Maneuvers and uncertainty

The campaign for Belarusian legitimacy, if any, will not be easy for the Kremlin - NT special correspondent Denis Lavnikevich from Minsk

Moscow and Minsk are now reminiscent of spouses who, after 20 years of marriage, have firmly decided to get a divorce, but cannot decide who will file for divorce first. And the number "20" is not accidental here: in December of this year, exactly that many years will be celebrated by the Union State of Russia and Belarus. But before the anniversary, this education runs the risk of not surviving.

Chronicle of mutual reproaches

At the end of March and the beginning of April, so many unpleasant incidents took place in Belarusian-Russian relations that had not happened in the past and for several years. First, a sharp showdown in absentia between the Belarusian Foreign Ministry and Russian Ambassador Mikhail Babich. Reason: Babich, with figures in his hands, proved the inconsistency of Lukashenka's stories that "Russia needs Belarus, and not vice versa." Consequence: Babich was "banned" by the official Belarusian media. And the independents, although they were not imbued with love, nevertheless made Babich perhaps the most promoted figure in the political field of the country.

After this story, Mikhail Babich said that "joint work on integration processes within the Union State continues." According to him, the working group on integration made proposals to the presidents of both countries, but so far without a response. The main obstacle, according to the ambassador, is the position of some people: “There are, of course, certain well-known defendants who replace this active work by talking about quite fundamental issues, and to some extent this slows down the process.” After that, the Belarusian media began to wonder who Babich had in mind - Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei or Lukashenka himself?

This was followed by the already traditional clarification of relations in the agrarian-food sector. A ban on the export of cattle from Belarus to Russia came into force. And this is a very strong blow to the country's economy: according to Belstat, last year Belarus exported beef to Russia for more than $2.45 billion.

The Rosselkhoznadzor also sharply limited the supply of Belarusian “milk” to Russia, but most importantly, the transit of vegetables and fruits to the Russian Federation through Belarus through Belarus was completely banned. At the same time, another capture of illegal suppliers of "sanctions" through Belarus took place - with the exponential destruction of the seized production.

On April 2, when the “Day of Unity of the Peoples of Belarus and Russia” is officially celebrated in Belarus, the Russian government officially approved another loan, which Minsk had been asking for for almost a year. But even this looked like a mockery: Lukashenka asked for a billion dollars for the development of the economy, but he will receive no more than $600 million - just enough to pay off the interest on previous Russian loans.

This whole series of conflicts ended with the fact that on April 5, Belarus notified Transneft of its intention to sharply increase the tariff for pumping Russian oil through its territory. Nikolai Tokarev, the head of the company, told reporters about this: “We are talking about 23%. But this is a negotiating position that needs to be discussed.” This is despite the fact that from February 1, Belarus has already increased tariffs for Russians by 7.6% for oil transportation services through trunk pipelines laid through its territory.

All 25 years of Lukashenko's rule passed under the banner of "unity of fraternal peoples", and therefore now any rhetoric on the topic of the Union State, any officialdom is perceived by Belarusians approximately the same way as in the late USSR people perceived the propaganda of Marxism-Leninism. That is, it goes past the ears, the brain does not turn on

Interestingly, the new increase cannot be justified economically. There is an agreement: if the parties have not agreed on the amount of tariffs, then Belarus approves them by raising the current tariff rates by the average annual consumer price index for the current year, set by the parameters of the forecast for the socio-economic development of the Russian Federation, increased by no more than 3 percentage points. This, in fact, everyone saw in the February price increase.

It is very likely that the Russian side will be outraged by the new tariff only by the proposal of the Belarusians to “walk around the market and look for cheaper” - Russian oil traders still have no alternative to the Belarusian Gomeltransneft Druzhba OJSC and Polotsktransneft Druzhba OJSC.

Here it is obvious that the Belarusian side is trying so hard to put pressure on Russia in order to somehow close the still unsettled issue of compensating Minsk for the consequences of the Russian tax maneuver. According to Minsk, the tax maneuver in the oil industry of the Russian Federation promises additional costs for 2019-2024 in the amount of $10-11 billion, including $300-400 million in 2019. In addition, the gas price protocol for Belarus expires in 2019. Minsk has already sent Moscow its proposals on methods for calculating gas prices, but has not received a response.

