The troubles of manual control

About the possible causes of the disaster in Sheremetyevo, which occurred on May 5, 2019 with the Sukhoi Superjet 100 aircraft and claimed 41 people, Pavel Kotlyar is talking with pilot Igor Deldyuzhov , President of the Sheremetyevo Flight Company trade union. In an abbreviated form, the interview was published in French in the publication Le Courrier de Russie.

- What are your questions following the results of the report of the Interstate Aviation Committee to SSJ 100 pilots, did they deliberately flew into a thunderstorm?

- I said earlier: I do not believe that the pilots flew into a thunderstorm. Each pilot knows that a thunderstorm is the most dangerous weathering. Perhaps around the thunderstorm there was a heap-removable cloud, where the category of static electricity was possible. It looks like a zipper, but weaker in power, lightning hits in thunderclouds, and a static discharge-in layered, in layer-pocket, kuchevo-removal, which are displayed on the displays of locators with green color. The pilots do not fly into a thunderstorm, it can be seen on the display with yellow and red color, they are afraid of it. In our case, a characteristic noise was recorded when they flew in precipitation. And then the pilot said: “Now it will shake,” it means it was a heap-removable cloud in which a boltka is observed. The pilots did not request permits to bypass the thunderstorm from the dispatcher, left the airfield according to the standard scheme ...

- The report presents photos of the tracks from the category. Do you know such traces? What can be said about them?

- For them we can say that the category was powerful enough. Over 27 years of flight work, there were two cases of discharge with static, but the blows were in plumage and in the radio station. And here the damage is more serious.

- A radio communications disappeared at the aircraft, and soon partially recovered. Was the decision to return the right one?

- It's hard to say, it was the commander’s decision. The plane moved to Direct Mode and was actually uncontrollable. The plane reacted to the usual influences on the part of the commander not at all in the same way that the commander actually had no experience in piloting in this mode. It was his decision, he had the right to make him. Apparently, he regarded that being in the air is less safe than quickly land. Now you can talk a lot about this, but from the report to the end it is not clear what refusals have occurred in the electric system and why the control system has passed to Direct Mode.

Why did he immediately decide to sit down? Why didn’t he fly to the same Murmansk or to the north of the Moscow region to develop fuel? After the production of fuel, even with gross landing and destruction of the aircraft, the fire would be less. In addition, after the production of fuel when going for landing, there would probably be less speed, which means that less load on the design of the aircraft during landing. And, finally, the third argument in favor of not going to land in such a situation immediately is an opportunity to “learn” to fly in the Direct Mode unusual for pilot, to feel the controllability of the aircraft. If the pilot is experienced, then at least some management skill can be obtained ...

- Judging by the report of the poppy, the plane during landing constantly deviated from the glidead.

- Yes, it seems that they flew below her all the time. Why - it is still incomprehensible. Perhaps due to the shift of the wind, to which the alarm several times indicated. After this alarm, the pilot did not go to the second circle, the Aeroflot leaders allow him to do this to his pilots. I flew in Aeroflot on Boeing 767, we had a similar alarm, and if it was triggered, we had to go to the second round. For 13 years, this alarm has worked only once, and I went to the second round. In the documents of Aeroflot there is a footnote that allows not to go to the second circle if the pilot is sure that this is a false alarm trigger - but how can you be sure of this? This system is there for that and is configured accordingly.

The commander streamed the plane so much that there were pulling efforts on Sidestick. On the SSJ 100 there is no mechanical trimmer of the steering wheel, and it is not yet clear whether the crew could open the Flight Control page to determine the position of the trimmer for himself.

- A strange situation with the presentation of the defendant’s emergency code 7700 ...

- When the second pilot asked whether to put the code 7700, the commander replied that it was possible to turn off the previous communication code 7600. Nevertheless, the emergency code 7700 was delivered. This suggests that the commander simply did not control the actions of the second pilot, he was focused on piloting and looked at the devices. And the dispatcher in response to this could ask for why the crew changed the defendant’s code and is there an emergency situation on board, but this did not happen.

