The era of developed militarism

There were no other points of support in the mass consciousness of Russians, except for the myth of the Great Victory

Today, no one remembers this wonderful march: “Artillery, Stalin gave an order ...”, capturing the “correct” version of the war, approved by power. “Of the hundreds of thousands of batteries for the tears of our mothers, for our homeland - fire! Fire!" Fire by the end turns into a salute in honor of the leader.

The victory in the war of 1941-1945, according to Russians, is the main event of world history. With the departure of the generation of front -line soldiers and veterans who know firsthand what war is, mythology of victory is becoming increasingly important every year.

May 9 - a supporting symbol of national identity in present -day Russia, the basis of collective pride and self -esteem, and moral capital of the regime. This is our victory, we do not want to share it with anyone else.

From 60 to 70% of Russians are convinced that “we” (Brezhnev and subsequent generations!) Would defeat the Nazis without the help of allies.

In the public consciousness, the memory of the severity of military everyday life, blood, fear, hunger, homelessness, mud, hard labor of mobilized, and millions of prisoners and crippled were practically erased. They were replaced by ceremonial glory on holidays and television pictures of computer battles.

If in the late 1980s and early 1990s the huge figures of the dead, both military and civilian population, which are not amenable to imagination and understanding (officially 27 million, some historians talk about more than 40 million), public opinion associated with unpreparedness to war, with repressions among the command of the Red Army, with the fact that the life of soldiers in the eyes of generals cost little, then, starting from the middle The 2000s, after the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the explanation of the failures of the first years of the war and military losses returned to the Soviet versions: the surprise of Hitler’s attack and the cruelty of the Nazis.

The depersonalized, exhausted figures of losses give, as it were, a special, sacred meaning at the price of victory in the war, towering the victims brought by the people.

In the 1960-1970s, the most important issues in discussions about the war were: what the price of war, what are its reasons, how is the war with the nature of totalitarianism, what is the measure of responsibility of the Soviet leadership for its unleashing and defeating the first years? Today, most Russians (especially young ones) are not interesting.

In public space, these topics are taboo, the war was turned into the sacred symbol of the greatness of the Russian power, which is not subject to doubt and analysis.

Yesterday, the former front -line soldier could rightfully say “we need one victory, we won’t stand at the price”, today there is a vague understanding from this - “The price is not interested in the price, they will not stand at the price.”

The walking militarization of mass consciousness is not recognized by Russian society. The past war is blocking the current ones. Of the 27 years of its post -Soviet history, Russia waged and continues to wage limited wars: 3.5 years of the First Chechen War, 9 years - the second, 3.5 years - in Syria, 5 years of hybrid war in Ukraine (“small” cases of using troops like 1993 or regular ones who do not count). Such a policy does not cause noticeable internal resistance or criticism, as there is no guilt for tens of thousands of lives taken.

Since 2004, Russian patriotism (national pride) has merged with ideas about our military power, wealthy nuclear weapons that can destroy all living things. In public opinion, the belief was established that in the world "we are respected because they are afraid." There are no other grounds for Russia's authority in the world. Victory and military power turned into the most important grounds for the legitimacy of Russian authoritarianism.

During this time, the very meaning that is invested in the concept of “great power” has changed. If in the 90s and even in the first half of the 2000s, the Russians associated with this, first of all, the ideas about the developed economy, the high level of the welfare of the population, the generally recognized achievements of science and culture in the world, then only “very large territory”, “natural resources” and “military power”, the glory of Russian weapons remained from this. Cosmos, science, Russian literature, the achievements of socialism and much more, which was very highly appreciated in our history, today they lose their symbolic weight. The significance of the "army" in this context is growing from year to year. The paradox is that almost all the wars that Russia waged in the twentieth century, most Russians are recognized as unfair - both the Japanese, the First World, Civil, Finnish, Afghan, like both Chechen wars. The only thing - and absolutely justified - the exception is the Great Patriotic War.

The annoying official Victory cult has replaced the masochistic experiences of national inferiority and historical insolvency that arose after the collapse of the USSR.

The conviction has risen that “Russians are a great people who have particular importance in world history”:

For 25 years (from April 1992 to November 2017) the number of respondents sharing this opinion has grown from 13 to 64%. Another opinion - “the Russian people are the same as others” - on the contrary, decreased from 80 to 32%.

