This is our problem

Political scientist Georgy Satarov in a polemic with participants in the discussion NT proposes not to consider the problem 2024 - the problem of Putin or the elite surrounding it

I agree with Tatyana Stanovaya ( “Leave or stay” ) - Putin has no good moves in solving the “Problems of 2024”. And partially agree with its justification of this thesis. And of course I regret that I do not belong to the electors, who, as she, "knows his disgusting attitude to dictators, clinging to power by any means." On the contrary, it is difficult for me to imagine that he has a gag reflex every time he looks in the mirror. On the contrary, it seems to me (and not only to me) that he, removing the cognitive dissonance, has long convinced himself that he, Putin, is the happy fate of Russia. And in his concern for Russia, in his belief that without him it will be an orphan, he will not hesitate to extend his power. But if we consider the “problem of 2024” as a problem of the continuity of power, then since the diagnosis of Stanovaya is correct, Putin is facing the fan of problems, and it is not difficult for me to list their list, here it is: “2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024”. Roughly speaking, all this can collapse before. And this is clear to many. This rightly indicates in his article ( “Putin's plans? Do not look at the calendar” ) Fedor Krasheninnikov.

I really liked the assumption expressed in the article by Andrei Kolesnikov ( “Putin’s system : the age of survival” ) that the people can tell Putin: “I'm tired, I am leaving”, quoting the farewell television performance of Boris Yeltsin on December 31, 1999. But I am not very understandable to his insult to reducing politics up to one person. After all, the method, scale and depth of policy analysis is the author’s personal choice.

It seems to me that a friendly discussion of “problems 2024” is a traditional for sapiens in general an attempt to analyze a possible future associated with the need to reduce the uncertainty of this future, its fundamental unpredictability. But what is the meaning of this digging in the unknown, if it is unpredictable? This meaning appears only when our fantasy goes beyond the slander of possible scenarios of the future and reaches attempts to connect these scenarios with our current actions. So a meaningful policy is formed.

Now Putin is dependent on the fragmented and bewildered elite, which differs from us sinners in that it does not discuss all these problems publicly

Problem 2024 as a problem

But whose "our" actions? Now the discussion is focused on choosing one politician. But whatever this choice, the problem does not go anywhere and with the successful solution to Putin “Problems 2024”. After all, then Putin faces the fan of new problems, which is also easy to list: "2025, 2026, ...". This is with the fairness of Tatyana Stanovaya’s statement that “there are no good solutions.” And Andrei Kolesnikov helps us formulate a criterion of a good solution. This is a decision in which the people do not tell Putin: "I'm tired, I'm leaving." (This is equivalent to the recognition of the legitimacy of the extension of Putin’s authority, which Vladimir Gelman writes about in the article “In Search of Life Power” ). True, the question remains open: "And in what form, in what way the people bring this statement to Putin?" “If you decide to“ leave ”. I will return to this below.

Now about something else. The written above means that if we reduce the uncertainty of “Problems 2024” in the interpretation proposed by the editors, we do not remove the uncertainty of the future in the same forecast horizon. After all, Putin leaves or remains, leaves in 2024, or earlier or somewhat, more important issues remain that determine the basic uncertainty: “1. What will happen to Putin's power? " and "2. What will the transit of power in the case of its departure (the collapse of the current regime) be? ” But it’s still more complicated, and that's why. Even this discussion, concentrated in Putin, contains notes of doubt that life is arranged like this: the elite is consolidated in its intention to extend Putin’s power; Political technologists are developing options, and Demiurge Putin chooses a solution that considers the most profitable for himself.

Obviously, this is not so. Putin was never completely independent. He was always dependent on his environment, on the vertical of power, on the bureaucracy. And this is inevitable: if you embark on the path of ignoring the right, providing your rule, then you are dependent on those who implement this choice in practice (I wrote about this repeatedly and therefore will not repeat the justifications and practical confirmations). Only this entails even more important: in search of the reduction of the uncertainty of our political future, to hopelessly consider Putin as an isolated system. We must take into account his “environment” (with different radii of the “circle”).

