Ironical Empire

How long will the "system of the Russian Federation" live? Political scientists are discussed by Gleb Pavlovsky and Konstantin Gaaz

• In 2018, the fourth presidential term of Vladimir Putin began. Obviously, the political system created by him is quite stable.
• In his new book, political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky writes about the features of the formation of post -Soviet Russia, the so -called system of the Russian Federation.
• This system is the most successful state education in the history of Russia. It adapts to internal and external challenges and is quite inscribed in the global world.
• The system of the Russian Federation is stable, since it is not a state, but a way of surviving power and the distribution of resources.
• According to the author, the system of the Russian Federation does not have a significant economic or managerial base, its basis is a strategic game of power with the people.

Sergey Medvedev: We are already starting to prepare for the approach of the New Year, gathered under the Christmas tree and try to recall the most important thing that happened to Russia in the past year. Naturally, it is impossible to get around the election of Vladimir Putin for the fourth presidential term and a kind of confirmation of the stability of the system, the system of the Russian Federation, which seems to cope with any external and internal challenges. This is one of the most interesting books of the outgoing year - “Irony Empire. Risk, chance and dogma of the Russian system,” written by Gleb Pavlovsky. Details in the plot of our correspondent.

Correspondent: In this book, the author expresses his opinion on the features of the formation of post -Soviet Russia, or rather, the so -called system of the Russian Federation. This system, according to the author, does not have a significant economic or managerial base, its basis is a strategic game of power with the people. Pavlovsky is sure that, unlike landscaped states, not being a state, such a system is invulnerable in political and military relations. Why the system created by Putin is so stable and what its resources are - Pavlovsky is asked by these and many other questions.

Sergey Medvedev: We have Gleb Pavlovsky , political scientist, creator of the Russian Institute, the Effective Policy Fund , and Konstantin Haaza , political observer, expert of the Moscow Center of Carnegie , a person involved in the creation of this book, who wrote a large and passionate preface.

Probably the first and main question that the person who has read this book is the seemingly absolute invulnerability of the Putin system. What, at the end of 2018, Putin beat everyone again?

Gleb Pavlovsky: But the system is not Putin. Putin is, I would say, a false friend of the expert. In all difficult cases, the expert can say: "Well, this is Putin. Who can penetrate this mysterious, dark and terrible soul?" And then, the expert should not talk about Putin already because it is too interesting. In general, too interesting topics are, in essence, not scientific and not expert topics, it is just an occasion to talk. The system, of course, carries the imprint of Putin’s personality, and it really needs it.

Sergey Medvedev: Is he its creator? Or is he - her product?

Gleb Pavlovsky: No. I saw how she arose in the 90s and, alas, in a sense took part in this. Actually, you can already begin to build a monument to its 30th anniversary, because it arose in the collapse of the Soviet Union, from this dying matter. But people wanted to live, wanted to survive, and they entered into such interesting and, as it turned out later, dangerous relations - political, and winding state. By the way, this terrible idea of the succession of the Soviet Union would be destructive for any state, for any construction of the nation: it is simply impossible to implement.

There is such a thing - "imperial anguish." Many people consider the Russian Federation an imperial federation and believe that this is a matter of its future, perhaps gloomy. But I think that he was at the beginning ...

Sergey Medvedev: Imperial anguish is what Paul Kennedy writes about.

Gleb Pavlovsky: Yes. To create in this territory, which has never been in this form, the authorized state was a completely impossible task. And from this impossible task this unusual system was born, anomalous, as I think.

Konstantin Gaaza: We have examples of continuity that last much longer: some continuity in the bureaucracy, in its rituals, in how people physically send power. But this particular thing really turned out to be surprisingly rich in ways that it can use by which it can make contact with society. Yes, this is a thing with extensive experience of survival, it knows how to pretend the threat.

What is still good this book: it allows you to see different things through it. But I still do not see the prospects to see the self -disclosure of the system.

Now the system predicts the collapse literally no later than the next summer

Sergey Medvedev: We live, observing political life, especially political analyst, from predicting the crisis: here is another six months, another year ... I would believe this if it had not been cooked in these predictions for 15 years. Now the system predict crash literally no later than the next summer.

