Why has the offensive of Russian troops in Ukraine slowed down?

We answer the main question that arose by the end of the second week of the war

In this text, the editorial office is trying to evaluate the combat situation in Ukraine on the basis of available data. "Medusa" opposes the war and for the speedy return of Russian troops home.

In recent days (from about the 10th to the 14th days of the war), the Russian offensive deeper into Ukraine has clearly slowed down. The columns of Russian combat groups in the camp (and not combat) order no longer pass tens of kilometers per day. At the same time, the army continues to suffer losses - both as a result of Ukrainian counterattacks in advanced groups, and from ambush and raids on rear columns. All these successes Ukrainians - both journalists and ordinary civilians with mobile phones - are fixed and laid out on social networks.

However, this does not mean that the offensive stopped at all. The same Ukrainian videos and photos after studying geolocation show that Russian troops have advanced significantly on the way to their alleged goals. This happens at key points on several fronts formed after the start of the invasion:

• Kyiv was virtually blocked on three sides: Russian troops crossed large forces by the west of the capital from the capital Kyiv -Zhytomyr and are moving south to the outskirts of the outskirts of the city from any message with the western regions of the country. The offensive is, despite the constant pressure on both flanks of the group - both from the side of Kyiv and from the Ghytomyr. The Ukrainian army continues to apply the advanced losses (as evidenced by the published videos, which can be watched, including on our interactive map ), but cannot stop the advance of the enemy.
• Russian troops from Chernigov and from the Sumy region approached the eastern and north-eastern outskirts of Kyiv-Brovary and Borispol Airport-and entrenched there. This was prevented by either the resistance of the regular Ukrainian units in the rear, distracting forces in the same Chernigov (while he is actually surrounded), nor the loss of Russian rear services in technology.
• In the south of the country - in the Zaporizhzhya region - the Ukrainian army is trying to shut up the gap, formed after the defeat of its units on the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov, while Russian troops continue to collect Ukrainian equipment thrown at hastily abandoned bases. Russian troops in the Zaporizhzhya region, connecting with the group in the Donbass, are conducting an offensive to the north through the cities of Pologue and Gulyipol. Their goal, probably, cut off the entire or significant part of the strongest Ukrainian group, which, before the invasion, was concentrated on the “line of contact” of the Armed Forces and the forces of the self -proclaimed republics in the Donbass.
• Towards the Russian group in Zaporozhye, probably, the forces of the Russian Federation should advance from the vicinity of the cities of Balakley and Raisins, south of Kharkov. In recent days, battles have gone in Raisins, some of the city were destroyed, but the real situation is not clear there. In the case of the capture of the city (important transport hub), Russian troops will be able to begin the offensive in the southern and/or southwest direction.
• In the Donbass itself, one “boiler” was already formed with Ukrainian troops inside (in Mariupol and Volnovakha) and another is formed - in Lisichansk and Severodonetsk. In the last two days, Russian troops and the forces of the LPR covered these cities (and a large grouping of Ukrainian troops in them, which constituted the basis of forces in the Lugansk direction) from the north (from Russia) and from the south (from the LPR).
• Under Kharkov, Akhtyrka and sums, the parties exchange artillery blows and raids. Russian aviation regularly bombs these cities, but it seems that it has not been possible to achieve significant success on Earth (perhaps the Russian army does not count on advancement in these areas, considering other directions - west of Sumy and south of Kharkov - more important).
• Finally, in a separate, not related to other directions-near Nikolaev in the south-west of Ukraine-Russian troops suffered losses when trying to quickly break in the direction of Odessa (there is a video from the beginning of March with the burned artillery positions, knocked out tanks and armored vehicles near Vovceensky, where there was a struggle for a crossing through the southern bug, and near the Bashtanka). Since then, the Russian army has been accumulating forces in this area, and also expands the area controlled by it on the right bank of the Dnieper. The city of Nikolaev is blocked from the north and east and is subjected to artillery shelling.

How do we all know this?

All modern wars take place “under the supervision” of volunteers collecting and filtering (including on the subject of “fakes” and double counting) Documentary data - video and photo. At the same time, the lists are absolutely transparent: anyone can verify the certificate of each loss. One of these lists (from the authors who “count” all the last wars - in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Karabakh, in the Donbass) can be seen here .

The events of the last days - on our interactive map

You can also see a more traditional version of the map (which indicates the territories controlled by the parties). The card also correlates well with data from open sources (photos, videos and messages of the authorities of Ukrainian municipalities about the situation on their territory).

As a result, open sources create a very contradictory picture. On the one hand, judging by the video and photographs, the Russian army suffers continuous failures and suffers large losses, primarily in technology. On the other hand, losses and failures occur deeper in Ukrainian territory and closer to the possible key goals of this stage of the war.

However, this is an apparent contradiction. It must be remembered that open sources in the war - even in conditions of universal penetration of mobile phones with video cameras and social networks - are incomplete. In addition, the warring parties have fundamentally different political goals, tactics and strategy - from which different approaches follow both the information coverage of events and to purely military issues.

This is what is important to understand

As a rule, after the fighting, one of the parties controls the battlefield (or has access to it), while the other is not, and the first will probably be interested in showing the world the enemy’s loss, and not his own. In the case of Ukraine, operators shooting videos and photos of losses have access to almost the entire territory of the country, regardless of the situation on the fronts: among them the majority are civilians.

