Panic in the aquarium

Why did American sanctions work, which were previously considered non -working

Photo: Pixabay.com / Gerealt

To understand the consequences of large events, sometimes it makes sense to wait. The expansion of US sanctions is the news of last Friday, and, as in all previous cases, neither the Russian nor even the foreign markets have practically responded to the news. Well, sanctions and sanctions. The papers signed by the unknown in Russia acting as the director of OFAC Andrea Gaki turned out to be underestimated-on Monday morning, a frontal collapse began on the Russian RTS-MMVB stock exchange.

It is more difficult to say what did not fall - the RTS index for Monday lost 11.44%, in capitalization the Russian stock market has lost an amount close to 0.8% of GDP. The dollar in Russia moved for a mark of 60 rubles/$, euro - for 75 rubles/€. And this seems to be not the limit. All this bacchanalia is accompanied by large speeds of the exchange - Russian actions are actively reset, which gives reason to assume - now, when you read this text, about the same thing is happening at the MICEX.

Oleg Deripaska, Victor Vekselberg and, possibly, Vladimir Bogdanov are the subject of a practical experiment of the US authorities - what will happen if the billionaire from Russia prohibit any significant transactions with his assets and declare it outside the world economic community

Oligarchs as objects of experiment

In the updated SDN - the list of “specially defined citizens (other states)”, which introduced OFAC, an office for foreign assets of the US Department of Finance, three surnames are most important: this is the head of the US Surgutneftegaz sanctions Vladimir Bogdanov and two partners in the aluminum and energy business - Victor Vekselberg and Oleg Deripaska: Land On Monday, RTS was most likely explained by these three surnames in the new sanctions list.

The “corporate” part of the OFAC list is represented by holding companies belonging to entrepreneurs who fell under sanctions - all of them are listed in the “General License” OFAC No. 12. In the “General License” No. 13, only three companies - Rusal, EN+ and GAZ group. License No. 12 limits any trading operations with the list companies - they are allowed only until June 5. License No. 13 allows operations to transfer property to non -residents of the United States Assets and debt "Rusala", En+ and Gaza until May 7. And after - it does not allow. Essentially, this is a ban for any individuals and legal entities of the United States to own shares in the capital or duty of companies owned by Oleg Deripaska and Viktor Vekselberg - they must sell them for a month (and the ransom of shares, for example, Rusalus, is prohibited in the logic of the license, this should be non -Affilized with Diripaska and the US bill of all -nozzle), and US non -residents of non -resident) Report to the US Treasury - to whom and for how much it was sold.

Finally, in explanations, OFAC describes in sufficient detail which non -residents transactions with companies from license No. 12 will consider as supporting business these companies. OFAC explains that the “significant” transactions in other jurisdictions will also violate the Caatsa law-and will become a possible reason for the inclusion of participants in such transactions in the SDN lists if the US Treasury considers that they are de facto performed in the interests of “prophetic” persons and companies from Russia. This is an important clarification-in fact, in the United States, no one directly prohibits, for example, a company from China or Malaysia to buy Gazelle from Gas to supply them to the United States if this comes to mind. But in the event that it turns out that this is a continuation of the gas business in the USA, the intermediary will also fall under sanctions.

De facto is the Iranian sanctions scheme applied by the United States in 1981-1983 in a very limited volume. And Oleg Deripaska, Victor Vekselberg and, possibly, Vladimir Bogdanov are the subject of a practical experiment of the US authorities - what will happen if the multimilliarder from Russia prohibit any significant transactions with their assets and declare it outside the world economic community. In practice, it is simply “soft forced nationalization” “Rusala”, En+ and gas.

The market is confident that the aluminum holding, which was actively lending to both the country and within its limits, is an actual bankrupt

Domino chain

For obvious reasons, the market reaction was concentrated on Rusal, which is among the world's largest suppliers of aluminum, and on Oleg Deripaska, the actual owner of this holding. 17% of the supply of Rusala products falls on the United States, and taking into account the processing of Rusal aluminum in third jurisdictions with subsequent supply to the States - the company depends on the American market by about a third. Given the super -profitable competition in the global aluminum market, the most simple and understandable idea of ​​the Donald Trump administration is obvious: to throw Rusal from the United States is to provide American companies, primarily Alcoa, the opportunity to increase the production of aluminum to this share. Given that the expected trade war of the United States and China, including with a high probability, will affect aluminum - there is nothing incomprehensible in why Oleg Deripaska is not needed.