Gleb Pavlovsky: In my opinion, the first predictions were back in 2001-2002. It was about the 2005 crisis: this is some kind of fatal year, when there is no money, everything will break up ... Then this injury ... We all suffered a real injury: the state disappeared before our eyes, the country disappeared in the former sense of the word. It seems that it was, then why can't it be again?!

But there is still such a moment (this year I began to feel it very much): our intellectual abilities are supplanted by increasing sensitivity. Every time we cry out: "Oh! What absurdity! This cannot be?!" But it is. And each time we do not get tired of repeating: "And this is a complete absurdity!" And then what will be the following? What to call him?

Sergey Medvedev: Theory of the bottom.

Gleb Pavlovsky: Yes. I think that we are simply flying in a rabbit hole and count the shelves, each of them calling the bottom, and maybe piercing. Now, if this system was controlled by the correct bureaucratic order, it would certainly break the neck for a long time on the first and second shelf.

Sergey Medvedev: And her strength is that she is not managed?

Gleb Pavlovsky: But she does not manage. She throws them and draws them into the furnace. This system considers everything as cosmic dust.

Sergey Medvedev: Sasha Morozov had the image of a funnel: and this funnel constantly draws into itself ... and such a feeling of a moving black hole, which constantly sucks, sucks ...

Gleb Pavlovsky: I would not want to go to mysticism. If you look at these two or three decades, then this is a period when the world order has not adapted to the exit from the Cold War, when these wars that are not wars arose. By the way, we can recall that the concept of hot spots appeared here in the late 80s. A hot point is a kind of war and not a war in which people who are not representatives of the state participate. And what exists in the Donbass? What is this territory? This is a picnic on the side of the road, the place of visit - however, we know whose, but from this it does not become more comfortable and less abnormal.

Sergey Medvedev: Is this postmodern? The Russian Federation has anticipated all these postmodern departments of modern society?

Konstantin Haaza

Konstantin Haazaz: The postmodern state of society was predicted in the form of globalization, in the form of the lack of boundaries, in the form of a new understanding of the risk, so redeemed that it is existential ... No, of course. It is sometimes customary to understand some relativism by postmodern in Russia, but what is the properties? This is when we say: "Well, scientific knowledge is socially determined." And Putin says: "Well, you understand, democracy is historically determined." This is one thing, that is, at some point, the true discourse about society expanded very sharply, he had a lot of secret places through which you can go ...

Sergey Medvedev: But this is the situation of relativization of knowledge. And in an unexpected state of post -truths, the system began to work.

Konstantin Haaza: And how do we now? We say: "Uh, no, guys, we only have political bets, and therefore we will return to understanding the scientific truth of the 50s?" Why is there a demand for the prediction of collapse? Because it is a rational discourse about politics. This is a discourse that was held by Gempel, Copper, who said: if we know how the state is arranged correctly, then we can achieve this state by a certain development of science about how society should be correctly arranged. What broke? A bow between knowledge and society broke? Or (from my point of view), the discourse itself broke that there are normative knowledge about what is right. And then we have a different task. And here is one of the tasks that this problem solves is an attempt to speak about an incorrect political abnormal language, not a language - there is no parliament, institutions do not work here and so on.

Sergey Medvedev: To what extent does the system of the Russian Federation inherit the traditional Russian system of power, property, handout, resource state?

Gleb Pavlovsky: All these things are undoubtedly present, they are drawn. Moreover, I even think that those pattern, stable, repeated forms of behavior in each new system on this earth are again drawn. But how, at what point? They do not dictate a new system. This is not to say that the decisions of Ivan the Terrible simply dictated to us today's system, but he made really innovative decisions. Here there is a moment when it is not possible to build what they wanted to build or refuse to build, there is a moment of instrumental deficiency. And this is the moment of appropriation, return and retraction of these methods, which are called Old Russian.

Gleb Pavlovsky

Gifter spoke about the society of power not because he wanted to use the word "society", he simply said where there is a separation between the nation, society and the state. There is no this separation. You begin to build a state by means of power, and the authorities are already sitting on the very most inside society. And then she receives a new reason to intensify and build a non -treasure of the state, although you are announcing this and, perhaps, are even sure of this. Any titanic task is all the time, the authorities are ready to start: "Ah! We go to a breakthrough! Great! Then everyone who interferes with the breakthrough must be eliminated!" There is a struggle for who will have a breakthrough in their hands. Once it was a question of blood, now it is a matter of money. Who will have these colossal budgets? But the blood also pours.

