Hybrid war lessons

On the air - Evgeny Magda, author of the book "Hybrid aggression of Russia: Lessons for the World"

Vitaly Portnikov: A hybrid war is a topic for books and scientific research, one of the most important topics of Ukrainian political life. Here is one of these books, written by my colleague Evgeny Magda and already translated into other languages. I represent the plot of my colleague Vladimir Ivakhnenko .

Vladimir Ivakhnenko: In 2015, the Kharkov publishing house "Vivat" published a book of Ukrainian political scientist and publicist Evgeny Magda "Hybrid war: to survive and win." The book was one of the first studies on the topic of a hybrid war, which is believed that Russia unleashed against Ukraine. In the preface, Dmitry Kuleb, the ambassador on special instructions of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, notes: “The hybrid war is largely metaphysical and difficult to do. It is everywhere and at the same time nowhere. It is difficult to identify and comprehend all its components from the side, as well as internally to accept the fact that hybrid aggression requires hybrid defense, and not the search for classical answers.”

In his work, Evgeny Magda talks about the historical, energy, as well as the information and psychological aspects of the hybrid war, analyzing, in particular, the reasons for the weakening of Ukraine’s defense capabilities during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych.

In 2017, Kalamar Kiev publishing house has published a new book of a political scientist Hybrid aggression of Russia: lessons for Europe. ” The book was represented by Eugene in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on the eve of the fourth anniversary of the annexation of Russia Crimea - one of the successful Kremlin operations of the hybrid war against Ukraine. The new publication covers a wider range of issues, including the situation around Russia's intervention in the US presidential election.

In a review of the second book of Magda, Doctor of Political Sciences, an employee of the Institute of Strategic Research, Dmitry Dubov writes : “Why are they talking about a hybrid war about a new phenomenon? What is its essence, and how to distinguish it from all other types of wars? What are its features, and what are its methods? And most importantly, what in this regard to all do? Evgeny Magda in a very compressed form gives answers to almost all these Questions.

The hybrid war is devoted to many works by the Councilor of the Ukrainian President, Director of the National Institute for Strategic Research by Vladimir Gorbulin. He, in particular, is the co -author of the collective monograph "World Hybrid War: Ukrainian Front". Gorbulin emphasizes that the aggravation of contradictions in Europe is “one of the important components of a hybrid war, which continues as interference in election processes, destabilization of democratic institutions, energy dependence, economic and information and psychological pressure”.

The President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, which separates such fears, also believes that the Russian hybrid war against Ukraine, which had begun four years ago, not only covers the European continent, but "turns into a full -scale world hybrid war." "There is no country that would be so familiar with the hybrid tactics of Moscow as Ukraine. That's why I urge the whole world: in our interests to resist Russia's attempts to destroy our unity and destroy our democracies," Poroshenko said in a recent Munich Security Conference.

Vitaly Portnikov: The guest of our broadcast is a political scientist, executive director of the Institute of World Policy, Evgeny Magda.

For almost four years we have been talking about a hybrid war, it already becomes a topic for a serious political science. It seems to me that the Soviet Union was engaged in hybrid wars throughout the history of its existence, it is not news, but rather an extension of the passed. The fact that the authorities in Russia are people who have passed the school of the KGB of the USSR and know what hybrid wars was a prelude to such operations.

Evgeny Magda: In your words, of course, there is a rational grain. The hybrid aggression of Russia is primarily directed against Ukraine. There is also a hybrid aggression against Europe as a whole, but not only in Europe, because the United States with Russia's intervention in the elections also became a victim of hybrid aggression.

The meaning of hybrid aggression is that information plays the leading role in it, that is, it is cybergression and the spread of misinformation, fake messages, and all this works not only in Ukrainian realities.

Russia began to prepare for aggressive actions against Ukraine after the "orange" Maidan

Of course, this did not begin in 2014. According to my observations, Russia began to prepare for aggressive actions against Ukraine after the "orange" Maidan, so non -state organizations began to unfold. Russia turned out to be surprisingly good at the school of the "soft" power of Joseph Naya .

Vitaly Portnikov: “Soft Power” is, as I understand it, numerous public organizations, political scientists and political science centers. We remember how these people at some point flooded the Ukrainian television broadcast, the media, worked for the idea of Eurasian integration, the "Russian world". There were also many of them, especially in the regions - entire political parties, figures who advocated these ideas and were also supported from Moscow. Here, in Kyiv, on the most popular television shows (by the way, to the former Russian host), Russian politicians came - Konstantin Zatulin, Sergey Glazyev, from time to time they invited Boris Nemtsov, but these people were much more frequent guests on the air of Ukrainian television. But why enter the troops if there are such opportunities for influence, and they do not disappear anywhere even after Viktor Yanukovych loses power?

