Lost decade

For the pleasure of seeing Vladimir Putin, Russia paid expensive for 18 years. The second decade has been lost for economic development

Photo: Pixabay / Gerealt

Politics "ate" the economy

The rule of Vladimir Putin is divided into two equal parts: the first nine -year -old was excellent for economic growth, and the second was terrible. But they need to evaluate them taking into account the fact that actions in economic policy do not always lead to an instant effect.

In the 1990s, the difficulties of the Russian transition to the market were largely due to the mistakes of the 1970-1980s: the share of the military-industrial complex and heavy industry in GDP was too high, and social policy was too generous. On the contrary, in the first half of the 2000s, the economy quickly grew last due to the fact that in the previous decade, basic institutions of a market economy were created.

In the very beginning of the 2000s, Putin carried out several reforms that contributed to economic growth. But politics has changed quickly. Since 2003, the state has become much more interested in the selection of assets of private business. And since 2008 it has become similar to the “poorly lying” territories of neighboring states. This also did not give an effect immediately. But it gave: over the second 9 years of Putin’s rule, the economy increased less than on average for a year in its first nine -year -old.

Since 2003, the state instead of maintaining the growth of the economy began to select assets of private business. And since 2008 it has become similarly to act with the "poorly lying" territories of neighboring states

Deceptive start

Like many autocrats, Putin vigorously began: he instructed Herman Gref (Minister of Economic Development in 2000-2007) to engage in deregulation of the economy, creating equal rules of the game for all, reducing taxes. Other conditions also developed as well as possible. The market reforms of the 1990s finally had their fruits: the population and business ten years after the start of market transformations learned to live under capitalism. Oil and gas were valued. In the mid-2000s, it seemed to many Russian economists that our economy was growing thanks to domestic sources, and not an increase in the price of energy resources, that the dependence between the price of oil and the economic growth of Russia is weakening. Life refuted this optimistic theory.

Putin was going to double the GDP and "catch up with Portugal." Neither one nor the other happened. Although the average annual growth rate of Russian GDP in 2000-2008 came very close to the pace necessary for doubling. And for Portugal, the last two decades have been very unsuccessful - since 2000, its economy has not increased even by 4%over the year. Nevertheless, the first Putin nine -year -old was economically very impressive ( see table ).

Almost doubled

Calculations of the author according to the IMF

Oil and gas at this time were valued, and the ruble was strengthened, so the country was very attractive to foreign investment. And if you look at the economic indicators of the first Putin years in dollars, they look even better. Over 2000-2009, Puzushva GDP has increased more than once: from less than $ 2000 to almost $ 12,500. In this period, Russia, like China and India, really caught up with developed countries. If in 2000 the Russian Plush GDP was lower than the level of Germany, France and Great Britain by 12-15 times, then 2008 - less than four times. And China and India, despite the high growth rates, still seemed to poor countries playing the “lightweight”: for example, in 2008, the Russian pillow GDP in dollars was still 3.5 times higher than Chinese.

For 2000-2009, Puzushka GDP has increased more than once: from less than $ 2000 to almost $ 12,500

In the mid-2000s, one might think that, unlike the economic losers of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Putin “grabbed God by the beard”: oil is getting more expensive, a recipe for rapid economic growth was found. Another decade of such growth, and Russia would have approached the level of GDP to poor European countries like the same Portugal. Real (adjusted for inflation) salaries increased in 2000-2008 by almost 3.5 times. True, if the price of oil during this period remained unchanged, then salaries, according to the calculations of the economic expert group (EEG), would have grown by only 50%. As a result, according to the EEEG EEET, EEEG EEEG Gurvich, the increase in oil and gas revenues provided almost half the growth of the Russian economy during this period.

Thanks to the large (by European standards) population and growth rates, the Russian market was extremely attractive to car manufacturers, electronics, food; Production companies, retail chains and banks “entered” one after another. They brought not only goods and investments: together with them, the technologies necessary for working in the capitalist economy were imported into the country. In the 1990s, Russian companies and foreign companies working in the country made a gigantic contrast in everything-from financial management to procedures for developing goods and services, from marketing to corporate culture. And by the end of the 2000s, this difference began to go to naught: Russian companies have learned to act in a competitive environment. There, of course, where this environment was: Gazprom, Russian Railways, electric power industry, the military -industrial complex remained in many ways outside the competitive trend.

Change of priorities

The mood of investors are very conservative, they do not change immediately. The Chekists began the first loud attack on the private company back in 2003. Then the Rosneft swollen on the Yukosov assets undertook to carry out a project that Mikhail Khodorkovsky dreamed of: she began to lay a geopolitical oil pipeline in China. Investors for a long time did not believe that this trend could touch them; The analysts had the theory that “dispossession” would affect only those who 1) claimed political influence, 2) privatized Soviet assets, 3) aggressively minimized taxes. And if you build a company from scratch and do not climb into the State Duma, then you say you say there is nothing to be afraid of.