However, in such a situation, a foreign buyer of Rusala is obvious in such a situation - these are Chinese companies, which in the future trading dispute with the United States is more than useful, and the Chinaized Rusal is a good argument in this dispute. The unpreparedness of the Chinese authorities for such a development of events was demonstrated by the Hong Kong Exchange on the night of Sunday to Monday: the shares of the Russian aluminum company were sagged on it for a few hours by 40%, which, apparently, followed that the “sanctioned-a-luminous war” of the PRC, at least now, would not be included right now.

And then the Russian stock market thought about who Oleg Deripaska is and what will happen to his counterparties. He does not work in the airless space? The Rusal shares themselves predictably lost 20% of their value (from Friday - 50%) - but this would be a local event.

The main victims are supposed to be the largest creditor in Russia. Namely - Sberbank: minus 17% of capitalization per day

So, Oleg Deripaska is a co -owner of the Norilsk Nickel and conflict with Vladimir Potanin in the issue of monitoring the largest manufacturer Nickel for the world market. In the current situation, Deripaska will probably include Norilskell in the new “exchange” scheme, which allows you to get rid of the Rusal assets. Given how such transactions are usually carried out in Russia, as far as they are and under what political pressure are made - the capitalization of Norilsk Nickel for a trading day fell by 14.5%.

Those who have credited Russian aluminum recently - he is potentially affected by the company's default. “Technical default”, the inability to pay due to restrictions on payments due to problems not with money, but with the payment itself, Rusal has already announced. However, the market is confident that the aluminum holding, which is actively lending to both outside the country and its limits, is the actual bankrupt: the loss of the fifth part of the sales and the inability to lend outside the Russian Federation will inevitably cause violation of the Rusal loans, the banks this week will require early repayment of the debt, money, neither Deripaska, neither Deripaska. In the current conditions, Viktor Vekselberg, in fact, is nowhere to take. Ahead of insolvency - and the main victims are supposed to be the largest creditor in Russia. Namely - Sberbank: minus 17% of capitalization per day.

Glencore shares in London also fell by almost 5% only on expectations, the company's capitalization as a result on April 9 decreased by 3.4%

However, these are only the main domestic problems. A large shareholder of EN+ (8.75%) is the Glencore trader, and its leader Aivan Glazenberg is a frequent Moscow guest (it became known on Tuesday that Glazenberg left the Board of Directors of Rusala). In the end, it can not afford to not get out of the En+ Glencore shareholders, in the end, this is an international holding with headquarters in Switzerland. But here is the trade in aluminum from Russia and the Glencore operations related to this trade related to Russia - under a very big question. Glencore, previously former and Glencorexstrata, and Marc Rich & Co (companies that were once founded by the famous Mark Rich, who died in 2013, generally have an amazing ability to get into all Russian caskets), meanwhile, based on partnership with Deripaska, a bill of exchange, and with all over Russia - his global strategy. Recall that the “privatization” of Rosneft with the Alliance of the Qatari Investment Agency and Glencore has not yet been completed, and the eye, Chinese authorities, Kostin and VTB Bank, Igor Sechin and some more unknown, but very influential people are still in this virtual room, is now the time to leave, and it is unlikely that Glencore is unlikely The current situation will win. Given that Glencore - a highly risky and strongly closed company, Aivan Glazenberg and his partners - Swiss Willy Shthrothotte and Greek Telisa Mistakides - are coming difficult times: there are enough people who are ready to tear off the trading business in the world right now with a very bad reputation in the world, the most delicious pieces. By the way, Glencore shares in London also fell by almost 5% only on expectations, the company's capitalization in the end decreased by 3.4%.

In general, if OFAC, the US Ministry of Finance and Donald Trump and looked for a “pain point” of Russian business, then they found it successfully. But the fact is that they are unlikely to look for it - the more distant consequences of the expansion of the sanctions list are much more unpleasant than the collapse of the stock market, the phenomenon, although magnificent, is not so significant.

