How Georgia defeated

This must be able to: make so much nasty things and so little to extract from this benefit

On August 8, 2008, it is considered the official date of the beginning of the Russian-Georgian War.

The war began in South Ossetia.

I was in this unrecognized republic before I remember how, having returned, she told my friend: “There will be a war in the Caucasus. And it will begin in South Ossetia. ”

South Ossetia is the first experience of building a Gaza sector in the CIS. It was Donbass 1.0 - a poor territory without work, with huge migration.

Local authorities - they are bandits - at first earned on smuggling flowing from Georgia. When Saakashvili stopped her (which, undoubtedly, was his strategic mistake), the only earnings that remained was to sit in the trenches and fight for Russian money against the “Georgian fascists”.

The complete absence of the economy (I remember, I could not exchange a 1000-ruble bill in the store), a non-working water supply and a sovereign hysteria compensated for the non-working water supply. I remember how the local teacher brought me to Avnevi to the heights that dominated the city and, proudly shouting the blackberry hedges, where wooden needs were hidden, said:

“Here is the geopolitical center of the world. From here the victory over America will begin. ”

The Georgian villages in South Ossetia existed mixed with Ossetian, and the “insidious fascist” Saakashvili turned them into a sparkling window of new Georgia: with brand new auto -bonds, roads and hospitals. The contrast was amazing-the same as between the naked gas and Tel Aviv.

South Ossetia was ruled by corruption. Georgia is a law and order. The government of South Ossetia had to ban its citizens to be treated in Georgian hospitals. And the only thing they could do for their own survival was to destroy them. What they did.

The tension began to increase back in July 2008.

Russian troops began to be held on the border of the “exercises to repel Georgian aggression”. On August 3, the South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoita announced the evacuation of the capital - Tskhinvali. The civilian population reached out of the city. Instead, the “volunteers” stopped, ready to reflect the aforementioned aggression, and entire teams of regular propagandists, ready to cover this reflection.

Since there was no “aggression”, it had to be created.

Incomprehensible people began to shell the Georgian troops and Georgian villages with shells, which were probably obtained in the same Selpo, in which then other “volunteers” got tanks for the Donbass. Russian media at that time wrote about shelling from the Georgian side.

On August 7, the Ossetian authorities announced that two Ossetian villages - Damens and Khetagurovo - were destroyed by Georgians. The journalists went there: but the Ossetian villages were untouched, but the Georgian zero neighboring Khetagurovo, on the contrary, was glowing.

It was classic propaganda: always attribute to the enemy what you do yourself. All reports about Georgian attacks were declared a lie. All reciprocal attacks of Georgians were called "unprovided aggression."

All this time, Georgian President Saakashvili tried to get through to European leaders. Nobody cares about him. He called the State Department. He could not even talk to the Secretary of State Condolisian Rice, not to mention George Boucher. The only person to whom he phoned was the deputy. Zama condolis Rais Matya Breeze. Mr. Brisa advised Saakashvili "not to succumb to Russian provocations."

Georgians began to deploy troops only on August 7. By this time, I recall, Tskhinvali was already evacuated.

Saakashvili hoped for a peaceful outcome: he sent to Tskhinvali his Minister for Reintegration of Temuri Jacobashvili. He had to come there with the Russian ambassador Popov, however

On the way to Gori, Popov called Jacobashvili to say that he had a wheel. “Put a spare wheel,” Jacobashvili advised. "The reserve is also pierced."

Arriving in Tskhinvali, Jacobashvili met with Marat Kulakhmetov - commander of Russian peacekeepers. The President of Kokoita did not come to the meeting. “Kokoita got out of control,” said Kulakhametov.

Immediately after the departure, Jacobashvili Kulakhamtov and Kokoita went to reporters together and reported that they had agreed on negotiations. I remind you that at that time in Tskhinvali there was practically no civilian, otherwise the population that was, wrote: "You give early filling by the Georgian corpses of the morgue in Gori."

In desperation, President Saakashvili made the last attempt to stop the war: he announced that the Georgian side was stopping any shelling immediately.