Sergey Medvedev: The book refutes some mythology of Russia, in particular, the mythology of the undemocraticity of the system. What, in this sense, we can say that in view of the non -revelation of the authorities and the people, the state and the people, the system is paradoxically democratic?

Democracy is not always a great plus. The terror of 1937 was democratic: the party had no advantages, it spread to all

Gleb Pavlovsky: Democracy is not always a great plus. For example, the Bolshevik terror until the end of the 30s was unfinished, because the party was outside it, it was impossible to subject the party’s personnel terror. And the terror of 1937 was already democratic: here the party had no advantages, it extended to everyone.

Konstantin Gaaza: Well, and sanctions regimes also target not only and not always power, and sometimes often society as a carrier of this power.

Gleb Pavlovsky: Of course, we often mean by democracy already liberal democracy.

Sergey Medvedev: Yes, traditional institutions, representations, and so on.

Konstantin Gaaza: Is there open access from the bottom up? Look at Putin's guards - there is! These are not always people from the elite.

Sergey Medvedev: And in a broader sense, from the point of view of representation, this system of the Russian Federation can be called democratic?

Konstantin Haaza: I would contradict her representations. In general, in the representative of the model there is a gigantic number of contradictions: for example, a contradiction between the basic principle of organizing a national state. On the one hand, in a sovereign national state, people are self -identical, he does not need a representative to act. On the other hand, it still needs a little and needs, because he himself cannot equip his current life in self-identity. Russian authoritarianism in this sense is a very interesting substitute, because it combines all these things in a certain way. You have other channels that you can hear, see, express something not always in the representation mode, sometimes in design mode. The Kremlin was often ahead of ...

Sergey Medvedev: It is constructed ...

Konstantin Gaaza: Yes, and this will also not be an exclusive property of the Russian political system. And when we talk about the fact that in a sense, Macron is such a nephew or grandson of Putin’s nephew, this also makes sense, because it is not one direction smuggling when you take the technology of developed democracies and use them in such places. This is sometimes the technologies that appear in such places, and then sent by mailing ...

Sergey Medvedev: That is, Putinism is an export product?

Konstantin Haaze: This is all a set of experimental sites. And every reasonable owner of this experimental site looks at the neighboring ones. And there, there are no longer these differences in the West-East, free-lasting. There will be other differences.

Gleb Pavlovsky: We have already seen this exchange of experience. He was between Russia and Hungary.

Sergey Medvedev: Yes, the system is scalable, exported, convertible and monetized.

The book is discussed by the politician Leonid Gozman .

Leonid Gozman: The idea that Russia is formed from empty space, and what has formed can be called the word "nothing", it seems to me somewhat arrogant in relation to reality. It is more adequate to say: we do not understand what has formed. It’s also wrong to say that it formed from scratch. This is not an empty place, but ruins on which to build much harder than from scratch.

Leonid Gozman

We have not formed anything really yet. The system, which has been built for the past 18 years, requires constant lies, an illusory picture of the world for its existence. To do this, an idea of our unthinkable successes, we must say that we are surrounded by enemies who want to attack us. Of course, the “enemy at the gate” situation is beneficial for absolutely any government: it relieves questions about the quality of cheese, about the supply of hot water, about medical care, and so on.

In addition, the conversations that we are not formed not by the state, nor society, not true. Our state is weak, bad, but it exists. And our society is much more developed than the state. It is not consolidated, not one in the sense of understanding of some general procedures, communications and rules, but it is.

Sergey Medvedev: Gleb, one of the things that the book speaks of is the mythology of a weak state. Is there such a thing as a Russian state? If so, what is it: strong or weak?

Gleb Pavlovsky: It is quite obvious that it is weak. It is incredibly weak in a number of parameters: economic, financial, even military. Then the question arises - is it a state? It seems to me that the state is not building. There is a lot of fuss, a lot of rhetoric around this idea - a strong power, a strong state. And when it comes to the case, this is either the provision of some fairly to the fairly enough departments and people right to arbitrariness, or some giant symbolic projects.