Evgeny Magda: I think that in 2014 it was not a spontaneous decision, as separate even Russian politicians believe, for example, the same Ilya Ponomarev. This was a conscious decision: Russia needed a small victorious war. Why Crimea? There was a Russian military presence, Crimea was constantly in the information field of the Russian Federation. Russia was not shy about talking about its interests in the Crimea, it signed the Kharkov agreements, exchanging a discount on gas for its corresponding presence in Crimea until 2042. And, it would seem, she could leave everything, but the desire to conduct such a multi -income was inherent in the Kremlin.

In Russia, as I understand it, it was realized that the so -called “obese years” due to high prices for energy resources are not endless, so it was necessary to create conditions for a pseudo -Patriotic rise, and they, in fact, were obtained. In Russian society there was a patriotic-nationalist hysteria about the accession of Crimea, Putin’s rating immediately took off into sky-high altitudes.

Vitaly Portnikov: The victorious war turned out, the West could not do anything. Why then it was necessary to arrange a war in the east of Ukraine?

Evgeny Magda: These are also hybrid actions, because the war has not been officially declared. What is happening performed by Russia significantly changes the very logic of international relations. That is, Russia really destroyed the architecture of international security, which has existed from 1945 until recently, almost 70 years.

There is an important point here: why was it necessary to create such separatist republics, why not create a single new Russia? Due to the chain of unrecognized republics, Russia wanted to cut Ukraine from the Black Sea and Azov ports: thanks to this, Ukraine would have lost the possibility of exporting metal, ore and grain. If this plan was a success, I am simply not ready to predict what the course of hryvnia would be now.

Evgeny Magda

Russia does not set itself the goal of removing the blue-yellow flag and raising Russian tricolor over Kiev, realizing that this, speaking the language of the Russian elite, will entail some costs. But to get in Kyiv an absolutely loyal power, even more loyal than Yanukovych - I think this task is still in the Kremlin today.

Vitaly Portnikov: I still do not see any signs that they are going to fulfill it, that they are going to annex some more territories to these so-called People's Republics of Donbass.

Evgeny Magda: Ukraine simply did not fall apart from the first blow. There was a calculation that she would fall apart into several parts. If we recall Ukraine, divided into three parts, a model of the propaganda 2004, then this is an approximate map of Russian interests. I am practically sure that Russia in informal communication offered our Western neighbors in different format to take part in establishing control over various regions of Ukraine. Another thing is that quite unexpectedly for Russia in the European Union the principles (at least partially) defeated geopolitical greed, which in the modern world will not surprise anyone.

Vitaliy Portnikov: But this means that 20 million Ukrainians will live in Poland, in Hungary there are also several million, if you imagine in a purely theoretical way that the Western regions of Ukraine will move to some other countries. These other countries will cease to exist in the form in which we know them after the Second World War.

Evgeny Magda: I think it was a probe, that is, Russia wanted to create part of the occupied, annexed Ukraine in Ukraine. Indeed, in Russia there is a mechanism for entering the federation, and there is no mechanism for leaving it. Accordingly, Crimea is actually a hostage, which was forcibly dragged into the largest in size of the country of the world. The second variety is the Donbass and an unrealized operation in Odessa, where there would be enough pro -Russian politicians - perhaps this would be called people's republics. Everything else, including Kyiv, - here Russia, I think, under the flag of peacekeeping, would say that it is ready for foreign contingents, and that it is simply nominal Ukrainian statehood, which does not decide anything, in which Russia would receive the right to use Ukrainian resources.

Vitaly Portnikov: That is, Putin’s speech in the Kremlin during the annexation of Crimea, where he spoke of New Russia, brought completely clear geographical contours - were these real intentions?

Evgeny Magda: I think yes. At least, the very scale of actions in the Crimea and in the Donbass personally convinces me that this operation was preparing for more than one year. Just the events of Euromaidan, in my opinion, forced Russia to move faster, it did not fully completed the process of using the tactics of termites against Ukrainian special services and the army.

The very scale of Putin’s actions in Crimea and the Donbass personally convinces me that this operation was preparing for more than one year

Another important point: citizens of Ukraine made conclusions compared to the events of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-21. Then, after the First World War, many soldiers of the Russian Imperial Army or, for example, the Austro-Hungarian army, who were in other units of Ukraine, were simply tired of the war, they were served at home. This time, Ukrainians began to help their own army - to dress, supply, feed, only weapons were for the mass of their state. This, in my opinion, is a very serious lesson that shows that Ukraine has grown as a political nation.

