Military expert Michael Kofman: "This war may last much longer than many would like"

What do the results of the first phase of the "special military operation" indicate? How can the armed conflict end for Russia and Ukraine? Why did the United States go to the disclosure of classified information? Military Analyst Michael Kofman, Head of Russia Studies at the US Naval Research Center, in an interview with The New Times Editor-in-Chief Yevgenia Albats Pictured : Mariupol on Maxar Technologies satellite imagery

Evgenia Albats: Michael Kofman was the rare analyst who predicted the invasion of Russian troops in Ukraine when everyone, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, believed that there would be no war, that it was a bluff, that Putin was simply blackmailing the West. Michael, how did you know that war was on the doorstep?

Michael Kofman: I wouldn't say I knew. And I don't think it was just my opinion. But many wanted to believe that it was still a bluff. A very deliberate bluff, very overplayed. But in November-December 2021, it was already clear that the buildup of Russian military forces on the border of Ukraine was something new that we had never seen before. It didn't look like a military exercise, from the point of view of a military analyst. And then in December, when the Russian leadership had already publicly put forward its demands, it became clear to many that Putin was looking for a reason for confrontation, and not a reason for agreement.

Foil the Kremlin's plans

Evgenia Albats: In December 2021, American sources from the National Security Council told reporters that the Russian Federation was setting up hospitals and blood transfusion stations on the border with Ukraine. Was that the main indicator that a war was really coming? Or something different?

Michael Kofman: There were a lot of indicators. Things became much clearer during January. And it is quite clear already in February, two or three before February 24th.

I have never seen such a thing in my career - that they gave out classified information so openly and almost daily

Evgenia Albats: By the way, why did the American White House make these statements? Some observers wrote that this was a way for the US to make its intelligence sources public. Why did they go for it?

Michael Kofman: It seems to me that this was an experiment: the White House officially handed out intelligence data in an attempt to thwart the Kremlin's plans. Move the operation, disrupt the plans, because it was clear that the Kremlin had an intention to organize a provocation and try to create a pretext for war. In addition, there were disagreements between the allies in Europe. Let's say the French seemed to be looking at the same data, but drawing different conclusions. Some other countries too. The US was afraid that Russia would try to split Europe, including on the issue of sanctions. But of course it was an experiment. I have never seen such a thing in my career - that secret information was given out so openly and almost daily. There was also a game against the clock. Every day they could delay the operation gave Ukraine an opportunity to mobilize and prepare. I think it played a role. The Kremlin believed that they were conducting a special operation. They thought that they would take Kyiv within three or four days. That Zelensky will run away or surrender. And that the Ukrainian army will not fight with them. They believed that there would be no special battles, that the Ukrainian armed forces would surrender very quickly, and that the airborne forces, special forces, etc. will be able to infiltrate Kyiv within the first few days and be able to remove Zelensky from power. They thought there would be a big 2014 version. And everything will be secret, that is, most of the people in Russia will not know what really happened, and in this way they will be able to win the war in a few days. And most likely, even to avoid the more severe sanctions of the West. This plan failed.

Yevgenia Albats: But in your speech at Stanford, to one of the questions about the ability of the Ukrainian troops to resist, you answered that Russia has a much stronger army, and the Ukrainian troops will not be able to resist for a long time.