So, there are circles, more or less close to him, of interest, (my language does not turn to say “friends” or “associates”), which were once united by the idea of ​​preserving Putin in power. But as his rule complicated their life, as he was old, as problems grew in the country, how Russia ceased to be a place in which it was possible to fill a moshna with a rotational basis and then return to the already equipped for itself and the cozy west, as the murmur and falling of the rating was melting the unity of the Putin elite and the only basic goal was dissolved.

God! The problem is old, like this regime. Here: 2003. Soon after the arrest of Khodorkovsky, I talk with one major entrepreneur from among those who then went to meetings with Putin. I asked him why they do not use the compromising evidence that they probably have, to the environment of Putin and himself. To which I received the following answer: “You see, a system that is held on the thread of the Putin rating has already been built. And we do not know who she will fall on, we cut it off, starting our attack on them. ” Dathed. Now, if it collapses, then with much more unpredictable consequences and victims.

And the thread expires and will certainly break. And many feel it. And if earlier Putin was dependent on the bureaucracy and close circles, ready to do everything to extend his power, now he is dependent on the fragmented and confused elite, which differs from us sinners in that he does not discuss all these problems publicly. And they are all torn by two nightmares. The first: "I will not have time to join those who throw him off the throne, and they are shook, without even chewing me." The second: “I will jerk in the group of the former, it will be too early. And they cheat, without even chewing me. ” Just put yourself in their place, and it will become clear how scary it is.

But the system does not close this either. You won’t believe it: we still have it. Society, opposition, dissatisfied outside the authorities - call it as you want. Of course, we can not be taken into account - we are just a sand that creaks under the boots of the Russian Guard. We creak ... and even without boots. In the 1990s, they creaked: “How did Yeltsin do it, but did not do it. Why didn’t he make it beautiful and good!? ” Now we creak: "And what else will Putin teach?!" We are discussing the question: what he will do to extend his power in 2024. But we are bypassing the question - why is it in general in power. Because if you set it, then inevitably it will be necessary to take care of yourself, not Putin. And I really do not want to discuss yourself. Because ... Something in this appears a paternalist condovo, if expressed delicately. From time to time, we say that we must “form the agenda ourselves”, and then we continue to discuss what Putin or the Kremlin will do.

But I wrote is not a sentence, but rather a senile grunt. I do not hoist the cross over us. Since we are, we are different, there are many of us, and therefore we are power. Even being sand. Potentially.

I already wrote above that, concentrating on Putin, we do not reduce the uncertainty of the future. If the picture of the current state of the Putin elite, sketched by me, is true, then the inclusion of these elites in the analysis of these elites is intellectually interesting, but also does not reduce the uncertainty of the future (at least). But what will happen if the society is connected to the analysis? For the limited printed space, I will offer two scenarios.

The advantage among elite groups is obtained by those who cooperate with the opposition on the basis of the general recovery program of the country and the state

Society as a player

The first script is inertial. It means that, firstly, the rate of the rating continues to the level at which the elites, divided into competing groups, gradually lose the fear of action (this was mentioned in the previous discussion). But since, secondly, the opposition remains weak, unauthorized and disparate, the elites together are free in their choice. And this means that uncertainty does not decrease. This is the option in which the people are “tired”, but goes anywhere, but not where his future is being decided.

The second scenario is mobilization (it partially concerns Grigory Voosov in the article “There are a lot of options for preserving Putin in power” ). The opposition is consolidated and earns, including the fact of consolidation, influence and authority. In this case, the advantage among elite groups is obtained by those who cooperate with the opposition on the basis of the general recovery program of the country and the state. And this means a decrease in uncertainty. This is the option in which the people are “tired” to wait and hope, and therefore “goes” back to politics.

I have no doubt that this script of mine will be perceived as naive. I will answer this suspicion in the next publication. Here it was important for me to convince readers that “problem 2024” is not so much the Putin problem as our problem. And this means that we will have to solve it ourselves. And we will not, we will not decide, so we are dear to us ...

All articles of the discussion #problem 2024 are collected here .