Translated material
Leave or stay
Why the problem-2024 has no good solutions-the expert Tatyana Stanovaya thinks
Based on the experience of 2007, we can say with confidence that almost no one, with the exception of the president himself and, possibly, his closest environment, today is not aware of the actually discussed scenarios. And even potential successors may not guess that they are considered as possible candidates for the presidential post. Nevertheless, in the current conditions, there is already enough information that allows you to assume how the “problem-2024” can be solved and what options are seen by the president to one degree or another permissible.
A significant part of the “problem-2024” consists in the banal absence of a legitimate mechanism for preserving Putin in power after the end of its term and too high, even critical costs in case of attempts to create such a mechanism
The essence of the problem
The main challenge for Putin is the lack of an easy decision, which would allow, as a result of the presidential election, to guarantee the continuity of the course and the security of the current head of state. As you know, Vladimir Putin does not have the right to run for a new term for the current constitution, then if he wants to stay, the basic law will have to be changed. On the other hand, few people believe that he is really ready to leave. That is, if you follow the letter of the law, then in 2024 Vladimir Putin will not just cease to be the head of state, he will be forced to give in the fullness of the presidential power to the winner of the presidential election, the figure that has yet to be selected. Hence the question-is Vladimir Putin Released de facto repeating the 2008 script, having left the temptation to redistribute power in favor of some other authority or structure and put the entire system dependent on the relations of the former and future president?
Given this, it is clear that the significant part of the “problem-2024” lies in the banal absence of a legitimate mechanism for preserving Putin in power after the end of its term and too high, even critical costs (with certain scenarios) in case of attempts to create such a mechanism. Putin faces a very bad dilemma - either his regime or the state. In the first case, he will have to dismantle the current formal political system and create something else on its base, providing it with the extension of the conditional “mandate” (which will become a kind of reincarnation of the Putin regime), in the second case, to dismantle the current Putin regime, preserving the formally existing political system, but threatening himself and the environment dependent on it personally.
An ideal option for Putin would still be to leave his post, leaving him a reliable successor. His disgusting attitude to dictators, by any means clinging to power and frankly despised by Western leaders, at the same level with which Putin always dreamed of being
The inability to stay
Today it is very difficult to find an observer who believes in Putin’s intention to leave for real. Nevertheless, it is impossible to underestimate the significance of this difficult choice, which Putin will have to determine in the very near future.
In fact, if you study all Putin’s rhetoric over the past 18 years, as well as add to this the context of the election campaign held at the beginning of last year, we can assume that the ideal option for Putin would still leave his post, leaving him a reliable successor.
Firstly, his squeamish attitude to dictators, by any means clinging to power and openly despised by Western leaders, at the same level with which Putin always dreamed of being located, is known. Of course, you can answer this that such an interpretation is outdated and after 2014 Putin no longer has a critical desire to fight for his place in the club of privileged G8 leaders, that he himself is changing over the years and thinks less about his image in the eyes of the Western community. This is certainly true. However, this also does not mean a willingness to turn into a marginal, conditional Lukashenko, when he will have to build a non -alternative consciously selected authoritarian regime without any pretense and decorations. Whatever the regime itself today (and it is certainly authoritarian), in the eyes of Putin the Kremlin has built and builds democracy over the past years (albeit with reservations), and the same as in the West. As Alexei Venediktov very correctly remarked, Putin is building the “liberal empire of Chubais and Khodorkovsky”, that is, he actually tries to recreate capitalism with imperial ambitions, sincerely believing that he copies this by the West. Here to stay and change the constitution for yourself or to leave and change the regime so that the president will cease to decide anything-this would contradict this logic.
Secondly, the question is relevant-what's next? After all, staying is nothing more than an attempt to postpone a real solution to the problem, which inevitably implies “departure”. But the more time passes, the higher the chances that you will have to leave on foreign conditions. That is why, by the way, you should not underestimate the realism of the script of Putin’s early care, which would become an attempt to play ahead of the growing destabilization.
Finally, thirdly, during the presidential campaign, the Kremlin deliberately thrown the idea that Putin’s new term would be the last. Of course, we can assume that this was part of the game, bluff, an attempt to cloud the naive mind of the modernist thinking part of society and the elite in order to maximize the electoral result. Not without it. However, would that part of the presidential administration decide whom we now call the “administrators” to such a bluff in a situation where the chef dreams of staying? In each game there is a share of the game, one might say, paraphrasing a well -known saying. However, according to unofficial sources, Vladimir Putin really then, in 2018, considered his presidential term as the latter, and his administration acted in the context of this specified framework.
