The patriarch of all Rus' is required

Or what Putin is counting on - The New Times begins the discussion of the article by Andrei Kolesnikov from the Moscow Center of Carnegie

The summer of 2018 has somewhat modified the consciousness of the average Russian, but did not change anything in the optics of the authorities: the results of the September regional elections, which discovered a handling crisis, did not at all became a signal for liberalization. This was just a new occasion for the inclusion of an additional resource of political technologies and the search for new persons for the authorities, but from the inside of the authorities itself. The president himself discovered a sample of paradoxical thinking: at an event dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the Russian electoral system, he refused to consider the municipal filter a limit of the will of citizens-exactly because in the four Russian regions there were problems with the candidates of the authorities. If they have problems, then democracy is out of danger, competition is present.

The authorities nevertheless pushed the pension reform-the cost of loss of more than 10 percentage points of approval of activity: this rating of Putin, the most indicative of all, sank from the standpoint of 80+ in the spring to the residence permit, and has been kept on the 70-, in October, it amounted to 66 percent. But she pissed out, sideways, smuggling, depriving it of meaning-thanks to the Putin's amendments of August 2018, when he appeared before the public not the king, but the real supplier of the rating points, the reform became not cheaper for the state, but more expensive.

After the story of the retirement age, VAT and the “List of Belousov” it became obvious that the authorities were not interested in anything except knocking out money from the population and business with the aim of further buying loyalty to the same population and business with the same money

The rise in the cost of loyalty

The New Times magazine cover
dated October 8, 2012

After the story of the retirement age, VAT and the “List of Belousov”, it became obvious that the authorities were not interested in anything except knocking out money from the population and business with the aim of further buying loyalty to the same population and business for the same money. Pension money is more authentic, taxes are shorter, but most importantly-these millions and billions must be reached somewhere. The whole bureaucracy of the country, including new “technocrats”, is working on this, and not at all on the modernization of the system. They require great efficiency in state management, despite the fact that no one is going to touch the political foundations of the system, and the state presence in the economy is becoming more and more noticeable.

Instead of changes in the political framework, facial changes are taking place, and even that is not too impressive and with high expectations - the time has come for political Batmen, who, however, have nothing to stimulate the economy and nowhere to take money to buy loyalty. Hence the extraordinary attention to the effectiveness of budget expenditures - the state does not trust itself. Everyone counts - from Alexei Kudrina to Tatyana Golikova.

Citizens reject everything that comes from the authorities - both her radio expense and her candidates. There is a demand for changes, but it is rather a negative property

Loss of trust

With loyalty, too, everything is not very well. The convulsive start of the new beginnings of the summer of 2018, Putin destroyed confidence in the state. Any of his initiatives, even if they turn out to be more or less rational and reasonable, are obviously doomed to unpopularity and rejection. The old social contract - political support in exchange for the sense of a great power and a minimum grocery/preferential set - ceased to operate.

What could have gone for the benefit - May decrees, for example, is now seen either by deception or the most routine duty of the state to feed its citizens. Since the state itself has proved to them for years that they should live as dependents, it is enough to support the authorities in his great battle with the West. However, even the West has become a much less hated object during the summer of 2018, and the mobilization campaigns in the spirit of the “besieged fortress” ceased to inspire Russians to exploits-no one notices this routine.

Citizens reject everything that comes from the authorities - both her radio expense and her candidates. There is a demand for changes, but it is rather a negative properties, without a positive program, without color and ideology. In any case, in the demonstration of the cukish of power in the regional elections with the messenger contained in it, “And you would not go to all of you on ...” there is nothing communist and social democratic. Fixed social sentiments suggest that the bulk of citizens cannot influence the situation in the country, and at the same time these people do not believe that the authorities can expect decisions that improve the situation, primarily economic and social, and not on the Syrian front. The planning horizon as was short, it remained. The October study of the Levada Center testifies: almost every second respondent cannot, in principle, plan his life (46%). Depression in everything - in politics, economics, moods. Five years until 2023, you can live in a state of slow decay and erosion, but with what losses, including in social and human capital?

What does Putin have left? A new war is not able to raise a patriotic wave comparable to the Crimea. There is no resources on it and there is no effect from it. For example, there are no resources on the attack, they are not even on the capture of Belarus, where the father will show the frantically resistance, building an autocracy not for Putin, but for himself

Transit model

The authorities do not feel the danger in this erosion, as in the absence of incentives for development in the economy-even high oil does not save, because of it now, the price of gasoline is not growing. The speed of degradation is really difficult to predict, however, the experience of the summer of 2018 shows that the number of deaf discontent sometimes spasmodicly goes into quality - society has returned to the Prylim state in a matter of weeks.

Putin is increasingly meeting youth, imposing hopes for it on the successful development of Russia. But even if all talented children to transport to the city of Sochi under the wing of the President, the country from this will not become more comfortable and dynamic. The system of power is built so that the father of the nation, gradually turning into the grandfather of the nation, cannot manage all the processes and restraint erosion in manual mode, for him, numerous little Putins do it, who, making decisions, think: “And as if Vladimir Vladimirovich behaved in my place.” This type of thinking restrains the youngest and most educated bureaucrats from meaningful modernization steps.

Soon the authorities will be difficult to enrich even in young careerists bonfires of ambitions-few people want to be responsible for slow decay and its cosmetic repairs by some national project for the development of a digital economy, and even work from time to time in the switch. It would be possible to lose elections in several regions at once so that some candidate from the Communists took this responsibility. But the most important of the fears of the authorities is the fear of managing control, prevents the acting rationally, to share and delegate responsibility for the results of management.

Putin is ready to use the old set of tools: patriotic hysteria, militaristic cargo, mobilization inside the besieged fortress. And it’s not ready to modernize the system, afraid to completely lose it: numerous historical examples - from Gorbachev to the Maidan - are knocking in his heart.

What remains for him? A new war is not able to raise a patriotic wave comparable to the Crimea. There is no resources on it and there is no effect from it. For example, there are no resources on the attack, they are not even on the capture of Belarus, where the father will show the frantically resistance, building an autocracy not for Putin, but for himself. And the solemn entry into the Russian Federation, for example, South Ossetia, will either not notice or perceive with displeasure.

It is difficult to build a strategy in such circumstances. The situation is changing, it is necessary to record the losses of the summer-autumn of 2018, which began so triumphantly and so hopelessly ending. And the transit model of power, which seemed suitable yesterday, suddenly ceases to comply with the current circumstances. For example, sooner or later it is later to change the constitution for the next (after 2024) term of Putin? Is the moment lost?

And is it not easier to switch to another job in this situation. For example, go to the patriarchs of all Rus'.