Vitaly Portnikov: And this was not provided for by this plan.

Evgeny Magda: Russia absolutely did not provide for this. Honestly, on the one hand, it pleases me, and on the other, it is surprising. Russia has at their disposal a huge number of people who have not found themselves in today's Ukraine, but have certain distorted or not distorted knowledge about the situation in Ukraine. But Russia does not consider it necessary to somehow use them, that is, it acts, one might say, mainly according to imperial templates.

Our nationwide problem is that Ukraine considered it possible to be in the shadow of Russia good 20 years, and did not form its own image. We often went to the images imposed on us. To say that we can be identified through embroidered shirts, gopak, gorlyka and lard is not even a complex of inferiority, but simply a huge shortsightedness. Allow us to be identified now only through the war, Chernobyl, corruption - this is our big mistake. We cannot further develop this image of the victim, because the victim, like a beggar, can cause sympathy, but is unlikely to cause a sense of partnership, the desire to work together, and restore our country.

We must show that we are a state of significant opportunities. The Ukrainian leadership really said that we are a country of unique opportunities, but this was not supported by real actions. And therefore, Russia beats quite clearly at the sick points of Ukraine, walks along them and creates really serious problems for us.

Vitaly Portnikov: Eugene, the second part of your book is “Lessons for Europe”. Do you really think that Europe has learned lessons from this hybrid history?

Evgeny Magda: The book “Lessons for Europe” was published in the spring of 2017, and already in February 2018 a book appeared in English, and in February I presented it in the Council of Europe. The Ukrainian representative office helped us organize a presentation. It is significant for me who came: representatives of the Baltic countries came, the Georgian ambassador to the European Council, a representative of Moldova, a representative of Croatia, and this did not surprise me. What surprised me a little more is a representative of Spain: perhaps in connection with the Catalan crisis.

Europe still takes some lessons, it gradually unfolds from the perception of Russia as a reliable partner to understand that Russia is capable of too much, is able to exert serious pressure on Ukraine (and not only). I am sure that Ukraine is not the main goal of Russia. Its main goal is to destroy the European Union, because the largest space of rights and freedoms in the world, in my opinion, presses Putin’s geopolitical ego for the simple reason that its existence does not allow to return to the Soviet empire.

There is one more important point for awareness: Putin with its very different actions (often these are not direct statements, but hints) offers a binary model for the development of relations with the Western world, mainly with the European Union. It does not develop with the states, especially after the well -known sanctions law and the sanctions list, where everyone was driven to show that they are not particularly intended to negotiate with anyone. So, there are two components: on the one hand, Russia shows that it is ready to sell energy resources as the blood of the economy, to be a donor for the European Union. And this forces us to be more flexible many European Union countries, among which today there are those that are one hundred percent dependent on the supply of Russian gas.

Another part is no less interesting. Russia demonstrates that it is ready to buy high -tech European goods, high -added goods, that is, to contribute to the growth of the welfare of Europeans. In such cases, I wonder: and which of the European leaders is capable of in order to comply with the principles of abandoning the growth of the well -being of their fellow citizens? This Russia has a guaranteed election result, and the European politician itself forms the result in the elections or the circumstances in which it is.

Vitaly Portnikov: As this conflict continues, Europe will calm down or still establish clear rules of its relationship with Russia, given that Russia is not ready for such cooperation on fundamental issues?

Ukraine should show that it is a symbol of the struggle for European principles

Evgeny Magda: As I see, Putin’s tactics are to wait out. He waited for Barack Obama and waited for a seemingly more favorable Donald Trump, but as a result he received the opposite effect. He waited for Francois Hollande, Emmanuel Macron, who is more ambitious and has his own vision of France's foreign policy strategy. Now he is waiting for what will happen to the angel Merkel.

This is a really important point. In my opinion, while the angel Merkel is the Chancellor and the most influential lady in Europe in the political sense, the sanctions will continue every six months, in the European Union we will not talk about strengthening or weakening. But as soon as Merkel leaves ... Russia is preparing for this, and in different countries. For example, in Hungary and in the Czech Republic there are unpleasant trends, in Poland the general political climate becomes quite difficult for us. That is, we find ourselves in a situation where Ukraine cannot afford to say that "we restrain the Russian Horde," because in fact this horde is not seen in Europe. Ukraine should not afford to look like a barrier on the path of relations between Russia and the European Union, we must show that we are a symbol of the struggle for European principles, an example of how the state is fighting for its right to be part of political Europe, and not just to defend its independence.

Виталий Портников: Это в том случае, если кого-то интересуют принципы, а не деньги.