I wrote a lot on this topic. Initially, I proceeded from the idea of a weak state. Now I think that the state has ceased to build and began to pile up different tools and some means of distribution of resources. After all, it is not so easy to distribute to the rent so that the system does not collapse. When money for construction appeared, the people of the country at some point agreed to be simply the population, that is, in essence, the object of power. This is not even paternalism, as we said during the presidency of Medvedev, but escapism, in which people know for sure that their living standards are reduced weekly. But they do not mind, although they scold endlessly, annoyed ...

Sergey Medvedev: Is this a condition for the existence of a system of the Russian Federation?

Gleb Pavlovsky: Yes - specific atomization, depolitization. They don’t interfere with being dissatisfied, you are not pursued for this, there is simply no political place, a scene that you can go out with your discontent.

Sergey Medvedev: What is this system of the Russian Federation then? Is this a non -political system?

Konstantin Gaaza: We can try to collect politics around questions of life together, around the issues of good, around the scale. When it is Liechtenstein-well, after all, this is not a policy. Politics arises from scale. From the point of view of Gleb Olegovich, this is an effectively established survival technology. From the point of view of political philosophy, this, of course, is not politics.

Sergey Medvedev: The elite survival, the survival of the authorities or the survival of society?

Konstantin Haaze: Survival of people. 300 years of understanding this game - what we can give and what we cannot give. Здесь, конечно, нет никаких отношений, где мы чего-то не отдали государству, где подавляющее большинство российских граждан хотело сказать: нет, вы это нам оставьте, мы тут как-нибудь сами… Вот этого "как-нибудь сами" здесь нет. Другой вопрос – государство ли это? Эткинд говорит – колониальное… Если мы посмотрим на эту смычку – режим, двор монарха и тысяча бюрократов – это, может быть, не внутренняя колонизация. Простите, там 300 лет назад была половина немцев, если не больше. Может быть, это просто устройство, с помощью которого некоторые профессиональные, сословные, исторические группы исполняют эти роли. Они выполняют сервисную функцию. И тогда, если мы хотим подумать за Путина, нам нужно обратиться и сказать: "А какие сервисные функции выполняет вот этот странный девайс, который мы делегировали, включая свет в подъездах и так далее, и так далее?" Какого рода сервисные функции мы готовы у него забрать?

И в этом смысле я бы не стал сравнивать: зрелое общество – молодое государство, лучше общество – хуже государство. Я бы сказал, что, конечно, у общества есть готовность что-то оттуда забрать, и она намного выше, чем 30 лет назад. Если мы перевели друг другу на карточки 20 триллионов рублей, вызывая зубовный скрежет у ФНС, то, наверное, у нас есть какие-то отношения, в которые мы уже не хотим пускать государство.

Сергей Медведев: То есть, условно говоря, этот контракт разрывается? Общество готово переводить себе рубли, а государство постепенно отказывается от сервиса?

Константин Гаазе: Появляется контракт, а государство говорит: "Так я же тебя сейчас покормлю, мой хороший! Иди сюда!"

Глеб Павловский: Я бы не стал говорить, что есть контракт. На мой взгляд, только возникает потенциальное место для возможного контракта, и оно возникает со стороны общества. Со стороны власти оно пока совершенно не возникает.

Сергей Медведев: Историк Ирина Карацуба – с критическим высказыванием о книге Глеба Павловского.

Ирина Карацуба: В категориально-понятийном аппарате автора очень много таких слов – "ничто", "катастрофа", "деградация", "импульсы", "система", "стратегия". Это жонглирование такими вот шариками, игра смыслами, направленная в основном на уход от подлинного смысла того, что с нами случилось за последние 30 лет. И понятно, почему данный автор хочет уйти от подлинного анализа и заменяет его таким словесным жонглированием: потому что автор в своей деятельности напрямую причастен к той катастрофе, внутри которой мы сейчас находимся. Достаточно вспомнить Фонд эффективной политики, его политконсультирование... Сейчас, например, на форуме "Свободной России" в Вильнюсе составлялись списки, условно говоря, на люстрацию. Конечно, ФЭП – это не государственное учреждение, и люстрация как таковая тут невозможна, но многие из его народонаселения несут прямую ответственность за ту катастрофу, которая сейчас с нами происходит.

