
I already wrote ( the link is leading to the media website, which is brought by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in the register of media-agent) about what is happening now with the “non-systemic” opposition and the opposition public: in short, this is a split on two main topics-emigration and search for guilty, which leads only to even greater demoralization; The way out of this is only in the transition to the positive agenda of the new future and the new system. Now let's move on to the opposition system. She has a situation of scatter and staggering, that is, uncertainty is no better. The “special operation” in Ukraine for a while almost destroyed interest in all other topics - and in legal politics too. This is not surprising: when you have a house, you have no up to a rickety fence, pests in the garden and holes in the sole of the boot. All other problems have not disappeared, they are simply “postponed” by the current disaster and will inevitably return as a new reality, search for ways of survival and explanations of what happened.
Political life also seemed to have froze, politicians fell into anabiosis. Nobody is visible and not heard, except for those who are trying to justify and support aggression (this is primarily carefully active officials and politicians who are trying to show devotion and need for the regime), and those who are trying to resist it. The opposing are divided into two groups. The former openly criticize aggression and authorities, the latter do not speak directly about military operations and do not mention the names of specific officials, but actively talk about the consequences, primarily social and economic. At the same time, both the first and second opponents of aggression often find themselves in emigration: external (these are often open opponents) or internal (they criticize aggression indirectly, through the analysis of its consequences).
However, most are simply silent and waiting. Their position is simple: and the past difficult times have experienced, and we will survive these, the main thing is not to stick out and not break their neck. This infantilism as a philosophy of many causes surprise, especially abroad, but it is psychologically understandable taking into account the history of the country experienced by it over the last century of disasters and repressions that destroyed all who were against the authorities. Citizens almost cannot recall the experience of successful resistance in their memory, but the experience of repressions and examples of the victims - as much as they like. And this philosophy “nothing depends on us” was actively broadcast by the “influensers” encouraged by power for at least the last 20 years. It was those who were sitting on the couch for 20 years that said that it is pointless to vote, choosing less evil is pointless, etc., and are responsible for the fact that now most citizens are silent and simply waiting.
In the same way, like the population, the political opposition behaves (primarily a systemic one, which has something to lose). It cannot actively criticize the “special operation” for political reasons: it will instantly be perceived as a riot and will “tear your head off” (at least in a career and political sense). But it is also pointless to actively maintain a “special operation”. Firstly, in this case, the difference between power and the system opposition is completely erased, and if so, then why, for it, for such an opposition, to vote. Secondly, taking into account the new socio-economic crisis that has already begun, provoked by the most severe sanctions due to the war, the situation in the country worsens and will clearly deteriorate further: inflation, devaluation, external isolation, growth of unemployment, deficiency of all new groups of goods, etc.-attempts to approve or support voters are unlikely to appreciate.
It turns out that criticism is dangerous politically, support is dangerous electorally.
In such conditions, most of the opposition does not, in fact, nothing: it simply lay on the political bottom and waits when the situation becomes less dangerous and more clear in prospects.
Against this background, contradictions grow inside the system opposition. In the LDPR there is a struggle for the legacy of Zhirinovsky, the REPRIDENT between the “patriots” (mainly the old party -controlle, which has long advanced for supporting the LPR/DPR) and opponents of war and militarization (a significant part of the young party’s young wing, advanced from it, civil activists and human rights defenders) are intensifying. For example, anti -war sentiments are strong in the organizations of Komi, Primorye, Voronezh, etc. The Communist Party of the Communist Party and excludes of the opponents of the special operation are already in the Communist Party, although this is a real electoral self -shot: it was the unification of the most diverse groups of dissatisfied and allowed the party to achieve success in recent years. At the same time, the authorities, the first deputy-physical person, “media-foreign agent,” the authorities recognized the deputy of the State Council of the Komi from the Communist Party Viktor Vorobyov.
Meanwhile, life goes on as usual and slowly begins the new election campaign-2022 (and behind it the election-2023 is much wider and dangerous for the authorities- the link leads to the media website entered by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in the register of “foreign agents”).
