Lukashenko versus Putin

Having achieved the replacement of the Russian ambassador, Lukashenka again got what he wanted: he got rid of the "taskmaster" and slowed down the integration according to the Moscow scenario. With details - NT correspondent in Minsk Denis Lavnikevich

All the 25 years that Alexander Lukashenko has been in charge of Belarus, he has amazed observers with his ability to get what he wants from Moscow, even in a situation of acute conflict with a stronger neighbor. It seems that this year he again succeeded in this trick.

Getting rid of Babich

On April 30, Vladimir Putin, by his decree, released Mikhail Babich from the duties of the Russian ambassador to Belarus, and also removed him from the post of special representative of the president. Dmitry Mezentsev, a long-term member of the Federation Council, former SCO Secretary General (in 2013-2015), who did not receive the post of special representative, was appointed ambassador instead of Babich.

Rumors about Babich's resignation circulated for several months, but at first it looked like psychological pressure from the Belarusian side. The official Minsk did not want to accept this ambassador for a long time: Babich's candidacy in the Russian State Duma was agreed upon in the spring of 2018, but then, for almost the entire summer, he could not receive an agrement from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry.

Babich had never worked as a diplomat before. He served in the Airborne Forces and the KGB troops, led the Antey corporation, and in 2002-2003 headed the government of Chechnya. For some time, Babich was an assistant to the head of the FSB Border Service. Prior to his appointment to Minsk, he served as presidential envoy in the Volga District for 7 years.

Soon after Babich's arrival in Minsk, it became clear that he is fundamentally different from all the ambassadors of the Russian Federation who worked in Belarus before him. He acted “loudly”: he actively communicated with the Belarusian opposition, argued with the Foreign Ministry and other republican officials, publicly refuted the words of Lukashenka himself and the figures he cited (the last time this happened on the day of the April announcement of Lukashenka’s message to parliament and caused indignation of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry), examined the Belarusian factories and even publicly offered the services of the Russian Federation in resolving Belarusian domestic political problems. In fact, Babich was not an ambassador, but a special representative, a kind of "Putin's avatar", and interacted with Lukashenka in this capacity.

In recent months, Babich has several times entered into a tough correspondence skirmish with the Belarusian Foreign Ministry. One of the reasons was an interview in which he called on Belarus to decide on the format of integration and stated that it was necessary to fulfill the agreements, and not exchange reproaches in the economic sphere. After that, the foreign ministry of the republic stated that the Russian ambassador should better understand the specifics of the host country, get acquainted with its history and show a little respect.

In April, Babich responded rather sharply to the words of Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei that Dmitry Medvedev "may not be aware" that Minsk had long ago sent the Russians response proposals for the integration of the two countries. “It would be better for Mr. Makei to take into account the role of Medvedev in the Union State,” Babich said.

Belarusian officials in informal conversations confirm the rumors circulating in the Russian media and telegram channels: Babich's resignation was the result of Lukashenka's repeated requests addressed personally to Putin. The last conversation took place on April 26 at the 2nd Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum in Beijing. No official information about the essence of the conversation has appeared - there is not even a message on the Kremlin website that such a meeting took place (the next day, Putin told reporters that he had a short talk with Lukashenka, “on his feet”).

NT interlocutors in Belarus give the following version: Lukashenka assured his Russian colleague that he was ready to return to the issue of integration of the two countries, but in return asked to recall Babich. Putin agreed and gave Lukashenka a year, promising at that time not to interfere in the internal Belarusian agenda. This year is especially important for the head of the republic: in Belarus, parliamentary elections are to be held first, then presidential ones.

"Warning Shot"

“Of course, Mikhail Babich behaved defiantly in Minsk, almost like the “governor of Belarus” appointed by Moscow. He was an instrument of pressure on Alexander Lukashenko,” Belarusian political scientist Sergei Martselev said in a commentary for NT. - However, such a quick and unexpected replacement of Babich with Mezentsev looks at least strange. All the more strange is the replacement of a strong ambassador by a weak one against the backdrop of an escalation of the conflict between Moscow and Minsk. The only way to explain all this is by the fact that Babich was not originally planned to be made ambassador to Minsk for a long time. He fulfilled the task of "warning shot" - he showed what real pressure from the Kremlin could look like if Lukashenka continues to "talk" integration.