This theory was quite quickly defeated by the story that occurred with the Euroset company Evgeny Chichvarkin . Then there were many other stories, for their transfer it is necessary to write not an article, but a book. The Stalinist Chekists famously dealt with the private business in the late 1920s, in a matter of years bringing an agrarian country to hunger. In the 2000s, they acted not as a wiser example. In modern Russia, unlike Stalin, you can do business. But this is a “sleeping” right: it is updated only by those who can protect it due to the proximity to power of one or another level. If there is no “security letter” or if your business needed the head of “older” by rank than your patron, you can say goodbye to business. They will also be stubborn into prison.

In modern Russia, unlike the Stalin, it is possible to engage in business, but this is a “sleeping” right: it is updated only by those who can protect it due to the proximity to the power of one or another level

Since 2007, officials of all stripes began to increase public procurements, who did not play a special role in the economy in the 1990s, and create a state-owned company for each task that they needed to solve. Are we preparing Sochi for the Olympics? Please, Olympstroy. Developing nanotechnology? Here you have "Rusnano." We integrate defense enterprises? Hello, "Rostec." We are engaged in innovation, dream of Silicon Valley in Russian open spaces? Here, even the quasi-president of Medvedev did not escape the creation of the Skolkovo innovation center next to the palaces of high-ranking officials.

When they created Skolkovo, it was dreamed that in 2020, which remained only a year and a half, in the territory of Skolkovo, in innovative companies, as many as 50 thousand people would work. And what? The road was built, the buildings too - the money was mastered. In state economics, the main thing is not how to make money, but how to spend. So they spent. The Investigative Committee and the Prosecutor's Office also won the activities of the state corporations - they had a large field for corruption investigations. True, in order to avoid political scandals, these investigations rarely open the “green light”.

As a result, according to FAS, in 2005-2015, the share of state and state -owned companies in the economy increased from 35% to 70% of GDP. This assessment is most likely overestimated in departmental interests, but the growth of the public sector in several industries is obvious. So, according to the calculations of Alexei Krivoshapko and Matthias Westman from the Prosperity Capital Management published in Vedomosti, in 2003-2016, the share of state banks in the revenue of the banking sector increased from 35% to 61%, and in TEK - from 30% to 53%. Companies with state participation are ineffective: their revenue is growing, but their share in the total capitalization of Russian companies practically does not change: in 2006-2016, it was, according to Alexander Radygin from Radigs, 47-50%. And the share of Russian workers engaged in state -owned companies during this period even increased from 2.3% to 5.8%.

The total weight of state -owned companies, the public administration and GUPs in the economy, Radygin believes, during which time increased from 39.6% to 46% (and at the peak, in 2009, it was approaching even 52%). But these figures are not exhausted by the state of the state on economic growth.

According to the FAS, in 2005-2015, the share of state and state -owned companies in the economy increased from 35% to 70% of GDP. The share of state banks in the revenue of the banking sector increased from 35% to 61%, and in TEK - from 30% to 53%

The point is not only that the state is ineffective as the owner and manager of economic assets. The main problem is that it is not able to survive the “split personality” when it is necessary to simultaneously manage state -owned companies and maintain equal conditions for competition with private business. The choice is made in favor of “your own”, which distorts the entire economic environment. Each level of power and in each industry has privileged firms that give everything, while the rest should fight the state for their existence. This is a fight against a predictable outcome. There is also such a phenomenon that is difficult for statistics as “private state companies”: it is not taken into account in the above numbers. Formally, private companies belonging to relatives and friends of officials and receiving almost all their income from the state and state -owned companies dominate most sectors of the Russian economy: they lay pipelines and manage housing and communal services, build houses and grow wheat.

Geopolitics against the economy

The growing wealth allowed the Russian leadership to engage in geopolitics. A short war with small Georgia in 2008 allowed Abkhazia and South Ossetia to tear from it. The world community then quietly whistled from such agility, but this, in general, was limited. The sanctions were quickly forgotten about the introduced, the deterioration of relations with the West did not follow.

Therefore, planning more than five years later, the Ukrainian adventure, the Kremlin hawks could think that this time everything would get away with them. Moreover, the scheme has not changed too much since 2008: to maintain the desire for national autonomy (Crimea, Abkhazia) for many years, exciting hatred of incompetent power, respectively, in Kyiv and Tbilisi, and, if necessary, help them in the implementation of long -ripened separatist plans. Help both humanitarian and armed forces. And where the local initiative was not enough (South Ossetia, Donbass) - there is primarily to help the troops.

