December 30, 2019, 11:56 am / Politics

“Protests from unexpected quarters are possible.” Main political risks of 2020

Opinion of political scientists on expectations for next year Elena Mukhametshina

Evgeny Razumny / Vedomosti

This year has been difficult for the Russian authorities - elections to the Moscow City Duma, a large wave of protests, the “Moscow affair”. There don’t seem to be any major events planned for next year, but it could become no less simple. It is in 2020 that the transformation of the system for the next presidential elections may begin, the repositioning of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party, we can expect serious personnel changes in the security forces, and situations may arise in the regions that will become serious challenges for the system as a whole. In addition, the US presidential elections are also important for Russia. What to expect from next year - the opinion of political scientists.

Nikolay Petrov, political scientist

/ Archive

“The main problem of the Russian government is the gap between the decreased legitimacy of President Vladimir Putin and the system that was built after 2014. Therefore, it will need to look for a way to increase legitimacy or increase repression in order to control the system.

Among the most important trends of 2020 are the regional elections in September, in connection with which changes in the party system are possible, since this is the last election campaign before the State Duma elections in 2021. 2020 will be the last year when it is possible to conduct a “test run” before the State Duma elections , if you plan to change the contours of the party system, test options for changing the electoral system or new technologies.

In 2020, it is possible that the transformation of the system will begin by 2024 - these include possible changes to the Constitution and the creation of trial institutions that would help ensure the transformation of power. New formats need to be tested - in Kazakhstan, for example, the transition of power has been prepared for several years.

We can also expect serious personnel changes in the security forces - for example, a change in the leadership of the Investigative Committee and the Prosecutor General's Office, the FSB and the Security Council is already overdue. At the same time, repressions against the security forces may continue, since this is one of the ways of seemingly conflict-free, but radical replacement of the leadership of these services. A change of leadership is also possible in state-owned companies that previously avoided it.

Finally, local crises are possible and even inevitable. For example, a change in the governor of the Irkutsk region, where elections were previously competitive, could lead to a difficult election campaign in the fall. And in other regions, due to elections, conflicts in regional elites and protests, situations may arise that will become serious challenges for the system as a whole.”

Gleb Kuznetsov, head of the expert council of the Expert Institute of Social Research

/ facebook.com/gleb.kuznetzov

“The US presidential elections are important [for Russia] because they will determine whether the sanctions policy will be absurdly inconsistent and focused on external effects (like, in fact, the entire foreign policy of President Donald Trump) or whether a Democrat will come to the White House who will give the anti-Russian consensus in the US political elites is systemic and consistent. In this sense, the continuation of Trump's rule is in the interests of not only Russia, but also the whole world. His political style, throwing around, focusing on showing off and demonstrating “deals” on all issues to his voters is the best possible contribution to the building of a multipolar world.

How the Kremlin fought the new political reality

Politics / Power

In Russia, leading political parties, new party projects and the entire electoral system will be preparing for the State Duma elections in 2021. In 2020, disputes, rumors and expectations regarding changes in electoral legislation will be put to rest. New party projects will announce themselves, and the “old” parties will decide on their strategy and ideology for 2021.

I also expect that in the process of preparing for the 2021 elections there will be a final victory of domestic issues over international ones. Over the past couple of years, there has been a steady decline in the population’s interest in the “international panorama,” but the media and politicians continue to actively use the foreign policy agenda. I think that in 2020, precisely in the context of preparations for the parliamentary elections, this situation will change and the domestic agenda will have a total advantage.”

Alexander Kynev, political scientist

/ Andrey Gordeev / Vedomosti

“The list of regions where elections are expected next year is quite colorful. The most interesting gubernatorial elections will be in the Irkutsk and Arkhangelsk regions, a rather interesting list of legislative assemblies and municipalities. I think that in 2020 there will be election campaigns that will be unsuccessful for the authorities.

In the coming year, the attempt to put pressure on the systemic opposition will continue. The split between the old party nomenclature and young ambitious leaders at the regional level, who in the course of party bargaining are increasingly becoming victims and getting nothing, will intensify. For example, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in 2019 was characterized by collaboration, while at the regional level the party has more and more young bright politicians who are moving into the real opposition. Meanwhile, after several years of cooperation, the authorities began, in fact, a struggle for the electoral destruction of the communists - this included the dismissal of [the governor of the Irkutsk region Sergei] Levchenko, and the war against [the head of Khakassia Valentin] Konovalov, and the attack on the Communist Party of the Russian Federation deputies in the Moscow City Duma. I think that this pressure will contribute to radicalization within the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and strengthening contradictions between the collaborationist elite, on the one hand, and the more radical lower party ranks and middle-level leaders, on the other. The internal crisis in the systemic opposition will grow, and this primarily concerns the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

Next year there will be presidential elections in the United States. Inside Russia, [major] international events are perceived as something to look up to. Thus, the story of the election of [Ukrainian President Vladimir] Zelensky and the victory of his Servant of the People party in the parliamentary elections worked in unison with the Moscow protests. I think the same effect could happen in the event of Donald Trump’s defeat in the United States - it will be perceived as a signal that Russia’s position in foreign policy is weakening and it is necessary to behave more carefully and delicately.”

