
I.
During his visit to the USSR in 1949, Mao Zedong refused to leave the train at the station located in the North Sea (Baikal) on December 9. Accompanying Chen Bod (political adviser, one of the prominent Chinese communist theorists) asked why. Mao reported to Chen Boda for ignorance of history and a “heavy angry tone” said that “here is a pass of his herds Chinese shepherd Sichen Su U”. Mao made it clear that this land is the ancient homeland of the Chinese people, illegally occupied by the Soviet Union. In the era of the reign of the Tan, Yuan and Qin, China, had administrative governing bodies in Cold Siberia. But then Russia began to seep east to Siberia and further to the coast of the Pacific Ocean. Many Chinese did not forget such humiliation.
One could doubt the reliability of the memories of Comrade Chen Bod. But the very first words with which Mao officially addressed the platform of the Yaroslavl station to the honorary guard of Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bulganin are certainly known. A few hours later, he repeated these words to the Soviet dictator during a meeting with Stalin: “Dear comrades and friends! I am glad to visit me to visit the capital of the world's first great socialist state. There is a deep friendship between the peoples of the two great countries, China and the USSR. After the October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet government, followed by Lenin’s policy, first of all, was primarily unequivocal in relation China agreements of the period of imperialist Russia. "
Thus began this visit, for many decades ahead, which determined the agenda of the Soviet-Chinese, and then Russian-Chinese relations. Mao arrived at the celebration (December 21) of the seventh anniversary of Comrade Stalin, but spent about two months in the residence that was provided to him by one of the Stalinist residences, sometimes asking himself the question: is it not under household arrest?
Mao Zedong condescendingly praised Lenin and Stalin for the fact that it was they who proclaimed a policy of canceling the contracts that were unequal against China, and unobtrusively reminded Comrade Stalin that he was responsible (equally with Lenin) responsibility for the fulfillment of them - this, in the opinion of Mao, - to return to China the territories torned from him. During the negotiations, it turned out that the 1945 agreement concluded by Stalin and Chan Kayshi, he, Mao, also considers unfair. Thus, Mao Zedong again raised the question of the status of Mongolia and, moreover, playing longly, opened the opportunity to revise in the future under favorable circumstances of the Soviet-Chinese border. It was a minimum of the Chinese leader, and he completed it by leaving Moscow with a new agreement on friendship, union and mutual assistance containing the serious economic obligations of the USSR. Mao later said to his associates: "I managed to tear out a piece of meat from the mouth of a tiger."
By the way, he did not sign anything. Mao stubbornly maneuvered for more than a month, trying to convince Stalin to sign a historical agreement with Zhou Enlai. The fact is that Mao immediately made it clear: he is not going to recognize Stalin neither the leader of the world communist movement, nor the "older brother". He defiantly emphasized and, most importantly, was deeply convinced that he was the leader of the great civilization, the history of which has several millennia. The solemn signing in his presence of fundamental documents by Stalin and Zhou Enlai would make them both (in any case, in the eyes of Chinese subjects) with equal vassals of Mao.
The question arises: how did Mao with such impudent behavior even managed to get out of Moscow alive and sound? In those harsh times, for much smaller deviations from the general line in fraternal countries (in Czechoslovakia, for example), the older brothers behaved very cool. But in the person of Mao, Stalin was faced with a completely new phenomenon for him. In the communist camp, Stalin was an indisputable high priest of a new powerful religion. He made bourgeois politicians like suckers, using his fundamental advantage over them: he was a bandit. Neither one nor the other worked in the case of Mao and the regime standing behind him, who won in a huge country. Mao himself claimed to be the Stalin Tiara, and he was no less bandit.
The first round of the Soviet (Russian)-Chinese virtual war, declared Mao on the platform of the Yaroslavl station, ended with his victory on points. Judge for yourself: the leader of the poor, ruined by decades of the Civil War and the Japanese occupation of the country came to the sovereign of half of the world located in the halo of glory and military power (by the way, just overpass nuclear weapons) and told him two things: 1) we are absolutely independent of you; 2) In the 19th century, your imperialist rulers rejected huge territories from China. We remember this and will always remember.
II.
Since then, 70 years in Beijing have been guided in their relations with Moscow by the same two postulates. There were many different things in these relations. Fierce disputes regarding the dogmas of communist scholasticism have been conducted for a long time. They came to naught only with the death of this scholasticism itself. Moscow in 1958 (under Nikita Khrushchev) refused to transfer Nuclear technology to China. The PRC independently conducted the first test of nuclear weapons in 1964. Conflicts on the border, initiated, as a rule, by the Chinese side, outgrown in 1969 (under Leonid Brezhnev) into a major military clash on the Damansky River Island (now Zhenbao Dao).