One of the parties can collect documentary certificates of losses is more willing than the other. In the case of the Ukrainian war, this, obviously, is as follows: Russian military personnel are forbidden to independently shoot for social networks. The exception is the fighters of the regiment of the Russian Guard from Chechnya, who actively cover their combat activities. Also, proceedings of Ukrainian losses are delivered by pro -government Russian journalists, but they are allowed only in a few combat areas. Most of the well -known Ukrainian losses in technology and ammunition are documented in these areas: in the Donbass, north of Kyiv (where a regiment from Chechnya operates), and in recent days - in the Kherson region. Before that, a small share of Ukrainian losses was recorded by Ukrainian civil operators who confused the gained Ukrainian equipment with Russian.

The Ukrainian leadership is conducting a campaign to cover Russian losses and, obviously, considers it one of the main tools for the struggle aimed at Russian citizens. If they are “sensitive” to losses, this can exert political pressure on the Kremlin.

The Kremlin, in turn, wants to deprive Russian citizens of any unofficial information, and therefore simply blocks the channels of its distribution in the country.

Of the open sources, we know a lot about the problems, losses and failures of the Russian army, but very few about what is happening with the army of Ukraine, which has lost several regions and entire regions in the south and in the Donbass. Skarting information in the Western media draws a picture of heavy losses and failures on the Ukrainian side.

So, the article in The New York Times on March 6, based on an interview with Ukrainian officers, talks about heavy defeat and battles surrounded by the 59th APU brigade in the south of the country in the early days of the war. The brigade, its commanders reported, was attacked by Russian forces that exceeded her by five times, was continuously exposed to enemy aircraft (she had nothing to contrast, since a significant part of the air defense of the brigade was sent to Kyiv on the eve of the war), was surrounded by the Dnieper’s left -wing bank, suffered heavy losses in tanks and artillery, but its remnants were able to be able cross the river to Kherson. He had to leave under the threat of a new environment, which threatened the remaining parts by defeat. Now the remnants of the brigade with other arriving units are trying to restrain the Russian offensive in Kherson.

Details of the battles in the other section of the Southern Front - in Melitopol and Berdyansk - have not yet been told; However, there, Russian pro -government journalists were allowed to remove the captured base of the Ukrainian separate cannon artillery division with abandoned equipment and reserves.

It is clear that both sides suffer heavy losses. Ukrainian increases when parts of the regular army are surrounded. It was the encirclement (or the creation of the threat of environment) units and entire enemy formations, as it seems, became the main goal of Russian troops at the current stage of the war. The meaning of this, apparently, is to destroy a significant part of the Ukrainian army in the Donbass, on the left bank of the Dnieper and in Kyiv as an organized force. In recent days, the Russian army, surrounding Mariupol and Chernigov, was clearly preparing to continue surgery for the environment and in other areas.

All this, however, does not mean that war is following the plan of the Russian General Staff. The goals and pace of operations laid down in this plan are unknown to us, but we can judge that everything goes wrong as it was planned by changing the methods of conducting hostilities (and, of course, according to the problems and losses apparent in open sources).

• Obviously, the Russian army faced unexpected logistics problems for it: in different sections of the supply columns, they suffer heavy losses, which affects the action of advanced groups.
• The advanced parts themselves have intelligence problems. Judging by the data from open sources (video with wound and abandoned technology), reconnaissance is mainly carried out in various directions of small detachments from several tanks and armored vehicles that suffer losses from enemy artillery, anti -tank missiles and tank counterattacks.
• Russian artillery - at least near Kharkov and Nikolaev - suffered sensitive losses from the fire of Ukrainian artillery. This suggests that far from everywhere it has an advantage in intelligence, target designation and firepower. Meanwhile, before the invasion, it was believed that the power of its artillery should be one of the main advantages of the Russian army in the war. However, in the north and west of Kyiv, as well as in the Donbass, it seems that Russian artillery still has an advantage.
• The Russian command seems to have abandoned the helicopter landings in the enemy rear. Apparently, the risks for landing in the air and on Earth were higher than the advantages of capturing goals deep in the rear of the enemy.
• Deep breakthroughs on roads with troops in the camping construction are no longer used. As the enemy’s resistance advanced to key goals, the logistics of the delivery of reserves and reinforcements has become more complicated, and therefore the pace of promotion fell. Each operation now, it seems, requires the accumulation of forces, as well as the blockade of settlements in the rear and at the front.

The Ukrainian army, in turn, is defending on large settlements - in approximately the same places where its units were based before the war. The surroundings of cities on the way of the Russian offensive are shot by artillery and anti -tank missiles. The troops regularly make counterattacks with mobile groups with tanks (as it was near Kharkov, Chernigov, Nikolaev). All this forces Russian troops to look for new routes of extension and supply, spending strength on the blockade of cities and, in the future, on their assault. This slows down (and even stops in places) a Russian offensive. However, the general strategic and operational situation for the Ukrainian army continues to deteriorate.

At the same time - what few expected two weeks after the start of the invasion - the struggle for dominance in the air continues. The Russian army here (as before the war) has an advantage, but Ukrainian aviation and air defense, contrary to Putin’s statements , still exist and can even carry out limited operations. The preservation of the combat -ready Ukrainian air defense (at least focal) so far leads to the fact that the growth in the intensity of the use of Russian aviation sharply increases its losses.

The inability to achieve complete dominance in the air with the overwhelming advantage in resources is apparently associated with problems in the organization of intelligence. And this despite the fact that Ukrainian air defense and aviation of organizational problems is no less (a consequence of which, probably, loss from fire in their own).