Michael Kofman: Of course, Russia had an advantage. Especially quantitative. When the possibility of war was considered, many, including myself, expected that Russia was planning a big war with Ukraine, that is, a large-scale invasion of troops. And that it will all be organized and coordinated accordingly. No one expected - and in this sense I was wrong, many were wrong - that it would be some kind of banal special operation to stage a coup, to remove Zelensky in four days. They didn’t even tell the troops until the last moment that they were going to be sent to Ukraine, and even when they were sent, they were told that they were participating in an operation on the territory of Ukraine to help the Ukrainians free themselves. Can you imagine? The column goes along the road, as if they are still in Russia, and they are told: do not expect resistance from the Armed Forces of Ukraine. I didn't expect this, I confess. There are many more factors that are difficult to foresee. The strategy, the approach, how the armed forces will be used, how they will show themselves on the battlefield. Russia has never tried an operation of this magnitude with this army. What can be seen in military exercises, even strategic command headquarters exercises, is closer to the military theater than to practice. What conclusions could be drawn from the very limited operation in Syria, which involved one mixed air regiment, and the invasion of Ukraine in 2014-15, which involved several battalions of tactical groups in a very limited area? It was very difficult to imagine how Russia would lead a "full-scale operation" when it has 120-130 battalions and about 200 thousand different troops. That is, a heterogeneous group: the armed forces, the National Guard, etc.

Evgenia Albats: By the way, why the National Guard? Why did the police, riot police, special forces suddenly become involved in hostilities?

- What about the level of training of Kadyrov's fighters?

- That's a good question. I will say so. They are, of course, much better equipped and technically equipped than many other soldiers that I see in this war.

Michael Kofman: Because they expected that they would win very quickly, there would not be much resistance, and the National Guard would enter the cities and act like the National Guard - suppress protests, rallies. Will shoot governors, mayors, etc. Put things in order, so to speak. As if they operate in Russia. By the way, they do this in Melitopol and Kherson, it can be seen. But it is clear that there is still another National Guard, Kadyrovtsy, they are now fighting in Mariupol. Half of the Russian videos of this conflict are Chechens filming themselves.

Evgenia Albats: And it is not very clear how effective they are. Although Kadyrov makes such statements that one might think that he is the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Michael Kofman: Well, yes, his level of PR is, of course, very high.

Evgenia Albats: And the level of training of his fighters?

Michael Kofman: That's a good question. I will say so. They are certainly much better equipped and technically equipped than many of the other soldiers I see in this war. It is clear that serious money was spent on them, and they look motivated. How they fight is hard to understand.

Unattainable Goals

Evgenia Albats: If you listen to the Ukrainian side and its officials, it turns out that the war will end soon, that the Ukrainian armed forces are winning. I understand that creating the impression that your troops are about to win is necessary for mobilization, to maintain morale. And according to your assessment, what is the current situation in the theater of operations in Ukraine?

Michael Kofman: Most of the Russian operation is, of course, a failure. They tried to surround Kyiv. They didn't have enough troops for that. Fight for the Donbass, surround and capture Mariupol, go from Kherson to Nikolaev and somehow bypass Nikolaev near Voznesensk and reach Odessa. There were not enough troops for this either, they even competed with themselves. The Russian army cannot attack in so many scattered directions, and it is clear that there was no special military strategy. They were trying to achieve goals that they simply could not achieve. Especially with such resistance to the APU. Now, I think, they have a more realistic approach - to concentrate forces, to try to oust the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the Donbass.

If they can capture most of the territory of Donbass, then there is a chance that they will simply declare victory and somehow end the war

Evgenia Albats: Do you think that there will be no offensive in the west of Ukraine, in Lutsk and Lvov, despite the bombing that has already taken place there? And Russian troops will not take Kyiv? But you assumed that there would be an operation with the help of amphibians against Odessa. Odessa will be taken?

Michael Kofman: No, I don't think so.

Yevgenia Albats: So the Russian military force will be limited to the east of Ukraine?

Michael Kofman: And south. Because they took Kherson and most of Zaporozhye. They leave the line of contact between Kherson and Nikolaev, hold a strip there and send most of the troops to the Donbass and the battle for Mariupol.

Evgenia Albats: Will they continue to control this part of Ukraine?