How many applicants for any asset in the Russian market are already on the second day of new sanctions lists in lines in high rooms? And how much will it be by May 7, the day before the formation of the new Russian government

Aquarium battles

What is Vladimir Putin - and there is no doubt that it is he who will solve the problems of Oleg Deripaska - will do with Rusal? No one has an answer to this question. There are three options, in fact, and not one of them is painless.

Option one is the actual nationalization of the Rusal, En+ and, apparently, gas (this business itself is not interested in, in any case, to present its quick purchase of both the Russian, European, and even the South Korean company now impossible). This will enable the “russal” in the already large list of companies nationalized through the banking system, and it is quite simple - German Gref, operating a decent share of the money of Russian depositors, together with Andrei Kostin, operating also with a comparable debt, may well divide a huge industrial business with completely unobvious prospects on their balance sheets. With the support of the Central Bank - if the head of the Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina cannot be proved to Vladimir Putin that this is a path to nowhere. It is not clear why Herman Gref in this case should not be appointed the head of the restored state plan, since in this way he will automatically become automatically after the expansion of sanctions.

Option of the second - the provision of emergency loans or restructuring programs, leaving Oleg Deripaska and Viktor Vekselberg by the owners of their assets. In principle, this scheme has slightly differences from the previous one, moreover, in this case, Elvira Nabiullina clearly will have to support Sberbank and VTB (hello, inflationary targeting). This is a very expensive and mainly dead end way to solve the problem - tomorrow, Emergency loans will come to both Kerimov and even Sergey Fursenko: who said that the Zenit team is not a national heritage?

The third option is the most natural-to give Rusal to go bankrupt and sell Deripaska’s assets-good, for some part of their hunters will be found and even manage to agree with the United States about new working conditions. Against this option is the potential damage to national pride and the uncontrollability of the process of “breaking” the size of a business that the Russian authorities simply cannot go to. Because - everything should be under control.

Therefore, it is more likely, given that sanctions can expand further, the fourth option is a large conversation within the Russian business elite about a new configuration of asset ownership. And in this regard, the appearance on the SDN list almost forgotten by all Vladimir Bogdanov is very symptomatic. Surgutneftegaz is traditionally a key piece of ownership for the Russian market: it is a company that does not allow Rosneft to become an actual monopolist in Russian oil and gas. “Surgut” along with “Lukoil”, in fact, is the last hope of the Russian market that in the future it will remain a market, and any “big redistribution”, in which Rosneft, Gazprom, Gazprom, Gosbank, and Kovalchuk, Rotenberg, and Novateko (and this is an incomplete list). Touch Surgutneftegaz. It differs from all other companies in Russia: (a) the volume of funds on the balance sheet is about 2 trillion rubles, or about $ 35 billion (neither Deripaska, nor Vekselberg cost so much even together - and, which is characteristic, and (b) a completely opaque structure of property, which, presumably, is closed from the point of view of its management personally on Vladimir Bogdanov. Its inclusion in the sanctions list is an obvious recognition of his role in the layout, which on Monday was obvious in the picture in the stock market: all, in fact, fell from Aeroflot to Mechel, and with a high probability - waiting for the “war of all” in an attempt to divide all markets in the summer of 2018. After all, “consolidated around Putin” does not mean “abandoning an attempt to eat a neighbor” - right? And how many applicants for any asset in the Russian market are already on the second day of new sanctions lists in lines in high rooms? And how much will it stand by May 7, the day before the formation of the new Russian government, which in newly discovered circumstances will be extremely nervous? Certainly, OFAC was advised by some people very well versed in Russian politics and economics.

However, was there a different picture if the Steven Mnuchin team decided to experiment with the “aiming” sanctions of a new type not in relation to Deripaska and Vekselberg, but, say, in relation to Potanin and Timchenko or Abramovich and Mordashov? Exactly the same. Large business in Russia is so integrated into power that there is no need to talk about oligarchs. On the contrary, it makes sense to talk about the “oligarchy” as a single power-entrepreneurial major conglomerate, where no matter what Vladimir Putin think about it, there are no more exceptions, nor younger, or permanent partners, nor officials, or businessmen-there is a close artificial ecosystem with the almost biological rules of the game. And Vladimir Putin is inside this aquarium, not outside.