Translated material
2022: with us Putin and Covid?
What do negotiations with the American side on armaments, the borders of NATO and Ukraine mean for the Kremlin? Will Russia enter a new round of international isolation after unproductive Russian-American negotiations in Geneva? What will this isolation mean for residents of the country? How will this affect the internal activity of citizens and is a new wave of repression possible?
How will the situation in Kazakhstan affect Russia? Is it possible to exclude the Russian invasion in the east of Ukraine and is Ukraine preparing for this scenario?
What to do with pandemia Covid-19 as a political problem?
The media manager and political analyst Vasily Gatov (USA), art manager and political analyst Marat Gelman (recently recognized as an ino-agent), politician and businessman, political emigrant Ilya Ponomarev (Kiev) are discussed. Expert opinion of the epidemiologist Vasily Vlasov .
Elena Fanailova is conducting the program.
Video version of the program
Elena Fanailova: We continue to discuss the political and other prospects of 2022. Let's see the plot about the events that struck the entire post -Soviet world, and not only the post -Soviet world: Kazakhstan.
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0:00 0:02:47Elena Fanailova: negotiations in Geneva, negotiations in Brussels , events in Kazakhstan . How can this turn out for the future of Russia?
Vasily Gatov: The main consequences are that Russia is finally fixed in the status of an aggressive state, ready to do what the Soviet Union, Imperial Russia was known: immediately enter the troops to where it considers to be necessary, demand from the neighbors of humility and staying in the status of border states that do not use complete sovereignty. No signs that the course can be changed, that Putin can hand back. The application is very serious: we want some binding guarantees. It is very difficult to deviate from this in domestic politics, and in the external too.
Russia is finally fixed in the status of an aggressive state, ready to do what the USSR was known
We must clearly understand that we see a certain public position in all statements, press conferences and so on, which may differ from the true content of diplomatic negotiations. This is normal, this is due to the fact that diplomats need to report to the top leadership of their country, especially in Russia, where they are not reported to citizens, but to the president. The impression of a dead end can be intensified due to such a communication position. In fact, Russia's requirements are partially ready to discuss, especially in terms of technical issues related to the resumption of the non -proliferation of medium and low -range missiles, a restriction of military activity near the corresponding boundaries. This, by the way, is a positive signal to Moscow: if she wants to agree on details, then this is possible. Strategically NATO and the United States firmly said that they would not change the policy of the bloc. And this is what Putin would like to achieve, especially ideologically. Where ideology comes into business, logic ceases to act and certain principles come into action, far from necessarily understandable and pleasant.
Elena Fanailova: I can only agree. Recently, I analyzed the archives associated with the Levada Center (in Russia was forced to “in the agent”), there, in particular, Boris Dubin and Leo Gudkov say that the first thing Putin did was intercepted the symbolic Soviet agenda: the hymn, the emblem, the flag. And this turned out to be an amazing cross that still unites millions of people. Another cross is a fantastic irrational fear of NATO. A person can criticize the existing administration as much as he likes, but as soon as he hears about the promotion of NATO east, Soviet instincts are included.
Ilya Ponomarev, your impressions of the current political landscape: anxiety or hope?
Ilya Ponomarev: Of course, anxiety. Everything seems to be bad with hope. I do not really agree with the analysis of Vasily, I believe that Putin has no ideology, he has exclusively thirst for profit, the personal interests of himself and his environment. Of course, the interests are not only financial, but this is the instinct of self -preservation, which forces to cling to power at all costs. Putin does not resemble the figures of the past at all: Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, even Dan Xiaopin or Mao Zedong, who were ready to sacrifice the blood of their citizens, but also their interests in the name of some purposes that seemed high to them. There was never anything like this in the Kremlin, the logic of actions is completely different.
Putin has no ideology, he has exclusively thirst for profit, personal interests
It seems to me that all these negotiations that are going on now are begun specifically in order to fail. Putin needs to create an excuse primarily in the eyes of Russians. You are talking correctly about fears that are associated with the promotion of NATO east. Of course, the deep people are not formulating this, he formulates that “the enemy at the threshold, the enemy comes, the enemy is stronger, accordingly, we need to rally around the leader, forget the perch and prepare for the defense.” Putin actively plays on these strings.