Евгений Магда: Конечно. Но сама история Европейского союза и модель принятия решений в нем все-таки подталкивает к тому, чтобы там понимали саму логику, хотя ставка Путина на противостояние с Евросоюзом связана с тем, что все решения принимаются консенсусом, и поэтому он имеет определенный временной люфт. В Соединенных Штатах несколько не так, все-таки модель президентской республики работает иначе, а Трамп находится в прокрустовом ложе санкционного закона. И поэтому России приходится маневрировать между разными крыльями западного мира, чтобы не позволить найти какой-то общий рычаг для давления на Кремль.

Виталий Портников: Если бы ваша книга называлась "Гибридная агрессия России: уроки для Кремля", что бы вы тогда писали? Россия, по вашему мнению, извлекла уроки?

Евгений Магда: Вы знаете, после выхода моей первой книжки на эту тему еще в 2015 году ("Гибридная война: выжить и победить"), буквально через три месяца вышла книга известного российского политолога Сергея Маркова "Гибридная война против России". Я пишу, например, о том, что книги — тоже элемент гибридной войны. Если моя книга — это все-таки исследование, то там больше речи и интервью Маркова.

Уроки для России. Первое: необходимо, наверное, четко изучать объект своего воздействия. Нужно понимать, что невозможно действовать в исключительно имперских рамках против одного из самых больших государств в Европе. Да, они четко понимают, что гипотетическое поражение Украины будет иметь деморализующее значение для стран Балтии, например, или для стран Центральной и Южной Европы. Но при этом нет смысла давать уроки тем, кто не хочет учиться.

Виталий Портников: Я очень хорошо помню свой диалог с одним высокопоставленным российским руководителем где-то в 2010 году, когда Виктор Янукович уже победил на президентских выборах. Мой собеседник сказал: ну, это ненадолго, максимум на один срок, ведь ясно, кто будет следующим президентом Украины. Я заинтересовался: и кто же? Виктор Медведчук. Я удивился: Медведчук пользуется не такой большой популярностью, он не избираем как президент, это практически невозможно провести, даже если потратить любое количество денег. А этот руководитель мне говорит: это решение Владимира Владимировича, с такими решениями никто не спорит.

Евгений Магда: Вот эта матрица очень сильно подводит Россию. Я думаю, она может пригодиться России в условиях общения с Европой, в чем-то - со Штатами, но она не приходит в условиях общения с Украиной. Многие столетия жизни рядом россиян и украинцев привели к серьезному взаимопроникновению и культур, и языков, но все-таки мы остались разными. Они в России, видимо, даже не прочитали книгу "Украина — не Россия" Леонида Кучмы.

Виталий Портников: Потому что она опровергала саму суть такого подхода, что это просто некие мятежные территории. Видимо, когда Леонид Кучма писал свою книгу, Вадимир Путин сказал Александру Лукашенко, что Белоруссия может присоединиться к России только областями. Мне кажется, это предложение никуда не исчезло ни по отношению к Белоруссии, ни по отношению к Украине.

Евгений Магда: В контексте многочисленных конфликтов на постсоветском пространстве Россия, очевидно, претендует на то, чтобы быть ведущей страной этого пространства (это, в принципе, мало кто оспаривает и на Западе). Нагорный Карабах, Грузия, Приднестровье, Украина — это сублимация российского видения сверхгосударства.

Виталий Портников: То есть сверхимперии нет, но она ведет себя как империя.

Евгений Магда: По крайней мере, пытается так себя вести, показывая, что она хозяйка на своем заднем дворе в общем геополитическом понимании. Украина выбивает Россию из этой роли, и она ничего не может сделать.

Виалий Портников: Как вы считаете, в будущем Россия вернется к роли страны, которая будет оказывать такое политическо-культурное и информационное воздействие в "мягкой силе", или продолжит действовать, как слон в посудной лавке - с помощью войск, добровольцев или с помощью генерирования территориальных конфликтов?

Евгений Магда: Нынешнее состояние украинских вооруженных сил как минимум несколько сдерживает Россию в средствах. События в Иловайске и в Дебальцево показали, что в российском руководстве есть видение каких-то допустимо возможных потерь. Поэтому Россия будет воздерживаться от активного военного сценария (это, в принципе, подтверждают и западные эксперты). Но Украина уже четыре года живет в состоянии перманентного общественно-политического кризиса -государство, которое 23 года независимости строило мирную страну и имело мирный "оранжевый" Майдан, тут получило огромные потери. Кстати, на Западе откровенно говорят: если бы мы потеряли столько людей, мы бы уже искали компромисс, возможность договариваться.

Россия будет использовать не давление на фронте, а давление изнутри. И тут 2019 год, год выборов будет во многом решающим для Украины.