The resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) of June 26 on the unconditional recognition of the powers of the Russian delegation, instead of a step towards de-escalating conflicts through dialogue, became a factor in their further deepening. National delegations of Ukraine, the three Baltic countries, Poland, Georgia and Slovakia declared their fundamental disagreement and readiness for joint protest. The content of the resolution, as well as the history of its adoption, indicate that European politicians gave preference to behind-the-scenes bargaining over adherence to declared principles and procedures.

193 parliamentarians from 40 countries took part in voting on the resolution. At first glance, there is a quorum. 306 people from 46 countries had the right to vote, not counting the representatives of Russia, on whose return to work at the assembly the vote actually took place. However, riddles await those who try to understand what happened from the very first steps.

Invisible ink

The first mystery concerns the draft resolution. It was prepared by British parliamentarian Sir Roger Gale. In the accompanying note, the speaker critically assessed both Russia's aggressive actions towards Ukraine and the situation with freedoms within Russia. Gale proposed restoring the rights of the Russian delegation, but to a limited extent. In particular, he advised depriving Russian representatives of the rights to be elected to the governing bodies of PACE, to act as speakers, to participate in observation missions under the auspices of the assembly and to be its representatives in international missions or organizations.

The draft resolution initially did not contain any mention of restrictions or conditions for the restoration of the powers of the Russian delegation, but it was unanimously approved on June 25 at a meeting of the committee for monitoring the obligations of the participating countries. It is noteworthy that this committee is also headed by Gayle, and 93 parliamentarians participate in its work, including 18 representatives of Great Britain, 12 representatives of Ukraine and Poland each, five representatives of Georgia, four of Lithuania, three each of Latvia and Estonia (57 in total, i.e. i.e. the majority). Representatives of these countries, including Gale himself, voted against the resolution the next day.

The second mystery relates to the discussion of the draft resolution, from which references to restrictions disappeared, at the plenary meeting on June 26. A total of 19 amendments were proposed, only one was adopted: a call for cooperation between the Russian authorities and international organizations and missions to monitor the situation. Moreover, this, the third, amendment was adopted without the use of an electronic voting system, and therefore “unanimously”.

All attempts to add clear restrictions or conditions to the resolution failed. For example, only 69 parliamentarians voted for the proposal to restore the rights of the Russian delegation only temporarily, until the fall, and at the October PACE session to discuss Russia’s fulfillment of its obligations. It is noteworthy that among them were all the national delegations that subsequently went on a public demarche, as well as the British delegation. They were not heard even in small ways.

When discussing the ninth amendment - on the need to oblige Russia to abolish legal norms in national legislation that allow not to implement the decisions of the ECHR - the votes were distributed almost equally: 90 “for” and 91 “against”. And in this case, the attempt to condition the return failed.

At the same time, the word “monitoring” with its derivatives turned out to be among the most frequently found in the text of Gale’s report and the resolution itself - it is used 21 times! Another frequently occurring word is “dialogue” (14 times). As the main justification for the resolution, dialogue was mentioned as a distinctive feature of Western European political culture. In the text of the report and resolution, “dialogue” was most often mentioned with words such as “parliamentary”, “parliament”, “decision” and “political”. Other notable clusters are “follow,” “rule,” and “procedure,” as well as “violation,” “international,” “law,” “annexation,” “condemn,” and “Russian Federation.” That is, the resolution is formally designed to prevent violations of international laws, rules and procedures through dialogue. But the dialogue, even during the process of its adoption, did not work out in practice.

Changing room

The third mystery awaits those who want to identify the factors that explain the voting of representatives of a particular country for or against a resolution. On the one hand, there is some continuity between the vote on the resolution and the position taken by European governments in the spring of 2014, immediately after the outbreak of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Western European countries in 2014 were classified by experts as either “vultures”, i.e. supporters of a tough position towards Russia, or “doves” who opposed sanctions. There is a moderate and statistically significant correlation between the voting results and the 2014 assessments (r=0.614).

On the other hand, the actions of Western European politicians were not always consistent. Some countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, have turned from hawks to hesitant sparrows. Their representatives cast their votes in equal measure for and against. Ireland, also a "hawk" in the past, became a "dove" - three of its four representatives voted for the resolution. Bulgaria, a “dove” in 2014, has now taken a more moderate position. Slovakia, also a former “dove”, has now become a member of the “hawks” group.

An attempt at regression analysis does not bring clarity to the picture. In 2014, the position of European countries was pragmatic: it was dictated primarily by economic factors such as the degree of dependence on natural gas supplies from Russia and the volume of foreign trade both with Russia and with other European countries. In 2019, economic indicators were of weaker support. Of the many variables, only three influenced the results of the vote on the resolution: membership in the group of Eastern European countries neighboring Russia and Ukraine, Russia’s share in national exports, and the ratio of trade volumes with Russia and Ukraine.

Countries geographically close to Russia and Ukraine—Poland, Georgia, the Baltic countries—voted predominantly against Russia’s unconditional return to PACE. Countries for which Russia represents a significant market (for example, Finland) voted more often for than against. However, the desire to avoid dependence on too large players in trade also played a role: the more significant the share of a PACE member country’s trade turnover with Russia exceeds the share of its trade turnover with Ukraine, the relatively higher the share of votes against the resolution. In general, despite their interest, they tried to stay, but they did not abandon their adherence to the principles of the free market.

The resolution, of course, says nothing about trade interests in Russia. Although the requirement included in it to immediately pay all membership fees to the budget of the Council of Europe suggests that pragmatic considerations played an important role in the vote this time too.

Dialogue of the deaf

At the end of the quest, even those who offered answers to all three riddles are left with a residue of understatement. There is no certainty about the correctness of the answers. Publicly available information leaves more questions than it answers. This is good for a quest, but hardly for a model of democracy and liberalism.

In all likelihood, both the changes in the text of the resolution and the peculiarities of the procedure for its adoption reflect not public, but purely behind-the-scenes agreements between the largest players in European politics and Russia. Representatives of Ukraine, which will be affected more by the adoption of the resolution than anyone else, were apparently presented with a fait accompli. It is possible that other key participants in the “dialogue” were also presented with a fait accompli, including the rapporteur, who so advocated for it, but ultimately voted against the resolution.

In such a situation, it is difficult to identify the winning parties, with the exception of supporters of the thesis about the crisis of liberalism. The reputation of the parties to the behind-the-scenes agreements has definitely not improved, not to mention the reputation of PACE itself, a body designed to be a model of democracy and liberalism. Instead of creating the preconditions for respect for the principles of the rule of law (the word “law” is mentioned in documents 27 times, “obligation” – 22, “procedure” – 19, “rule” – 17, “court” – 16, “charter” – 11 ), PACE de facto agreed with the acceptability of the opposite practice of non-public political auctions.

The author is a leading researcher at CEMI RAS, professor at Memorial University, Canada.

Find the ends of the PACE resolution