Inside the country

The first and main question that arises after all of the above is: what do the Belarusians themselves think about this? For the most part, they don't think. All 25 years of Lukashenko's rule passed under the banner of "unity of fraternal peoples", and therefore now any rhetoric on the topic of the Union State, any officialdom is perceived by Belarusians approximately the same way as in the late USSR people perceived the propaganda of Marxism-Leninism. That is, it is passed by the ears, the brain does not turn on.

At the same time, those generations that are used to living with the idea that the fate of Belarusians is in alliance with the Russians are finally leaving the stage. Today, only people aged 40+ remember that the anthem of the BSSR began with the lines: “We, Belarusians, have joked about our brother Russia at times and sometimes dear ...”.

Belarus, thanks to its status as "the closest ally", receives Russian gas at $129 per thousand cubic meters - this is the lowest price among all Gazprom's foreign partners. Duty-free deliveries of Russian oil to Belarus continue, which is then re-exported by the republic with an export duty credited to the country's budget

Today, the most active part of society is citizens who were either born in the independent Republic of Belarus themselves, or found the USSR at a very tender age, and therefore do not have any particularly warm feelings for it. These people are already raising their own children - the second generation of residents of an independent country. Lukashenka feels these changes with his unique instinct of a people's politician and tries to meet the needs of younger generations. Those who want to live in an independent state, if only simply because life in another is unfamiliar to them. And, of course, the clumsy and aggressive empire in the east does not excite young Belarusians, most of whom are already well acquainted with European realities.

But with the economy, everything is more complicated.

“Belarus retains full economic dependence on Russia. Formally, the country's trade turnover with the EU and the Russian Federation is already approximately the same, but the structure of trade immediately shows everything. We sell oil products made from Russian oil, round timber, metal, fertilizers and other raw materials to Europe, - Belarusian economic observer Vladimir Denisov explains in a commentary for NT , - but to Russia and other post-Soviet countries - products of our engineering, other equipment, Food. That is, everything that no one wants to take outside the "Soviet camp" because of low quality and inconsistency with modern requirements. Also, the lion's share of raw materials and components consumed by Belarusian factories comes from the Russian Federation. That is, in industry, all the chains of economic ties have remained since the times of the USSR, and this is the strongest thing that binds Belarus to Russia.”

Add to this the uniquely cheap energy resources: Belarus, thanks to its status as the "closest ally", receives Russian gas at $129 per thousand cubic meters - this is the lowest price among all Gazprom's foreign partners. Duty-free deliveries of Russian oil to Belarus continue, which is then re-exported by the republic with an export duty credited to the country's budget. Under the 2017 agreement, Minsk has the right to resell 6 million tons of oil from the Russian Federation per year in this way.

Independence as an agenda

This is how the situation looks in which Alexander Lukashenko is forced to act today. Who, perhaps, would be glad to continue the endless games of integrating his country with Russia - after all, he did it very well since coming to power in 1994. But he has a very sad example before his eyes: neighboring Ukraine.

“For Alexander Grigoryevich, in every sense, the year 2014 was a turning point. When he saw that Russia would not be at all embarrassed by the “brotherhood” of the Slavic people, if the opportunity suddenly presented itself to snatch a piece of its territory. Psychologically, it was very difficult for him - after all, after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine, the whole picture of his world collapsed, - Belarusian political scientist Svetlana Grechulina said in a commentary for NT , - but Lukashenka has not just been in power for so many years, he knows how to adapt perfectly . It was in 2014 that the obvious change in foreign policy and foreign economic vectors began - to cooperation with the West and with China, while at the same time deliberately reducing dependence on Russia.

None of the representatives of the Belarusian government speaks about this publicly, but now the official course is this: away from Russia, sovereignty is the main value, we must be friends with the West, Ukraine and China. Only such a multi-vector approach can save Belarus from being swallowed up by a much stronger neighbor. Although this is all behind the scenes, the trend breaks out from time to time. For example, through the ban on the Immortal Regiment procession in Minsk or the expulsion of St. George ribbons from the public space.

