The myth of the "Soviet man": who does he work for?

The results of the all -Russian elections each time provoke a wave of poisonous comments about the inferior people with a slave mentality. Surely this will happen with an impending plebiscite on amendments to the Constitution: on July 2, we will find that the absolute majority supports the zeroing of Putin’s presidential terms, which means that many will conclude, there are no place for free people here. This old and well -known theory gives the most common explanation of the depressing pain and disorder of public life in Russia. It meets to us when we hear about the "archaic mentality" or "cultural-institutional matrix." Often it is expressed in the form of an outright insult: the population of the country - it is said in such cases - consists in its mass of morally flawed people who deserve their fate. The term “population” itself should cause associations with cattle or bureaucratic unit, opposite to the “citizen”.

But is the people in Russia really not matured for self -government and forever doomed to an authoritarian regime? Or is it ordinary social racism - and while he was so widespread? And finally, what can we offer in return?

Upon closer examination, it turns out that we are in front of us is the work of an ideological myth, which is designed from three elements: the reactionary rod in the worldview of the elites, the organic demophobia of the late -Soviet intelligentsia and the mass spontaneous disappointment in politics and its own capabilities. Take a look at them in order.

The reactionary ideology of elites

In February 2012, the column of Andrei Konchalovsky “Untitled Russian History” was published in the Rossiyskaya Gazeta. In it, the author notes that "the catastrophic majority of the country's population does not want and does not understand the need for his participation in urgent reforms." Konchalovsky’s logic looks as follows.

For centuries, Russian civilization has developed as a barbaric society - as opposed to civilized in Europe. Barbarian society is distinguished in that people in it avoid productive classes and seek to use the fruits of someone else's labor, while in the society of civilized people live their honest and free labor. In Russia, on the contrary, the “communal consciousness”, which refers to the peasantry, prevents the development of individualism: “The individual was suppressed ruthlessly - hence the irresponsibility and the desire for“ parasitism ”.”

All modernization projects of the Russian rulers failed because Konchalovsky writes that the speed of the appearance of a layer of productive individuals is too small. Despite the industrialization and urbanization of gigantic proportions that took place in the 20th century, in Russia there remains “the same public consciousness that we inherited from Russia, the same slave consciousness that has never received private property and political independence from the sovereign suzerer- the Khan-Kan ”.

But the pathos of the text of Konchalovsky is not at all in its analytical part. Konchalovsky writes his column in the midst of “swamp” protests and at the very beginning announces his task: to show that the hopes of the democratic public for the awakening of the country's civil consciousness are in vain. All sad discussions about the “Russian civilization” should serve as evidence of its main thesis: protest performances are premature, the emerging middle class needs to gain historical patience, and a hasty attempt to jump above the head and remake the barbaric mass to the tragic consequences.

This is the role of the myth of the dangerous “deep people” in the ideology of elites: we must be content with the status quo , abandon collective claims for changes for the better and engage in individual self-development in anticipation of the natural ripening of the middle class in Russia. Such ideologies are called “reactionary” because they help to substantiate resistance to changes that threaten privileged groups. Fear of access to the political scene of the dark masses is the main excuse of authoritarian rule.

The figure of an immature people works in the worldview of elites, including as a way of self -justification: if I know for sure that a high position was not for outstanding competencies, I can easily believe that my privileges are justified by an obviously terrible alternative to me. Inexperienced officials can sometimes blame about their demophobia, as was the case with the press secretary of the Irkutsk governor Irina Aleshkevich, who called the inhabitants of the Tulun “Beach” and “cattle from the barn”. The same position is sometimes breaking through among representatives of large business - for example, in the words of Roman Abramovich “The people are cattle” , who sounded in the London court against Berezovsky. The main formula of all presidential elections "Who, if not Putin?" It is based exactly on prejudice that there are no more people in the country who could be entrusted with the rule.

Konchalovsky himself, of course, refers to a privileged layer, he has something to lose. Surely he also sincerely believes in the theory of the barbaric mentality of the Russian people as the hero of Tabakov in the “Unfinished play for a mechanical piano”, which with foam at the mouth proved that the “plague” could never play on a classic tool.

