An late power

Political scientist Dmitry Travin - about the reasons for Russian backwardness

Russia failed another attempt to modernize, exchanging it in the illusion of imperial greatness and the restoration of authoritarian power within the country.

Political institutions are destroyed, archaic returns to society, and reforms and modernization have finally disappeared from the agenda and from the dictionary of power.

The next chance for the modernization of Russia is associated only with the change of regime: according to experts, serious changes are impossible under Vladimir Putin.

Sergey Medvedev: In 2021, 30 years after the collapse of the USSR, it becomes obvious that Russia once again failed an attempt to technological, economic and political modernization. Why are the reforms in the country are skidding and each time end in a rollback? What are the causes of eternal Russian backwardness? Is there a special "Russian path" and does Vladimir Putin embody it today?

Video version of the program

Our guest is Dmitry Travin , the scientific director of the Center for Research on modernization of the European University in St. Petersburg .

For ten years there has been no economic growth; Social inequality, poverty is growing

Correspondent: By 2020, it became obvious that Russia failed another attempt to political and economic modernization, exchanging it in the illusion of imperial greatness and the restoration of authoritarian power within the country. For ten years there has been no economic growth. In his absence, the authorities are proud of stability, but cannot but understand that the protracted stagnation only increases social tension. Social inequality, poverty is growing. Political institutions are destroyed, archaic and patriarchal morality are returning to society, and reforms and modernization, which began in the 90s and 2000s, finally disappeared from the agenda and from the dictionary of power.

Sergey Medvedev: Dmitry, is the backwardness of Russia already a scientifically recognized fact?

Dmitry Travin: There are quite clear criteria. Let's say a gross product per capita in Russia is much lower than that of the leading countries of the world. The second point: we compare ourselves with developing countries. There are countries that some time ago greatly lagged behind Russia, but now they go ahead with seven-mini steps. There is much more economic growth than that of Russia. The most striking example is China. Finally, the standard of living: I think, there is no need to prove that he is so -so in Russia, especially in the province.

If we believe that we want to live better, then we need to raise the question - why are we behind and what can be done in order to live better? If we do not want to live better and believe that for some reason we go in a special way and live optimally, then I will not convince such people-they have the right to have such a point of view.

I came to the conclusion that the problems are common, there are no special ways, although, of course, every country has its own historical specificity. But there are general tasks - say, build an effective market economy. In this regard, there are successful countries that have done some common and understandable things, and there are countries lagging behind, which have not yet done these things. Here Russia is behind.

General problems do not exist, although each country has its own historical specificity

Sergey Medvedev: From what moment can we consider the lag of Russia and the access to the cycle of catching up of modernizations, about which Gaidar wrote a lot?

Dmitry Travin: This is a very difficult question. The peripheral position of the Russian lands in economic terms, along with constant raids, which even destroyed the economy that arose, say, in Vladimir, Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, together created a much more difficult position than in central Europe. Then many new problems appeared, but they seemed to follow the previous one.

Dmitry Travin

There is such a concept - a "historical track", which, for example, was written by Russian economist Alexander Auzan . When the car moves along the rut, you can turn it out, but this requires additional efforts and depends on the depth of the rut and the general quality of the road. Here is the same country that begins to lag behind in ancient times falls into the rut. The track is not a fate that closes the opportunity to go normally along the road. It can be turned out of it, but the deeper the track, the more difficult: it requires a more powerful motor.

Sergey Medvedev: Throughout the twentieth century, we saw how many countries have been chosen from the rut, which, it seemed, had been driving along the old road for centuries.

The track is not a fate that closes the opportunity to go normally along the road

Dmitry Travin: My opponents say that Russia is a hopeless country and we are practically in a certain Russian matrix, from which we can’t get out, except that a miracle will help. The theory of modernization says something else. If we look at a long historical development, we will see that there is nothing fatal, mentally condemning us to failure, in this development. In my books, every time I undertake to explain to quite rational reasons why this or that unpleasant turn took place-not some mentality of Russians, which is incompatible with the mentality of the British or Italians, but very specific reasons. But the future is not predetermined, and Russia has a chance to catch up with successful countries.

Sergey Medvedev: But still, passing these forks, Russia retains a distance, and a gap of 50-60 years in terms of urban life, in social trends, in the per capita GDP, and for objective economic indicators has been persisted for more than 200 years. Why does Russia make a choice in favor of counter -reform? Why do Alexander II reforms end with the conservative rule of Alexander III? Why does NEP first break off into collectivization, and then into the neo -imperial forms of Stalin? And why were the reforms of the 90s stalled and failed?

Dmitry Travin: What is sometimes called Russian cycles is the general problems of modernization of any country. There is no smooth movement forward anywhere. Basically, with each movement, groups of interests appear that benefit from this movement in the short term, and those that lose. When we are just starting to move forward, who won a little bit, the losers of a lot, the losers are crushing and lowering everything down. But with each new generation there are more and more people who adapt to changes and do not want to return to the old. Therefore, gradually with decades, and sometimes with centuries, the number of groups of interests that benefit from changes becomes more than losing. And this is how modernization is carried out, which takes 150-250 years in almost any country.

Sergey Medvedev: But why in Russia every time this coalition of changes, the number of people who benefit from modernization does not develop?

Any ruler, if he has resources, tries to parasitize them, and then the reforms are bad

Dmitry Travin: folds. I looked at how public sentiments and groups of interests changed, which supported and did not support serfdom, from Peter to 1861. From Peter to Catherine, the question of serfdom did not stand at all. Under Catherine was the first attempt to cancel slavery. Then we see how it all does not roll at all, and Catherine refuses this idea. And then with each generation for about 100 years there are more and more groups of interests that understand that serfdom needs to be canceled at all costs. And finally, by the 1850–1860s, a critical mass of people accumulated, including the emperor who are ready to cancel it. This fits very clearly in the overall picture of modernization. It was about the same in France and in Germany.