“By betting on sovereignty as the highest value, Lukashenka can enlist the support of various layers - from nationalists to “red directors”, who do not care at all to have their unprofitable state-owned enterprises privatized by Russian oligarchs. So his rhetoric “Russia is our friend, but it’s better to live in your own apartment” quite resonates with people,” explains Belarusian political strategist Sergei Martselev. - The only exception, the weak link in the state system, is the security forces. Among them, Lukashenka is not respected, Putin is in trend there as a strong leader of Russia rising from its knees and pride in the power of Russian weapons. Plus, the Belarusian security forces want to have the same material allowance as their Russian counterparts. And, of course, the same impunity.”

In relations with Russia, the official Minsk is still trying to adhere to the tactics of “exhausting and talking” that have justified themselves. The Belarusian position is as follows: “We wholeheartedly support the integration of the fraternal Slavic peoples, but it should be exclusively equal in rights, without division into “senior” and “junior”. Therefore, in the economy, everything must first be carefully weighed and calculated. After all, we cannot put the Belarusian people in less favorable conditions than those in which the Russians are.”

It is noteworthy that this is said by the same Lukashenka, who in 1995 pathetically exclaimed: “Yes, I’m ready to crawl to Russia on my knees!” Over the past 20 years, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus have somewhat changed places. In the late 90s, it was the Belarusian side that “molested” with demands: “Let’s integrate into a single state as soon as possible, please!”, While Moscow arrogantly “turned up its nose”. And today it’s the opposite, from Moscow it sounds: “How are we doing with the Union Treaty, let’s fulfill it as soon as possible!”, And from Minsk they answer: “Integration is sacred, and therefore it must be approached carefully and thoughtfully, without haste, and only on an equal footing.

Do not forget about an important ideological factor: Belarus is "up to its neck" immersed in the Russian media space. Ordinary Belarusians daily watch RTR, NTV and Ren-TV, read Komsomolskaya Pravda and AiF. Official (state) television is so similar to the Soviet TV of 1984 that few people watch it. Therefore, the Belarusian authorities are forced to communicate their position either through full-time ideologists (a mandatory position in each organization is the deputy director for ideology), or through many hours of speeches by Lukashenka himself, which are necessarily broadcast by all channels, including those usually given to Russian broadcasters.

Everyone who personally knows Alexander Lukashenko agrees: he will not give up power and will not join Russia. Another thing is that today Lukashenka also has his own “fan of options”. And the most optimal thing now is to continue to receive a “hydrocarbon subsidy” from the Russian Federation, while at the same time talking about integration, but without taking real steps.

Sight-2024

Now Vladimir Putin has a so-called "fan of options" - scenarios for how he can stay in the Kremlin after 2024. One of the most tempting is to "restart" the Russian Federation, including South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Belarus. This is a new country, a new Constitution, so the countdown of presidential terms can be started from scratch.

But for the inclusion of these territories in the Russian Federation, the “unanimous desire” of the local population will be required. And if Tskhinvali and Sukhum hold the required referendum with the desired result without question, then Lukashenka may balk. And he will not be tempted either by an arbitrarily high position in the Russian hierarchy, or by security guarantees from the Kremlin. Because now he is the president of an independent country, and in the Russian Federation he will become only one of the governors.

Everyone who personally knows Alexander Lukashenko agrees: he will not give up power and will not join Russia. Another thing is that today Lukashenka also has his own “fan of options”. And the most optimal now is to continue to receive a “hydrocarbon subsidy” from the Russian Federation, while at the same time talking about integration, but without taking real steps. But he doesn't know if the Kremlin will leave him alone. If they choose the option with the “new Russian Federation”, they will not leave it. It is likely that Moscow expects that, suddenly left without Lukashenka, the Belarusians will vote for joining the Russian Federation. In reality, of course, they are unlikely to vote, but the Kremlin may have its own vision of the world. And it is very dangerous for Lukashenka.

In the meantime, regardless of plans for 2024, Lukashenka and Putin will meet again this April, and most likely both will try to clarify whether the Union State project will develop further, or whether integration in the post-Soviet space will finally move into the EAEU format, which he insists on in particular, Kazakhstan. The last option is more advantageous for Lukashenka in terms of retaining personal power, but losing in economic terms.

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