"Soviet man" as the pain of perestroika intelligentsia

In 2016, the viral post of director Kirill Serebrennikov was held on social networks about the crash of the Titanic, which stated that “among the rabble, who was traveling in the third grade, some men, that is, the most powerful. They, pushing women and children, occupied saving boats. Cameron in the film “Titanic” is on the contrary ... If Cameron shot, as it was in reality, the viewer would simply not have believed him - this formula was too attended in his brains: “The poor are poor and kind, and the rich are evil, greedy predators”. ”

Serebrennikov himself later deleted his post, but he was very popular with the intelligentsia - from journalists and writers to the capital's bohemia. They saw in it an allusion to Russian society, in which the power intercepted the boor of the “rabble” , thereby violating social harmony and led the country to its troubles. The irony is that the post turned out to be a literal quote from A. Nikonov’s book “How a woman differs from a person” with an equally chauvinistic subtitle “The woman lost again: a comparative analysis of the mental abilities of the female and chair”.

In fact, a social drama, built at the highest level of pre -war European inequality, broke out at the Titanic. The very structure of relations between people on the ship suggested that the gap between the first and third classes is not only in conditions of sleep and leisure. The first -class passengers were obviously more opportunities for salvation, because the boats were closer to their cabins. In addition, they had something to bribe team members . So why did many commentators applying for moral and intellectual superiority come up with manipulation?

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a whole narrative arises, aimed at criticizing the mass consciousness of the Soviet man. It is based on two statements: firstly , any progressive reforms in Russia are faced with the resistance of the predominant human type, and secondly , this type inherits the Soviet era as a whole and the Bolshevik coup in particular.

A vivid example of such journalism is an article by Alexander Obolonsky “Conservative Syndrome in the Soviet Mass consciousness” , published in 1991. Obolonsky writes about the “national-state of inferiority”, “slavo-Holoi-bureaucratic morality” and “a country of inverted values”: “There was a system standing on the whole of ugly, distorted forms of social relations, a kind of“ kingdom of crooked mirrors ”, where everything is determined by imitations, fakes for normal public institutions.” Some provisions of the text of Obolonsky are almost literally preserved in the language of the modern liberal public.

The failures of Russian reforms in the 90s only strengthened the demand for Demophobic discourse among the intelligentsia, which had high hopes for these reforms. The theory of modernization said that, in addition to the radical transition to the market and the import of constitutional liberalism, there is no other development path. But it quickly became clear that the predictable modernization does not occur and, on the contrary, somehow it is necessary to explain the sharp increase in inequality, impoverishing wide social layers, the export of capital abroad and the political behavior of the elites. The idea of ​​the natural and historical flaws of the Russian people, who supposedly not ready for freedom and democracy and requires a strong hand, was the best suited for this.

The most popular images were given here by Mikhail Bulgakov’s “Dog heart”, which became an accessible mass Soviet reader only in 1987. Sharikov became a household name for the type of people, who, according to Obolonsky, crushed a pre -Soviet moral social order. The intelligentsia itself associates itself, of course, with Professor Preobrazhensky - a victim of this process.

A culturalist from Yale University, Rosen Dzhagalov writes about this in the article “Antipopolism of the post-socialist intelligentsia” : “In a brilliant study dedicated to the reception of this story and its film recordings <...> in the circles of the late Soviet intelligentsia, Michel Rivkin-Fish explains the popularity of this text by the fact that representatives of the intelligentsia perceived it as an excuse for the growing social Inequalities of the late 1980s -early 1990s . Professor Preobrazhensky’s attempt to turn the dog into a person was considered <...> as a parable about the futility of the Soviet, and the traditional-intelligence, the project to “enlighten” social lower classes. Ham is a boor, and you can’t change this with any efforts. ” After 30 years, this Demophobic image works the same way.