I think his next step is connected precisely with "scrapers": the anthem is restored, but the flag is not, it is with Lukashenko. The unification of this flag and anthem in the near future will be ahead. I think the main task of Putin is to transfer to the chair the leader of the so -called “Union State” in the next two years, strengthening him, and get rid of Lukashenko as the head of Belarus: for example, he will become the head of the All -Belorussian People’s Assembly. And the ideological justification for this will be just this: we suggested that the West preserve a certain sanitary buffer between Russia and NATO in the form of Belarus, Ukraine and other countries, but they did not listen, they threaten us. Therefore, we make a counter move, play ahead of the lead and take Belarus, begin to restore the USSR, but it will be called, for example, the Slavic Union.
Elena Fanailova: I do not see contradictions in the statements of Vasily Gatov and in your comment. Ideology for the current Kremlin power is only a screen. Yes, they protect their economic interests, but this ideology surprisingly includes certain buttons in the brains of fellow citizens.
Ilya Ponomarev: And I believe that Putin builds some ideological constructions, and Surkova actively writes about all sorts of Orthodox robots in order to in order to retroactively justify what they do based on a completely different motivation.
Vasily Gatov: If we proceed from the classic Marxist understanding of the concept of “ideology”, then yes, Putin has no ideology. This is rather the ideology of the denial of the existence of other values and ideas. But in the framework of pure political analysis, when you say that someone has long-term ideas, protection of their property, stolen, power, and so on-this is also an idea, it is simply purely materialistic, there are no spelled out principles behind it. But this is precisely the ideology of defense, the protection of the besieged fortress.
The criminal regime for the sake of his interests threatens the fate of both Russia itself and other countries
Elena Fanailova: The biggest question is what to do about it. Marat Gelman wrote a brilliant, but also a pessimistic post about the latest political events.
Marat Gelman: Thanks for the announcement of the "foreign" post.
I'm trying to understand what Putin himself thinks. What we think is understandable: the criminal regime for the sake of his interests threatens the fate of both Russia itself and other countries. But what does he think, how is he going to get out of this situation? In my opinion, the failure of these negotiations was initially programmed. One of the versions: this delegation will return with nothing, and then Putin will go to increase the rates, will now offer to gather at the level of the presidents ("Seven" Plus Russia, Twenty Plus Russia), include in this conversation, except for the OSCE, China and India with which he had negotiations. A very important element for Putin is that Europe and America will not be able to completely isolate Russia, in any case, we have any unspoken relations with these countries.
This is a positive script. This means that along with the delegation of the Foreign Ministry will leave these crazy conditions, and the presidents will already speak another language. What does he want to achieve? On the one hand, after the accession of the Crimea of Russia there will be no peace, a certain threat will always hang that Ukraine will want to return Crimea: not today, but tomorrow, not by a military way, but by pressure. Since 2014, the insoluble issue has been hanging, which must be resolved.
On the other hand, of course, the Russian economy is weak, the infrastructure is weak, and Putin is a major figure in the late XX - XXI century. In any case, he will lose the positional war, because the positions are weak. Then he says: let's play in combination. Of course, the chances of winning are small. But he is ready to play games in which he has small chances. If even one chance of ten, he plays it, because he believes that if he does not play, then he already initially lost. I read his formula “World without Russia” I read: “I am ready to sacrifice the Russia that I now manage if it does not become the empire, a revenge project that is in my head.”
The whole world actually understands that this round of negotiations cannot have a way out. As for what he wants to grab the “DPR” and “LPR” after this failure: it seems to me that this will not happen. Even if they are not afraid of sanctions, that is, they are ready to lose money, lose the "Northern Stream - 2", I do not see a single plus. The Americans and the EU will react quite calmly, their interests will not be affected if the peacekeeping Russian forces take these republics, but then their hands will be untied even further to limit Russia. I do not believe that Putin wants expansion.
Elena Fanailova: On the eve of our meeting, I watched Ilya Novikov’s interview with the “NOT POSON” channel, and I was struck by a calm confidence with which Novikov said that Crimea would not be Russian. Russia is included in the new round of international isolation? What will this mean for residents of the country?
Vasily Gatov: The central moment here is that Putin is really ready to sacrifice. This is a great difference between him and the key leaders of the West. Why did Vladimir Vladimirovich unfolded the head like that? Apparently, his past and present dictates to him that this is possible, and that this will be experienced by the country, voters (if he is thinking about them at all). Unfortunately, we must state that if you have not yet prepared for this, it may be too late. Today, departure is the only reasonable tactic for a Russian who wants to maintain freedom of movement and thought, freedom not to go to rallies in support of the authorities. It will not be possible to live in Russia more in Russia, and quite soon.