We simply did not notice how, desperately trying to collect at least some vassals in the "Near Abroad", Russia itself is already turning into the near abroad of China
Military intelligence officer and expert in China Colonel Andrei Devyatov believes : “ Under Gorbachev, the Russians took a fatal and irrevocable step towards fundamental strategic concessions. The first tips“ bended ”just to China, not NATO: the withdrawal of the 40th Army from Afghanistan, the 39th of the MNR, the layering of the troops from the Chinese border and coercive Vietnamese to withdraw their troops to withdraw their troops From the campaign-all this happened as a reaction to the requirements of the PRC and several years earlier than the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, but it is not without reason in the "Essay on the History of the PRC" Modern Chinese historians pay attention to the fact that at the level of the deputy ministers of foreign affairs from 1982 to the beginning of 1985, the Soviet side occupied a tough and unyielding position and did not want to hear about the elimination of "three large Gorbachev came and eliminated: in May 1989 he arrived “to the court of the Son of Heaven” with “gifts”-guarantees of the fulfillment of Chinese conditions to normalize bilateral relations. After this actual recognition of the “vassalization” (in traditional Chinese ideas), neither the late USSR nor the Russian Federation could not and cannot claim the status of a “older brother” in relations with relations with relations with relations with relations with China, as in the 1950s, but with a huge stretch, they are able to talk at least about relative parity in bilateral relations, most of all fearing how to not “not offend” China again. "Face".
Completely agreeing with the characteristics of the current state of affairs, I will allow myself to dwell on the strategic concessions of the last 30 years of the already post -Soviet rulers of Russia. Two complemented trends sharply increased the perception of the vassal position of Russia by China - one geopsychological, and the second, growing, is already purely criminal.
The All -Russian post -Soviet Eurasianism was ideologically secondary, was the function of resentment to the West and played the role of psychological laying for the Russian "elite" on the critical days of its relationship with the West. Not to a random drinking companion, but an existential Russian question is addressed to the heaven of the West: "Do you respect me?" There is no answer. The Chinese understood all this perfectly and treated Russian flirting skeptical and with an inevitable dose of condescending and arrogant contempt. If these pale-faced northern barbarians, which at one time imposed unjust agreements, for some reason attach such importance to papers about "strategic partnership" and "multipolarity", then for the sake of uninterrupted supply of Russian raw materials and Russian weapons, these pieces of paper can be signed and signed.
But relations with the United States, the main economic partner and political rival, for China is much more important than relations with Russia. By building them, Beijing is guided by anything, but not by the complexes of Russian politicians. But, it seems, they are not very taken to this convoy of the Kremlin oil and gas traders. Confrontation with the West and the course of "Strategic Partnership" with China inevitably led not only to the marginalization of Russia, but also to subordinate its strategic interests of China and to the loss of control over the Far East and Siberia - first De Facto , and then De Jure .
We simply did not notice how, desperately trying to collect at least some vassals in the “neighboring abroad”, Russia itself is already turning into the near abroad of China. The Russian side during the dialogue all the time tries to stand on tiptoe and reach the style of the pathos declarations of two high contracting parties, while the Chinese side politely, but sequentially indicates its youngest partner to its rightful place. The rulers of the Middle Kingdom have not considered it necessary to hide this spiritual perspective from their younger strategic partners for a long time. People close to the Russian-Chinese official negotiations have been repeated in one voice recently that the Chinese have less and less bother to pretend and portray anything. They relate to the Russian kleptocracy and its leaders with contempt and are no longer embarrassed to express this feeling publicly.
“ Today, Russia in the eyes of China has lost its status, became a servant, ” Andrei Devyatov states. “ But if Russia try, it can become an older sister - this is a good status. In the Chinese world, the mother is the earth, father, the sky, everything is decided by men and brothers, but the older sister personifies wisdom. Even if she is drunk, she needs to be taken care of, she should not be thrown out, she should not be abandoned. Intuition and wisdom - and Russia can present this wisdom . " Putin's kleptocracy is not only trying, but also does everything possible in order to bring the day to Russia the “good status” to bring as much as possible. Especially, apparently, it inspires the members of the Lake cooperative that, having received all the grandmas from the Chinese according to the bonded agreements concluded in recent years, they will be able to retire forever for the West cursed by them with a sense of deep moral satisfaction over the completed civil duty. Take care of the older sister that has lowered and plow the garden on her territory, which cannot be abandoned, will now, as Colonel Ninenes, Chinese comrades assure us. And how they will use the "family civilization" swore to them for loyalty - as a stupid younger brother or as a "wise" older sister that rises from the knees - this is an exclusively question of their taste preferences and demographic expediency.
III.
Muscovy returns to his native harbor - the Golden Horde and the Empire of the Yuan dynasty, where its traditional spiritual scrapers were formed. The large-scale tasks set by the Emperor Mao during his historical visit to the White Tsar in the winter of the 49-50th year of the last century are practically fulfilled.