So far, in all surveys, the party of power is confidently dominated by. So, the State VTsIOM on April 22, the results of its latest survey (ended on April 17), reported that the UNITAL RUSSIA support level amounted to 40.4% (-2.1 per week), the Communist Party of the Communist Party-10.3% (-0.8 pp), the LDPR-9.4% (+0.6 pp), “Fair Russia-Patriots-for the truth”-for the truth ”- 5.8% (+0.2 pp) and "new people" - 5.0% (+0.2 percentage points). On the same date, FOM gave United Russia 45% (+3 pp per week) from respondents (at the end of January it was 34%). Both VTsIOM and FOM asked the practically identical question “Tell me, please, how, what party would you vote for if the elections were held on the next Sunday?” Of course, any rating polls in emergency conditions should be perceived with caution: politically active voters are clearly frightened, which cannot but influence their readiness to participate in surveys and their open expression. However, it is also obvious that, in addition to the party in the authorities, in a public field, people now do not see anyone at all. In addition, there is a short -term effect of “unification around the flag”: many sanctions are aimed at Russians as such and, not seeing any personal guilt in what is happening, citizens in response feel offended and situationally in their offense are partly united with power. A paradox arises: the consequences of “special operations” are psychologically perceived as its justification (“this is all because they never loved us”).
However, this is now the dominance of the party in power (you can argue not with the very fact of dominance, but with the real interest of support) is clearly temporary and will begin to disappear as the crisis intensifies, the growth of socio-economic problems and the inevitable completion of the active phase of the “special operation”.
Hysteria is always temporary phenomenon.
We already have experience in 2018, when the system opposition most of the campaign led the usual game of gadement, more or less activated in the context of pension reform only by August. However, even in the conditions of such a weak campaign, an angry and disappointed voter still demonstrated a mass protest vote in the election and voted even for the weak opposition that was in ballots - simply because there was no one else.
The fact that the authorities are aware of the risks of the growth of protest voting is also evidenced by the adoption of the Law No. 60-ФЗ dated March 14, 2022 on new extensive amendments to the electoral legislation, which give the possibilities to even more widely apply “remote electronic vote” (special article 64.1 has been introduced into the law “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participation in the Referendum of the Citizens of the Russian Federation” and canceling the institution of members of electoral commissions with the right of advisory vote in all commissions below the regional level (in sites and in TIKs). The restrictions of passive law are expanding even more. These amendments just show that with the expectations of supporting the authorities in the upcoming elections, everything is not so good, but on the contrary, everything is bad.
Probably, the system opposition is counting on this - silently lie on the political day,
Performing only formal procedures for the nomination of candidates, and in fact without leading any campaign and relying on the growth of protest voting on its own. This means that the actual campaign of 2022 will be nominal in nature, citizens will almost not see it and voting will be provided by state employees and a “motivated drive”, as well as falsification. But everything can change the severity of the crisis and the growth of internal contradictions in the opposition itself.
What in such cases is the most rational to make a system opposition?
Why do you need such a systemic opposition at all? There is an answer to this question.
The preservation of a weak, but still existing systemic opposition in the country is extremely important in order to have at least some points of support for the formation of a new political system in the country after the collapse of the current system.
No matter how it relate to them (and system parties consist of living people who are as afraid of repression and pressure as ordinary non -partisan citizens), they have a political infrastructure - a personnel network, regional and local organizations, their media and communication channels. As history shows, in a situation of change, this resource is invaluable. Nothing arises from nowhere. Any party always has a party or public prototype.
Often in authoritarian regimes it is the system opposition or part of it that becomes an incubator, from which new political forces arise in the future, after the collapse of the previous system. For example, the Serbian progressive party ruling in Serbia since 2014 is nothing more than its more pragmatic and pro -European wing from the Serbian Radical Party in 2008. Serbian radicals were a typical system opposition in the country during the time of Slobodan Milosevich. Initially, the progressive party was headed by one of the former leaders of the radicals Tomislav Nikolich, and then he was replaced by the younger Alexander Vucich, the current president of Serbia.
Another example. The first government of the GDR after the fall of the SPG monopoly was headed by representatives of the then system opposition - the CDS GDR. In the 1990 elections, he spoke on his own, received the majority (40.8%) and formed the coalition government led by the Chairman of the CDU Lotar de Mezer. As a result of the distribution of portfolios between the members of the election coalition, the post of deputy press secretary of the first and last freely elected government of the GDR received few people then a well-known angel Merkel.
It is very likely that from the current Russian system opposition or some part of it, as if not to relate to it, and the Russian Vucichi will come out, and maybe the Angels Merkel.