The main purpose of the regime is to eliminate its substitution

Professor of the European University in St. Petersburg Grigory Voosov about the causes of protests and what they can lead to

1 We live in a world where too much is not the same as it seems. Of course, in the old days, people showed a tendency to deceit and self -deception. But only today can one say with confidence that one of the two main in the degree of prevalence in the world of political regimes is electoral authoritarianism, which exists, among others, and in our country - is entirely built on lies. In George Orwell Fierce, the totalitarian state supported its power, manipulating the consciousness of some subjects and dulling others. It is possible that this prophecy will still come true in almost literal form, with editing for new technologies. Say in China. But one cannot exclude the fact that Orwell’s forecast has already materialized in many countries, including Russia, although in a slightly different form.

Indeed, modern electoral authoritarianism is not very similar to gloomy, almost ascetic even for the ruling class, the world of Orwell. The current dictatorships are distinguished by hedonism and even some fun - or, in any case, cynicism, which sometimes amuses. But in terms of liga, they far exceed any system of the Orwell type. The fact is that electoral authoritarianism is lying by definition, by its nature. He wants to seem what is not, and deliberately subordinates all his statements and actions to justify false claims.

The current dictatorships are distinguished by hedonism and even some fun - or, in any case, cynicism, which sometimes amuses. But in terms of liga, they far exceed any system of the Orwell type

The main goal of modes of this type, like any other variety of authoritarianism, is to maintain power at any cost, exclude its replacement. To achieve this goal, it is possible - and even necessary - repressive measures to suppress any opposition that begins to pose a real threat. But such regimens do not have a good excuse. There is no anointed of God, acting in the field of heaven, no grandiose project like building communism or improving human breed through racial selection. Modern authoritarian regimes have to make excuses that they remain in power by the will of the people. Therefore, they pretend to be democracies.

In Russia, this lie is greatly facilitated by the fact that in the nineties the very idea of democracy was largely discredited. Therefore, the transition to electoral authoritarianism, which occurred, in my assessment, in the middle of the zero, remained almost unnoticed by the general public. Repressive actions were then pointed. The main means for establishing authoritarianism was creeping institutional changes - the creation of a “vertical of power” after the cancellation of the governor’s elections, as well as the cleaning of the party system and such a change in the election system, which already practically excluded the victory of the opposition. These measures, combined with the oil prosperity of that memorable decade, made the regime for some time invulnerable.

But in 2011 this was not enough. Control over the institutions was quite enough for not a single really opposition politician to go to the Duma, but it was not enough for citizens to consider such a result fair. And the citizens went out in the square. It was then, in December 2011, that the stage of the country's political history began, where we remain today.

The electoral authoritarian regimes reach consolidation, combining two main methods-institutional and political manipulations that give them liberal-democratic visibility and repression. These two methods are used to be balanced, and the December events of 2011 have shown this especially clearly.

On the one hand, the well-known speech by President Dmitry Medvedev, made as the answer to the protesting in Bolotnaya and Sakharov in the winter of 2011-2012, really contained a promise of some liberalization, and I would say that this promise was fulfilled-but to exactly the extent that the regime could afford it without sacrificing its main goal. The rules of registration of parties were facilitated, but so that truly opposition organizations remain outside the game. Governor's elections are restored, but so that only candidates who received the “good” from the Kremlin win them. The electoral system is changed, but so that United Russia even gained an additional advantage.

At the same time, already during the 2012 presidential campaign and immediately after it, the regime began to rapidly increase its repressive component. In the short term, this resulted in a series of political processes and other measures directed against the opposition. In the long term, this was manifested in the legislation against “foreign agents”, which inflicted a powerful blow to independent social activity in Russia, as well as in titanic efforts to strengthen the repressive apparatus, its thorough preparation for the suppression of mass excitement. The main product of these efforts was the Russian Guard, which replaced with ineffective internal troops.