Of course, all of the above refers to the category of what is desired and can, as you know, diverges very much with brutal reality. Even if you accept on faith a possible desire (or rather a dream) of Putin to free himself from the burden of the sovereign service, it can be almost impossible to decide on this. There are much more arguments and psychological, political factors that are not controlled by Putin for the decision to “stay”. At some point, it may seem to him that the system leaves no choice, even if this beautiful word will be hidden in many ways and a significant part of the dominant conservative part of the elite, for which Putin's departure is akin to a political catastrophe.
Six years of the presidential term for the successor is a lot. Putin very well remembers his own fears of 2011 about the fact that the plan for the exchange of posts with the successor will break. This was not caution, but a sense of critical dependence on one person who had everything in order to replay the events of 2011 in his favor
The inability to leave
The main reason for “staying” is the inability to guarantee two things critical for Putin: his own security in the broadest sense (including family, friends, etc.) and continuity, that is, the successor refusal to revise the course. Risk minimization here rests on two processes-the choice of a successor and political and legal fuses.
Some observers say that Putin may well repeat his experience in 2008, which can be considered more successful. Dmitry Medvedev played absolutely by the rules, returned the president’s post, when it took, retained loyalty and continuity (albeit with a lot of excuses). What prevents this experience from repeating (be it Medvedev or someone else) in 2023? And two circumstances interfere. The first is Putin of the 2023 model and Putin of the 2007 sample - far from the same political leader, his “weight” and potential will differ significantly. Other health, other expectations of the elite and society and a much smaller chance to return (in 2030 it will be 78 years old). Not because the elderly (it is clear that at 78 you can go for another term), but because at 72 he will have to wait 6 years. Putin's departure in 2024, unlike leaving in 2008, can be regarded as a sunset of a political career.
The second - six years of the presidential term for the successor - this is a lot, if we consider it as a temporary and non -self -state figure. Recall 2010 - the first half of 2011, when Medvedev really began to turn into a center for consolidation of the elite, which made a bet for his second term. Let us recall Medvedev, the decisions that were made by Medvedev contrary to Putin’s position (comments on the Yukos case, the position of Libya, on the “rebooting” of relations with the United States). If Medvedev had two additional years, his chances (or rather the chances of the anti -Putin and rapidly mobilizing anti -Putin part of the elite) to replay the entire balance of forces and start “your game” would sharply have grown. Putin very well remembers his own fears of 2011 about the fact that the plan for the exchange of posts with the successor will break. This was not caution, but a sense of critical dependence on one person who had everything in order to replay the events of 2011 in his favor. Is Putin ready to be in this situation again, being a priori much weaker after leaving? It would be naive to count on the decency and loyalty of the future successor, and Putin inevitably requires “fuses” that can ensure that his interests and interests of his environment. This means that it will not work out completely, and he will have to stay in one form or another.
A minimum of political responsibility, the maximum of the ability to act on behalf of Russia in the world arena. With this option, Putin could put in the place of the president - a technocrat, who, with the very fact of his election, could already begin a new village of relations with the West
Options "stay"
Today there are three conditional options for “stay” (maintain a dominant role or at least a “golden action” in the system). The first and easiest is the banal edit of the Constitution (lifting restrictions for two in a row) and re -election for a new term. In the same context, there may be a variation with the absorption of Belarus, which is discussed a lot today (and in the Kremlin there really are those who do not exclude this).
The second is the reform of the state and the redrawing of prerogatives in favor of a certain institution of power, which will squeeze the president. Here the State Council and the Security Council are often mentioned. But in this case, Putin would have to significantly revise the constitution and make the head of state dependent on the “collective Putin”. Is Putin he himself is ready to go according to the script, which he repeatedly called dangerous is a question. Recall that he has repeatedly emphasized that he considers it necessary for Russia to have a strong institution of presidential power.
Finally, the third script is a combination of pleasant with useful. It would be comfortable for him not so much to “remain in power” as to continue to engage in geopolitical games, dropping off the administrative, socio-economic routine, which he has not been engaged in particularly for many years. A minimum of political responsibility, the maximum of the ability to act on behalf of Russia in the world arena. With this option, Putin could put in the place of the President - Technocrat, who, by the very fact of his election, could already begin a new village of relations with the West, but at the same time, of course, would be all responsible for the development of the country (which is excluded by the second scenario where Putin would remain the center of the regime). But, as mentioned above, the question - how to create fuses and guarantee safety - does not have a unequivocal and simple answer (if it has at all). And where to get such a successor who, in a couple of years, does not imagine himself a figure that can perform the story without the custody of his predecessor?
As a result, whatever Putin dreams about today and, perhaps, it may not be expected to go aside gradually, opening the way young, the most marginal option for today to “stay” as a result of the most undesirable can turn into the only possible one, and the desired will have to sacrifice in favor of saving the country from an increasingly hostile reality. The way Putin will solve his problem-2024 will depend on the degree of confrontation in relations with the West, the strength of the regime (ratings), the financial and economic situation, but any option will inevitably provide for a certain reformatting of the system, and the Kremlin can begin in advance.