Global agreement

Does Russia need a balance with the United States for strategic weapons

Hundreds of scientific and near -scientific materials with interpretations of the principles of strategic stability published in books, magazines and articles in several decades were supplemented in September this year with the article “Continuration in a new era”. With the subtitle “how to strengthen multilateral strategic stability” it is published in the authoritative journal “Russia in Global Policy”.

The article is based on the results of a situational analysis conducted in the Higher School of Economics together with the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy with the support of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma. This alone allows us to consider the article an event, taking into account the fact that it is already retold in foreign centers. I would like to discuss its main provisions and conclusions.

The main goal of the article is to show that in the changed military-strategic situation when erasing the faces between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, an increase in the threat of cyber attacks, the absence of restrictions on the deployment of space weapons and for other reasons

The principles of strategic stability existing to the present require a cardinal transformation.

As you know, these principles were recorded in 1990 in a joint statement by the USSR and the United States, where strategic stability is defined as relations that eliminate incentives for the application of the first nuclear strike, and its principles are implemented in strategic offensive weapons (SNA).

However, now, as noted in the article, changes in the military-strategic situation are so significant that it is necessary to proceed to multilateral strategic stability (MSS). And that the previous policy to maintain strategic stability due to START contracts between the two countries with a balance of strategic forces and mutual control systems in the context of nuclear multipolarity and the emergence of new types of strategic weapons ceased to be effective.

Separate provisions of the article are fair and known for earlier publications. It is impossible to deny that the threat of nuclear war has become more real compared to previous periods. In a large part, this is due, as noted in the article, with a dangerous decrease “... many elites have a level of competence, a sense of responsibility, aggravation of“ strategic parasitism ” - the feeling that the world is forever, the weakening of resistance in militaristic policy societies. It took a generation of leaders who knew firsthand what war was, and sought to avoid it by all means. Discussion of scenarios of the unleashing of war has become a common occurrence. The war is perceived as something similar to a computer game. ”

The feasibility of inclusion in the processes of monitoring the nuclear weapons of other nuclear states is also fair. This is also stated in the text of the START-3 agreement, signed in 2010, where the task of the contract is “... to give a new impetus in the context of maintaining the safety and safety of your nuclear arsenals, as well as in order to expand this process in the future, including giving it a multilateral nature.”

The crisis of traditional principles of strategic stability is illustrated by the elimination of the INFMD and various statements in the leadership of the US Department of Defense on the difficulties of extending the 5 years of the START-3 agreement, on the impossibility of a new agreement on START without China, etc.

The thesis about the inappropriateness for Russia new restrictions on nuclear weapons and preserving parity with the United States (retired drummer Bolton, who inspired President Trump, applauds the same, is repeatedly repeated . There is also a lot of other well -known illustrative material about the positions of China and other states that could be commented, but not in the limited framework of the article.

But there are a number of initial provisions on which the authors based the need for a cardinal transformation of the principles of strategic stability. The first of them is the erasing of the faces between nuclear and non -nuclear weapons.

On the possibilities of nuclear and non -nuclear weapons

In the speech at the 2015 Valdai Forum, Vladimir Putin said: “The concept of the so -called first disarming strike has already appeared, including using high -precision non -nuclear means of a large radius of action comparable in effect with nuclear weapons.” He spoke about this a year earlier: "Today, many types of high -precision weapons in their capabilities have already approached the weapons of mass defeat ..."

The authors of the article went much further and generally claim to erase the line between nuclear and non -nuclear weapons.

Of course, the effectiveness of non -nuclear weapons with damage to small targets increased significantly due to the high accuracy of hitting. However, I consider it to be undeserved to give him strategic potential.

The erasing of the boundaries between nuclear and non -nuclear weapons is emphasized in the report based on the results of sitanalysis, on which the article in the journal “Russia in Global Policy” is based. Panic conclusions are mentioned there about the possibility of damage to 90% of strategic nuclear forces (amends) of Russia with high -precision non -nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time, which was previously replicated in the media.

This was no longer carried out by even non -public scientists from the specialized Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense. In a number of newspaper articles, they brought detailed calculations showing the impossibility of simultaneous strike with high -precision cruise missiles even on one specific base of stationary ICBMs in the European part of the country, taking into account the size and geometry of targets and the required number of cruise missiles to reliable the defeat of one highly protected facility - the shaft installation, the command post. And this is even without taking into account the measures of camouflage, electronic opposition, air defense systems of type "shell" and others.