Sergey Medvedev: Is there uniquely Russian models of the resource state, which is the main owner and builds the whole society under itself, class and, in fact, serfs? Is this a special Russian uniqueness that in every iteration, in every century, this state reproduces itself, whether it is imperial Russia, the Stalinist USSR or Putin's Russia?

Dmitry Travin: Any ruler, if he has resources, tries to parasitize on them, and then the reforms are not going well.

Sergey Medvedev: In Russia there has always been some kind of monoresurs-fur, forest, grain since the time of Catherine, and then, from the twentieth century-hydrocarbons.

Dmitry Travin: Real resource disease begins only in the 70s of the twentieth century, when Russia has mastered the third oil and gas region, Western Siberia. From this moment on, of course, huge resources began to enter Russia thanks to exports, we still live on this, and this seriously slows down the development of the country. Such problems can arise in any country if there is a lot of cheap resources. This did not stop the development of Norway, but very often cancels normal development, because the authorities parasitize on these resources.

Sergey Medvedev: Political scientist Andrei Kolesnikov , a researcher at the Moscow Center of Carnegie , argues.

For the end of modernization, you need not an authoritarian regime, but political democracy, a change of power

Andrei Kolesnikov: There are such Russian vicious circles that are described by the term “incomplete modernization” in relation to the reform problem. Each time, not only in the twentieth century, but also in the XVIII - XIX centuries, modernization turned out to be incomplete due to the fact that the state actually stopped it itself. Here there was an eternal contradiction between modernization goals and conservative means of achieving them. For example, when you are trying to reform the socialist economy without touching property without turning it into private, you still will not succeed, no matter how you try to free it or stimulate it.

So in the post -Soviet period, Russia was undertaken, and those attempts by authoritarian modernization that have been undertaken for the past 20 years have not led to anything. To end modernization, not an authoritarian regime is needed, but political democracy, a change in power, political incentives, in order to give people freedom, maintain private initiative and not press the pedal, which says "state intervention".

Andrey Kolesnikov

The construction of institutions is also very important, only these institutions should not be imitating. Suppose, the Russian parliament does not perform the functions of the parliament - this is an imitation, paper institute. But the historical path and effect of the ruts, which are argued a lot, still matters. The philosopher Gustav Shpet said that Russia has been suffering from such an ailment as non-layout, that is, the inability to perceive something from the West, in view of the lack of contacts, isolation, fear of a foreign invasion.

Sergey Medvedev: Over the past 30 years, the country seems to have repeated the full cycle of the Russian matrix. What do you see the reasons for the current rollback? Was there an inevitable closing of the reform project?

The market economy has not gone away, and Putin is not going to cancel it

Dmitry Travin: Inevitably, of course, there was no, but in general the picture of the last 30th anniversary very clearly reflects how modernization gives rise to different groups of interests that win and lose, and then these groups change in strength for decades. Here are economic reforms of the early 90s. Almost the whole country won from some changes: nobody liked Soviet shortages in stores. In this sense, everyone liked the market economy. And, no matter how people opposed the Gaidar reforms, the market economy has not gone anywhere, and Putin is not going to cancel it.

But! Many groups of interests said: "We need a market, but some other, because from the market we lost in this." And the state is trying to adjust the market, but it acts poorly, inefficiently. Thanks to the state correction of the market, economic growth stopped with us, but many groups of interests that in the 90s felt losers in the Putin era received some resources, from military orders to the military of the military-industrial complex and ending with direct subsidies of some regions, especially in the North Caucasus.

And now the majority say: "Oh! The Putin market we like!" But the problems accumulate. This means that after some time a new generation of reformers will appear, which will have to carry out new reforms. I think that purely for political reasons, under Putin’s rule, changes are no longer possible.

But after Putin, new reforms will begin. Generations that have been formed over the years are already much more adaptive to market changes. So, we will take one more step forward, and then we will stop again and we will say: but this does not suit us ... So the last 30 years is still not a vicious circle, but a partial movement forward. The market was taken, but at least two disadvantages: the first - the state of the market regulated and stopped development, and the second - there is no democracy, there is an authoritarian regime, which is very closely connected with the first minus.

After Putin, new reforms will begin, we will take another step forward

Sergey Medvedev: Is it possible to say that Putinism is a conservation of backwardness?

Dmitry Travin: I still love more complex definitions.
Yes, backwardness, of course, intensified over the years. But the logic of the regime was not so much in the conservation of backwardness as in extracting rent from the Russian economy in the interests of the ruling class.

Sergey Medvedev: The priorities of the state are, first of all, the preservation of power and the extraction of rent, that is, such the lowest instincts in the "Maslow Pyramid" . The state is not engaged in development.

Dmitry Travin: Any state, not limited by democratic institutions, will do this. As soon as democratic limiters appear, there are fewer possibilities for plundering.

Sergey Medvedev: In the future, for the modernization of Russia, is it necessary to preserve the role of the Russian state, or is it necessary to reduce it?

As soon as democratic limiters appear, the possibilities for plundering are less

Dmitry Travin: the role of the state must be reduced so that the economy develops better. I think that after Putin this role will decrease somewhat, which will allow us to have any 3-4% of GDP growth per year. But I do not hope that Russia will become a truly liberal country: too many groups of interests will be against it. For starters, we will solve the tasks that are feasible to us, we will start at least a little bit to catch up with Europe.

Sergey Medvedev: Perhaps one of the problems is that the Russian president is constantly late. Putin is known for his delay in the Pope, and the Queen of the British, and to all state leaders. Maybe when in Russia there will be a leader who knows how to come on time, then the country will finally catch up with the developed world.