The text of Obolonsky shows that he relies exclusively on his everyday observations. The new discourse was acutely not enough science. The empirical base for the theory of "Soviet man" was provided by the study of the group of Yuri Levada. In 1988, they began work in the newly educated VTsIA, and in 1993 the first monograph “Soviet Simple Man” was released.

Based on the material of public opinion polls, the Levadovites tried to show that the country is dominated by a socio-anthropological type, the main features of which are international self-isolation, state paternalism, equalizing and anti-elite attitudes, imperial syndrome and an associated complex of inferiority. All these characteristics sound contemptuously-they say so when they want to offend someone. Although the Levadovites constantly emphasize that "this is not an assessment, but an analytical category of understanding of society and personality, nothing more." But let's look at the study itself.

The Levadovites proceeded from the fact that this special type of “Soviet people” developed in the 1930s and 1950s and was the successor to the “revolutionary man” of the 1914-1920s . Since the revolution was made by “desperate, free from cultural and moral restrictions of adventurers”, and “Soviet man” is their heir, it should be suspected of reduced morality. It is difficult to expect that research with such a model will demonstrate something besides what the authors themselves wanted to find.

The same happens with questionnaires, and with the interpretation of answers. For example, as evidence of the paternalism of the Soviet man, the Levadovites cite the following results: 4% believe that “our state gave us everything, no one has the right to demand something else from it”, 11% agree with the statement “the state gives us more, but we can demand more”, 8% claim that “the state gives us so little,” we are not obliged to him, ”as many as 33% believe that 33% believe that 33% believe that 33% believe that 33% believe that 33% believe “Our state is now in such a position that we must help him, even going to sacrifice,” and, finally, only 32% agree that “we must become free people and force the state to serve our interests.”

According to the authors, the first four options “clearly denote paternalist positions”, which is evidenced by the word “demand”. And only the word "force" characterizes a real citizen.

At some point, the Levadians simply cease to pretend that they are engaged in a sociological study, and proceed to direct dehumanization of Russians: “<...> we are dealing with a double set of reasons for the moral failure of Russian society: the first-with the effect of decomposition of morality (corruption) under the influence of repressive structures of the totalitarian and then authoritarian and corrupt state and, firstly , The underdevelopment, non -ceremony of the lower and provincial layers and zones of the population, the “percelete” of the population, the preservation of dilapidated ethical traditionalism, the lack of universalist representations. ”

In the social sciences, such ideas fall under the category of Social Darwinism and have not been taken seriously in the academic world for more than 100 years. All claims to the theoretical and methodological viability of the Levadovites are well known in the Russian scientific community, but they are more likely to be expressed in very moderate criticism: “<...> the method to which the authors are merit“ hard ”empirical base, it is precisely as poor, since it is only eaten by a source of public opinion polls, the scarcity of which is compensated (impressive, but not derived from the used from the used. method) the wealth of imagination and life experience of interpreters. Own life experience becomes a source of “typical” examples, the illustration and confirmation of which is perceived by quantitative data. ”

Thus, the Levadovsky Homo Soveticus was originally ideolog, picked up as a crutch for the failed theory of modernization and absorbing the demophobia of the late Soviet intelligentsia. The Levadovites themselves sometimes quite frankly describe their motives: “<...> After the first years of the reforms in Russia, conservative or restoration trends were increasingly and stronger ... one of the most important circumstances that block the possibilities of changes, transformations of the system of social, political or economic relations, the type of person himself was the rather weak potential of reforms, and confronts those groups or public forces that are of those groups or public forces, which Declaring their commitment to liberal and more humane forms of society. ”

Does this mean that the whole study of the Levadovites - falsification and its conclusions should be read exactly the opposite: “Soviet man” was responsible, moral and enterprising? Of course not. The point is that the very setting of the task, namely, the identification of the cultural and anthropological type, which, if necessary, turns out to be degenerative, is false. She talks more about the authors than about society.