Абсолютизация зла – один из самых хороших способов уйти от необходимости бороться с ним

Во всей этой словесной игре я вижу очень популярную сейчас тенденцию. Я бы назвала это абсолютизацией зла. Это один из самых хороших способов уйти от необходимости бороться с ним: ну, оно же абсолютно, что ты с ним сделаешь? Вот 30 лет в режиме катастрофы – ну, что ты с этим сделаешь? Это очередной шулерский интеллектуальный маневр для манипулирования нами, нашими чувствами и мозгами.

Разумеется, в действительности в 1991 году или позже никакого "ничто" не было. Это была очередная в русской истории попытка модернизации сверху и отчасти снизу. Августовская революция 1991 года была, с одной стороны, революцией бюрократической (революцией вторых секретарей обкомов), а с другой стороны, демократической: вспомним всех тех, кто стоял перед Белым домом. К сожалению, когда революция носит такой бюрократическо-демократический характер, подобные кентавры долго не живут.

Irina Karatsuba

Большевики при НЭПе говорили: вот НЭП – это развитие частной инициативы, но командные высоты в руках государства. Эта система долго не живет – либо командные высоты сожрут, либо частная инициатива и свобода сожрут. Понятно, что получилось в НЭПе. К сожалению, почти то же самое получилось и в 90-е годы: все-таки бюрократический характер сожрал демократический.

Один из самых важных уроков – как больше этого не допустить. В частности, сейчас уже понятно, что нужно было проводить люстрацию. И не нужно было допускать ситуацию, при которой подполковник КГБ смог стать президентом РФ. Вот ничего этого у нашего автора нет. Взамен этого идет жонглирование этими понятиями.

Глеб Павловский: Безусловно, моя ответственность здесь тоже есть, и мне как раз интересна структура того предмета, за который я несу ответственность. Например, мы говорили – "хозяин". Там, где есть хозяин, уже нет политики. А слово "хозяин" здесь зазвучало совсем не с Путиным, а буквально с последних лет перестройки: "В стране должен появиться хозяин". Эта мантра повторялась во всех изданиях и по телевизору.

Сергей Медведев: А Ельцина называли неформально хозяином?

Глеб Павловский: А как же! Он и сам себя так представлял! А кто первым стал называть Ельцина – "царь"? Его близкие либеральные помощники, реформаторы того времени.

Сергей Медведев: Если эта система простирается за пределы президентского срока Путина, возможна ли замена руководителя внутри этой системы? Как Путин сменил Ельцина, может ли кто-то дальше сменить Путина, и система остается прежней в своих институтах или субститутах?

Глеб Павловский: Я считаю, что она остается прежней в каком-то таком дурацком смысле, что все было всегда. Да, есть пытки. Пытали в зонах и при перестройке. Очень важно, что в этом году впервые за 25–30 лет тема пытки попала в центр общественного внимания. Об этом заговорили даже люди, от которых мы этого не ждали: например, Валентина Матвиенко. There are changes. Проблема в том, что тупик, невидимая стена, в которую бьется Навальный, помимо противодействия (это более слабая стена), в отсутствии политических лидеров, в отсутствии политической сцены. Я считаю, что в прошлом году мы уже достаточно близко подошли к серьезным изменениям. Президентские выборы могли превратиться во что-то большее, чем то, чем они стали – праздником нового проекта мобилизации…

Сергей Медведев: А во что они могли превратиться в 1918 году?

Глеб Павловский: Можно было прорвать блокаду отсечения неугодных кандидатов.

Сергей Медведев: Возвращение политики?

Gleb Pavlovsky: Yes. Навальный, с моей точки зрения, был безукоризнен в этом отношении с конца 2016-го до осени 2017-го, где ему показали громкую банку на хвосте, Ксению Собчак. And all! – он погнался за ней, забыв о том, что надо достроить эту кампанию.

Сергей Медведев: Система может продолжаться без Путина?

Глеб Павловский: Да, но это будет новая каденция системы: думаю, мы увидим нечто новое, а потом начнем говорить, как нам свойственно: "Постойте, а это же уже было в прошлом!".

Сергей Медведев: Но все-таки есть надежда, что помимо системы в России еще существует низовая модернизация, модернизирующая общество. И, может быть, будет возникать государство, существующее помимо этих законов Системы РФ, уникального государственного образования, возникшего в течение последних 30 лет и снова подтвердившего свое существование в 2018 году. Давайте с надеждой смотреть в будущее!