Salt percent

The experts were not given a secret key that would allow you to deal with the "Crowning". We publish the full text of the report of the technical group, special opinions and comments

From the editorial office
We publish a report of a technical group for checking the remote electronic voting system. Below we also give special opinions of members of the technical group Dmitry Nesterov and Evgeny Fedin and a commentary on a member of the technical working group Dmitry Kuznetsov.

Full text of the document

REPORT

Technical Group on the Cross Sistemance Steel of Remote Electronic Surrender Moscow, October 1, 2021

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The text of the report was also published in the official telegram channel of the technical group for checking the remote electronic voting system @techgroupdeg .

A special opinion

Dmitry Nesterov

Member of the technical group:

- I am one of the participants in the technical group, participated in the discussion of most issues, some of which were not included in this first intermediate report. Unfortunately, the text of the report on style and content eventually resembles the answers that we are used to receiving from Russian officials or election commissions.

Answering some private questions, publishing additional data and information about the concept of the DEG system, the text does not contain answers on the merits of the main hypotheses about the possible distortions of the will during electronic voting . The given alternative versions of the occurrence of anomalies are useful for a more complete picture, but cannot replace the checks necessary to refute or confirm the main hypotheses about the distortions.

In my opinion, which was recorded by A. Venediktov at the first installation meeting, the main mission of the technical group was to be an independent test of the lack of basic manipulations, such as:

1) voting virtual voters (bots);

2a) unauthorized settlements for real voters;

2b) the incorrectness of the calculation of the results when taking into account the partition.

Now it is precisely these mechanisms that are clearly or implicitly suspected in the context of distrust of the results, and in the analysis of anomalies in electronic ballots and the DEG voters list.

The openness declared during the creation of the working group has so far been expressed in the provision of documentation on the system and a large array of secondary statistical information, most of which is publicly available in an unprocessed form.

However, the most important part of the information has not yet been obtained for analysis - actually data that would allow the above hypotheses.

A realistic option for checking the presence of bots in the system could be an in -depth sociological survey controlled by the working group on the list of DEG voters, the algorithm of which was proposed and allowed to statistically reliably measure the contribution of invalid/uncontrolled accounts with an accuracy of a percentage of interest.

The only realistic option for a comprehensive verification of possible distortion through the dispute is the provision of data on the anonymous chains of crossings, which can be obtained by a controlled working group to reproduce the algorithm for deciphering the ballots, identifying chains of partition and calculation of the “latest votes”.

Only according to the results of such inspections and a conscientious analysis of the information received, it will be possible to give convincing explanations to the anomalies and make judgments about the validity of the hypotheses under consideration. The rejection of such inspections will naturally preserve suspicions of the results with citizens and experts.

A special opinion

Evgeny Fedin

Member of the technical group:

- I rather do not agree to consider myself to the signing this text.

The public headquarters formed a technical group so that it checked the correctness of the vote counting on the basis of the data on the votes that got into the DEG system during its work.

It turned out that this task could not be solved , since the data on what votes were cast by one voter, they refused to provide the group.

However, Dit provided data on the votes that were presented as the last submitted by each of the voters. Checking that in total these data give numbers from the voting results was performed, I agree with this part of the report. Is it excluded that they could calculate incorrectly? No, it is possible. The correctness of the choice of the latest votes filed by each of the voters was not checked .

A verification of the correctness of the system, the correctness of the fact that it was precisely the votes that were calculated, the technical group did not deal with , while trying to clarify the issues related to the operation of the system, it was indicated that these are the tasks of the audit group, and we are not engaged in an audit.

Comment "Novaya Gazeta"

Dmitry Kuznetsov

Member of the technical group

- This is the first report in a series of reports. We do not draw the final conclusions in this report. We analyzed the data presented, in particular, the headquarters of candidates; The material that came out in Novaya Gazeta yesterday (09.30) did not have time to analyze us. We will consider it in further work, asking for information in the child.

Andrey Zasakin: Did you manage to hold a secret blockchain in your hands?

DK: - No. We are now asking for this opportunity. The Secret Blockchain is a database that the selected “final” voices fall using the algorithm that the child of Moscow provided us, but we did not achieve the official information, because I wanted the description of this algorithm to become not just a dock file, but an official document that could be referred to. So, we want to explore the work of this algorithm and its application.

A.Z.: - “Database 2”, which you quote in the report, brought you on a flash drive or did you get it from a public dump?

DK: - They brought it to us on the “flash drive” (abstractly brought it on an abstract flash drive), we did not count it without sufficient information to count it. In order to calculate this array on our own, with the participation of employees of DIT and their infrastructure, we need not only the algorithm and the application itself that can recalculate, but also the secret key, password to restore the final result,

In the algorithm, this key is called “Salt”, this is a set of certain random data that are added to the ballot identifiers to restore the chain of crossings.

A.Z.: - That is, on the “flash drive” you were brought “database 2” with final voices - those that were not burnt out, and the “last” voices from among the distorted?

DK: - Yes.

A.Z.: - And there is no public mechanism for building “database 2” either you or me?

DK: - Yes, this is the mechanism that we requested from DIT.

A.Z.: - Do I understand correctly that the reliability of the “database 2” is based on the word and a good reputation of Moscow?

DK: - So far, yes, this is a gentleman's game.