Together with the rise of militarism, mass ideas about the merits of President Putin are also changing. In the 2000s, the main achievements of Putin, according to the respondents, were to increase the standard of living of the population, the growth of salaries and pensions, ensuring economic growth and optimism, the confidence of Russians in the future. In the 2010s (after the crisis of 2008-2009), “strengthening international positions”, “the restoration of the status of a great power” (in 2010, 51%thought), came to the first place.

And since the spring of 2014-Putin’s main merit begins to consider “strengthening the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces” (in the fall of 2018, 41% of respondents thought so; in the list of its achievements, “growth of welfare of the population” goes to 11th place, only 16% of respondents called this position).

The peaks of Putin's popularity and approval are precisely on the military campaigns: 2008-war with Georgia, 2014-the accession of Crimea.

As the long-term sociological polls of the Levada Center show, according to citizens, Putin in his politics relies primarily on the army and special services, expressing and protecting the interests of mainly these institutions. The Russians believe that Putin returned to Russia the authority lost under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which, in their opinion, possessed the USSR.

If in the mid-1990s less than a third of Russians recognized Russia as a “great power”, then after the “Crimean” and confrontation with the West, in 2017-2018, more than 70% of the population were already convinced of this.

The apology of the army, like the very nature of Russian militarism, has changed in time over the past 100 years - from “our proud“ Varangian ”to“ We are peaceful people, but our armored train ”, from the“ Red Army of all stronger ”or“ Gremya fire, sparkling with brilliance, will go on a violent campaign, when comrade Stalin will go into battle ... ”before“ not mix our “Iskander”. But the meaning - the protection of the current government under the cover of the protection of the country and the people - remained unchanged. The warriors of Alexander Nevsky, Ivan the Terrible, Suvorov, Zhukov, and recently, soldiers of the First World War were connected. The main thing in this picture of the world is the enemy, its function is to ensure the unity of the people with the authorities, which allows us to demand from all solidarity and complete subordination, which in another language is expressed as “selfless heroism” and “devotion to the motherland”.

The attitude to the army of Russians reproduces the characteristic double -humus, reflecting the position of an individual in his attitude to the state: the point of view of the layman and the state of state. As a private person, our person tries to evade the sovereign service, as far as possible to slide his son from the army, requires increasing the costs of medicine and assistance to the poor, indifferent to “politics”. As a “people” - he approves the actions of the Kremlin in the Donbass or in Syria (while he himself categorically does not want to go there or pay for the inevitable costs of such a policy). He believes that it is necessary to allocate as much as it is required for the defense of money, even if at the same time you have to sacrifice something else. The ratio of these attitudes changes depending on whether the situation in the country is calm, whether the incomes of the population are growing, or we entered the phase of the “excited state of society” (provoked by threats from the outside), patriotic pride and mobilization of readiness for reconciliation. Periodic internal crises sharply reduce the significance and effectiveness of militaristic rhetoric, while periods of prosperity - in combination with anti -Western propaganda, an enemy threat - give bursts of patriotism and confidence in the army.

The end of the 1980s was marked by the paralysis of the mass draft army. Society realized the invasion for the country of preservation of previous military expenses, the processes of the internal decomposition of the army, and the loss of its purpose. The symptom of dysfunction in the army was an intolerable situation with grandsa, and an indicator of the strongest discontent of society by military policy - an increase (although not openly articulated) demand to end the Afghan war, withdraw Soviet troops from all other countries, put an end to the hypertrophied influence of the military, reduce military expenses, stop the practice of biased military assistance to “friendly” countries. The vast majority of Russians then considered it necessary not only to reduce the number of the army, but also by the speedy transition from calling to contract, or, as they said then, to a professional army, which ensures not only an increase in its effectiveness, but also a greater protection of the rights of the military themselves.

In 1998, 35% of Russians agreed that the army and defense had to spend more budget funds, 52% on the contrary, insisted on reducing military spending, redistribution of the budget in favor of social needs.

The actual defeat in the First Chechen War, corruption scandals in the highest military leadership, the death of Kursk and the shameful behavior of the leadership and the highest military officials in this situation even more undermined the authority and trust in the army.

