February 10, 2019, 11:13 pm / Opinions

How can the authorities maintain ratings?

Sociologist Denis Volkov about the resources of public support for the regime

Last year, for the first time in 5-6 years, there was a serious decline in the authority of the Russian government in the eyes of the population. Thus, the Prime Minister’s approval rating for the 12 months of 2018 dropped from 45 to 32%, the government’s from 51 to 37%, and even the President’s approval dropped from 82% in January to 66% in December (these figures should not be confused with trust rating, which is always two times lower than the activity approval rating). Falling ratings make the authorities nervous and look for ways to maintain their weakening popularity. Let's try to figure out what resources the political system has left to strengthen its authority. But first we need to correctly identify the sources of growing public discontent.

It is based on the decline in household incomes, which has continued for five years in a row. This is evidenced both by official data from Rosstat and by subjective assessments of people reflected in public opinion polls. According to the results of research by the Levada Center, the share of low-income citizens who, according to their own estimates, do not have enough money for food or only have enough money for food, has increased 1.5 times over the past four years from 16 to 24% of the population. If in 2016–2017 There was a timid increase in optimism, which was associated with the gradual adaptation of the population to the new economic reality and hope for a quick improvement in the situation, but at the end of 2017 - beginning of 2018 this trend changed to the opposite. The mood began to deteriorate. Even then, the main complaint of respondents against Vladimir Putin was that the president “forgot about ordinary people”, “does not know how they live” - these are answers to an open question that allows you to hear in what words people themselves describe what is happening. And if about a fifth of the population is ready to talk about this in relation to the president today, then almost 2/3 of the population is ready to subscribe to similar words addressed to officials and deputies.

The increase in pessimism continues to this day. Fewer and fewer people believe that their situation will soon improve. However, people are not expecting a catastrophic deterioration of the situation either. Discussing the trajectory of the country's further movement in focus groups, most of our respondents today agree that it will be a smooth downward movement.

The announcement of the pension reform in the summer of 2018 noticeably aggravated the fears and concerns of the population - this was a serious one-time blow to the authority of the authorities. First of all, people were offended that they were deprived of their honestly earned money. It is equally important that the proposed measures seem absolutely unfair to people: as participants in our focus groups have repeatedly said, the authorities are going to compensate for the lack of funds in the budget solely at the expense of ordinary citizens. According to those surveyed, neither officials nor oligarchs are going to sacrifice their income, shifting the entire burden of solving the problem onto the population. (At the same time, the tax increase went largely unnoticed, since very few are able to independently trace the connection between the increase in VAT and the rise in prices of consumer goods.) It must be taken into account that the inability to ensure a fair distribution of income in the interests of ordinary citizens and the increase in wealth stratification are regularly mentioned by our respondents among the main claims against the government and the president. Therefore, any new decisions that are unfair, from the point of view of the majority of the population, lead to an increase in public discontent.

Vladimir Putin has lost the trust of a fifth of Russians over the past year

Politics / Power

Finally, last year the “Crimean effect”, which in 2014-2015 was completely exhausted. was expressed in a sharp increase in the ratings of the authorities, especially the president. Today, not only ratings have decreased, but also the population’s willingness to support their country’s active foreign policy. There is growing dissatisfaction in society with the fact that a lot of money is spent on helping other countries: in the form of low gas prices, debt forgiveness, humanitarian aid supplies, and direct military participation. People want all this money to be spent on social support programs within the country. Over the past year, the number of citizens who are burdened by the international isolation of the country has noticeably increased, the fear of world war has reached its maximum in a quarter of a century of sociological observations - today more than half of the population says this. All this gradually undermines people's confidence that the current government can change the situation for the better.

