Insidious captivity

Lukashenko takes the Kremlin hostage with the help of a "migrant crisis"

Alexander Lukashenko obviously exacerbates the conflict. It provokes migrants to force penetration into the territory of the European Union. Why is he doing this?

The first answer, which begs: revenge the EU or force it to the dialogue. But if you think about it, this makes no sense. Now on the border of Belarus and Poland, 4-5 thousand migrants are clamped, there are about 12 thousand in Belarus in Belarus. Even if the Poles of all of them are unhindered to their territory, the European Union will not notice this. Moreover, the EU easily copes even with a stream of ten times large - such a little expansion will not cause any global “migrant crisis”. The vast majority of immigrants, if they find themselves in the EU, will be detained and sent back to Iraq, who already agrees to accept them. Therefore, if Lukashenko is trying to force someone here to bring closer, it is Moscow, not the European Union (see this below).

The second option of incorrect answer: to earn. Each migrant paid from $ 2600 for a trip to the EU through Belarus. However, it should be understood that most of this money has already settled in the pockets of the performers. Half reached a piggy bank of the regime. In addition, the administrations of the President of Belarus are fabulously rich, this is not their scale. Finally, every day of the confrontation on the border, Lukashenko itself stands a lot of money. Migrants paid their blood once, and the Belarusian regime has the costs of continuing the conflict every day.

Then it turns out that the actions of Lukashenko look like an absolute nonsense, hysteria? Unfortunately, this is unlikely to be this: “The Last Dictator of Europe” is by no means insane. Let's think about why the Migrant Crisis really needs.

The actions of the security forces of Belarus primarily say that Lukashenko is very important to constant aggravation of the situation.

Simply put, he waits for the first blood to shed as a result of the actions of the Poles. There are many ways to provoke the Polish military to an armed response. You can simply endure the migrants endlessly on the barbed wire until the nerves surrender to some Polish border guard and he will open fire towards Belarus. If you continue the pressure long enough, sooner or later it will happen.

There are more radical methods: they will try to arm migrants on the border - in this case, you will have to shoot for self -defense. You can still shoot several exposing videos, which will capture the transfer of weapons to migrants allegedly from Poland (possibly Ukraine) as part of a “hybrid war”: to build a fence somewhere in the forest, through which unknown in balaclavs, but with Polish signs, the distinctions on the clothes will be transferred to migrants by migrants with automatic machines. In any case, even this can be considered an act of aggression of the EU regarding sovereign Belarus. What then?

Then Lukashenko will immediately ask for military assistance from Russia, CSTO. Russian planes are already flying near the border of Belarus and Poland, showing their readiness to "defend the Belarusian people." It is easy to predict the further. Martial law is introduced in Belarus, Russian troops are included in the country - supposedly to help the reflection of aggression from the EU and strengthen the western borders of the Union State. What will simultaneously mean not only a change in political rates in the European (primarily Ukrainian) direction, but also the actual termination of the sovereignty of Belarus, while maintaining the formal leadership of Lukashenko. Like his presidency in one or another form ( a referendum planned in Minsk is devoted to this).

Why do you need to fence this garden, you ask? Why, then, Lukashenko simply will not sign any 29th road map on the entry of RB into the Russian Federation?

It is now obvious that the Lukashenko regime can no longer survive without the help of Russia and Russia alone. There will not be enough internal resources:

The growing sanctions are painful and there is no getting away from them - and you can put a cross on the possibility of support from the rest of the world.

Over the past year, Lukashenko met Putin several times with Putin behind closed doors, where they could discuss one single issue: how to make Belarus part of Russia (ideally in exactly the 24th year), while ensuring a guarantee for Lukashenko himself and his family, in which he would have remained at the head of the former independent country, "without moving to Rostov."

It is obvious that if you simply announce the entry of Belarus into the Russian Federation (for example, having carried out another twisted referendum on this subject), then Lukashenko’s position will be shaky. He will become just one of the Russian officials that does not give him any security guarantees. In this case, Putin will be able to change it at any time or even send the defendants to the bench. And the Belarusian people will go out onto the streets again, now protecting not only the elections, but their country and independence. This option is not satisfied with the official Minsk/Moscow.

Another thing is a plan with the introduction of a “soft creeping occupation” of Belarus by a Russian ruble and a small contingent of troops. (A completely separate topic of the conversation, that this plan will be implemented, of course, not at all like the Kremlin - Lukashenko, as usual, will continue to try to beat and draw Putin, and he still succeeded.)

What will happen if the provocation on the Polish border will be successful and the Russian infantry will temporarily enter the Republic of Belarus? In this case, the situation will freeze and the prolongation of the conflict on the border according to the already familiar scheme.

Russia will receive actual control over Belarus. Gradually, step by step, after the military, the integration of civilian institutions will be carried out, most likely it will stretch for many, many years. In this case, you can either completely cancel the elections, or hold them under the muzzles of Russian observers. Elections in Belarus would be an obvious trigger for a new wave of protests - but there will be no protests if the streets and squares of the Belarusian cities will “completely legally” patrol Russian and/or Belarusian “astronauts”, supposedly ensuring the country's security from external hybrid aggression and provocations.

In this case, Lukashenko will remain for Putin a very important person, actually irreplaceable - after all, the legitimacy of the location of Russian troops in the territory of the Republic of Belarus will be confirmed by the fact that the formal head of state agrees with this. The role of Lukashenko, at the head of the occupied Belarus, can be compared with the role of Assad in Syria.

Of course, Lukashenko has no absolute guarantees. It is possible to remain in the position of “Wedding President” only until Putin’s will be obediently fulfilled. Otherwise, the former father can finish the same way as Hafizulla Amin in Afghanistan at one time. But in the end, the presidency, albeit formal, is better than the inevitable putsch among his own.

But do not write off Lukashenko in advance from the accounts. It is understandable that he is still trying to lead a more complex, uncomfortable game for Moscow.

Even now, having agreed with the Russian special services about provocations in the sky or on the border with Poland, he most likely expects to push the EU and the Russian Federation with his foreheads. And Lukashenko himself expects, as far as possible, to stay away and prevent the complete occupation of Belarus. Thus, Russia should turn out to be a subject of a semi -native conflict and a dependent partner forced to pay Lukashenko more new “loans”.

Russian mediation in negotiations between Belarus and the EU is not only a theoretical opportunity , but the very goal of the “migrant crisis”. Only now the game is conducted not by the usual pawns such as references to the threats of a “new Maidan” and a possible association with the EU/NATO, but in large figures - the economic interests of both oriental and Western neighbors. And for those and for others, transport transit through Belarus, both energy and railway and especially road, plays a colossal role. It is enough to study the railway network to understand: the bypass of Belarus is possible, but definitely not by rail through Ukraine or Helsinki. The complete cessation of cargo and energy transit and the closed western border will hurt on both sides, and Lukashenko will definitely threaten this after the exacerbation of the border conflict. The Kremlin risks becoming a hostage in Belarus in the same way as in the time in the North Caucasus.