It is foolish to equate legitimacy with the absence of revolution, chaos and civil war.

One can ask an economist: what is the direct harm of election fraud? What is specifically bad about not allowing opposition candidates? Of course, it is undemocratic, does not correspond to the norms of civilized countries in the 21st century, and reduces citizens' interest in politics, but all this is not direct harm, not a specific consequence. If candidates who enjoy great support are not allowed to participate in elections - hundreds of volunteers worked for them, they collected thousands of signatures, tens of thousands of people took to the streets to protest against their removal - this, they say, reduces the legitimacy of the government. And this reduction in legitimacy is usually taken lightly. And in vain: a reduction in the legitimacy of the government is, in essence, direct damage.

A year ago, in September 2018, 70% of Muscovites who came to the polls voted for Sergei Sobyanin. It seemed like a huge, decisive advantage. By the summer of 2019, the situation had apparently changed dramatically. If Sobyanin were still supported by 70% of Muscovites, he could have pasted a “Sobyanin list” on every entrance and asked citizens who support him (the overwhelming majority, judging by the results of last year’s elections) to support his candidates as well. Even if this did not guarantee victory, it would have made the candidates the favorites. If, of course, Sobyanin really enjoyed support. However, judging by the withdrawal of all opposition candidates – including those who collected thousands of signatures and were, according to polls, the leaders in their districts – very little remained from 70% a year later. Or, perhaps, these 70% never existed.

In short, the events of the summer of 2019 – the withdrawal of candidates, night searches and arrests of activists, beatings of peaceful citizens on the streets – indicate that the mayor does not have the support that a major victory in the elections gave him. And legitimacy now corresponds not to 70% and perhaps not even 50%, but to the level when people obey because they are afraid of getting hit on the head. And the same is with the president. A man, during whose presidency peaceful citizens are beaten on the streets, arrested for solitary pickets, imprisoned for reposts and fined for likes, may not be as popular as the official figures say.

However, the issue of the legitimacy of power is usually treated with disdain. They say that as long as the police and the army obey the president, as long as citizens do not disarm the police, as long as an armed crowd has not seized the Kremlin - until then, the power is legitimate. But it is stupid to equate legitimacy with the state of "absence of revolution, chaos and civil war". The legitimacy of power can decline for a very long time without reaching critical values. And the danger does not necessarily lie in the area of these critical values. When political leaders enjoy the support and trust of citizens, the country develops faster - because the efforts of the people and the efforts of the leadership complement each other. The more support and trust, the faster. When citizens see that others do not trust - and everyone sees arrests, beatings, fabricated cases, unfounded fines - they trust even less. And until the removal of candidates, the fabrication of cases, the persecution of activists, the beating of citizens on the streets stop, they will not trust anymore.

The author is a professor at the University of Chicago and the Higher School of Economics

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