But after the Crimea, the situation completely turned over: already in 2015 (crisis!) The year, 52% would support “an increase in defense costs, even if it created problems for our development,” 34% did not agree with this, 14% found it difficult to answer.

There is no connection in public opinion between the growing economic stagnation, the fall of the population’s incomes and the support of a militaristic policy in the mass consciousness or it is completely depressed and sterilized.

The pride of the military power and confidence of most Russians is that in which our army would protect the country (in 2005, 52%thought so, in 2018-88%), is paradoxically combined with an extremely ambiguous position in relation to our own choice: and if you have to fight for your homeland, are you ready to voluntarily go to the front, as in 1941? They are ready for volunteers - 21% of respondents, only by conscription - 22%, 31% will dodge, another 26% said that they were not subject to call.

In other words, the current militaristic propaganda arouses a sense of collective pride, which, however, does not turn into fanaticism and self -sacrifice, as it was in the past. But at the same time, the “I am like everyone else” is growing for the Soviet consciousness: if in 2000 only 30% considered it necessary to maintain universal military duty (63% were against), then in 2017, after Crimea, the picture changed almost completely: 58%, 37% - against.

The strengthening of Putin’s power and the change of the ruling elite meant the increase in the influence of the special services and the generals. Media freedom clearly interfered with them during the first Chechen campaign. The introduction of censorship and stripping political parties allowed the military to take revenge. After the war with Georgia, the army received priority financing, weapons began to modernize, the income and privileges of the highest officers were growing. The Ministry of Defense has become one of the key players in promoting the ideology of state patriotism, in the fight against the “alien” ideology of liberalism, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, everything that is under the general cap of the “export of color revolutions”.

Today, the Minister of Defense and the new commander of the military-political education of the Armed Forces promise us in the coming years to introduce the units of the Unarmia into each school without fail. Public opinion is processed by numerous “military-patriotic” channels and propaganda programs on television (“Zvezda”, “training ground”, “territory of error”, “military secret” and all the others gradually).

The daily presentation of materials about the superiority of our latest weapons, which, of course, has no analogues in the world that can destroy New York and London in a matter of minutes, over and over again, he was in the head of the layman: we are all stronger, but we are peaceful people, but we want to humiliate, destroy us, weaken, do not like us and despise that we are stronger than all. We do not attack, this is always threatened with us, we are only victims of someone else's aggression. The combination of several motives - the eternal “Russophobia”, the moral right of the winners of fascism and their “special path” - displaces the question in the minds of the Russians: why are they not loved so much?

Maybe unconsciously feeling our inferiority and shameful servility, we attribute to others what we are inwardly ashamed of?

According to the vast majority of Russians, the government should first of all be concerned about the problems of falling the living standards of the population, the increase in prices, the degradation of medicine and social security, corruption and the general incompetence of the administration, threatening a decrease in the quality of education, the development of social infrastructure, and instead it is engaged in the war in Syria, confrontation with the West and Ukraine. Yes, reforms in the army are important, and the modernization of weapons is also important, but so far the result of this policy was the isolation of Russia and Western sanctions, which are becoming increasingly tangible over time, a decrease in production and the drop in population incomes. After Putin signed the law on pension reform, his rating decreased sharply, and in September 2018 the army was already in the first position in the list of the most influential institutions that enjoy the trust of the population.

For the most part, the Russians are ready to approve the growing expenses for “defense”, believing that the increasing threat from the West (and that it is real, 56% of respondents have no doubt today) requires certain sacrifices. But this attitude is not least caused by the fact that there are no opportunities for people to influence the distribution of the state budget to take the authorities and interests their opinions and interests. Therefore, such answers in polls do not mean “hot approval”, but the lack of objections, the passive acceptance of the actual state of affairs, when the authorities decide what to spend the collected taxes on.

And this is the most important effect of militaristic propaganda and imposition of state patriotism. In the language of sovereign greatness, the memory of the heroism of ancestors and victims, threats from the hostile West it is impossible to discuss the problems of everyday life - inflation, shadow employment, impoverishment of most of the population, cynicism, greed and corruption of the administration and much more.

Author- Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Director of Levada Center