Scientists confirm the impossibility of destroying in the first blow of a part of Russian amendments with high -precision means without the use of nuclear weapons. The striking abilities of nuclear and non -nuclear weapons when hit on highly protected point objects are incomparable, they show, and this is due to the need to use an exceptionally large number of non -nuclear means. It is almost impossible to plan a similar blow at the same time for several hundred targets located in the vast territory of Russia. It takes a long time to prepare such an operation and create an appropriate group. This preparation cannot be hidden, and Russia will have time to transfer its nuclear forces and funds into increased combat readiness.

For these reasons

It would be a delusion to believe that the Pentagon is able to plan not only an absolutely useless non -nuclear disassembly blow to Russia's STAR, but also risk catastrophic in the consequences of the response nuclear blow.

This also fully applies to assumptions about the use of expensive hypersonic products developed in the United States for disarmament impact, which will most likely be purchased in limited quantities.

If we compare the effectiveness of non-nuclear and nuclear weapons, then it makes sense to remind the authors of “erasing the faces” between nuclear and non-core weapons The experience of Bombarding Dresden in 1945. Over two days, Anglo-American aircraft dropped 7,100 tons of bombs into the city, using more than 2400 aircraft and lifting. The number of dead still varies from 25 thousand to 150 thousand people, since the number of refugees in the city and burned in a fiery tornado at a temperature of more than 1,500 degrees is unknown. However, a practically similar effect can be obtained when hitting the same city with only one ballistic missile with a single nuclear ammunition weighing about 200 kg with a TNT equivalent of about 300 kt.

The article establishes the impossibility of new contracts, including because of the new hypersonic Russian weapons: the winged missiles “Dagger”, “Zircon”, the Avangard missile systems and the “Poseidon” underwater drones. However, the “dagger” and “zircon” are not a strategic weapon. As for the Avangard complex, the development of which was started in the USSR to overcome the failed space system about in accordance with the Star Wars program, it can be built into the START-3 agreement in case of extension. An obstacle can only be the term “ballistic missile” in the first chapter of the protocol to the contract, which determines that this means a rocket, most of which is carried out along the ballistic trajectory. Some difficulties are known in connection with this term in the flight tests of the Avangard prototype even under the action of the START-1 agreement, but they were overcome. This is a topic for coordination by the parties. Moreover, the scale of the deployment of this complex will most likely be very limited. This is due to the uncertainty of the functions of such missiles, in addition to demonstrating technological achievements, as well as with a high cost, which includes, in addition to the cost of a missile with a planning block, deep refinement of mine launchers, which previously stood “heavy” governors.

Do you need a balance of nuclear forces

In the article under consideration, it is not considered necessary for Russia to maintain further parity from the United States on START. From the point of view of performing the task of nuclear deterrence with this, one can agree, since even with a noticeable quantitative unbalancing, Russian amends will always be able to ensure an unacceptable response blow. This is due to both proven inefficiency of the United States and a multiple decrease in the level of unacceptable damage to the aggressor.

Regarding the possibilities of the pro, the influence of which is greatly exaggerated in the article, it should be said that

The whole 50-year history of development and testing of various Pro in the USSR and the United States convincingly proves that it is impossible to create such a PRO that could protect the country's territory from a response strike by hundreds of ammunition.

Today there is not a single specialist capable of conducting appropriate calculations who would not agree with this.

Back in 2015, at the Army-2015 forum, President Putin said that our intercontinental ballistic missiles are able to overcome any, even the most technically advanced PRO systems, which is confirmed by numerous calculation estimates of Russian and American experts. This allows you to exclude about the composition of destabilizing factors in relations between Russia and the United States.

Claims on the Pro in Romania and Poland are now related to the fact that from these launchers, winged missiles of the Tomagavk type can be launched. But this is a separate question.

A more difficult question is to preserve the balance of START between Russia and the USA.

Despite the citation in the article of Bolton’s negative position, there are factors in favor of extending the current agreement for 5 years. It is actually very beneficial to the Americans, since it allows you to conduct total control of the current state of our nuclear triad and planned changes. There is the possibility of exchanging dozens of notifications about the state, entry and withdrawal of strategic objects planned by launches of missiles on Earth and at sea, as well as exchange television meters. And most importantly - to conduct up to 18 control trips of inspection groups every year to launch plants of the ICBM, submarines, heavy bombers with the opening of roof roofs, removal of missiles for combat -outs, etc. National technical control systems are able to compensate only a small part of the information lost in the absence of mutual control under the contract.