A person can criticize the administration, but as soon as he hears about the promotion of NATO east, Soviet instincts are included
Elena Fanailova: I can’t completely agree: the whole country cannot leave.
I want to draw your attention to another serious problem, the pandemic of the Covid-19, with which we will stay this year. A survey on the streets of Moscow: people answered a question about state measures, and this is a political question.
A survey of passers -by on the streets of Moscow
Elena Fanailova: The results of the survey on Twitter: Do you support measures to combat coronavirus in Russia? 18% of people support, do not support 56%, and 26% believe that these measures should be tightened. Let's see the comment of the epidemiologist Vasily Vlasov .
Elena Fanailova: In the story with the epidemic, I am striking that, despite the great threat to humanity, the military escalation continues. However, we can recall the beginning of the twentieth century, 1917-18, military operations against the backdrop of epidemics, which then shocked Europe.
The protest potential did not disappear, because the problems did not disappear, they will only increase
Returning to the idea of international isolation, which will clearly accompany Russia: how will this affect the internal activity of citizens? I mean the opportunity to consolidate in protest events. Or can we say that the opposition is finished with the landing of Navalny?
Ilya Ponomarev: There are no opposition for a long time, the landing of Navalny did not seriously affect this. The opposition is organized political structures united by a common goal, the same ideology. All this in Russia has been defeated for a long time. There were separate opposition, around them were their own "fan clubs", it was difficult to call it organized structures. Now there are no “fan clubs”, and here the landing of Navalny really played a role, there was a cleansing, and by the September elections to the Duma this process was almost completed.
Protest actions are always possible, the protest potential has not disappeared, because the problems have not disappeared, they will only increase. The more isolation, Covid, economic and social troubles, the more protest potential will be. But in order for the protest to turn into a conscious political action, the political structures are needed that lead, draw it up, direct, and allow it to nominate real, achievable political goals. Ultimately, this is a question and some big goal, great vision. "Russia without Putin" is not a vision, it is a reaction to what is happening, and not some dream that the majority of Russian society would like to get. Until such a goal appears, the structures will not appear with her that put forward and promote it, there will be no changes, no outbreak of protest will turn into revolutionary activities.
Elena Fanailova: As I understand it, now analysts, analyzing Kazakhstani events, say exactly about this.
Ilya Ponomarev: In Kazakhstan, there was a more complex process. A spontaneous outbreak in Zhanaozen began, where before that there was the execution of workers, the protest of the working class. Then he was picked up by one elite group against another elite group, their political structures. It was beneficial for them that violent events occurred so that there were acts of looting, which is why they were concentrated primarily in Alma-Ata, so that it would be clearly and noticeable.
Marat Gelman: I believe that the changes will not occur due to protests, but because of the death of the leader, because of the conflict within the group, that is, from above. The protest potential, obviously, is, we were shown to us at anti -icing rallies. People ceased to be loyal to the authorities, they agree to play with the authorities in the obedient population, but this is not loyalty. This means that with any real problem regarding people economically, they are ready to go out with protest. But this protest has nothing to do with the change of power. As soon as a person appears among the protesters who says “the old man, leave”, they immediately say to him: no, no, we are not engaged in politics, we are protesting against this and that.
About Covid. You can criticize the Russian power here in one thing: there is no adequate business support system that is clearly suffering from all these restrictions. And the rest they act within the framework of global ideas about what needs to be done.
People have ceased to be loyal to the authorities, they agree to play the obedient population, but this is not loyalty
As for Kazakhstan: this is an epic, very important event that recorded the status of the CSTO and Russia. If NATO is a defensive union, then the CSTO is a structure acting in the interests of the current government that has been staggered. The same thing was in Syria, the same thing was in Kazakhstan, apparently, they did not have time to do the same in Ukraine. And they will try to keep this power structure in this quality. Putin now has no other way on how to create such an alliance of dictators and maintain these troops. Probably, we are going to the fact that there will be no transit, Putin we have until the end of his life.
Elena Fanailova: The Ukrainian case becomes a stumbling block when the Kremlin says that NATO should protect Russia, and the price of the issue is the failure of Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, and the American side is quite firmly worth it. If we talk about Ukrainian sentiments, is it possible to exclude the Russian invasion in the East? How is Ukraine preparing for this?
