
The head of the analytical department of Taiga.info Alexei Mazur argues why Kadyrov intensified on the all -Russian agenda.
In recent days, Ramzan Kadyrov has become a constant source of news. Then he explains what he would do with Ukraine, be he in the place of the President of Russia. That declares to the “terrorists” of human rights activist Igor Kalyapin and journalist Elena Milashin. And also reports that the family of federal judge Sidi Yangulbaev is either in prison or in the ground.
As Oleg Kashin notes in his column, a series of these statements looks like a bustle, and they began after the Chechen security officials took out his wife Judge Yangulbaev Zarem Musaev to Chechnya from Nizhny Novgorod. Citizens of Russia are accustomed to the fact that in Chechnya it can be done at all, but “this is Chechnya,” and the rest of the regions of Russia is completely different. And here it turns out - no, not another. The law enforcement practice of Chechnya can suddenly come to any city. And this can alarm people and cause a negative reaction of the Kremlin.
“ And perhaps that is why Kadyrov these days fussed, which he still does not know whether it will get away with him or will not get away. Most likely, it will come down, but in a sense he knows in a sense-he knows better what he should be nervous and what should he be afraid. He will get nervous and stops, and until the next time. “The Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Chechen Republic, open ” **, ”Oleg Kashin ends his column.
We are here in Siberia (which it would seem, too, “not Chechnya”) are interesting in this story by other facets.
One of the information reasons that Kadyrov issued was his statement that Chechnya did not live without Russia, since the federal budget spends 300 billion rubles a year on the republic. And this figure cut. The Novosibirsk region is twice as much as the population than Chechnya, but its budget does not reach 200 billion.
Later, Ramzan Kadyrov published in his telegram channel information on the “cash execution of the budgets of the budget system of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic for 2021”. However, in less than a minute, this document was deleted from the Kadyrov Canal, Znak.com noted .
But, as you know, the Internet remembers everything: “From the published document it follows that the cash execution of the budgets of the budget system of the Russian Federation in the territory of Chechnya last year amounted to 375.7 billion rubles. This amount consists of several components: Chechnya received 102.7 billion rubles from the federal budget, 105.6 billion rubles from the Pension Fund of Russia, 7.2 billion rubles from the Russian Social Insurance Fund, 140.2 billion rubles from the consolidated budget of Chechnya, and another 19.9 billion rubles from the budget of the territorial compulsory medical insurance fund of the Chechen Republic. ”
The note is made so that you can’t figure it out without a special education. What does “from the consolidated budget of Chechnya” mean? Do not federal subsidies are included in the consolidated budget?
We turn to the original source (not to Kadyrov, but to the Law of Chechnya about the budget for 2021): “The predicted total amount of republican budget revenues in the amount of 106.68 billion rubles, including gratuitous revenues in the amount of 91.27 billion rubles, tax and non -tax revenues in the amount of 15.4 billion rubles”.
If “gratuitous revenues” in the amount of 90 billion are from the federal budget, then those 300 billion are formed in the amount and form 100 billion - direct expenses of the federal budget, another 100 billion - the payment of pensions.
In principle, there are direct expenses of the federal budget in other regions of Russia. The content of the police, parts of healthcare, science. Bridges and roads are built with federal money.
If you make everything out and count on the per capita, then it cannot be said that Chechnya is directly overfed. It’s just that for some reason she has very few her own tax revenues, and the lion's share of her budget forms revenues from the center. What Kadyrov himself honestly told.
Another line of this story is Russian federalism. The question arises, why is the head of Chechnya so much allowed? Or a more correct question - why do not the heads of other regions allow themselves the tenth of such statements? Imagine the governor of some Siberian region who would tell you how he would have acted with Ukraine in the place of the president. Or that she used to think about independence before, but since the entire budget comes from the federal center, it is not necessary to think about it.
The thesis, if you think about it, is very dangerous. After all, his inversion sounds like this - about independence, one must think of those regions that are financial donors.
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However, by the fight against the internal enemy and the announcement of journalists and human rights activists by the accomplices of terrorists, the head of Chechnya is not so lonely. Here in us in Transbaikalia the other day they offered zoo defenders to put on the wall. But such statements do not sound from the heads of the regions, but from politicians with a lower rank. We have democracy and freedom of opinion - what they think, then they say.
It is clear to everyone and everyone that Ramzan Kadyrov has a special, unique place in the Russian system of power. However, like the Chechen Republic, a special region.
In 2009, Taiga.info published my article “Neo -Feodalism in Russia”, which describes how the political system of the country has developed and what it is. Actually, the title speaks directly. The main question in Russian politics since the second half of the 90s "whose man is this?" To this day, most participants in the Russian political system cannot believe that there are people who act on the basis of their beliefs (however, we recognize that such people today are very rare).
Those who are interested in Russian neo -feudalism and its nature, I advise you to read the article. It has not lost its relevance and contains several predictions and possible development scenarios. And we see that an attempt to implement one of them.
“Nevertheless, there is a reverse process. On the one hand, there is a task (the Kremlin) so that the population is more or less enough. This task is becoming less and less fulfilled in the framework of neo -feudalism, as evidenced by Dmitry Medvedev's messages.
