March 18, 2018, 11:53 pm / Opinions

How long will the calm last?

Levada Center sociologist Denis Volkov on reserves of government support

The prevailing public mood was favorable for the Russian authorities long before voting day. The election campaign passed calmly, without much noise or unrest - changes in the ratings of presidential candidates throughout it were minimal. There are no signs of serious social unrest, but isolated pockets of discontent still exist. The decline in public optimism may begin as early as the spring, and it is not obvious whether the authorities have the resources to reliably and permanently reverse the negative trends that emerged at the end of 2017. If they are not found, within 2-3 years after the elections the political system, which today seems stable, may face a deficit of public support.

To understand the situation, let's take a short excursion into the recent past. Despite the fact that Vladimir Putin received 63.6% of the votes in the 2012 elections, only every fifth respondent wanted him to be re-elected for the next term at all costs. More than half would prefer to see a new person in this position if possible. But after the annexation of Crimea to Russia, which was perceived by the majority of the population as a symbol of the revival of the country’s greatness, the situation changed fundamentally: two-thirds of the population wanted to see Putin in this post, and not someone else. This situation continues to this day, i.e. the general emotional background of the 2018 election campaign was fundamentally different from the previous one.

Today in society there is no fatigue and dissatisfaction with the authorities that was observed six years ago. Then this was expressed in a heightened sense of uncertainty about the future, in a general feeling of impasse and the inability of the authorities to change people's lives for the better. Mass protests 2011–2012 became a kind of culmination of these sentiments, when the number of dissatisfied not only with the government, but also with the president, according to Levada Center polls, approached half of the country’s population and covered different social strata.

The tone in that protest movement was set by the urban middle class, but mass participation was ensured by the influx of new, non-politicized and relatively poorly versed ordinary people from different social strata. Soon, many of these “newcomers” became disillusioned and left the protest movement just as quickly as they had joined it. After the annexation of Crimea and against the backdrop of unrest in Kyiv and bloodshed in the Donbass, some of them completely “returned” to Putin.

Today, slightly more than half of Russians are dissatisfied with the government’s actions, and the prime minister’s rating is even lower. However, public support for the president remains high, which supports the legitimacy of the system as a whole. Therefore, although isolated outbreaks of discontent are possible, there will, in all likelihood, be no mass protests yet.

Until recently, the adaptation of the population to new economic conditions, the gradual revival of the economy, and low inflation played a role in maintaining high support for the authorities. It is important that the political system entered an economic crisis at a time when the level of optimism and support for the authorities was at its peak. The population believed Vladimir Putin’s words that the crisis would last no more than two years (this statement of his, made at a large press conference in December 2014, was often recalled by participants in group discussions), also because his rating was at its highest point .

The slow restoration of optimism became noticeable in the spring of 2016, when assessments of the state of affairs in the family and in the country and expectations about the future began to rise. The positive dynamics continued until October–November 2017, when for two months in a row sociological surveys recorded a decrease in the corresponding indicators. The potential for further improvement in sentiment was running out. But December 2017 measurements unexpectedly showed bursts of optimism. The attitude of Russians towards the government has improved, their assessment of the state of affairs in the country has improved, and their hopes for the future have strengthened. The end of the year also marked the peak of readiness to vote for Putin in the presidential elections - almost two-thirds of the population declared this.

It was primarily low-income citizens who improved their attitude towards the authorities, who are usually less supportive of the existing order than others: in terms of assessing the situation and the level of support for the authorities, representatives of the poorest segments of the population, as a rule, demonstrate greater pessimism. As qualitative research has shown, over the past couple of years, dissatisfaction has been growing in this social stratum that the government “has stopped caring about its people” and is helping other countries, “forgetting about the needs of ordinary people.”

At the end of 2017, low-income Russians in their assessments abnormally approached the average statistical indicators - apparently, election gifts had an effect: raising pensions, extending the terms of maternity capital payments, and the promise to withdraw troops from Syria. The gesture itself was important - the government is turning towards its citizens and their problems, we will spend on ourselves, and not on others. The last time a similar surge in optimism among the poor was observed 10 years ago, during the 2007–2008 elections, when satisfaction with the state of affairs and government ratings were higher than today. It seemed that this time too the measures of electoral mobilization would have the desired effect.

However, in February 2018, the mobilization machine seemed to have malfunctioned - all three major sociological companies recorded a drop in Putin’s ratings (for example, according to the Levada Center, Putin’s approval rating as president decreased from 80% in January to 76% in February). Probably, the president’s illness and his disappearance from television screens had an impact, which was echoed in group discussions: “the president is sick,” “he looks bad,” he is “just tired.” But soon after Putin returned to television, the ratings leveled off (up to 80% in early March). What happened once again should have reminded us of the role that Russian state television has in maintaining the current political order.

In Russia there is a total simplification of mass consciousness

Politics / Social Policy

The most resistant to pre-election mobilization turned out to be residents of megacities, where assessments of the authorities are also traditionally lower than all-Russian ones - primarily due to the views of the politically active part of the middle class of the capital and largest cities. In general, this layer is loyal to the regime, but the discontent that exists here is stable and specific. Here there are complaints about the “authoritarianism of the authorities” and the connivance of corruption, displeasure about the persecution of the opposition, and a poor business climate. This is where the most articulated demand for democratic and market changes comes from. Qualitative research shows that this layer is gradually forming the opinion that the current government itself is an obstacle to such changes: “As long as Putin is in his place, nothing will change in the country.”

The insensitivity of the politically active urban class to pre-election mobilization suggests that the authorities were unable, and most likely simply did not want, to find the right words and take a step towards this social stratum. Apparently, the logic is that now the interests of the advanced, but small strata can be neglected - the support of the majority is enough.

The failure of pre-election mobilization and its limited effect indicate that the negative trend in public sentiment that emerged in October-November last year may return after the elections. In the absence of structural changes that would support active urban strata, there will apparently be no rapid economic growth. And if there is no growth, there will be no increase in living standards. This means that public discontent will continue to grow – and it is not yet clear how public sentiment is planned to be maintained at a level comfortable for the authorities over the next six years.

The author is a sociologist at Levada Center