The last nuclear review says that the United States is ready to discuss the extension of this contract until 2026.

However, the situation may change in the absence of a new START agreement. Two options are possible.

The first - in which Russia and above all, the United States will not significantly increase the number of missiles and ammunition in its triads to prevent the quantitative nuclear weapons race, carrying out only modernization. In this case, it cannot be excluded that after a few years (electoral cycles) the parties will be able to return to negotiations on the restriction of nuclear weapons, taking into account the requirements of the agreement on non -proliferation of nuclear weapons (day). In this case, the balance of the START will be saved.

The second - in which the United States will begin to build up primarily the number of nuclear ammunition, which is enough for them to do in 2-3 years. Under the START-3 agreement, the TRAPUT-2 BPL was unloaded by four ammunition, but you can equip it with 8 ammunition of high power or 12 low-power ammunition with which the missiles were tested. At all MBR “Minitman-3” you can install 3 ammunition. And this will increase the total number of nuclear ammunition in the US SNS by more than doubled. Some information about this can be obtained on financing these works, but nothing more. A number of limited measures can be taken in the strategic nuclear forces of Russia, but the balance will be destroyed.

As noted above, Russia's Office can still be delivered by a destructive response blow. However, as you know, the balance of Russia and the United States on START is the last sign of super -power for the country, and the country's political leadership will have to make a choice.

Applications that since the Americans do not want new contracts, then we do not need them, we can do, should not convince anyone of sincerity.

Very needed, and balance is possible only under the action of contracts. The contract balance on STARTS with a limitation of their levels provides a significant reduction in costs.

The beginning of the process of real reduction and restrictions on nuclear weapons is primarily laid by the START-1 agreement, which was concluded due to the historical role of M.S. Gorbachev as a result of colossal work of highly professional diplomats, military, specialists of defense industrial enterprises. On the basis of this agreement, the START-3 agreement was also developed.

This should not be forgotten, calling to abandon this unique experience.

Due to the lack of negotiations, there is a risk of a crisis of a review conference on a day already in 2020. The last successful sightseeing conference was in 2010, after signing the START-3 agreement. Conferences 2005 and 2015 They were largely unsuccessful, which observers associate with stagnation of negotiation processes between Russia and the USA.

In the article under consideration, it is advisable to note a number of biased assessments of the positions of our counter -partners and quantitative inaccuracies. So, for example, it is argued that the intention to install low -power nuclear weapons on strategic carriers implies the possibility of using it not as a deterrence weapon, but as a means for use in conditions of military operations using conventional weapons. However, according to the Americans, small capacity charges on the Tranny-2 BRPP are designed to restrain the use of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons to de-escalate non-nuclear conflict. About this in the "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities", approved in 2017, it is directly stated that "in the conditions of escalation of a military conflict (meaning non-nuclear conflict), a demonstration of readiness and determination of the use of force using non-strategic nuclear weapons is an effective restraint." It should be noted that such a “nuclear de -escalation” in the marine doctrine, which can be heard from the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation, is not agreed with the current conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in the military doctrine of Russia.

From the point of view of Americans, Russia believes that in the case of use of non -strategic nuclear weapons for such a de -escalation relatively low power, the United States will not meet this with strategic weapons with powerful ammunition. And that is why we need to restrain us from this threat of response by nuclear weapons of low power.

Quantitative inaccuracies take place when comparing the non -strategic nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States. It is said that in order to align the ceilings of Russia would have to be reduced by 10 (!) Once. However, according to expert estimates that no one refutes, we have 1800–2000 charges for such weapons, Americans have 500 units.

The list of such semantic and quantitative errors can be continued, however, this is enough to advise the authors of the article to avoid the use of poor -quality information.

As a result , there was not “erasing the faces between nuclear and non -nuclear weapons”, but to erase the boundaries between far -fetched myths on catastrophic disarmament strikes, hypertrophied effects of pro and repeatedly proven data confirming the expediency of maintaining nuclear weapons and contractual relations between Russia and the United States. This is only possible to attract other nuclear states to participate in the control of weapons.

Наконец, нет необходимости «кардинальной трансформации» принципов стратегической стабильности. Нужно совершенствование этих принципов с учетом новых возможных дестабилизирующих факторов: киберугроз, вывода оружия в космос, эскалации региональных военных действий и др.