As we recall, in the Middle Ages, the end of classical feudalism laid absolutism. Absolutism becomes possible when the quality of bureaucratic management increases and the same optimum/resource shifts closer to the border “The whole resource”.
Purely theoretically possible is an option to improve centralized management. What is needed for this is the topic of a separate, big discussion. ”
We look carefully at the “Governors-Technocrats” and the training courses of future governors and we understand that this is an attempt to improve centralized management (alas, not yet too successful).
We see that Russian neo -feudalism has passed in decades those stages for which classical feudalism took centuries. Feudal fragmentation with elements of separatism (yes, Chechnya) in the 90s, the establishment of strong royal power and bringing to the oath of all barons to zero and the transition to absolutism to the 10th (especially after the Crimea).
One of the features of absolutism is the direct management of territories through the appointed administrators and the removal of the inheritance rulers of land from the power. Russian neo-feudalism is too small in time, hereditary "nobility" has just begun to increase. The “zero” role was played by regional “heavyweights” and oligarchs.
Well, where did the former heavyweights remain in the regions in the regions? They can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The main type of the current governor is the Varangian who had no roots or connections in the region at the time of appointment (or even never at all in it).
Against this background, Kadyrov’s “Speciality” is even more noticeable. It seems not even zero, but nineties with a fragment. And to an outside observer, he seems to be some kind of “Infant Terryble”, which the Kremlin suffers for completely incomprehensible reasons.
But the Kremlin looks at Kadyrov and at modern Chechnya with a completely different look. The Kremlin compares Kadyrov not with other governors, but Chechnya - not with other regions of Russia. He compares Kadyrov with Dudaev, Maskhadov and Basayev. And modern Chechnya-with Chechnya of the 90s, when it seemed a greatly insoluble problem.
And the Kadyrov clan turned out to be a solution to this problem.
In the Second Chechen War, unlike the first, the federal forces managed to quickly defeat the main separatists. But then the phase of the partisan war began, which has a completely different logic than the traditional war. She nourishes herself, and violence gives rise to even greater violence. Revenge generates revenge, stripping and raids lead to the departure of young people into the mountains. And the fear of reprisal does not allow them to go down from these mountains.
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The role of Kadyrov Sr. was that he stood between the feds and the separatists who had gone to the mountains, giving the last guarantee of immunity, in the event of return. The fate of such leaders is extremely difficult. Yesterday's associates consider them traitors and hate even more than enemies. And the "feds" is considered an unfinished enemy, who for some reason was ordered to endure (and even observe the guarantees issued to them).
But what is the alternative? Yes, in Chechnya "tyranny" and everything is bad with human rights (although it is unlikely that the Kremlin is very bothering). Is the constant war and terrorist attacks better? So the Americans played in Afghanistan in democracy and human rights, and what did they play?
Probably, the Kremlin from time to time discusses the issue of replacing Kadyrov and bringing Chechnya to “unitary management”. They did it with Dagestan, and nothing terrible happened. But possible risks are too large yet, and the benefits are not obvious. The Kremlin, as you know, can wait.
And until then, Ramzan Kadyrov-not just there the ordinary Baron or Governor General. At one time, the Carolings to protect the border regions of their power created “stamps”, which were headed by strong military charmers. There was a Spanish brand that covered the empire from the Arabs (and its legendary leader Roland). There was Northern Mark, it was Avar.
So for the modern neo -feudal system of the Kremlin, Ramzan Kadyrov, a Margraph, covering the Caucasian direction.
Chechnya in a sense and is very convenient to the Kremlin. It gives 1 million votes of United Russia for every election. Ramzan Kadyrov can say that the Kremlin himself cannot afford. And Chechnya itself becomes a kind of landfill of new law enforcement practices.
After all, when the war was in Chechnya, it formally remained one of the regions of Russia, it formally acted in it the same laws as in the rest of the territory. And at the same time, there were “stripping” in the villages and cities, and on the roads there were an ambush of special forces that could shoot civilians.
If the ambush could stand on the Chechen road, then, purely legally, could stand on Novosibirsk.
The struggle against Chechen separatism turned out to be a two -way road. The guidance of the "constitutional order" in Chechnya turned into a certain case of Russia. First, many law enforcement officials enriched with new experience there. And then the law enforcement agencies of Chechnya began to visit the Russian regions.
And here we are already observing how Siberian politicians apologize to Ramzan Kadyrov.
Does the answer to the question look ambiguous - does the political system of Chechnya are moving towards the Russian, or Russian - towards Chechen? Judging by the changes that occur in the laws, and especially in the practice of their application, rather the second. And for sure, there are many supporters of turning the nuts to the limit.
I hope they understand possible consequences. I will quote Ramzan Kadyrov
“No [today] of this. We have no gas, no light, no oil. <...> I have been looking for seven years, but I can’t find a single investor to engage in oil production, processing. Without Russia, we will not be able to. <...> If something else is offered to us, let them write us an economic model, how they want to support the republic. ”