Kohman: For now, yes. But it is not clear what the Kremlin's future plans for these territories are. What are the political plans? Are they going to use them as a bargaining chip in negotiations? Or will they create some kind of Kherson People's Republic there? Or will there be a complete annexation of the south-east of Ukraine? I don't know, I can't predict. It seems to me that the Kremlin has not yet decided. That is, they did not expect at all that they would be in such an environment. With the announcement of the Ministry of Defense, everything is clear - how superbly they fulfilled the first plan. That is, neither there, nor there, nor there they could break through, and they had to focus on the only part of this operation in which there is still a chance to achieve something and declare as if everything was according to plan. I don't know how it will turn out. But if they can capture most of the territory of Donbass, then there is a chance that they will simply declare victory and somehow end the war. But I'm not sure.

Evgenia Albats: In Mariupol, according to the Ukrainian side and according to the data published, in particular, by The New York Times, up to 90% of all buildings were destroyed. According to the Ukrainian side, 5,000 civilians died (according to the Ukrainian side, as of April 12, 10,000 -NT.). Why is there such a battle for Mariupol? What is so special about this city on Azov?

Michael Kofman: I don't think it's anything special. It's just that the city is surrounded on both sides, and those who defend it don't give up. Over time, Russian troops and those who participate in this operation, the same National Guard, Mariupol will be taken. And they will take it in such a way that the whole city will actually be destroyed.

Evgenia Albats: Why destroy what you are going to take and apparently use?

Michael Kofman: Mariupol is the main city in the Donbass, after Donetsk and Luhansk, which Russia did not control. This is first. And secondly, I think they wanted to make a big show of how they denazified the Donbass. Because Mariupol is the base city of the Azov Regiment* (considered an extremist organization by the Russian authorities—NT.). They need Mariupal to see that they have control over the Donbass.

Losses: a rough estimate

Evgenia Albats: Is it possible to count the losses in this war? The Department of Defense gives one number, the NYT another, the Ukrainian side a third...

Michael Kofman: All these numbers are at a very low level of certainty. Because there is simply no reliable data on losses. I would say that the losses are calculated in the thousands killed. Usually this figure can then be multiplied by two and added together. Therefore, if we say that about 7,000 (I use the figure from The New York Times) Russians killed on the battlefield, then most likely there are twice as many wounded and missing. Maybe the total number of Russian losses at that time was 20,000 or even more - dead, wounded, missing, taken prisoner. Of course, the loss of equipment is much more visible than the loss of personnel. Russia has very serious losses. Most likely, 120 battalions of technical groups were concentrated near the borders of Ukraine. Loss of equipment - 20-25 battalions. This is a rough estimate, but still we can talk about serious losses both in personnel and in equipment. Because of this, several brigades, regiments and divisions are actually completely disabled. For example, the losses of the 4th Panzer Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army are about 50 T80U tanks out of 220.

Evgenia Albats: That is, the fifth part? Is it a big loss?

Michael Kofman: Very big. The same can be said about the 2nd motorized rifle division. Those brigades that sent battalions of the tactical group of the 6th Army fought near Kharkov, there were also heavy losses. Like the Airborne Forces.

Evgenia Albats: Are the losses of the Ukrainian side many times greater?

Michael Kofman: I know a lot less about them. They are probably smaller, but this is not the main issue. The question should always be about losses compared to total strength. The armed forces of Ukraine, of course, were much smaller. They carried out a full mobilization. While one side is trying to fight a limited war, the other is doing a full national mobilization and using all the men it can find. They don't even let men from 18 to 60 out of the country. They have already made up a large general reserve. But they don't have the technology.

Evgenia Albats: Despite the help of Western countries?

Michael Kofman: Western countries are sending anti-tank missiles, MANPADS, etc. But with such weapons, you cannot assemble a motorized rifle brigade and regiment. In Russia, the problem is the opposite. There is a lot of equipment, but there are not enough military personnel, especially contract soldiers. I think because of this they concentrated on the Donbass.

If both sides still want to fight and want to achieve something on the battlefield, why should they compromise? Far from a truce

Evgenia Albats: Are the negotiations being conducted by the delegations, Russian and Ukrainian, are these real negotiations, or are the parties trying to buy time?

