimim of the bushy -made drones can fly from the territory of Turkey?

It confuses, to everything else, that’s what, in addition to the reign’s thoroughness of the thoroughness of the thoroughness of the thoroughness. Nowhere is there any official information about the “mortar shelling” that occurred on New Year's Eve on December 31.

And this despite the fact that as a result of this attack, two military personnel of the Russian army died, and nothing is known about the number of wounded at all.

Back in January 2016, when I had a chance to visit the Khmeimim air base, I drew attention to its inaccessibility. Mountains approach one side of the runway and parking of aircraft, to which 3-4 kilometers - so that the reliability of the protection of the air base has no doubt.

In the sky, helicopters were constantly barrier, on the slopes of the mountains, as the military told me, military security units worked around the clock, and the approaches to the base were mined. However, from the opposite side to the Khmeimim airbase, Basel Al-Asad, converted from civilian airport, residential buildings approach. However, the Syrian special services carefully cleaned this area from the "unreliable elements", and in order to get to this place from Latakia, it is necessary to drive several checkpoints. That is, it is very problematic to get to Khmeimim on a truck, and it is possible to deliver at least one 120-mm mortar that has the appropriate firing range there only by a truck.

In addition, there is still not a single official photograph confirming the very fact of mortar shelling - neither funnel from the mine, nor traces of fragments or damage to Russian technology.

Therefore, the question arises: was there a mortar shelling? Some of the military who I had served in Khmeimim put forward the version that the militants attacked with the help of drones on December 31, only the military passed it.