Ilya Ponomarev: Unfortunately, we can’t exclude anything. But I do not think that in the next year or two we will observe a large Russian invasion of Ukraine. The war is on, and in Russia fellow citizens do not understand well that since 2014 we have been at war. But it is limited in area, by involvement, by the number of Russian troops, in their role in this conflict. The war that we know from films, with aircraft, front -line attacks and so on, will not be here in the near future.
I think Putin needs Belarus now. He cannot leave, he is already tired of staying, but the issue of his own safety is in full growth. Therefore, it is necessary to create a more stable design than Nazarbayev created. Putin needs Belarus so that, having rushed to the chair of the leader of the united state, he could put someone on Russia (no matter who) and thereby ensure what we call transit. But then his gaze will still turn south. Для Украины это очень небезопасная ситуация.
В Украине понимают угрозу, боятся нападения, в частности, через Беларусь. Но, к сожалению, я не вижу, чтобы это трансформировалось в настоящую долгосрочную политическую стратегию. Украина привыкла находиться в статусе больше пассивного участника мировой политики, чем самостоятельного игрока, что мне кажется ошибкой, потому что Украина, как ни крути, это крупнейшая страна Европы по территории, одна из самых крупных по населению, с очень большим потенциалом. Такое принижение собственного статуса достаточно нерационально. В частности, Украина не осуществляет даже попыток влиять на ситуацию внутри России, хотя, по идее, тут-то и все карты в руки: есть и родственные связи, и язык, и территориальная близость, и есть российская эмиграция, которую можно в этом смысле использовать. Но ничего подобного не происходит.
В Украине понимают угрозу, боятся нападения, но это не трансформируется в настоящую политическую стратегию
Марат Гельман: Есть гипотеза, что следующим ходом после неудавшегося глобального демарша будет получение каких-то гарантий по Украине. Была идея, что такие безумные цели неразрешимы, но зато можно попросить их надавить на Украину, выполнить Минские соглашения и так далее. На мой взгляд, история с невступлением в НАТО – это ложный дискурс. В целом я не вижу без всякого вступления в НАТО ограничений для того, чтобы помочь Украине оружием. Сегодня стоит вопрос обучения людей, ведь мощь армии – это не количество людей, а оснащенность, профессионализм. Я вижу, как в течение года-двух без всякого вступления в НАТО можно сделать Украину мощной военной державой.
И это ошибка Путина: он, нагнетая этот вопрос, толкает их именно к этому решению. Я не вижу ни одного плюса для Путина в том, чтобы занять Донецк и Луганск. Конечно, в России есть какое-то количество людей, которые топят за это, у них есть аргументация, это не только путинский реваншизм, но еще и национализм, еще и то, что там сейчас живет полмиллиона граждан России. Путин сейчас играет в гораздо большую, глобальную игру. Свести все это к тому, чтобы что-то выиграть в этом украинском конфликте, – это не то, что ему нужно. Но если будет хоть какая-то возможность через провокацию или еще через что-то позволить пострелять войскам, которые есть около границы, не перемещаясь буквально за границы Украины, я думаю, он такую возможность не упустит.
Елена Фанайлова: Вы верите в так называемые "адские" американские санкции?
Илья Пономарев: Я думаю, произойдет очень интересная вещь. В Сенате сейчас лежит законопроект, который говорит о том, что в случае, если Путин вторгнется в Украину, будут применены санкции. Новизна в том, что американцы впервые не говорят про санкции, когда что-то уже случилось, а упреждающе принимают решение: если вы это сделаете, то мы введем санкции. Задача – не допустить, чтобы что-то произошло, а не потом сказать "ата-та". Но ирония ситуации в том, что это будет привязано конкретно к вторжению в Украину, которого в ближайшее время не произойдет, – это разменная карта. Сейчас надо защищать суверенитет Беларуси, в том числе и для защиты Украины, но про это абсолютно никто не говорит. Все люди в Вашингтоне говорят: Беларусь – это отыгранная история, чего заморачиваться на эту тему? This is very sad.
Марат Гельман: Я верю в то, что в Сенате проголосуют за эти санкции. Я понимаю, что в ближайшее время ими не воспользуются, в том числе потому, что идеология реваншизма, которую исповедует Путин, не отменяет интереса к собственным ресурсам и накоплениям. У него есть деньги, дочки, родственники. В его представлении это типа “на святое покусились”, на его личную собственность. Но в то же время я думаю, что это будет серьезным аргументом, чтобы не делать то, чего он, кстати, и так не собирался делать.