Bender and Nobel

That scientists from Stanford could tell the "great combinator"

Readers of the novel “Twelve Chairs” remember that the “half -crust of the work of the master Gambs” in which the diamonds Madame Petukhova were hidden, almost in the hands of Ostap Bender and Ippolit Vorobyaninov. "Concessenhips" could only win auction bargaining.

“A great commotion would have begun here,” thought Ostap, looking around the auction audience, “if they found out which cucumber would be sold under the guise of these chairs today.”

You can’t imagine what kind of “commotion”, the economists of Paul Milgrom and his teacher Robert Wilson, the holders of the “Swedish State Bank for Economic Sciences of Alfred Nobel” 2020 could say. Professors of Stanford University received the most prestigious Economics Prize for "new results in auctions theory and the creation of new auctions."

For forty years, as auction theory has been the central theme of the entire modern economic theory. Why so? Because by studying auctions, we study two models of concepts on which economic science stands. This, first of all, the model of demand and sentences is the first page of even a school textbook of economics. And in the second - the model of information and incentives - the behavior of economic entities depends on the private information that they own. Actually, the great combinator thought about this, “looking around the auction audience” - for all participants in the auction “ten chairs from the palace” were “ten used chairs”. But for the "concessionaires" Ostap and Kisa, they kept a tremendous state.

Hence the difference in the behavior of the auction participants.

“ - Ten walnut chairs. Eighty rubles.

The hall perked up. A thing needed on the farm was sold. Hands jumped out one after another. Ostap was calm.

- Why aren't you trading? - Vorobyaninov attacked him.

“He went out,” answered Ostap, gritting his teeth.

- One hundred twenty rubles behind. One hundred and thirty -five in the same place. One hundred forty.

Ostap calmly turned his back to the department and began to consider his competitors with a grin. "

Everything was done correctly Ostap, Nobel laureates tell us. The value of objects that are sold at auctions can be determined differently. It can be Common Value (total value) and Private Value (private value). In the first case, the object is valuable for all buyers, but they do not understand its value and try to find out, focusing on the actions of others. For all buyers of “chairs” their value was approximately clear (Common Value) and could not be some kind of prohibitive. In the case of such an auction, it is important that the participants know what bets others make - on the basis of this, they conclude about the real value of the object.

But for Ostap Bender chairs, they had a Private Value - a private value that was in no way related to their consumer qualities. This value was one and a half thousand rubles - this was an approximate assessment of the treasure, hidden the mother -in -law of the former leader of the nobility. But he could not pay such an amount - at his disposal there were only two hundred rubles. Therefore, he waited until one of the applicants would pay the amount that would seem too high for the public-exactly, as Robert Wilson would recommend.

“Just behind Ostap, the lady, having talked with her husband, was flattered on the chairs (wonderful semi -pricks! Wonder work! Sanya! From the palace!) And raised her hand.

- One hundred and forty -five in the fifth row on the right, since. The hall went out. Too expensive. "

Yes, this is the so -called “curse of the winner”: if you won the auction, this, paradoxically, may indicate that you “overestimated” the sale object.

But this is for someone who sees “common value” in the object. And if you know about “private value”, then you behave differently.

“... Before the black lacquered hammer hit the plywood department, Ostap turned, threw his hand up and said quietly:“ Two hundred! ”

The treasure was almost in the hands of the "concessionaires", but they were short of information about the rules of trading.

“ - Let me! - screamed by Hippolytus Matveevich. - Why a commission fee? We do not know anything about such a gathering! We must warn. I refuse to pay these thirty rubles!

According to the rules of auction bargaining, ”the auctionist said loudly,“ a person who refuses to pay the full amount for the subject he bought must leave the hall! ”

... This h-Deche knows what it is! - continued Vorobyaninov. - Tear off the workers at exorbitant prices. For some ten two two hundred and thirty rubles! ”

And what would happen if the participants of the bargain, as Ostap thought, would find out which “cucumber is sold under the guise of chairs”?

The answer to this question from a scientific point of view gave Paul Milgrus - he became the author of the “general theory of auctions”, which allows not only a common, but also a private value that can change from one participant to another. Having analyzed the trading strategies in a number of the most famous auctions, Milgrus showed - when the auction participants learn more about assessments of the total value of the traded object, from the point of view of their competitors, this gives the seller a higher expected income.

That is, "honesty is the best policy"? From the point of view of auction theory - yes. But what if the auction participants agree with each other, so as not to increase the price? But in this case, the organizers of the auctions need to ask the Nobel laureates!

Imagine for a second that an auctionist who sold “10 chairs from the palace” guessed that there is a buyer on the market for whom they are of exceptional value, and would set out the goal of helping for them the amount of two hundred rubles offered by Ostap?

In this case, he would have to organize a “complex auction”, selling chairs individually and forcing the main interested buyer to bargain for each chair. In the case of Ostap - he would have to collect all ten chairs at all costs, only then he could be sure that he would find a treasure. About such an auction was organized by Milgrus and Wilson in 1994, when they helped the US government to help out at the auction for the sale of radio frequencies a sum of the amount of the same, which were expected by officials.

In principle, the auctionist from the Twelve Chairs almost did this when he “felt that it would not be possible to get two hundred rubles from the public at once (too large for the meel left in the hall), and decided to dry these two hundred rubles in pieces. The chairs entered the bargain again, but already in parts. ”

Because the auctionist of the work of Milgr. and Wilson did not read and made a gross mistake, pulling Ostap Bender from participating in the auction. If he allowed the great combinator to try his luck again, perhaps he would have not only inflated the price, but could also find the money missing to buy.

What does it matter to us today? The most direct. According to the law, all public purchases in the Russian Federation are auctions. In theory, this system should help the state cheaply buy “good” and sell “bad” expensive. But it turns out somehow the opposite-“good” always falls into the hands of state people for a penny, and they pay for “bad” state people very expensive. Of course, one could seek advice to Milgrom and Wilson. They would find a solution, and auctions would come up with different ones - for different tasks. But something tells me that in this case the answer can be much easier and the Nobel laureates can not be disturbed.