It is worth mentioning that right now it is hardly worth expecting a further serious decline in the presidential rating. Thus, at the end of last year the rating froze for three months at 66%. And this figure is not so small: it was with this support that Putin won the 2012 presidential election. The confidence of the majority of the population in Putin’s lack of alternative, which has been cultivated for years by central television channels, will protect the rating from a significant drop. If earlier the president was supported because he returned Crimea and respect for Russia in the international arena, today many continue to support him simply for lack of a better candidate. However, the prime minister, the government and the Duma are not immune from a further decline in ratings, so, most likely, the authorities will look for measures to increase their authority.

Most Russians blame Putin for the country's problems

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Obviously, the most effective measure to increase the authority of the authorities would be to increase the standard of living of the population - this is largely the subject of the May presidential decree, which involves investments in healthcare, education, and housing. Economists argue about the effectiveness of the proposed measures, but it is clear that the declared measures will not bring a quick improvement in life. If they work, it won't be right away. On the contrary, in the short term we can expect further price increases due to the increase in fuel prices postponed until spring. This, in turn, will entail higher prices for consumer goods and a further increase in social tension. Therefore, the authorities will look for ways to quickly strengthen the authority of the authorities outside the economic sphere.

Most likely, we should expect the authorities to flirt with the topic of social justice. It’s hard to believe that members of the Russian elite are ready to give up high salaries and a luxurious lifestyle. Therefore, a demonstrative fight against corruption and the imprisonment of individual officials who have stolen seem more likely. Such steps will undoubtedly enjoy the support of the population.

The fact is that we have a common belief that people become officials in order to achieve personal enrichment. Moreover, the belief that “the government is corrupt and acts only in its own interests” has increased from 25 to 32% over the past four years. The second most important complaint against Putin, which the Russians told us when answering the open question already mentioned, is that he is “too soft towards ministers,” “dissolved them,” and “is under the power of his entourage.” In third place was the reproach that the president “does not fight corruption” and “has created thieves around him.” Very few respondents could name specific individuals from Putin's circle. But what is important here is the general attitude of the majority of the population towards power: there are no honest people there (or practically none), and therefore anyone at the top can be “taken”. The arrests of the ex-head of the Serpukhov district of the Moscow region, Alexander Shestun, or Senator Rauf Arashukov, organically fit into this logic, but to satisfy public opinion, either bigger figures or more arrests are needed. However, an overly active anti-corruption campaign can have the opposite effect. After all, the more they talk about corruption on TV, the more it worries people, and the shadow falls on the central government too. If there are too many arrests, people will increasingly wonder, “Where have you been before?”

The Russians wanted respect and honesty from the authorities

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Another resource for maintaining the authority of the authorities today could be a course towards a new détente in international tensions and a reduction in Russia’s foreign policy activity. And although serious political concessions are unlikely to be popular, Russian public opinion is ready to live by the formula “they don’t interfere with us, we don’t interfere with them” (one way or another, it repeatedly arose during group discussions).

The initial negative reaction of the population to certain foreign policy plans of the authorities does not mean that they cannot be implemented, although there is a certain risk for the authority of the authorities. For example, the possible transfer of part of the Kuril Islands to Japan. The overwhelming majority of the population today is against such a step; only about a fifth of respondents are in favor. However, its negative effect on ratings should not be exaggerated. Several years ago, more than half of the population was also initially opposed to Russia’s intervention in the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts; this did not subsequently prevent the majority from approving the decisions taken by the country’s leadership. Public opinion can change if you choose the right arguments and provide the necessary information support. But this is not so easy to do.

Finally, in connection with the fall in the government’s ratings, there is a lot of talk about the possibility of new mass protests. Indeed, as pessimism and a sense of impasse grow in society, protests become increasingly likely. However, these protests are unlikely to change anything. Twice already, in 2005 and 2012, the authorities demonstrated their ability to work with protest sentiments. Therefore, at first, even mass protests do not pose a serious threat to the existing political order. The Russian political system is not in danger of a Venezuela-type collapse. The Kremlin still has tools to control public sentiment, but it is becoming more difficult to do so.

The author is a sociologist at Levada Center