In his speech to both houses of Congress on April 29, US President Joe Biden warned that the 21st century. will determine the outcome of the titanic struggle between democracy and autocracy, which the autocrats are confident they will win. Biden is determined to prove them wrong: “It was never worth betting against America in your life, and it’s not worth it now either.” America, he promised, was reclaiming its role as a global leader, and it would unite democracies in meeting this challenge.

Forging ties with democratic allies in Europe and East Asia, a top U.S. foreign policy priority, is a first step in this direction. The Biden administration plans to convene a summit of democracies this year to send a message that the United States is back as a leader in the democratic community and to decide how to promote democracy after years of retreat around the world, including in the United States itself.

Donald Trump did not care about values in foreign policy and rather preferred to make deals. Biden's aspirations indicate a return to political tradition. Since its founding nearly 250 years ago, the United States has promoted democracy, either by example (“the shining city on the hill”) or through missionary work in countries around the world. Since World War I and the Woodrow Wilson administration, the United States has framed the global struggle as an existential struggle between freedom and tyranny—between light and darkness—and has seen its mission as leading the forces of freedom. And at least on a rhetorical level, Biden's call is almost certain to receive broad support both in the foreign policy establishment and in the country as a whole.

However, translating lofty rhetoric into concrete policies is not easy. Especially in a world where the balance of power is changing, new technologies are transforming the way we communicate, work and struggle, and nationalism, populism and fundamentalism inflame passions and demand loyal service. Forming an alliance of democracies that is strong enough to change the trajectory of global development, but not so large that it compromises the very idea of democracy and turns ideological confrontation into an outright struggle for power is an incredibly difficult task. Solving it requires a careful balance of ambition and insight.

Here, the Biden administration will need to address three major issues.

First, find the right balance between ideological aspirations and geopolitical needs. You don’t have to look far for an example of how difficult this is—just remember the Cold War. In an attempt to contain the Soviet Union, the United States, leader of the “free world,” often supported vile authoritarian regimes (especially in what was then called the Third World) in their fight against Marxist insurgencies. The United States became allies of authoritarian states in strategically important regions, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran under the Shah in the Middle East. They even went to such extremes as establishing close relations with communist China in order to undermine Soviet power.

The need to sacrifice principles was explained by the fact that containing the USSR was necessary for the progress of democracy in the world wrested from it. It was difficult to argue with this argument. However, this approach made it possible to accuse the United States of hypocrisy and cynicism, which Soviet propaganda readily took advantage of.

Today, solving this problem is no less difficult. The Biden administration identifies autocratic China as its main strategic adversary. Will Washington turn a blind eye to Narendra Modi's authoritarian tendencies in an attempt to make India a partner in the fight against China? Will he invite Recep Tayyip Erdogan or Viktor Orban to cooperate, despite their orchestrated assault on democracy, because Türkiye and Hungary are important allies for containing Russia in Europe? And if not, what will this mean for NATO, which presents itself as an alliance of democracies, or for the EU, which proudly calls itself the leading force in the world, following basic democratic norms?

Regardless of whether geopolitical interests are placed above democratic values or vice versa, the Biden administration will have to explain its actions.

No less contradictory is the position of a simplified choice between freedom and tyranny, which Biden formulates. Consciously or not, this position creates a view of the world divided into a democratic bloc, led by the United States, and an authoritarian bloc, led by China. But the bipolar approach does not fit well with the reality in which the world is becoming increasingly interconnected and multipolar. Leading democracies such as France, Germany, Britain and Japan are unlikely to follow calls to choose sides, especially when their economic well-being depends on maintaining good ties with China. That the EU agreed to a full-scale investment treaty with China on the eve of Biden's inauguration shows that these countries will resist pressure that the US president may bring to bear on them. Low-key protests by democracies against China's crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong and human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region underscore the complexity of the situation.

Consequently, for a sufficiently large group of countries to reach an agreement to promote democracy in the modern world will require careful balancing of their political, economic and geopolitical interests. This means that any agreement will almost certainly fall short of the goal of vigorously defending the principles Biden proclaims, which his rhetoric suggests he is striving for.

The third problem is related to the state of affairs in America itself. Many of its allies and partners are questioning whether the United States can lead a global alliance of democracies after four years of anti-democratic developments and ongoing domestic political strife. Well-founded fears that a man like Trump, if not Trump himself, could become president in 2024 raise concerns about the long-term viability of Biden's proposal. This does not mean that America's major allies will refuse to attend the summit he hosts, or that they will not express a commitment to strengthening democracy at home and promoting its progress abroad. But this gives reason to assume that the list of joint plans and obligations will not be so large, and the common efforts to implement them will not be so active.

The Biden administration likes to proclaim that “America is back.” But it must demonstrate that American democracy and predictability are back for the long haul before other countries may be willing to risk pursuing joint ventures and projects with Washington.

The alliance of democracies is not a utopia. But it will take time to create, and success is by no means guaranteed. A reasonable first step, therefore, would be for a small group of leading democracies to meet to discuss the challenges they face and outline possible joint actions. This would be similar to what the major democratic developed countries did in the 1970s when they created the G7 to discuss global economic issues.

This year the G7 is inviting Australia, India, South Africa and South Korea to take part in some of the discussions. As many observers have suggested, these 11 countries could become the first participants in a group that will discuss Biden's proposed democracy support issues. Subsequently, they can turn into the core of an alliance of democracies, to which other countries will gradually be added, depending on the circumstances.

At the same time, the United States will need to restore democracy at home to transform the alliance into an effective player on the world stage. The task, of course, is not an easy one, but it is hardly impossible.

Translated by Mikhail Overchenko

Will the US be able to create an alliance of democracies?