Dmitry Badovsky, head of the Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research Foundation

/ Maxim Stulov / Vedomosti

“2020 will be a very ideologically rich year in Russian politics. The 75th anniversary of the Victory and the fight against falsification of history will become the basis for the government’s course towards the patriotic consolidation of society. It will also be important for the Kremlin to ensure maximum representation of world leaders at the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Victory on May 9 in Moscow.

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Economics / World Economy

At the same time, the authorities will continue the policy of promoting national projects and massive social support for the least affluent social groups. Combined with patriotic consolidation, this should help ensure a more or less significant “restorative growth” in the government’s ratings, which is a necessary condition for ensuring good results in the 2021 State Duma elections.

The development of the foreign policy background will also remain of great importance for Russian politics. The outcome of the US presidential elections in November 2020 and the prospects for the development of Russian-American, and therefore international relations in general until 2024, will largely determine the “framework parameters” that are important for the Russian authorities in balancing the influence of elite groups and preparing for a period called transit of power."

Konstantin Kostin, head of the Civil Society Development Foundation

/ JSC "TV Center"

“The outgoing year ends with good election results for the authorities and fairly stable indicators of the social well-being of citizens. The political system is approaching balance, which provides a large number of opportunities and resources. At the end of 2018, everyone was talking about protest moods, deteriorating social well-being, there were second rounds in the [gubernatorial] elections - and all this put the public administration system into a state of stress. Now, thanks to the fact that in 2019 the main points of the political calendar have been passed calmly, we can talk about a change in the context of what is happening.

In 2020, all political actors will begin preparations for the parliamentary elections of 2021. All political forces will begin to select and test new election strategies, technologies and practices, communication models, and look for new people, because the single voting day 2020 is the main rehearsal before the elections to the State Duma. Most likely, Alexei Navalny will try to launch “smart voting” in Novosibirsk, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party will begin their “old songs about the main thing” - from a referendum and early elections to a vote of no confidence [in the government] and collecting signatures for anything. And this will give 2020 informational and political richness.

We saw the second expected trend in the elections in capitals and megalopolises – a change in the configuration of media consumption. For a significant portion of the audience aged 18 to 30, television is ceasing to be the main source of information. Alternative and accessible platforms for the opposition on social media are becoming more important, and for a significant part of the audience, “collective Dud” is no less important than for another – television shows.

The third trend is also associated with the increasing role of social services. In political communication, collective emotion will be replaced by the total expression of individual emotional reactions, although previously it was believed that collective emotion could be transmitted to society through opinion leaders. Thus, collective emotions, especially political ones, will give way to personal emotions. In the minds of the population, emotional reactions to personal success and personal well-being will come first, and collective emotion will be replaced by the total expression of individual emotional responses. And, summed up, these emotions will influence what happens in politics as a whole. There will no longer be a single common theme that will influence the political preferences of 75% of active voters, and there will no longer be a single type of media through which to reach them.”

Andrei Kolesnikov, director of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions program at the Carnegie Moscow Center

/ ONF

“The main trend of 2019 is a sharp increase in the restrictiveness of legislative activity and repressive behavior of the authorities, largely provoked by an increase in conflict in the relationship between the state and civil society. This de facto already ongoing “civil war” between the state and society will continue and, perhaps, worsen next year, especially since preparations for the 2021 parliamentary elections begin. An even greater narrowing of constitutional freedoms and the emergence of new anti-legal laws in the spirit of “sovereign Runet" or "foreign agents - individuals" aimed at selective use against "enemies of the state." The tendency to fight against everything foreign will continue and worsen to the point of insanity. Protests are possible for unexpected reasons and from a side unexpected by the authorities - those social groups that are considered the core of Putin’s support. And excesses like the story with the “Lubyanka shooter”.

Little will change in foreign policy: Russia will sluggishly debunk in the style of the Stalinist press of the late 1940s; most likely, [French President Emmanuel] Macron’s new policy towards Putin’s Russia will fail. The mobilizing potential of foreign policy and militaristic themes will decrease even more.

And this, in turn, will aggravate another trend - towards even greater concentration of citizens on their everyday economic and social problems. The model of building a personal life trajectory according to the principle “the main thing is that it doesn’t get worse” will remain dominant, and it is unlikely that the deepening deep discontent will break through into socio-economic protests, although conflicts are possible on this basis. Since the Kremlin and the security forces that have joined it (or vice versa: the security forces and the Kremlin that have joined them) are not going to change the mechanism of even greater state intervention in the economy, their policy, based on national projects and milking business, will not become more effective, and the investment climate formed by the FSB , the Investigative Committee, the prosecutor's office, the courts, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Guard, will not improve. The growth of real incomes will be fictitious with a decreasing share of income from business, and if economic growth occurs, its only short-term driver will be government investment in the construction of another bridge, which will only worsen corruption and will not create the prerequisites for healthy development based on market competition.”