A few hours after the stated ceasefire, at 23.30, the shelling of the Georgian village of Tamarashen began, and at the same time Saakashvili received the data that Russian tanks were taking place of the Rock tunnel.

Apparently, it was the second column of tanks. The first has long stood at the base in Java. Georgian pilots bombed her at about 5 in the morning, and the Russian authorities for a long time were outraged by the bombing of the “humanitarian convoy”, which at 3 nights hurriedly made Java to Tskhinvali.

The reason for the shelling of Tamarashen was clear. The fact is that Tamarashenes stands on Transcam - the only normal road that leads from the Rock tunnel to Tskhinvali further to the mountains. The second - Zarskaya - the road that is bypassing is impassable for tanks. The shelling of Tamarasheni was nothing more than artillery preparation in order to destroy (illegal, by the way), Georgian fortifications in Transcam, so that Russian tanks could pass through it.

The West was entirely on the side of Georgia. But very soon the attitude of the Western bureaucracy began to change. Russian money, Russian agents of influence and simply unwillingness to quarrel with Russia began to do their job. Western politicians looked at the war and were now looking for a way to relieve themselves of responsibility, and the best way to do this was to blame Saakashvili.

The culmination of this policy of the peace of Russia was a report prepared by the EU Commission under the leadership of the experienced Swiss bureaucrat Haydi Taglivini.

The commission was supposed to answer the question “who started the war”, and she answered him like this: according to Georgians, the Russians began the war, and according to the Russians, Georgians. And where is the truth, we do not know.

Moreover, the commission stated that the war began at the moment when Georgia attacked Tskhinvali.

Thus, the Taglivini commission gave a new definition of war. According to this amazing concept, the aggressor in the war was the wrong side that began the war, but the one that decided to defend its territory.

According to the conclusions of the commission, Talyavini Saakashvili simply should not answer.

He had not to answer when Russian artillery equalized Georgian villages along Transcam. He had not to answer when the Russian tanks occupied Gori. He had not to answer when they approached Tbilisi. And if he answered, then he would have started the war! And it is logical: if Saakashvili had not answered, there would be no war - there would only be occupation.

The Taglivini Commission was not the only one who took up the peace of Russia. The most influential of the pacifiers was none other than the new US President Barack Obama.

Soon after the victory in the election, he announced the “reboot” of relations with Russia, thereby recognizing the entire crazy anti-American propaganda in the eyes of the Kremlin, which accompanied the Russian-Georgian war.

If there was no reboot, there would be neither Donbass nor Crimea.

The subsequent annexation of Crimea, the Novorossiya project, the war in Syria and the “hybrid war” against the United States forcing us to overestimate everything that during this time not only Russian propaganda, but also Western pacifiers wrote about the Russian-Georgian war.

In the case of Crimea, the behavior of the Ukrainian authorities was the exact opposite of the behavior of Mikhail Saakashvili - in a considerable queue precisely because they took into account the lesson of the betrayal of Georgia by the West. When Kyiv realized that Russia was growing up the presence of “polite people” in the Crimea, Kyiv made exactly that Saakashvili recommended Matya: “He did not succumb to provocation.”

Alas, this recommendation was not very useful. The Kremlin not only took the Crimea, but also immediately moved on.

In Georgia, in Ukraine, in Syria, in the "hybrid war" with the United States, the Kremlin has always been demonstrated by the same Modus Operandi . He always denied a direct part and attributed his actions to some volunteers. He always wrapped tension through the fake "volunteers".

And, unfortunately, in all these wars, the enemy lost a lot. Saakashvili, for example, lost power - the voter did not forgive him a loss in the war, and the brilliant, from a needle, the building of the exemplary Georgian state turned by the will of voters into the usual post -Soviet corruption toilet.

So: the enemy lost everything. But Russia did not acquire anything but problems. With the exception of Crimean annexation, not a single hybrid war that Russia waged ended in increasing influence or an increase in the economy.

This, in general, must be able to: so much nasty things and so little to extract benefits from them.