But, if we seriously want to understand something about the worldview and life strategies of people from the last Soviet generation, we should turn, for example, to the work of Alexei Yurchak, "It was forever until it ended." Yurchak shows among other things that behind the facade of the imaginary manipulated collectivism in the late Soviet Union, total disbelief in any collective practices was hidden. It is the division that will become the most important characteristic of society in the new Russia.

Atomization instead of collectivism

This is not to say that the political skepticism of Konchalovsky and the Levadovites is completely deprived of the grounds. We really live in a rather depressed and passive society with a dramatic past. At the same time, modern social studies show something opposite to what supporters of the theory of “backward people” seek to convince us of. Perhaps the most insightful calculations and generalizations are offered by the sociologist and professor Shanka Grigory Yudin.

In his lecture on the myth of Russian paternalism, Yudin shows that contrary to the widespread opinion, Russia today is one of the most individualistic countries in the European part of the world. He cites European Social Survey , according to which 26%of Russians are committed to a strong individualistic orientation, while in Germany this figure is 14%, in Poland - 13%, and in the Netherlands only 7%. In general, 54% of people are oriented to individualism in Russia compared to 45% in Spain, 34% in Sweden and 26% in Germany.

To explain these unexpected indicators, Yudin proposes to look at the characteristics of society: the decline in civil participation, disbelief in collective actions, low interpersonal trust and high economic inequality. You do not need to be a specialist to see how poorly developed institutions of collective life in Russia. In politics, this is expressed in an extremely low appearance in the elections and in the marginal position of local self -government. In the labor sector, the same applies to the role of professional associations and trade unions. По данным European Social Survey 2018 года, лишь 6% людей в России принимали участие в общественных организациях. Для сравнения: во Франции это 15%, в Германии — 31%, в Финляндии — 39%. Низкое коллективное участие сопровождается низким доверием к людям вообще (так называемое «обобщенное доверие»). В России лишь 32% людей ожидают от других честности; во Франции — 46%, в Германии — 50%, один из лучших показателей — в Финляндии: 71%.

Вместо классической дихотомии «индивидуализм/коллективизм» Юдин в качестве главной характеристики современного российского общества предлагает понятие атомизации. «Наша проблема, — говорит Юдин в интервью «Новой газете» , — в том, что в России господствует агрессивный индивидуализм, который подпитывается страхом и превращается в жесткую конкуренцию, тотальное взаимное недоверие и вражду… Мы часто принимаем за коллективизм зависть, неумение поддержать инициативу и развитие другого человека, понять их ценность для себя. Но это как раз проблема отсутствия общей коллективной базы — почему я должен радоваться твоим успехам, если каждый сам за себя? Точно так же уважение к правам других индивидов появляется, только если есть коллективная деятельность по защите общих прав».

Атомизацией прекрасно научились пользоваться элиты. Пропаганда в духе «осажденной крепости», которая, на первый взгляд, играет на коллективистских чувствах и призыве к сплочению, заключается как раз в том, что сплотиться нужно с элитами , а любое низовое объединение, самоорганизация только угрожают стабильности. В конечном счете пропаганда подогревает наши страхи друг перед другом, преподносит атомизацию как неизбежность и предлагает защиту в лице действующих элит, которые не идеальны, но, по крайней мере, огородят вас от соседа.

«Господствующая идеология есть идеология господствующего класса»

Невозможно спорить с тем, что Россия на сегодня — крайне деполитизированная страна. Подавляющее большинство людей демонстрирует политическую пассивность и беспомощность. Вопрос лишь в том, в чем причина такого состояния и как из него можно выйти.

В ходе протестов 2011–2012 годов особую популярность приобрела идея о двух Россиях — «России айфона и России шансона». Как пишет политолог Илья Матвеев в своем исследовании этого явления , это «примитивная идеологическая схема, разделяющая российское общество на активное, просвещенное, вестернизированное прозападное меньшинство и — пассивное, конформистское, лояльное власти большинство». Самое удивительное, что идея двух Россий была хорошо воспринята не только элитами, от которых она исходит, но и активистами протестных движений. Последние увидели в ней объяснение тому, почему отсутствовала массовая поддержка в борьбе за честные выборы и сменяемость власти, которая казалась им проявлением здравого смысла, присущим любому «нормальному» человеку. «Россия шансона» представлялась им реакционной массой, которая не может понять необходимость перемен в силу своей врожденной ограниченности.