Evgeny Minchenko, President of the Minchenko Consulting holding

/ Maxim Stulov / Vedomosti

“Among the trends of 2020, I would highlight the repositioning of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party. The old pact with the Kremlin has ceased to operate, and now their task is either to find a “new balance” or to try to conquer a new niche for themselves through radicalization. At the same time, the establishment of both parties is inclined to the negotiating scenario, and the base wants radicalization. The situation is aggravated by the “leadership challenge”: in both parties there are contenders for the role of the new leader, but the question is the readiness of Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky to give up their seats.

Another expected trend is the design of the party space by the Kremlin. The main potential areas of such design are the reform of United Russia (or the creation of its bloc with the ONF, Rodina or a new project), the “party of angry citizens” (“Civic Platform” by Mikhail Prokhorov in version 2.0) and the “new left” ( a new project based on “A Just Russia” or on another platform). A separate area of attention is spoiler projects.

In addition, in 2020 there will be an intensification of the struggle within “Politburo 2.0” for the redistribution of markets and personnel pools. There are two scenarios here: fragmentation of the elite space or the formation of large coalitions.”

Mikhail Vinogradov, President of the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation

/ facebook.com/mikhail.vinogradov1

“2020 is interesting because no irrevocable events are planned for it - except perhaps the American elections. But being faced with a blank canvas is not a dream for a politician, but rather a bad dream. Events seem to be planned, but any of them - from friendship with China to national projects - can be erased so that no one will notice, much less regret, as was previously the case with the Syrian campaign or Eurasian integration.

The most obvious of the new challenges is whether to move from the 2013 remake to the 2014 remake, that is, from elements of tightening the screws to an unequivocal demonstration that the political regime is ready to take any radical action to show that it is here to stay. Repressive trend 2012–2013 was logical as an “anti-swamp” revenge, but did not give any special image effects. For this, Crimea was needed, along with the Donetsk attached to it and other import substitution of everything that came to hand. The question of whether the results were worth the costs has remained closed to debate all these years. But the variety of options for answering it can return to the agenda if the “we can repeat it” discourse arises. Moreover, past attempts to remake Crimea - such as the war in Syria - did not provoke any particular growth in national self-awareness and the demand in society for the return of power to internal issues was not canceled: on the contrary, today it is more powerful than the voices of “mozhemrepetiteli”.

There are alternatives to such a scenario, but for this we must admit to ourselves that on the eve of 2021, 2024 and other epoch-making years, the key tactical task is not to increase the rating of the government, but to prevent an increase in its anti-rating. And this requires deradicalization of the agenda and leaving everyone alone - from Facebook and Booking users to doctors and scientists, who are repressed and imprisoned no less than oppositionists.

Topic number two in 2020 is the American elections. The point is not in the results of Trump’s policies (by the way, they were quite successful and turned out to be better than his reputation), but in whether the fight against him will cause a wave of chaos or, conversely, consolidation of the American establishment. The result of this campaign for Russia should not be exaggerated. But given the blurring of Moscow’s goals in relations with Washington, there is an obvious task - the desire to maximize Russia’s presence in the American agenda with all that it entails.”

Abbas Gallyamov, political scientist

/ facebook.com/abbas.gallyamov

“The main trend will be the continued growth of protest sentiments, which will actively spread from Moscow to the outback. In fact, Levada Center surveys regarding Russians’ attitude towards the protests showed that this process is already unfolding – residents of the province sympathize with the protesters more than with the authorities. It is now obvious that the Kremlin’s talk that, they say, only Moscow opposes the authorities, while the outback remains loyal, has no basis. The hinterland, of course, is still passive, but it is no longer loyal.

The main question here is whether these sentiments will reach the level of intensity that ensures protest voting - as it was in Moscow [in the elections to the City Duma], where the authorities lost almost half of the constituencies, despite not really registering a single one a strong opposition candidate. After this, it became clear that the main tool with which the regime had always ensured its victory—control over the mechanisms of access to elections—no longer guaranteed its success. This expression of protest sentiments on the political plane will become trend number two.

The third trend is related to the actions of the authorities. Judging by Putin's recent statement that he does not rule out revising the Constitution in favor of expanding the powers of parliament and revising the model of its relations with the government, the Kremlin is considering a transition to a parliamentary republic as one of the options for solving the 2024 problem. It would allow Putin to remain the formal head of state, but to step away from the operational management of the country, transferring this function to the successor prime minister. Perhaps next year the authorities will begin to take concrete steps in this direction.”