-We see that the commander’s actions in the management of the control handle (joystick) were really “sweeping” when landing, is it because of the lack of experience?

- Absolutely. The pilot did not know how the aircraft reacts to the deviations of the pen. From the report, it is clear that before the first touch, the pilot completely took the pen towards himself, and after the rebound, he completely gave it away from himself. At this moment, he had to hold the pen and not give away.

It is not clear why the crew increased the traction of the engines before planting, increasing the speed from the required 155 knots to 170 at the beginning of leveling. Naturally, the higher the speed, the more sensitively the plane reacts to control and the less movements you must make a pen ...

The speed of speed shows that the pilots did not know how to distribute attention where to look. The commander did not see this speed and did not react in time, did not take the engine mode. This is the so -called tunnel perception - at this moment the pilot is focused on one parameter, and what is happening around, does not notice.

Before planting, the pilots prepared air brakes (interceptors) for automatic production. In normal mode, after planting, as soon as the chassis is squeezed, sensors are triggered, and the interceptors come out of the upper surface of the wing. But when the plane is in Direct Mode mode, they do not go automatically. And the pilots missed this moment, although if the air brakes came out, the plane would not have broken so, since he would immediately lose the lifting force and would not separate from the strip to a great height. From the report, we see not all parameters. It is necessary to apply several data schedules to one grid: this is air speed, and vertical, and overload, and Sidestick deviations, and the mode of operation of the engines, and one -time commands to turn on the reverse and release of the interceptors, and the voice messages of the crew. Then the situation will be more clear at this stage.

- And in fact, the pilot turned on the reverse in the air after the first rebound?

- The commander transferred the levers to the “full reverse” position immediately after touching. This is a requirement of guiding documents, but it could not turn on, as it is driven by compressing the main rackets of the chassis. Apparently, the pilot did not expect the aircraft to bounce. But after the second touch of the rack, the chassis appealed and the reverse sash began to be shifted from the direct traction mode to the opposite. The plane jumps again, and here, apparently, the commander decides to leave for the second circle and gives a take -off mode, not having information that the reverse sash is in an intermediate position. Everything happened in a split second, and we can only guess what the commander was thinking at that moment. As a result, after the third rough landing, the pilot nevertheless turned on the reverse at a speed of 107 knots (198 km/h), when the chassis has already broken.

- Further actions of pilots when moving in the strip and evacuation of passengers raising questions?

- The crew set the parking brake, turned off the engines - all these things must be done before the evacuation of passengers. They did all this and announced the evacuation.

-Still, the key question, how long did the commander have previously trained in this mode Direct Mode?

- Only when retraining from one type of aircraft to another in 2016. And, most likely, this training was an introductory-in a straight-line horizontal flight, the instructor turned off the Normal Mode, the pilots took out a checklist, performed the necessary procedures, read them and tried to pilot with a handle to the right on the simulator. That is, they did not decrease, did not land, did not land, did not go to the second circle in this mode.

- That is, the pilot ruled the plane, having tried this special regime only once in his life, not knowing how to sit on it or go to the second circle?

- Yes, and this is the main mistake of the flight management of the airline - the fact that they approved such flight training programs. I looked at all the Aeroflot flight programs over the past three years, there are no such training.

By the way, the report states that earlier there were eight cases of the transition of pilots of other SSJ 100 to Direct Mode, five of them in Aeroflot. And earlier, the actions of the pilots were also “sweeping” with a handle of administrations, they swept the plane, and “Aeroflot” did not take any action. And this leadership saw this, since the parameters of all flights are deciphered, and did not take any measures to give pilots additional training. Moreover, on the "Airbas" in Aeroflot there is a handmade training - on A330 and on A320, there this mode is called Direct Law. And for some reason there is no “dry”.

In general, due to the introduction of all kinds of automatic systems in aircraft in pilots, manual control skills are degraded. The pilots stopped flying manually, there were only two of them. If one pilot wants to fly manually, then the load on the second pilot becomes huge. He must have time to provide a connection, change the modes, set speed, release the mechanization of the wing and chassis and monitor how the other is piloting, prompting deviations.

