
Khodorkovsky’s landing laid the foundation for a completely new system of relations between the state and oligarchs. Before that, the system in Russia was now in Ukraine. The oligarchs were independent of the state, could dictate the conditions for him, and this independence (which they certainly abused) simultaneously performed the most important function of separation of powers and a partial guarantee of democracy.
After the landing of Khodorkovsky in Russia, a new social system began. The business has ceased to be independent of the state. From now on, it was possible to plant anyone. The major had the right to eat a business of such and such a size, the general-such and such, and the head of one oil company-all. Previously, businessmen ate each other with the help of a general, now the general was eaten by everyone.
In the same way, an attempt to kill Navalny is the beginning of a new era. This is a signal that political killings and violence are acceptable at any level.

You don’t even have to bother with a criminal case, as in the case of a “network” ( prohibited in the Russian Federation. - Ed. ) Or “new greatness”. There is a person - there is a problem. There is no person - there is no problem. And there is no criminal case. And if there is, then for the submission and one by which the victim’s like -minded people will search.
Immediately after Navalny’s poisoning, two things happened. In Tatarstan, they attacked the ally of Navalny Georgy Alburov, and Yegor Zhukov was beaten in Moscow.
Everything is clear about Alburov, and Zhukov’s beating logically fits into two statistical rows.
One is a “Moscow business” and the defeat of HSE.
At first, Zhukova wanted to put a batch of security forces. They planted him in the framework of Moscow - a grandiose business that would make security officials what the Belarusian riot police turned into now - the only force by which Putin could rule. Zhukov could not be planted, because what was sewn to him was a fake. Lies. And the other Kremlin tower managed to convey this to the president and ruin a single Moscow business for a bunch of fragments not in order to save Zhukov, but to save themselves.
Then the Kremlin defeated the tower - he did not like that the professors there at the corresponding faculty did not support pseudo -constitutional reform. Then Zhukov tried to beat, the first time unsuccessfully, excluded the towers from the magistracy, beaten.

This is one statistical series. The security forces remembered, did not forget, got it.
Another statistical series is the high -profile statements of the Kremlin cook "Prigozhin after the poisoning of Navalny. Prigozhin publicly bought an 88-millionth fine in front of the Moscow School, awarded to Navalny, Sobol and FBK. He said immediately after the poisoning that he intends to “undress and tear out” Navalny, on the Sobol card a debt of 34 million rubles hung (which are not there).

Navalny is Putin’s nomenclature, and the decision on his fate can hardly be made without Putin’s knowledge.
Apparently, they poisoned him with a difficult poison, it may very well be that a relative of the “newcomer”, according to the same scheme as Litvinenko and Skripal.
The circumstances of the poisoning are the removal of the Chekist “outdoor” from Navalny in Tomsk, so that even the outdoor does not see who poisoned, the call to the Omsk airport about mining in the hope of preventing the plane with the patient, the fantasy of the Omsk head physicians and categorical refusal to institute criminal proceedings-there is no doubt that it was a state operation, and not some kind of private structure there, even if there was a private structure. received the monarch blessing to political violence against the enemies of Putin.
With this in mind, Prigozhin's behavior looks like an attempt to become a lightning rod.
Here, they say, gentlemen, you have a whole set of versions: Navalny ate pills, Navalny poisoned the insidious West or “Corruptionor is the hero of his investigations”, but the most brave can be discussed by Prigozhin. “Well, look, everything is not so scary, they wanted to scare Navalny, but they didn’t calculate the dose.”
Zhukov’s beating fits perfectly into this statistical series. Two benefits at once: let Zhukov, not Navalny, and Prigozhin, not Putin, are discussing. (Yes, even at Prigozhin, they say, some difficulties with Beglov, an extra reason to behave loudly. The main enemy of Navalny is inviolable.)
Indeed, after Zhukov’s beating, the authorities tried to immediately adapt him to PR. Even a criminal case was started! Even the HRC called on the Ministry of Internal Affairs to take the case of special control! (Something about Navalny HRC was silent.) But there is even Peskov-the same Peskov that did not find the need for a criminal case before it would be known how poison they poisoned Navalny, even Peskov said that the Kremlin hoped that "the perpetrators will be punished by law." Hooray! And this is despite the fact that we do not know, on the scooter what brand those who beat Zhukov left, and we do not know what color they had shirts! How to institute criminal proceedings without this?
In fact, it is very easy to stop political violence in Russia. To do this, it is enough to find and plant those who do it.
Therefore, I predict that, despite the noise, they will not find anyone and will not even look.
As they did not find and did not look for a man who, on August 15, 2017, hit the face of Ivan Skripnichenko, a volunteer of the Nemtsov memorial. Skripnichenko became bad, a week later he died.
As they did not put those who organized the beating of Oleg Kashin, although the performers were accidentally found themselves and gave detailed testimony about the customer.
As they did not find those who beat activists in St. Petersburg.
As they did not open a criminal case on the murder of the Pskov blogger Sergei Tikhonov, even after the investigation of Denis Korotkov in “New” found out that he died not from a heart attack, but as a result of an injection of a certain Oleg Simonov, who then worked with Viktor Amelchenko, an employee of Prigozhin's structures.
As they did not find the one who pricked the husband of Lyubov Sobol, who, according to Amelchenko, pricked the same Simonov with a syringe (subsequently mysteriously dead).
As they did not find those who doused your submissive servant shit, burned my car, who poked our house (as many as two families, eight people, including four old people and two children), some not completely safe rubbish.
(By the way, they doused me with shit left on a scooter. The Zhukov who beat me on electric scooters. Similar tactics, a perfect departure plan can leave along the sidewalks, and the dog will not take a trace.)
But moreover.
Before the poisoning of Navalny in all these cases, the Kremlin could more or less sincerely pretend that it had nothing to do with it. This, they say, is all a private initiative, “miners and tractor drivers”, as in the Donbass. And this was even true, although it is clear that in a country where there was no independent large business, there can be no more independent large system of private violence, new, from a needle proposed by the boss, without the consent of this boss.
The boss endured this system in order to be able, on the one hand, at any moment to put it in, and on the other, to be able to say: "This is not us." The fact that this system of private violence also worked for its owner, and not just on the boss, was recognized as a reasonable fee for the possibility of denial.
However, after the poisoning of Navalny, the situation changed.
As after the landing of Khodorkovsky, the Kremlin was given a signal. A new era has come. The era of open political reprisals.
As the rating of power falls (and the visual future in the form of Belarus), the number of opponents of the regime who will be killed, beaten or poisoned, will only grow.
And the fact that the Kremlin at the same time also gave private political violence at the mercy and never asks for it, can lead to a situation where absolutely any person for some particular reasons may become a victim of this violence.
More recently, we had a system when - after Khodorkovsky - any business could be taken away. Soon, as in the Donbass, we will have a system when absolutely anyone can become a victim of violence, as in 1937, absolutely anyone could become a victim of denunciation.
Will this preserve the authorities? Yes.