На самом деле в такой социальной стигматизации со стороны протестного движения нет ничего загадочного — она вызвана первичным травмирующим опытом активизма в деполитизированном и атомизированном обществе. Любой, кто участвует в общественных кампаниях и пытается найти поддержку среди соседей и просто незнакомых людей в городе, в 90% случаев сталкивается с леденящим равнодушием и скепсисом. Активист всегда уверен, что проблема, которой он занимается, достаточно важна и очевидна. Но не включенные в борьбу «обыватели» часто не готовы проявить солидарность и иногда даже относятся к активистам пренебрежительно.

Из этого положения предлагаются два диаметрально противоположных выхода — демократический и элитистский. Один предполагает, что большинство в России никогда не сможет разделить с прогрессивным, образованным и морально квалифицированным меньшинством его благие ценности и намерения, поэтому лучшее, на что мы можем рассчитывать, — это передача социальных и политических институтов в руки этого меньшинства без претензий на массовую поддержку и демократию. Эту элитистскую точку зрения отстаивает , например, Юлия Латынина, которая прямо заявляет: «Мысль, что избирательное право — это неотъемлемое право любого человека, — коммунистическая пропаганда и огромная ложь. What on earth? "

Легко догадаться, что такой подход только способствует политической демобилизации в обществе и сдает это общество на поруки тем, кто, прежде всего, заинтересован в демофобной идеологии, — правящим элитам. На этом был построен, в частности, трюк с Игорем Холманских, который в мае 2012 года выступал от имени рабочих Уралвагонзавода в поддержку Путина: оппозиция тогда приняла все за чистую монету и объявила «уральских мужиков» своими врагами вместо того, чтобы развернуть их протест по назначению.

Другой, демократический, подход основывается на том, что массовая пассивность и отторжение от солидарных коллективных действий есть следствие порочных социально-экономических отношений, а не природы некоего (демонизированного) антропологического типа. В этой версии массовая деполитизация поддается расколдовыванию, но не путем нравоучений или навязывания своего интеллектуального и морального превосходства, а путем включения и организации совместных действий. Это подразумевает устранение стены между продвинутым, как ему кажется, активистом и «обывателем». Огромный опыт работы в этом направлении описан в монографии «От обывателей к активистам. Зарождающиеся социальные движения в современной России» Карин Клеман, Ольги Мирясовой и Андрея Демидова.

Вопреки мифу о «советском человеке» практически во всех странах мира абсолютное большинство людей политически пассивно, Россия здесь не исключение. Да, по данным European Social Survey , в России только 23% людей выражают готовность активно участвовать в коллективных политических действиях, но во Франции это всего лишь 31%, в Германии — 40%; наилучший в Европе показатель — в Норвегии: 57%. С одной стороны, это следствие структуры занятости, которая предполагает, что большую часть времени люди проводят на работе. С другой, это рациональный выбор, потому что даже либеральные политические системы постоянно демонстрируют непроницаемость правительств для влияния простых людей, из-за которой западные страны столкнулись с падением явки на выборах.

К этому в России добавляется авторитарная специфика политического режима. Странно ожидать, что люди будут с удовольствием выходить на митинги и подписывать петиции в условиях демонстративных политических репрессий. Кроме того, традиции демократического движения, опыта, который передавался бы всем, кто созревает до активных действий, у нас почти полностью отсутствуют. Помножим социальное отчуждение и атомизацию на глубокое экономическое неравенство. Этого достаточно, чтобы понять, что для объяснения массовой политической апатии не обязательно стигматизировать людей. Напротив, необходимо отбросить теорию «неполноценного народа» и увидеть за ней инструмент подавления демократии.

Автор — депутат Совета депутатов муниципального округа Зюзино в Москве.