The world community harnesses for a long time, but then it still goes. Unlike the first, the second geopolitical adventure of Putin led to a deep freezing of Russia's relations with developed countries. Large joint projects in the oil and gas sector are suspended, it is difficult to obtain foreign financing by Russian companies related to the state. But the main thing is that Western banks are gradually accustomed to consider as “toxic” all Russian assets. This extremely complicates the organization and conduct of any transactions. The matter is completed by a hostile attitude to foreign business in Russia itself: “antisancies”, import substitution and protectionist barriers, benefits “their own” in the placement of state orders. It is impossible to invent the worst atmosphere for economic growth.

Western banks are gradually accustomed to consider as “toxic” all Russian assets

Minus 9 years

The results of the policy described above are visible from the table below. Throughout the second Putin nine -year -old, the economy increased less than it grew on average in a year in its first nine -year -old. Compared to other countries, this result also looks extremely weak, although growth rates in the USA, Germany, France, Great Britain and other developed countries in 2009-2017 were also very low. But developed countries have other problems: there the economy gradually comes to his senses after the most severe financial crisis, which demanded large volumes of the Slum by banks and customers of housing. It was accompanied by a strong increase in public debt and a reduction in government departments. There were almost no similar problems in Russia: we were hit by a decrease in oil price and our own stupidity.

For the entire second Putin nine -year -old, the economy increased less than it grew on average a year in its first nine -year

Lost nine -year -old

The calculations of the author according to the IMF and national statistical agencies

The result is sad. Now the Russian Plush GDP (expressed in dollars) is almost 18% lower than in 2008: about $ 10,250. A decade that seemed almost insurmountable for this indicator (then 3.5 times) was reduced by seized steps. The Chinese Plush GDP exceeded $ 8500 and may surpass our level before Putin ends his next presidential six -year -old. Türkiye and Brazil almost caught up with Russia in terms of per capita GDP-in general, from an economic point of view, we have turned from a successful developing country with great prospects into a sednation country.

Four years in a row, real (adjusted for inflation) incomes of the population are reduced. In total for 2014-2017, they fell, as follows from the data of Rosstat, by 11.1%. At the same time, salaries, including in real terms, are growing. But the salary statistics in terms of budgetary organizations have lost its adequacy due to Putin decrees on raising salaries to teachers and health workers. The problem is that Rosstat considers only a medium rather than a median salary, and if, as is often the case in state institutions, the school principal or the head physician of the clinic receives a lot, and ordinary doctors are not enough, then the average salary is much higher than the salary that the average employee of the budget institution receives.

Four years in a row, real (adjusted for inflation) incomes of the population are reduced. In total for 2014-2017, they fell, as follows from the data of Rosstat, by 11.1%

The history of developing countries is rich in examples of militaristic autocracies, throwing all economic resources to the wars. There are many examples of populism mixed with protectionism: the economic results of Argentina in the last decade are not much better than Russian. Of course, we are very far from extreme failures in development that Venezuela or Zimbabwe experienced. Putin is conducting a responsible budget policy. Fearing to fall dependent on creditors, it almost does not increase the public debt and for this purpose supports the budget balance. One of the most important economic achievements of recent times is low inflation. In 2017, for the first time during the post -Soviet years, Russian inflation was below 3%. However, inflation decreased not only thanks to the skillful policy of the Central Bank, but also thanks to weak demand. What will happen to the prices when the economy begins to come to life is a big question.

Now the Russian Plush GDP (expressed in dollars) is almost 18% lower than in 2008

–9 years - 6 years = –15 years?

So far, no signs of revitalization of the economy are visible. And even if the politics had changed instantly, those that impede growth factors that were laid in 2003-2017 would continue to act for a long time. It will be very difficult to get out of the foreign policy, into which we drove ourselves, and the continuation of the movement on it is fraught with the further increase in expenses for the military -industrial complex and the special services, which destroyed the Brezhnev USSR. So the new Putin six -year -old 2018–2024 may well add six more by 9 lost years.

In this case, not only the victorious wars with Georgia and Ukraine, but also a sad loss in an economic competition with China and Turkey, will be the results of Putin's “getting up from the knees”. And then you will have to compete with the developers of the developing world of India and Indonesia gradually selected. After all, as can be seen from our experience, poverty is a profit. You just have to try. And from their experience it is clear that poverty is a curable disease. It is only necessary to change the priorities of development.

* Boris Grozovsky is an economic journalist, in recent years he has been engaged in educational projects with the Yegor Gaidar Foundation and the Sakharov Center, a long -term author of NT