Babich was required to conduct reconnaissance on the ground, establish contacts with pro-Russian groups, find out how ready the Belarusian society and state are for resistance, what options for pressure remained

But there is another version in Minsk, among experts and journalists close to Lukashenka's administration. Babich came to Belarus to solve problems related to the preparation of the so-called "deepening of integration", and in fact - with the preparation of the Anschluss. He was required to conduct reconnaissance on the ground, establish contacts with pro-Russian groups, find out how ready the Belarusian society and the state are for resistance, what options for pressure remained. And there is a possibility that Babich solved the assigned tasks, so he no longer needed to remain an ambassador. Now Lukashenka is being given a year of respite, but after the elections in Belarus (parliamentary elections are scheduled for November 2019, presidential elections are scheduled for August 30, 2020), integration will be accelerated.

“Moscow slowed down the activity on the Anschluss of Belarus a little. But I would not recommend relaxing - neither the Foreign Ministry nor civil society. It cannot be concluded that this scenario has been abandoned. There are signals that Moscow may change tactics, but keep its focus on absorbing Belarus,” says Belarusian philosopher and political consultant Vladimir Matskevich.

However, Matskevich adds, Babich's behavior as ambassador - "absolutely undiplomatic behavior of the vicegerent of a metropolis in a colonial country" - may play into the hands of opponents of accelerated integration with Russia. “The reaction to Babich, both from the Belarusian civil society and from the bureaucracy, showed Russia that the prospects for the scenario for extending Putin's presidency are not as bright as they were presented in Moscow. And this is a little encouraging for the supporters of Belarusian sovereignty,” sums up the NT interlocutor.

Beat your own

Resonant events in Belarus coincided with the recall of Mikhail Babich from Minsk - a series of arrests in the highest circles of the Belarusian leadership. The loudest of the new cases is the arrest of the former head of Lukashenka's bodyguard, and now the deputy secretary of the Security Council Andrei Vtyurin. Versions sound different - from connections with the FSB of the Russian Federation (Vtyurin was born and studied in Russia, is actively friends with colleagues in the Moscow special services) to a conspiracy with a group of 5-6 generals and colonels against Lukashenka with formidable intentions, up to "physical elimination".

This arrest is also notable for the fact that Vtyurin was a member of the closest circle of Alexander Lukashenko, whom he had been guarding since 1995. And he even raised his youngest son Nikolai, literally replacing his father.

Vtyurin and Sivodedov are called members of the "pro-Moscow party" in Belarus - allegedly they paid the price for this. The recent actions of the Belarusian authorities show that they are still not ready for integration according to the Russian scenario.

At the same time, the KGB of Belarus arrested the general director of the state telecommunications monopoly - the Beltelecom company - Sergei Sivodedov, as well as three of his subordinates. All of them (including Vtyurin) are charged with accepting bribes from Russian companies totaling about 1 million rubles. And unofficially - the actual transfer of the Belarusian channel for connecting to the Internet under the control of the relevant departments of Russia.

Pro-government telegram channels in Russia call Vtyurin and Sivodedov members of the "pro-Moscow party" in Belarus - allegedly they paid the price for this. Be that as it may, the latest actions of the Belarusian authorities show that they are still not ready for integration according to the Russian scenario.

The fact that Minsk did not make any concessions is also indicated by the following symbolic gesture. In the Belarusian capital, on this May 9, the Immortal Regiment procession was again banned - an action supported by the Russian authorities around the world. A year ago, a similar ban caused a scandal in Belarusian-Russian relations - the Russian media were seething with indignation about the "Belarusian Banderism", and Russian officials vaguely tried to explain to Minsk that real allies do not act like this. In response, Lukashenka stated in plain text that “we have our own procession, and no one interferes with walking with portraits within its framework.” Soon after that, in fact, the story began to spin with the appointment of Babich as ambassador to Minsk.

Photo: 4esnok.by