The doctrinal attitudes of the Military theorists of the PRC include the concept of "living space", which, as they believe, "is used to ensure the security, vital activity and development of the country" and "for strong powers, far goes beyond their state borders." And the strategic boundaries of living space "should move as the integrated power of the state grows." By the way, is it not from this doctrine that the Kremlin foreign policy concept of the "zones of the privileged interests of Russia" was written off? So, you know, it is pleasant, getting up from the knees, to speculate about the territories of your neighbors as a zone of their privileged interests. And what can it feel like in someone else's zone if this one, who has a second economy of the world, a multimillion-dollar army sharpened on deep land offensive operations, and a serious missile-nuclear potential, will also want to overcome the largest geopolitical disaster of the XIV century-the collapse of the Mongol Empire or at least the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the second half of the XIX century? No, not by direct military operations, of course, but exclusively in the spirit of Sun Tzu : "Effective control, carried out over a long time over the strategic district, which is outside the geographical boundaries, will ultimately lead to the transfer of geographical boundaries."
The secret of success in Chinese is to understand the psychology of another, to subordinate his will, to use his complexes in their interests
The Kremlin kleptocracy issued dozens of licenses for the long -term development of natural deposits of minerals, from which in China the production of iron, copper, molybdenum, gold, antimony, titanium, vanadium, silver, germania, tin and other things will be established. China is building processing production in Russian territory if Chinese workers are busy with them. In about the same scheme, China has concluded in recent years a number of agreements with African dictators. True, in Africa, agreements provided for the creation of a much larger number of jobs for natives. The same program includes the expansion of border checkpoints and "strengthening Russian-Chinese cooperation in the field of labor activity." In China, a special state -owned company was created for investment in agricultural production, involving the rent/buying of land in Russia. Huge forest and water ( North Sea!) Resources of Siberia and the Far East were provided with the PRC.
Actually, China received everything that he needed today to digest during the "long time of the strategic region, which is outside the geographical boundaries." He will not come for a second license. From now on, the game will be conducted exclusively according to Chinese rules. The secret of success in Chinese is to understand the psychology of another, to subjugate his will, to use his complexes in their interests, to rely on the absolute cynicism and irresponsibility of Putin's kleptocracy, the last generation of the Soviet communist nomenclature, the final product of the process of its degeneration. This is a brilliant strategic victory, won in the classical traditions of Chinese military art without exposing the sword, without a single shot, except for the firing means involved during the exercises.
The military exercises of 2006, 2009, 2016, which took place in the territory of the four northern military districts of the PRC, left no doubt: the People's Liberation Army of China deliberately demonstrates its potential readiness for a large-scale land surgery in Russia. Neither in the Himalayas, nor in the Taiwan Strait, nor in the reflection of the US and the sea hypothetical attack from the air and the sea, a similar combat experience of the Chinese army will not be needed in principle. The conviction that the nuclear potential of Russia completely leveles the superiority of the PRC at the conventional level is quite common. This is wrong. The threshold of "unacceptable damage" for China is incomparably higher than for developed post -industrial countries and Russia. This difficultly formalized parameter is a derivative not from the characteristics of weapons systems, but from the civilizational type of society, from the value of human life in a particular culture. And since a nuclear strategy is more than half psychology, the advantage in this psychological duel may not be in the side that has a more perfect nuclear arsenal, but in the one whose culture is more tolerant of large -scale human losses.
If you look at the potential Russian-Chinese military conflict in this perspective, you will have to abandon the illusory idea that the threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons can restrain the superior conventional forces of the enemy. A good readiness for victims will allow the Chinese side to increase the rates in this nuclear poker, responding to the threat of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield with a threat of escalation of a nuclear conflict, for example, to the level of exchange of medium -range missiles in the cities of the region and so on. Это перед Западом Владимир Путин может, шантажируя, трясти ядерными причиндалами, с Китаем такие приемы не проходят. В сценарии полномасштабного столкновения сегодняшний Китай оказывается противником, впервые в нашей военной истории превосходящим Россию на всех уровнях эскалации конфликта.
IV.
Все вышесказанное позволяет сделать вывод, что семидесятилетняя китайско-российская война, начавшаяся 19 декабря 1949 года, закончилась. Россия потерпела в ней поражение. Пекин не настаивает пока на формальной капитуляции, потому что действующая российская администрация активно, чистосердечно и плодотворно сотрудничает с державой-победительницей, способствуя планомерному расширению "жизненного пространства" Поднебесной. После неизбежного в исторической перспективе падения путинского режима (либо его гуманитарной эвакуации) некоторые фундаментальные итоги минувшей войны будут юридически зафиксированы. Земли, принадлежавшие Срединной Империи согласно Нерчинскому контракту 1689 года, могут быть воссоединены с КНР. Остальные территории, входящие в зону жизненных интересов Китая, будут институизированы как дружественные ему субъекты.
Загадочным для внешних наблюдателей стало неожиданное единодушное решение верхушки КПК отказаться от установленного еще Дэн Сяопином и хорошо себя зарекомендовавшего на практике правила ограничения власти первого лица двумя сроками. Представляется, что разгадка не в исключительности личности товарища Си Цзиньпина, а в исключительности тех задач, которые предстоит решать китайскому руководству в довольно близкое, но точно не предсказуемое время. На заключительной стадии триумфального преодоления крупнейшей геополитической катастрофы XIX века мировые лидеры века ХХI не могут себе позволить отвлекаться на мелкие процедурные вопросы смены высшей власти.
Андрей Пионтковский – политический эксперт
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