It is clear that these efforts of the authorities were very facilitated by the patriotic euphoria of 2014. But it is also clear that it was a situational factor, doomed to gradual leaching. Meanwhile, for the opposition, the events of 2011-2012 also did not pass without a trace. Firstly, it became obvious that in Russian society-in any case, in large cities-there is a potential for mobilization of discontent in the form of mass protest. Secondly, the formation of the organizational structures of this new opposition, as well as its political asset, began. Thus, a new potential for the struggle for democracy has arisen.

This potential was manifested in the course of recent speeches related to elections to the Moscow City Duma. From the point of view of political mobilization of citizens, these events confirmed that the organic deceit of the regime is still able to cause a rather significant group of population a direct, acute emotional reaction, without which there are no street protests. Moreover, this reaction arose about, which should be recognized more adequate than in 2011. After all, falsification of elections results is a secondary and non -compulsory element of electoral authoritarianism, but there is one of the main tools for maintaining the dictatorship to the election of opposition parties and candidates.

Another aspect is more important. The authorities did everything so that the registration of opposition candidates becomes technically impossible. The election commission and the “experts” attracted by them can easily disqualify any number of signatures of any quality. The calculation was that the opposition would not try. But this calculation was not justified. The signatures were collected, and certainly no less convincing than the official candidates, “self -emergency”. Undoubtedly, this required significant - and rather coordinated - efforts from a whole group of politicians united by a common goal. In other words, this required the organization. And it turned out that the Russian opposition has it.

Political activity in the conditions of electoral authoritarianism is paradoxical. There are legal ways to register a party, get an office, even participate in the elections under the party flag. But all these benefits go to politicians at the cost of loyalty to the authorities. Therefore, truly opposition activity is possible within the framework of non-party structures. Recent events have shown that in Moscow the main structure was the Fund for the fight against corruption. It was the associates of Alexei Navalny that became the core of the group of “unregistered candidates” who found themselves in the center of protests. In Russia, a political asset was formed, the installation and forms of activity of which are adequate to the nature of the regime.

The efforts of the authorities aimed at the organizational defeat of the opposition, that is, measures directed against the FBK and its financing channels were less widely seen.

The answer to the actions of the opposition was straightforward and logical. On the one hand, unprecedented repressions against the participants in mass performances should have shown that street protest activity was a dangerous lesson from which it is better to stay away. These repressions were noticeable, caused a fairly wide public reaction. Unfortunately, the efforts of the authorities aimed at the organizational defeat of the opposition, that is, measures directed against the FBK and its financing channels, were less widely seen.

Meanwhile, it is the struggle against the organizational resources of the opposition that now acquires paramount importance to the authorities. One of the lessons that can be removed from the events of 2011-2012 is that even a truly massive, very emotionally motivated protest can go into the sand if it is not supported by the organization, that is, a combination of a structured asset and effective guidance. The question of whether the FBK will be able to recover in some form after the defeat that the authorities are preparing for him remains, of course, open. But this issue is of key importance for the prospects for the struggle for democracy in Russia.

There is no reason to believe that the future promises this struggle a quick and easy success. The regime continues to solve its routine problems. The main one is to ensure in one way or another to provide Vladimir Putin with the preservation of actual power after 2024. I think that the authorities would prefer a method that would allow at least some elements of liberal-democratic surroundings. Therefore, the elections will not be canceled. If stripping the opposition leads to a satisfactory result for the authorities, then I would not exclude any measures aimed at cosmetic liberalization of the regime. One of the paradoxes of electoral authoritarianism is that repression and liberalization go hand in hand, and the success of suppressing the real opposition serves as a measure of how gentle conditions can be created for more loyal critics of the regime.

However, the position of the opposition, albeit difficult, is by no means hopeless. Over time, lying nature of the regime will manifest itself more and more clearly, pushing citizens to emotional protest poured on the streets. This could be added to a growing discontent to a deterioration in economic conditions associated with poor management quality and foreign policy adventurism. However, the opposition needs to make significant efforts to turn this spontaneous discontent into a political plane. And it must be remembered that the struggle will be a long, and an effective organization will be a key condition for success.