- And earlier in the crews there was a sorcerer for this ...

- The sorcerer, navigator, radio operator, and everyone was doing his own business. The navigator was navigated, the sorcerer monitored the systems, the radio operator provided contact. And the first and second pilots took the plane, could work out the piloting technique to the filigree level.

Now the flight authorities receive prizes for their KPI (key performance indicators), but for this it is necessary that the pilots do not allow all sorts of deviations and violations. Therefore, the authorities say: “Do not disconnect the autopilot, it is forbidden to reduce the level of automation of flight. Fly automatically. " Therefore, there is a degradation of skills. When I flew at Aeroflot, this was not.

- How often did you train in manual modes when you flew to Boeing 767?

-At Boeing, everything is different, this is a “normal” plane with a helm, and even in the latest models 777 it was left, and the control system with joysticks began to be introduced on the “Airbas” and “Superjets”. It is clear that this is the result of the struggle for reducing the mass of the aircraft - the wire and the computer is easier than the real rods and cables. The signal from the joystick in normal mode enters the computer, which, having considered this, itself gives a signal to control steering cars. And in the Direct Mode there is no computer - the joystick signal immediately goes to the steering machine.

It is always easier to control the helm, and with the joystick, this is still the problem. There are few people who can equally easily act both with the left and right hand. When managing the joystick, minimal hand deviations are required, and the commander of the crew of the joystick is under his left hand!

- Is the problem of the lack of training manually only for SSJ 100 or for Aeroflot? Tell us how in Europe?

This problem concerns the same. All modern highly automated aircraft are piloted by the first and second pilots. Sometimes there can be two seconds. But little changes from this. Remember the A330 Air France A330 Disaster in 2009? They flew from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. Then, in a horizontal flight, the commander went to rest, and in the cabin there were two second pilots, who, after the freezing of Pito’s tubes, turned off the control, did not cope with the control, the plane began to fall from a height of 11 km, and they could not do anything, although the aircraft from a wagodaker was taught at the flight schools. Now many European airlines have been concerned about this problem and give pilots additional training on simulators or in real flights on light -engine aircraft.

- What questions at this stage do you have to the SSJ 100 aircraft?

- The main issues arose before the report - they say, the norms of flight fit during certification were not observed, why the chassis broke, why they pierced the tank, flowing kerosene, and so on. But now it became clear that after the second touch of the chassis they did not fall off, but only cut off the bolts at the place of their attachment to the price -plan, and they no longer provided the necessary rigidity and therefore the chassis developed. With these three strokes, the plane behaved, as it should. Unspread loads were allowed.

At the first two strokes, nothing remained in the lane, and no fuel leak was recorded - only after the third blow.

- The report states that at the very beginning of the emergency development of the air in the air for 15 seconds, incorrect work of on -board recorders was underway. Why?

-This also could have happened due to the nutrition failure. If the generators refused, then while the food switched to batteries, perhaps the record was not going. So far, you can only guess about this.

- By the way, explain why, when landing, the crew turned on the Armed Forces (auxiliary power plant)?

- I can’t say, perhaps this is due to electrical refusal, with de -energization, but Mac has not yet written about it. But there are rumors that both generators refused the aircraft, that is, the aircraft after the category of static electricity was de-energized and flew only on batteries, which was why there was a transition to Direct Mode. And then, if there is a refusal of at least one generator, not to mention two, it is necessary to launch the BOS on which there is the same generator as on the engine. This is done because the batteries can fly a limited time, if they sit, the plane will be without power supply.

Perhaps, by the way, this is one of the reasons why pilots were in a hurry to land. Another reason may be that the crew turned off the air selection from the engines for air conditioning so that there is more traction with possible departure to the second circle, because planting is carried out with the exceeding the maximum planting mass of the aircraft, and the APU provided the conditioning of the cabin.

Igor Deldyuzhov
Talked by Pavel Kotlyar