Michael Kofman: I think the talks are real and serious, but I don't think Russia and Ukraine are ready for real compromises right now. If you just look at the battlefield, at the course of the war, it is clear that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are advancing, recapturing the territory that was previously captured. Why should they compromise? On the other hand, if the Russian Ministry of Defense now thinks that they will concentrate all their forces and send them to the Donbass, then they also have a chance. Yes, the negotiations are serious, but if both sides still want to fight and want to achieve something on the battlefield - what is their motivation, why should they compromise? That is, I think, is still far from a truce.

Evgenia Albats: Then what are these negotiations about?

Michael Kofman: To understand the key positions and demands from both sides.

Evgenia Albats: Ukraine has already stated that it is ready for a neutral status and will not join NATO. They are ready to discuss the issue of Crimea for 15 years. This means that questions remain with the Donbass.

Michael Kofman: There's another nuance about neutrality. Russia wants them to be given security guarantees, it is not clear what kind. There is a question about the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. There are questions about the territories that Russia is currently occupying. Crimea, Donbass discussed. And what about Kherson and Zaporozhye? Is Russia retreating, giving these areas to Ukraine, or does it keep them as a key link between Donbass and Crimea? Zelensky also said that the issue of neutrality should be decided, perhaps by a referendum. Because it is clear that he politically does not want to be a victim of this treaty. And he raised the question of how the treaty would be implemented. Zelensky, of course, will demand that Russia withdraw all its troops, otherwise the referendum will not be held. And Putin will say - how can you withdraw troops from Kherson and Zaporozhye if there will be no referendum after that? This is a discussion that reached a complete deadlock in the course of the Minsk agreements. A dead end is also possible here. If Zelenskiy says he is pushing for a referendum, and the referendum cannot be held in the territory that Russia now occupies, there will be an execution impasse. The situation will be de facto the same as in 2014. Russia will control part of the territory of Ukraine, there will be battles and there will be a war of attrition. And more importantly, the political and economic war of attrition. Because it is clear what will happen to the Russian economy after the sanctions.

Evgenia Albats: Then explain what goal, from your expert point of view, is the Kremlin pursuing? What does Putin want to do in Ukraine? Why destroy cities if you're going to use them somehow? Or is it really the idea to raze Ukraine to the ground?

Michael Kofman: I'm a military analyst, not a political scientist. I don't have all the answers. I don't work in the Kremlin. Therefore, I do not know what the Kremlin is pursuing in Ukraine. I think that they have no more chances, except to take the Donbass, in a military operation. But it's all relative. There is an option that they declare victory. Maybe within a few weeks or months. There is an option that there will be a pause and the continuation of the war at another stage. It all depends on the achievements on the battlefield. Because the Kremlin can want whatever it wants, and what they can achieve by using force is another matter. There are very big physical limitations. You see how the Russian army showed itself on the battlefield.

Evgenia Albats: We, unfortunately, see very little. Because all Western channels have left Russia, and even with the help of a VPN, there is little you can get on the Internet. No CNN, no BBC, no Sky News - no one is there, everyone is gone. And Russian channels, as you understand, are endless propaganda shows, stories about national traitors, and so on.

Michael Kofman: I've used the word "failure" several times in our discussion. I think it is one of the most appropriate to explain the situation of the first phase of this war.

They mustered all the battalions that could be mustered in a few weeks in Russia. Then they took it from Tajikistan, Abkhazia, from Kaliningrad

Evgenia Albats: How long do you think will continue what the Russian authorities call a military special operation, and the whole world calls a war. Weeks, months, years?

Michael Kofman: I think during April we will know and understand much better how long the war will last. In my experience, war usually lasts longer than anyone expects - especially those who started it. And often it turns out to be a war of attrition. Therefore, I have a feeling that this war may last much longer than many would like. Especially in the Kremlin.

Yevgenia Albats: There is talk in Moscow that Putin may want to end the war by May 9th. To declare victory and link two wars.

Michael Kofman: If they fail to capture the Donbass or most of it during April, it is not clear how they will declare victory. Even if they now said that the focus of this operation is Donbass?

Yevgenia Albats: Do you admit the possibility of using nuclear weapons?

Michael Kofman: Not in Ukraine.

Yevgenia Albats: So you think that Russia will not use tactical nuclear weapons?

Michael Kofman: No. Except for the armed conflict between Russia and NATO, that's another story.

Yevgenia Albats: Do you rule out the possibility that Russia, following Ukraine, will go to Poland, the Baltic states, etc.?

Michael Kofman: What will she go with?

Evgenia Albats: Well, the Russian army is larger than 120 tactical battalion groups and 150 thousand soldiers and officers?

Michael Kofman: No. In Russia, the army is just not very large. In the management of the combat troops, which are, there were a maximum of 170 battalion-tactical groups. They are considered in the Russian army as equipped contract soldiers. Everything is already technically involved in battles. Then you can still offer contracts for a lot of money, which is what they are doing now - to those who have experience and veterans. I heard that the Ministry of Defense has such an approach. Because conscripts who have completed their term of service, they let go. For me, this is a very interesting moment. I expected the Kremlin would have to make a decision. Or they will introduce martial law and there will be at least not complete, but partial mobilization - this was the case in America during the war in Iraq and Afghanistan: there were not enough military personnel, and they activated the stop-loss policy, that is, they simply did not release soldiers who had finished their term services. As far as I can see, the Kremlin still wants to try to finish this campaign as a limited conventional war.

Evgenia Albats: What will happen to the Russian army when the sanctions come into full force?

Michael Kofman: I think the first question is what will happen to Russia, to the Russian economy. And with the army, of course. The army will most likely have to go through a period of difficult reforms and rearmament. They lost a lot of equipment in this war. Well, it’s clear that new tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, etc. Russia will be able to assemble, build. But I do not know how, after the ban on access to various technologies, Russia will be able to bypass the restrictions in order to assemble high-precision weapons, more modern equipment. Roughly speaking, where to get the chips? Russia almost does not produce its own semiconductors. It is clear that restrictions will affect. Maybe not this year, but definitely next year.

reserves

Yevgenia Albats: You said that Russia is now trying to collect battalion-tactical groups wherever possible in order to deploy them to Ukraine. Have they already been transferred from the Chinese border too? Or does Russia see no threat in the east?

Michael Kofman: Russia initially transferred most of the Eastern Military District to Belarus. Even before the start of this operation. The Eastern Military District is currently in retreat from the western bank of the Dnieper River around Kyiv.

Evgenia Albats: So the border in the east is completely bare?

Michael Kofman: I would not be so categorical, but I would say that most of the combat capability of the Eastern Military District is now involved in the war. The Central Military District is also on the eastern side of the Dnieper. The 41st Army is fighting there, and the 2nd Army is supporting it. Therefore, a large part of the combat capability of Russia, especially if we know the scheme of the ground forces, airborne forces, special forces, and so on, all participate in this war. As far as I understand, they have already collected all the battalions that could be assembled in a few weeks from that part of Russia. Then they were already taken from Tajikistan, Abkhazia, from Kaliningrad, where the 18th motorized rifle division is.

Evgenia Albats: Are the Russian authorities not afraid of the Taliban offensive and are they calmly exposing the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan?

Michael Kofman: No, they may take a battalion or one battalion tactical group from different units. But I would not say that they completely curtail their presence there. It is rather an indicator of the shortage of troops. It is clear that the 18th division from Kaliningrad would not have been needed if there had not been serious losses in Ukraine.

Yevgenia Albats: And yet, you do not expect the use of nuclear weapons?

Michael Kofman: I absolutely see no reason to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. But the question is what kind of escalation will take place between Russia and the United States and NATO. What will be the response of Russia to the sanctions.

Evgenia Albats: There may be a pessimistic development of events. However, tactical nuclear weapons will not be used to solve the problem, as some analysts suggest?

Michael Kofman: No, I don't think so.